ELECTIONS - SERBIA
The same author discusses the recent feelers of the ruling Socialist party about finding a legal pretext to enable Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to run for the office for the third time, in the May 3, 1997 issue of ñVremeî.
Ratko Markovic, Vice-President of the Serbian Government and Professor of Constitutional Law at the Law Faculty of the University of Belgrade, told ``Politika Ekspres,'' after Tanjug originally released the news, that Slobodan Milosevic can qualify for the candidacy of President of Serbia.
"The same individual can be elected President of the Republic two times at most; but if that individual did not serve the full mandate, than a possible interpretation is that they were not elected,'' he said.
Many constitutions, according to Markovic, abide by the principle that ``if an individual did not serve at least half of the mandate, they will be considered as not having been elected in the first place.'' Markovic observed that in actual fact the Serbian Constitution does indicate that the same individual can be elected President of the Republic a maximum of two times; but he claimed that the preceding clause states that a mandate lasts five years.
Markovic called on the old principle from ancient jurisprudence where a decree cannot be interpreted in isolation, and only acquires significance when it is considered in relation to other similar decrees.
``From the intentions of Clause 86 the facts can be interpreted in such a way that elections did not occur if a mandate did not last five years,'' stated Markovic, predicting that ``like every interpretation, this one will elicit counter arguments'' but that ``it is not uncommon that constitutional decrees polarize even law experts.''
Elections and political laws favor my interpretation. The key question is will the President of the Republic rely on this interpretation and run once again as candidate for this position, or will he not?.'' There were many speculations in recent months on how law experts close to the regime will try to bend over backwards to ``ensure'' President Milosevic a third mandate. There were also attempts by the Opposition to elicit authoritative interpretations which would be binding for the government.
A representative of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Aleksandar Cotric, was waiting a full year for the answer to his question delivered in the Serbian Parliament. The question last year was the following: ``Can Slobodan Milosevic be elected once more as President of Serbia?'' ``The question is outside the authority of the Law Ministry,'' was the final answer by the responsible Minister, Arandjel Markicevic, who called on ``the interpretation of the Serbian Constitution.''
The Vice-President of the same government, Dr. Ratko Markovic, is for now stating his views in the likely role of preparing someone's candidacy, and he is looking for a crack between two fairly clear-cut constitutional formulations. Clause 86, Paragraph 2 of the Serbian Constitution states: ``The mandate of the President of the Republic is for five years.'' Paragraph 3 of the same Clause: ``The same individual can be elected President of the Republic a maximum of two times.'' Clause 87, Paragraph 1: ``The mandate of the President of the Republic runs out before the period for which they were elected in the event of retraction or of resignation.''
Professor Dr. Pavle Nikolic, a constitutional law expert, completely renounces the interpretation of Dr. Markovic in his statement for ``Vreme.'' ``The possibility that Slobodan Milosevic could qualify a third time for a candidacy as President of Serbia is out of the question. The interpretation of Dr. Ratko Markovic that Milosevic is entitled because he did not serve to the full his first mandate, is unfounded.'' The Constitution does not count or discount the number of years spent serving as President. It is clearly stated in the Constitution that one person can be elected President of the Republic a maximum of two times.
If Markovic's interpretation were accepted, what would happen with the mandates of representatives? As is well known, the mandate of representatives is four years, and it is not uncommon that it is completed before that period runs out. That someone's mandate, for whatever reason, lasts for a shorter time, is not a sufficient argument. After all, the Constitution states that the mandate of the President of the Republic lasts five years; and since Milosevic served two years of his first term and full five years of the second, he could then, if Markovic's interpretation were accepted, only be elected for another three years.
But, I repeat, the Constitution does not count years. If it were accepted that an individual who did not serve the full mandate had effectively not been elected, then the President of the Republic could resign every four years and nine months, and once again run for the Presidency.
However, I would not be surprised if Markovic's interpretation were to be accepted. The President of Serbia had broken the Constitution on many occasions. One of them was the freezing of the powers of the Party President, which is a completely unknown category. Then, after all that, in such a ``frozen'' state, the Party President was allowed to participate in party functions such as the Congress of the SPS held last year, or the recent meeting of their Head Committee. What is the reaction of the Opposition? The party, which at this time has a presidential candidate, thinks that Dr. Markovic is announcing another election fraud.
SPO spokesman Ivan Kovacevic, in his interview with a ``Vreme'' journalist shortly following the aired statement of Dr. Markovic, said that the SPO thinks that with the announcement of Ratko Markovic, the Vice-President of the Serbian Government, the ground is being set for the most blatant braking of the Constitution since its ratification.
However, in Kovacevic's opinion, Slobodan Milosevic has a history of braking the highest legal and political law of the country, as for instance when the 1992 elections for the President of the Republic were called at a time when none of the conditions for such action (retraction or resignation) were fulfilled. Kovacevic stated that ``SPO will confront such aggression with utmost vigor at a time when SPS, after a proven elections fraud last year, has fallen to the lowest levels and is facing a loss at the parliamentary elections.''
Thus the elections mix-up has been raised to another power: the President of the Republic has the right to a third mandate; the President of the Republic does not have the right to a third mandate; the President of the Republic completed his first mandate unconstitutionally; the President of the Republic is braking the Constitution which was written up in 1990 according to the specifications of the present President of the Republic.
Perhaps the President of the Republic wishes for a lifetime mandate. The President of the Republic is merely taunting other presidential candidates.
The President of the Republic is leading everybody on.
Source: Belgrade weekly ñVremeî, May 3, 1997
Ivan Torov of the Belgrade daily ñNasa Borbaî examines the electoral position of the radical Serb nationalist leader Vojislav Seselj in the Sunday, April 27, 1997 edition of the daily.
Could it happen that in the forthcoming four years Serbia would be headed by Dr. Vojislav Seselj, and his party, if not the ruling , then definitely one of the leading political forces in the Parliament ? Posing of this question alone is not so much product of different pre - electoral and political speculations, as much as an image of the state of mind in Serbia and current realistic positions of the leader of the Serb Radical Party. The new breakthrough of this extreme nationalistic political group, in any case, is causing greater attention of analysts of Serbian political events.
Many of them are ready, without any reservation, to view the renewal of the phenomenon of the ñRed Dukeî as the collection of various circumstances which are favoring this politician. Although there is a lot of truth in that, it is still considered that the Serbian political ambient, created by nationalistic homogenization, the psychosis of the break of the joint state and the war in these regions, has not changed in the meantime in such a measure that would give an advantage to the moderate forces of civic and democratic orientation.
The lack of true, forceful and stable democratic alternative to the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and his Socialists, in the phase after the conclusion of war and a chance that Serbia moves into another direction, created a paradox.
On one side is drastically weakened, compromised, but not defeated regime, on the other is the opposition, anemic, disorganized, divided and burdened by the illusions of the close past. Into this quite wide space between the two groups come in the Radicals, with somewhat modified political dictionary and tempting social, economic and nationalistic demagogy.
The chaos that dominates Serbia feeds their appetites, stimulates ambitions and offers them unique chance to present themselves to the public as the saviours of the nation and a serious political option. Without a doubt, it suits Seselj that one side (democratic opposition) are underestimating and knocking him, while the other (the regime) are using him for some not fully explained or less subtly thought out plans. It is most important to him that Serbian political public is taking him more seriously than his political opponents.
Why could Seselj win ? The answer is that, such as he is, he is needed by the MilosevicÍs Socialists. If in 1993 he served them as the spokesman and executioner of the regimeÍs warmongering and nationalistic politics, today their preoccupations are somewhat different, even though the essence remained the same - remain in power, even in a coalition with the devil himself.
Even though it has everything at its disposal, the military, the police, state and party mechanisms, finances, and leading media, the regime in Serbia has never felt so insecure and threatened as it does today. Both public and internal feelers of the electorate do not give Socialists much chance, so it simply forces them to find allies which will be the cover for the renewed pre -electoral switch to the ñnationalî and ñpatrioticî course.
Actually, the story is much more base and bizarre. If Slobodan Milosevic really does venture in the takeover of the federal state (which is, due to the ongoing conflict with Montenegro, less certain than it was), he needs a two thirds majority in the Parliament for the change of the constitution. He does not have it even with Montenegrin Socialists, on whom he is still counting on, so the Radicals are becoming his only alternative.
On the other hand, due to the elections the Socialists need the ñpatrioticî image of the Radicals, that is, their support in the suppression of any form of a democratic alternative. Of course, Seselj will charge this heftily - partly through biting off a sizeable part of the parliamentary electoral cake, partly - if Milosevic really does move to the federal level - through the possibility that the leader of the Radicals does get the Serbian presidential post. Within the new constellation of forces, this post would probably not have too great specific weight, so the loss would not be tragic for the Socialists, but the gain for Seselj and his party would be enormous.
Since the Socialists, without Milosevic in the race, do not have a real and strong enough candidate for Serbian president, they are pushing Seselj, who could win, in a race with more candidates of the democratic opposition. In this manner, he appears as an extra player of the regime.
It also seems as if the opposition is not conscious that t this moment, the regime is n even weaker opponent for it than the Radicals. Preoccupied with an ignorant stance of the Socialists towards their demands and internal conflicts in the division of the winnings in the local elections, and personnel combinations, in the so far, not fully founded conviction that they will wean global power in Serbia, the leaders of the opposition, in essence, are cleaning the terrain for SeseljÍs victory more effectively than others.
As it is at this moment realistic to expect that the democratic opposition will appear in the presidential elections with more relatively strong candidates (Karic, Panic, Draskovic, Micunovic), the dissipation of the votes of its electoral body will lead Seselj and the candidate of the ñleftî directly into the second round.
That is why in the current campaign Seselj is not dealing t all with Milosevic, Mira Markovic, the Socialists and JUL. He turned towards satanization of the ñZajednoî coalition, its leaders, particularly Zoran Djindjic, attempting to stimulate the escalation of the conflict within this coalition. He will turn against Milosevic and Socialists in the second round, and in this he will have the support of the part of the rest of the opposition and its electorate.
That is why the inertia of the oppositional block towards the warnings that the only medicine against the Radicals and the SPS-JUL coalition is gathering around one candidate for the president of Serbia and the formation of a wider coalition for the winning of the power in the Republic is surprising. The mistake in the estimates is already being paid. Seselj is using to the maximum the space given to him daily in the media, he is aggressive, he turns any serious discussion into a circus for the fun of the public, so that nobody even pays attention to the essence of what is being said.
Using effectively the renewed favors of the regime and the confusion in the ñZajednoî coalition, the leader of the Radicals is coming into a position to tangle the knots of both sides. And when this happens, it will be too late and useless to discuss why did an even more rigid and truly primitive political logic prevail in Serbia.
Source: Belgrade daily ñNasa Borbaî, April 27, 1997
SERBIA -
POLICE AND MILITARY SCANDALS
Milan Milosevic and Uros Komlenovic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" give a detailed discussion on the background of the murder of the acting Serbian police minister Radovan Stojcic - Badza in the April 19, 1997 issue of the magazine.
Last week, foreign politicians and newsmen compared Belgrade to Bogota, Medellin and Palermo. The reason? General Radovan Stojicic Badza, the chief of the public security sector, the deputy interior minister and the acting chief of police was assassinated on the night between April 10 and 11 in the Mamma Mia restaurant, where he was having dinner with his son Vojislav and one Milos Kurdulija, their friend and a customs officer.
The three were sitting in the smaller of the two restaurant halls„Radovan Stojicic and Kurdulija at one table and Vojislav Stojicic at another. According to media reports, an armed assailant wearing a mask over his head (both the media and eyewitnesses place his height between 175 and 185 cm) walked in and told everybody to lie down. He walked up the three stairs leading to the entrance of the smaller hall and stood between an empty ice-cream showcase and a full 25-liter bottle of Italian wine. Radovan Stojicic and Kurdulija were sitting at the first table to the right. Badza had his back turned to the assassin, barely a meter and a half away from him.
The executor fired seven bullets into the deputy interior minister. Only one of them missed the target and hit the wall right next to the vacant seat opposite the victim. Everybody in the restaurant lied down on the floor, and the assassin was out in a split second. He fired three more bullets into the window on his way out just to make sure no-one tried to stop him, but no-one else was hurt. The whole incident lasted only a few seconds. When the assassin left, Vojislav Stojicic and Milos Kurdulija went into the kitchen and called the police, who arrived in a few minutes.
Rumour has it that some of the guests grabbed their mobile phones as soon as they realized they were safe. The police sealed the entire neighborhood, and subsequently the entire city. Patrol units searched passenger vehicles, public transportation, wrote down license plate numbers, questioned people in nearby buildings and everyone who looked suspicious. All hell broke loose in the police and the top ranks of the authorities. All ranking police officials were woken up, a special morning briefing was held, and President Slobodan Milosevic was notified immediately. Some say he hadnÍt slept all night.
Whatever the investigation comes up with, one thing is certain: the assassin is an extremely composed and bold person. The Mamma Mia is located only a few hundred meters from the federal and republican interior ministry headquarters. The restaurant is also in the immediate neighborhood of two well-guarded embassies, British and Libyan.
The Mamma Mia, famous for its vast portions of quality food, is also a popular spot for businessmen, local pop and soccer stars and especially police officers. The constant presence of lawmen made the place quiet and safe from money extortion, at least from criminals. Former Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic and the well-known Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan were often seen in the Mamma Mia. The assassin was certainly familiar with StojicicÍs habits, and it is quite possible that an inconspicuous individual had walked into the restaurant before the murder, located StojicicÍs exact position, and tipped off the information to the executor.
Many believe that the assassin was a highly trained professional and that about 10 people must have taken part in the murder (a driver, informers, the getaway crew...), Which required at least two vehicles and one apartment. The perpetrators most definitely knew that everyone wearing a uniform in this country would be after them.
However, one must bear in mind that the assassinÍs job wasnÍt all that difficult: BadzaÍs regular outings to the Mamma Mia were common knowledge.
Stojicic was without his bodyguards on the fatal night, and they would have ended up just like him if had accompanied their boss. The General Zdanova street is dark apart from the area immediately around the restaurant, and deserted in that hour just like all the nearby streets. The few minutes between the murder and the arrival of the police were enough for the assassin and his companions to disappear without trace. This job required a few people and a lot of money, but Belgrade is full of criminals able to do it impeccably.
Therefore, the possibility that the assassination was master-minded by a Mafia boss unhappy with BadzaÍs interference in his business canÍt be ruled out. For quite some time, ranking Belgrade mobsters have been enjoying privileges their peers in civilized countries can only dream of.
Virtually all secret services around the world employ the services of gangsters every once in a while, but criminals know where they belong in civilized countries. They get the job done and slip back quietly into the darkness of their underground world, the last thing on their mind being some kind of equality with ``government agencies.ÍÍ These relations were completely disrupted in Serbia when the crisis and the war in the former Yugoslavia broke out.
Criminals became war heroes, the media portrayed them as such and the police began to turn a blind eye on their indecent behavior because of what they did in Croatia and Bosnia. Former police chief Radmilo Bogdanovic was seen congratulating Arkan in public on a number of occasions, and Radovan Stojicic Badza also looked happy in his company. Much less is known about BadzaÍs relations with other, less exposed criminals, but he must have had many such contacts. Criminals can be very ill-natured when they turn against their former bosses. That is why it is possible that Stojicic was murdered by one of his former underground ``favorites.ÍÍ
The very decision to commit such an assassination reflects either the perpetratorÍs overconfidence or awareness that he will be completely protected. The latter theory is supported by the fact that rifts and dissatisfaction within the police have been present for a very long time.
Stojicic had a lot of friends on the force, as well as people he promoted and did favors (who are now, according to some sources, gravely concerned for their positions), but a lot of enemies too. When he was made colonel-general, he had to promote a whole lot of people and introduce new ranks in the police to keep the dissatisfaction at a minimum. Stojicic was never accepted by circles known as the police elite. Officers with the reputation of utmost professionals started telling jokes about the rise in StojicicÍs career and the fact that he made it to the top mostly because of his physical education activities.
A Belgrade police inspector, Dragan Mladenovic, told a local newspaper three years ago that the police force was deeply involved in crime. He said there were clans within the police involved in drug dealing, car theft and other such activities. No one ever denied his claims. He mentioned the existence of BadzaÍs clan and a rival Montenegrin group headed by Slavisa Scekic. Mladenovic claimed that the Jugoskandik affair was a front for a showdown between the two clans and accused Badza of selling arms to Moslems and Croats as well as organizing the distribution of drugs in Belgrade.
The late Stojicic told the Novi Sad daily Dnevnik last May that organized crime requires cooperation between criminals and certain politicians and state structures, adding that there was nothing of the sort in Serbia. His theory may have been denied with his tragic and sudden death. The postmortem statements and condolence messages issued by the government, police officials and the Socialist Party indicate that Stojicic is a victim of crime.
If the official rhetoric that Badza was murdered by criminals is true, how and where did his murderers gather so much information on his whereabouts if there is no connection between the state and the underground, as the authorities say? Is there something inside the police?
Radmilo Bogdanovic, who spent his time in various security boards of the Serbian assembly after being sacked as chief of police, said recently that he ``wants to believe that there is no such thing as Mafia in these parts.ÍÍ When he was asked the same question in the assembly, he said that such a broad and sensitive issue could not be discussed in the assembly hall.
It must not be forgotten that Stojicic played an important if not crucial role in the war preparations, as well as in arming and training Serb troops in Krajina and Bosnia. He was in charge of troops in Borovo Selo during the Vukovar operations. He knew a lot about SerbiaÍs ``non-existent involvement in the war,ÍÍ and reported on delicate issues to directly president Milosevic.
Many reports, witnesses and public statements indicate that Radovan Stojicic was on good terms with Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, and that he too was sought by the Hague tribunal for war crimes. On Feb. 3, the London daily Guardian published an article quoting the former ``paramilitary commanderÍÍ
Branislav Vakic as saying that Badza provided sophisticated weapons to his troops during the operations in eastern Slavonia. The daily also cited Marko Nicovic, a sacked Belgrade police chief who was close to the left-wing alliance JUL for a while, who said that Arkan is nothing but a former bank robber who became untouchable since he made friends with Badza in eastern Slavonia.
The motive for murdering Stojicic, a ranking police official, is still unknown. However, it is quite apparent that BadzaÍs death has removed an important link in a chain of evidence linking Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to war-related events in Bosnia and Croatia. Officially, nevertheless, BadzaÍs role in the former Yugoslav war has been qualified as patriotic.
Of course, the assassination of a ranking police official is an attack against the state. It is only logical that the most immediate question is who the message was sent to. As far as protection is concerned, Radmilo Bogdanovic told reporters a few days after StojicicÍs death that only the president is entitled to protection, while other officials are treated as common citizens. When asked whether he feels safe, Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic said: ``But of course, I work hard and honestly, I am straight and I see no reason...ÍÍ
The new Federal Interior Minister Zoran Sokolovic said that 15 police officers were killed and another 52 were wounded in 64 attacks on police units in the past couple of years. Many police officers were sent to the troubled southern Serbian province of Kosovo, as punishment for daring to speak out about the illegal activities of some law representatives.
There have been no indications so far that StojicicÍs murder might have been organized by ethnic Albanian terrorists from Kosovo, who committed a number of similar acts recently, the most notorious one being the car-bomb assassination attempt against Radivoje Papovic, the rector of Pristina university. The activities of ethnic Albanian terrorist organizations have so far been confined to Kosovo.
The entire incident opens an interesting issue„for what purpose was such a massive police force built in the first place? One can say with a fair degree of certainty that the police (not including Kosovo) have so far been used as an instrument of preserving political power.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", April 19, 1997
In continuing series of articles, Milos Vasic and Milan Milosevic of the Belgrade weekly ñVremeî, write in the magazineÍs issues of May 3 and 10, about the scandals concerning former head of the Military intelligence service (KOS) Nedeljko Boskovic, and some of the activities he has undertaken while head of that service.
Criminal proceedings against the retired General Nedeljko Boskovic, the former head of the Yugoslav Army's Security Administration, in front of a military court in Belgrade are slowly progressing. In front of the military investigative judge an incredibly unpleasant picture is unfolding: how the campaign was conducted in 1992 in which JNA's Security Administration was systematically discredited, taken over and later marginalized. In the campaign, both regime and ``patriotic'' newspapers took part, uncovering state, military and official secrets, killing an ox for a pound of meat.
The fact that things became serious was evident on October 8, 1996 when the investigative judge of the military court in Belgrade issued a warrant of arrest for the retired General-Major Nedeljko Boskovic who was on the run and inaccessible to the state bodies.
An investigation was being conducted against him due to justified doubt that he had committed two criminal acts: illegal arrest and abuse of official position in extended duration, which is why he was to be kept in custody. The warrant was to activate both the military police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
General Boskovic remained inaccessible to the state bodies until January 17, 1997 when he approached the president of the Supreme Court, who advised him to call upon the investigative judge.
In the meantime, General Boskovic was seen in the company of top officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Montenegro. He wrote two letters to Slobodan Milosevic, gave an interview to Podgorica's daily Monitor (in three sequels while the police were allegedly bringing the text to him for authorization) and generally did not go into hiding. Only when two policemen arrived on the doorstep of his New Belgrade flat did General Boskovic comprehend that the warrant was a serious matter.
Issuing a warrant against a retired general and former head of a military intelligence service is a relatively rare practice. Who and why is accusing General Boskovic and how did that sorry tale come about?
Criminal charges against General Nedeljko Boskovic along with 13 other people, with Branko Kostic at the head of that list, were submitted on April 3, 1993 by a group of former JNA Security Administration officers and others who were connected with the service. They accused General Boskovic for a number of procedures by which he had violated the law: from irregularities at the time of handing over his duties, through to a number of offenses, up to disclosing state, military and official secrets.
The accusation of rigging court proceedings against former intelligence employees was especially stressed. Anyway, those proceedings were completed with acquittals or waivings of all claims---but only following a few months long legal but also illegal custody and harassment.
The military prosecutor's office, in keeping with its obligations, addressed the authorized bodies after receiving criminal charges against General Boskovic, demanding that all previous information be collected and that all items from the charges be checked. That lasted three and a half years; it must be that the military intelligence bodies dealt with that matter in a thorough way---or that certain obstructions ensued as ordered by someone, of which we know nothing. What strikes one is that the military prosecutor---for now---has accepted the allegations for three criminal acts from the charges, while he referred them to submit private charges for the remaining ones.
Throughout that period, General Boskovic acted in a very interesting manner---so to say---characteristic of him only. Understandably irritated by the acts of the military judicial bodies, he, as a practical man, did not ask for protection in a formal way, i.e. of the authorized institution of the system which had commenced those criminal proceedings---the military judicial bodies and the Ministry of Defense. Instead of that, he asked Slobodan Milosevic for protection, dispatching two letters to him on October 1996, after the warrant was issued. Whether the president of Serbia answered him---and how---is not known.
However, it can be justifiably presumed that the president---as is the procedure in such cases---referred him to the institutions of the system, advising him to place his trust in the independent and unbiased judiciary.
Taking into account that in his interview given to Podgorica's daily Monitor General Boskovic stated that he was prepared to go to The Hague ``as a witness, since no other reasons exist,'' he probably did not meet with a warm reception Where It Counts.
A thorough political analysis of those murky times yet awaits us. The strategic orientations of the actors, however, are already now known to a large degree which is why this sad story of a warrant and all that had preceded it has significance which surpasses simple criminal proceedings.
Military intelligence, what is usually (and wrongly) referred to as KOS, was then, according to the constitutional system (after 1974) practically the only security service which encompassed (in the framework of its authorizations, which should not be comprehended too strictly) the entire SFRY territory, since state security passed into republic authorization. Due to that reason a certain agreement was reached (according to the Regulations on Mutual Collaboration) by which KOS ``positions'' (agents) had to register with the local civic state security services.
What happened with the ``biggest spy affair in post-war Yugoslavia'' announced by Branko Kostic? Why is the air force at fault and how many coups were attempted within its ranks? What did the ``Opera'' do and why did general Boskovic arrest the ``Opera'' group?
A number of touchy details about the methods, the network and the operations of the secret service (KOS) were revealed between February 1992 and April 1993, the time of the campaign against its then chief, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, and head of the air force and anti-aircraft defence colonel Slobodan Rakocevic.
The fabricated war in Slovenia resulted in a dwindling resistance of the JNA command structures favoring the preservation of Yugoslavia and the theory of socialism (these two things were identical according to the
selection of the presidential candidates is made, nor it there a mechanism for nominating candidates. What will happen with us in such a race?
Nothing will happen. One classic, but ironic sentence states: ``We write successful stories about unsuccessful people!'' Including autobiographies.
Source: Belgrade weekly ñVremeî, May 3, and 10, 1997
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