Belgrade weekly "NIN" brought in its issue of December 13, 1996,
commetary by military analyst Miroslav Lazanski, about the possible
moves of the Yugoslav army in the current events in Serbia.
While the Western media put the Yugoslav army among the "pillars
of the current authority", the oppositionary politicians are slowly
courting it, or are only mentioning it in passing during the Belgrade
demonstrations. Mainly, it is of great interest what is thought, and
what will be done by the army.
Actually, how much the Yugoslav politicians in general know the
problems of the army, or how much they are personally inclined
towards it is hard to estimate, but all of the public opinion polls
say that from all of the Yugoslav institutions, people have the
largest confidence in the Army. This is confirmed by a good response
when the recruitment is in question and a large number of candidates
for the enrollement into military schools and academies. judging by
all this, the identity crisis and the morgage left to it by the
former JNA, for which it does not bear sole responsibility, the
Yugoslav army has bridged successfully.
So, o the current political events impose on the army also the
imperative of political preferences ? These days, the army is doing
its job in a completely normal manner, there was no raising of the
level of combat readiness, and the rumors about it are only
speculations. The calls in the media are so far ignored by the army,
and the appearence of a pensioned captain Milotun at one of the
opposition protests has been dealt with a exclusionary statement.
Of course, in a society where almost everything is politicized,
the de - politization of the army is hardly swallowed, since
tradiotionalistic stances are very strong. The former JNA has on two
occasions directly helped the Serbian Socialist Party and the current
regime: first on the eve of the first multi - party elections in
Serbia in December of 1990, when then Federal Secretary for Defence,
general Veljko Kadijevic gave an interview (to the author of the
commentary), and secondly, when the tanksrolled into the streets of
Belgrade in March of 1991. The JNA generals have complained to me
that when this "debt" was supposed to be returned with a concrete
support of the politicians in the days critical for the JNA - this
did not happen... Instead of that, 150 generals and admirals were
urgently pensioned. The JNA was to pay the price of the breaking up
of Yugoslavia...
Can March 1991, be repeated in 996, with the exit of the tanks
into the streets ? The international context is different, both the
political and the military one, but also the Yugoslav internal
situation is different. The Yugoslav army has de - politicized
itself, the two former generals who have appeared at the last
congress of the ruling SPS, generals Ojdanic and Kovacevic, have been
removed from their positions, one was pensioned, and the other got a
less responsible duty. Their appearance at a congress of a political
party was not received well in the army ranks, and certain form of
political neutrality of the Army ensued.
The current yugoslav military top is comprised by the generals who
represent the technical intelligentsia of the Army. These are all
generals-ingeneers wit PhD and MA titles, who are all generationally
tied, since they have graduated the Military - technical Academy in
Zagreb: generals Dimitrijevic, Milovanovic, borovic, vujcic,
Cekovic... The manner of their thinking differs from that of the
classic officer in the units, so that they have a much higher
political sensibility. It is certain that they would not like that
the Army leaves the barracks in any manner, except in the case of an
external attack, natural disaster, or a training exercise, and in
that respect the international circumstances are going in their
favor.Whoever would decide now to use the army for internal political
confrontations, would have to think first how would this be
interpreted in Washington.In Europe, nothing is an internal matter of
one state anymore. Of course, if one wants to be a part of Europe...
The Yugoslav Army continues to live its life in the conditioned of
imposed "rationalization of the military budget".Army again did not
get as much money as it asked for, but that is to be expected in
general poverty. The fact that the salaries for professional members
of the army contine to be late is something that has been going on
for a while. Thousands of families of the military personnel which
came from the republics that have left Yugoslavia still live in the
military barracks, improvised military objects and cellars. The drama
of these people continues, and the military top has to continously
think where to find an appartment more so to alleviate this
situation.
On the other hand, the officers and junior officers are witnesses
of a quick and eneromous enriching of certain levels of society at a
time when these same officers and junior officers were deprived of
all their property. To expect that the army will, in such conditions,
exit into the streets to solve the matters for any of these people -
is more than an illusion.
The Yugoslav army is obliged to lower the level of its personnel,
as is provided by the Agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe
(CFF). Many regiments, batallins and units will disappear. For
decades, former JNA was an exemplary army, the training was good, the
posture convincing. Then came the war and the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and a specific vacuum.
Now everybody knows that the transformation of the army is not an
easy process. but not one of the politicians has clearly stated what
kind of Yugoslav army do they want for the 21st century. It could not
be expected and demanded from the soldiers to self - motivate. That
is the duty and the obligation of the politicians. This vacuum can
lead to the conclusion that "the readiness for an eventual military
engagement can be presumed automatically and in all crcumstances".
Many professional members of the army have the feeling that the
society does not understand them at all, and in some categories there
is a loss of trus in politicians. The others characterize this as
"the defeating insecurity of politicians". Many ask themselves why
during the sessions of the Supreme Defence Council all members from
Serbia sit at one side of the table, and those from Montenegro at the
other.
In general terms, the Yugoslav Army is an army of all its citizens
disregarding which party they belong to, since Yugoslavia is a civil
state by its constitutional definition The Army might will not be
used in the fight for political power,; this will have to be resolved
by the parties in another manner and through a parliamentary
confrontation.
Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN",
December 13, 1996
The "Montenegrin element" within the army is examined by Vladimir
Jovanovic in the December 27, 1996 issue of the Podgorica weekly
Monitor".
The movements in Serbia, no matter what their epilogue will be,
are paving the way for dangerous Montenegrin temptations, provoked by
Milosevic's Serbia.These temptations are not of a recent date, but
their front has moved into the front yard of the so called FRY; and
in it every democratic threat to the dictator leads to the abyss of
civil war. The supposed "rift" in the Supreme Degfence Council would
not then, represent a sensation, even more so after the recent
statement of Momir Bulatovic that the attack on Dubrovnik "was a
mistake", possibly indicating that such "blunders" will not occur
again. These would pertain to possible Montenegrin participation in
stiffling of the Serbian oppositionary rebellion, in all possible
variants - including combat help. In the longer run, the solidarity
of Podgorica with Belgrade will be confronted with similar
temotations in Kosovo.
General Bozidar Babic, as the commander of the Second Army, dos
not solely command the Podgorica corps. His subordinate is also
general Rumenko Disovic, the commander of the Uzice corps, which
includes the garrisons in Raska, Novi Pazar, Bajina Basta, some units
and installations in Cacak and the Uzice garrison itself. Since these
are also the cities wher the Zajedno coaliton won, and in Novi Pazar
"The Sandzak list - Sulejman Ugljanin", the problems with the
possible use of the army are even more dangerous.
It is estimated that the possible military movements form the
Montenegrin garrisons, filled with reservists, would be directed
towards the shaky Kosovo and Sandzak regions, supposedly for the
guarding of stability and sovereignity. Actually, legally Montenegro
has no constitutional prerogatives to infuence the blockade of
military measures and steps on its territory. It is true that
Bulatovic has good co - operation with general Babic or general
Tripko Cecovic, the commander of the Podgorica corps, but it is key
that the decisions in the SDC are brought by simple majority, in a
case of conflict. Minister of defence Pavle Bulatovic and federal
prime minister Radoje kontic are not regular members of the SDC and
participate in its sessions in the status of "enlarged informal
membership". General Momcilo Perisic, the Army chief of staff is
there to execute what is decided, but he alos is not a regular member
with a right to a vote. Those voting are Lilic, Milosevic and
Bulatovic: two against one ?
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor ",
December 27, 1996
Milos Vasic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", discusses in the
December 30, 1996 issue of that magazine, the use of the police force
in the current events.
The events of December 24 were decisive and somewhat useful for
the future tactics of any political party in Serbia. The message is
loud and clear---don't pick a fight if you can't win---or don't lose
touch with reality, if you like. The fact that the Serbian
authorities have at their disposal 70,000 active police members and
vast back-up resources made almost no difference on Tuesday afternoon
when Milosevic's supporters, outnumbered and on alien territory,
tried to overpower Belgrade's marching protestors rallied by the
opposition.
The police, after all, is only a political means to an end, just
like the army, a party, money, moral integrity and others. However,
it cannot substitute what president Milosevic calls the balance of
power. No ruler can rely entirely on even the most efficient police
because even the police and its options are limited by developments
and contexts of a particular political situation. That was more
apparent than ever on Tuesday, December 24.
Scores of buses taking Milosevic's supporters free of charge from
rural and suburban parts of Serbia to Belgrade had been flooding into
the capital since the early morning hours until about 2 p.m. Some of
them had their own police escorts, while traffic police in Belgrade
were given the assignment to welcome them, park them and show them
the way back once the rally was over.
The job was done with utmost efficiency---regular traffic in
Belgrade was virtually grinded to a halt for much of the day.
Milosevic's supporters were given absolute priority---all cars parked
anywhere near the city centre had been towed away while passers by
were told to steer clear of the site where the rally was held. Some
sources say that an extra three brigades had been deployed before the
rally started, but there is no doubt that special police units were
sent to Belgrade as reinforcements back on November 17.
Analysing the events and consequences of the mistimed rally of
support for Milosevic, one has to wonder why the police decided to
enforce law and order at 2.15 p.m., long after skirmishes between the
residents of Belgrade and their unwelcome guests broke out? It was
crystal clear that the visitors had not been invited---they were
welcomed with obscene gestures, verbal insults and firecrackers, much
to their disbelief and astonishment. Fighting first broke out on
Republic square around noon, when a large group of Milosevic's
supporters deliberately encountered a rival party going the other
way. A timely and appropriate police intervention would have quite
easily prevented the conflict and others which followed. The
ambulance kept taking injured demonstrators from both sides to
hospitals unti 11 p.m.
The security of the coalition Zajedno did a great job preventing
large scale conflicts in downtown Belgrade while the police watched
the drama a few yards away waiting for orders.
The Republic square
was flooded with some 30,000 students around 1 p.m., and fierce
fighting broke out some 200 yards further as Milosevic's supporters
started arriving in numbers too. Minutes later, a group of students
was confronted by a busload from Backa Palanka near the French
embassy, when the driver tried to ignore warnings to stop. A serious
conflict with grave consequences was hanging in the air and the
police knew it. The residents of Belgrade had been on the streets for
more than a month defending the opposition victory anulled by the
ruling socialists; there was never any doubt about their
determination and spirit. Milosevic's supporters, on the other hand,
came from provincial towns and villages encouraged and deceived by
false reports on state television that a handful of students and
football fans are all they will have to deal with.
From the very beginning, the regime propaganda counted with the
most obvious and deeply rooted animosities between the rural and
urban folk, the illiterate and the educated, the primitive and the
civilised. Cries like ``go back to your sheepfolds'' best reflects
the mood of Belgrade's dwellers on Tuesday morning. The unfortunate
and astounded visitors were kicked, clubbed, spat at, some people
even threw garbage on their heads from balconies. Estimates place the
number of Milosevic's supporters a 50,000 who attended the rally and
100,000 in total. There were at least twice as many people behind
Zajedno even before the opposition leaders arrived on Republic
square. A gun was drawn but fortunately not fired (opposition
officials claim by a certain Mr. Vucinic from Kosovo) at around 1:40
p.m. during one of the fights, but police were still nowhere to be
seen. About 25 minutes later, a pro-Milosevic individual from Vrbas
fired into a crowd of opposition supporters and shot o 42-year old
member of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Ivica Lazovic, in the
back of his head.
A WTN television crew was on the scene and recorded
the incident, which was seen by viewers throughout the world minutes
later. The perpetrator was identified but left the scene of the
crime, the police held one armed individual for questioning but not
the man who opened fire. The WTN recording also shows that another
individual had picked up the shells and ran before the police
arrived. Ivica Lazovic is in critical condition as this article is
being written, and SPO officials say that many of the pro-Milosevic
group from Vrbas were armed. Tension mounted and fighting picked up
as news broke that socialists had killed a man. Time was running out.
The head of the Serbian president's security was seen in a
downtown passage around 1.30 p.m, which indicated that Milosevic
might show up at his own rally and address the crowd. The stage was
completed around 2 p.m. and state television crews took their
positions as they waited for the man of the moment to come through.
The only problem was that angry Belgraders kept bashing his
supporters right beside the stage calling them red bandits, a scene
which didn't fit into the scenario and wouldn't look good on
television. The police finally turned up at 2.15p.m. and formed a
buffer zone to separate rival protestors. They needed an hour and
minimum force to push opposition supporters back to Republic square,
after which they took their final positions. The opposition
supporters made a few unsuccessful attempts to push the police back.
Why didn't the police intervene earlier? One can only assume that
the plan was to let the pro-Milosevic party start a fight they were
expected to win with the horribly mistaken assumption that they would
outnumbertheir opponents. Why else would the socialists organize a
rally at exactly the same time and place as their rivals who have
been protesting in downtown Belgrade for over a month?
The intention was clear, but the prediction was wrong. Milosevic
and his men will no doubt find the culprits who led him to believe
that his supporters had the upper hand, but all too late after he had
no choice but to use the police to pave the area for his rally. The
police did their job quite professionally, absorbed a counter-attack
by the Zajedno protestors and escorted the unfortunate participants
of the Milosevic rally back to their buses. Their heroics included
using truncheons and some tear gas against unarmed protestors, but
they did have some difficulties in girding Milosevic's supporters who
lost their way in the dark and picked up a few more kicks in the
teeth as a result. At least a dozen buses had their windshields and
windows smashed on their way out of Belgrade. Police patrols were
sent to disperse stone-throwing brigades and managed to secure a safe
passage for the visitors at around 8 p.m. By 11 p.m., 58 people were
admitted to hospital, five were kept for treatment, including Ivica
Lazovic who is still in critical condition.
This time, the police did show discipline and restarint. There was
no trace of the outrageous brutality seen on June 1, 1993 when nearly
a hundred people were injured and a police officer was killed. On
Tuesday, the police were attacked by a force to be reckoned with,
street fighters armed with stones, wooden sticks and cables, but used
minimum force to refute the attack. It is up to those who control the
police whether they wil use them in such circumstances and how. The
police did their job correctly and professionally, but the organizers
of the pro-Milosevic rally didn't.
That's what happens when someone starts believing the propaganda
createdby his own party and television. If a timely political
decision to ban the protest and disperse the demonstrators had been
made, it would have taken an afternnon's work with hardly any force
or damage, a police officer told Vreme.
However, the deadline for
that kind of decision ran out in November. After groundless threats
voiced by Dragan Tomic, it was too late. Now, it is more late then
ever. The only mission the police can accomplish now is to enforce a
state of emergency and personal dictatorship. There isn't a shadow of
a doubt that the police will follow orders even to those lenghths,
the only question is whether and how many of them will do so with a
guilty concience. The political price of such action is a different
cup of tea.
The only thing we learned last Tuesday is that there will be no
more pro-Milosevic rallies in Belgrade after the one which ended in
disaster. Not even television commentators can help that, because the
police cannot substitute the people.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
December 30, 1996
Darko Marinkovic examines in the December 27, 1996 issue of
"Nezavisnost", the magazine published by the independent labor union,
the question of the participation of workers in the current events in
Serbia.
The civil protest has again made current the question - where are
the workers. The question is not a new one. An image has been created
in a part of the public that the workers in general are on a low
level of cnosciousness, partly bought off, immature and uninterested
for social change. Of course, such and estimate is incorrect and
draws away fro an argumented answer to the question which social
forces can carry the necessary and inevitable social reforms.
First of all, the workers were, as one of the most massive and
most risky categories for the social peace a subject of a very
forceful and systematic manipulation by the current regime, This
manipulation was dominantly achieved through two basic arguments. One
of them is nationalism, through which the interests of the workers
were completely marginalized. The second is the Labor Union of
Serbia, which is an extended hand of the state and the ruling party,
and which had the task to control and neutralize the workers
discontent and create the illusion that something is being done in
the workers favor.
Secondly the social movements in the last few years have
conditioned the changes in the structure and character of the working
class. More than a million people, for a number of years find
themselves on "obligatory vacation". They have lost the professional
and other connections with their factories, they have changed the
profession, they turned themselves to the jobs in the black market,
in essence, they turned themselves into the "lumpenproletariat",
which was never a base for a union movement. At the same time, the
middle class strata have been completely destroyed (doctors,
ingeneers, etc), which in all states with developed market economy
represent the moving force in the world of work and union movement.
The question of the participation of the workers in the current
protests has one of its sources in the "socialist realism" image of
the workers rebellion - the workers in blue coats and with greasy
hands go into the streets and protest. The workers have been taken to
the streets in other conditions too, and that image belongs to the
past.
The question where are the workers in the current civil protest is
also a form of ideological manipulation by the regime, geared to show
the public that this protest does not have the support of the
workers.
The question at hand is only the character of the protest. It is
first of all a civil protest, whose main goal is the protection of
basic civil rights. The analysis of the events gives a basis for the
conclusion that in front of our eyes we see the eveolvement of civil
emancipation, maturing of the consciousness about civil rights. This
is the place to look for the answer to the question why the tailoring
of the electoral results caused much stronger revolts that the
economic fall of the workers through the years.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly
"Nezavisnost",December 27,1996
Radivoj Cveticanin of the independent news pool AIM writes in the
latest edition of the Kragujevac by-weekly "Nezavisna Svetlost" on
the backgound of the "couter-meetings" organized by the regime as a
showof support for Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic.
Only a few weeks ago Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was
attempting to convince his high - level guests that he will not bring
into the streets his supportera as an answer to the protest meetings
of the "Zajedno" coalition. The guests, which were in some manner
fascinated by the result they have achieved, have barely left
Belgrade, and Milosevic has done exactly the opposite of what he
promised. A series of gatherings in support of his politics and
himself took rounds of Serbian cities, named as counter - meetings.
Milosevic's team first underestimated the demonstrations, ignoring
them completely. It was only left to the regime media to "work on
them", and tohse have put a full effort into that. It was counted
upon - looking at the experiences from previous similar protests -
the fatigue, overstarutation, even o cold weather. Nothing of any of
these though. Even the weather was good, and its getting better. The
protest was turning into something that the analysts ca''ed "people's
movement".
What was taken from Milosevic's hands was something that was once
his most powerful weapon: national masses, whith which at one point
he did whatever he wanted in Serbia and Montenegro. Now they are out
of his reach and control, even more so, they are geared directly
against him. Now, that power is on the other side, and it was
obviously something that had to have him worried.
The decision to organize counter - meetings across Serbia was
conditiened, without a doubt by the fear created by the current
events. The counter - meetings were announced by the so called
support telegrams, and have begun in a somewhat shy manner.
The basic
nominal approach was the support for Milosevic, his letter to the US
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the stance that "Serbia
will not be guided by a foreign hand". This patriotic cliche was
stated by Milosevic during his meeting with students from Nis, and it
is used as a counterpoint to the "treasonous policy" of the "Zajedno"
coalition. The "Zajedno" coalition and the"destructive" protests of
the Belgrade walkers are the main negative object of the counter -
meetings. There is, of course, no mention that these protests demand
the return of the stolen votes and responsibility fot the election
fraud.
It is a general impression that counter - meetings are not
organized by patched up. Worekers are brought in from factories with
special buses, they are loaded down at the secen of the event, and in
many cities, they are the predominant participants of the
meetingsalong with them, many old faces. Of course, it would not be
convincing to say that Milosevic does not have better supporters. He
definitely has them, but they are not at these events. The scenario
is everywhere absolutely the same: the condemnation of Belgrade
demonstrations stated by the official speaker, a shy student appears
here and there, at the end, the obligatory letter of support to
Milosevic, read by the local doctor or teacher.
The iconography is also unified: Milosevic's pictures from younger
days, and slogans with completely simplified messages, such as
"Slobo, we are not giving you up", or "Vuk equals one dollar,
Djindjic equals one DEM". The slogans of the Belgrade walkers and
other Serbian cities, compared to these, are world literature.
The elements mentioned are the key ingredients of the technology
used in former "meetings of truth" in Milosevic's infamous populist,
so called anti-bureacratic revolution. But for now, they are only a
pale copy of the formet torrent which brought fear into the bones.
There is no force or energy in them.
For the moment, the energy is on the side of the rebellious, lead
by the "Zajedno" coalition and those organized as the Sudent protest.
They now represent "the happening of the people".Milosevic's "anti -
bureaucratic revolution" was a state organized, simply nationalistic,
aggressive, destructive movemement, with a lot of barbarian elements
in it. The current "egg revolution" is everything contrary to it.
What is worriesome is exactly the characteristics of the former
Milosevic's "happening of the people" which are attempted to be
revived. The counter - meetings are not dangerous in themselves, but
as a provocation and the possibility of physical conflict between the
two sides. The can appear ridicilous and sad, but it is never clear
what barbarian thought lies in that mass. It seems that the leaders
of the "Zajedno" coalition are conscious of this.
The civil war is not an impossible price that Milosevic would pay
for his departure from power. That is why the counter - meetings were
condemned, not only by the Serbian opposition parties, by Milosevic's
coalition party "Nova Demokratija" (New Democracy).
Source: Kragujevac by - weekly
"Nezavisna Svetlost",December1996
In its firs issue of 1997, (January 4), Belgrade weekly "Vreme"
brought an article by Milos Vasic, which examines the possibilty of a
civil war in Serbia, stemming from current events.
On Thursday, December 26, at 5:00 p.m., central Belgrade's
Terazije square looked like something out of Costa Gavras' Z or
images of Italy in 1924: plain clothes hooligans armed with police
batons were freely beating up anyone they could get their hands on
while a police cordon just stood by watching. Even worse, they went
after TV crews and even hit a Serbian state TV (RTS) cameraman who
finally managed to pull out his press card and they left him alone.
There were three of those incidents:
first the group of organized men
rushed onto the square, injuring several people including Rade
Radovanovic, leader of the RTS independent union. A little later on
the square another group of 11 men pulled out their batons and beat
up whoever they could grab, especially camera crews. The third
incident happened in front of city hall and it could have turned ugly
because the hooligans were surrounded by a large group of people
before someone called the police. The police led the group away into
city hall. At least one TV crew got pictures of the incidents and the
pictures were seen across the world that evening. An analysis of the
unedited tapes shows several things: the hooligans were very
confident and went around freely; the uniformed police never
intervened; the batons the men in civilian clothes were carrying were
police issue and the group surrounded at city hall even had the white
batons of the traffic police. Later, the hooligans were identified as
members of a Serbian police unit.
What does all this mean? When the uniformed police intervenes to
restore law and order and beats up people and reporters who don't get
away in time, that is seen as a customary and unavoidable byproduct.
That is an excess of authority but is also considered customary. The
Serbian police showed that it can be disciplined and control large
crowds with a minimal use of force. The authorities who feel they are
legitimate and right will use necessary force openly in the form of
the uniformed police and will stand behind its decision. The use of
anonymous hooligans in plain clothes but with police issue batons
which you can't buy anywhere and are a banned weapon in this country
was a message from the Leader and the Family to the people: get smart
or get beaten both inside and out of institutions. That is where all
the difference lies: legitimate authorities will use force
institutionally; frightened authorities, aware that they are losing
legitimacy will make the mistake the Family made that Thursday.
The state of public and state security in Belgrade has the highest
priority; operative decisions on action in Belgrade are taken at the
highest political and police levels. The use of plain clothes police
as fascist hooligans is one of those decisions and no effort to blame
lower ranking civil servants will be accepted as convincing. If
things have gone that far then someone must be losing his nerve. The
opposition and unions said that if something like that happens again
they'll take self-defense measures; that will be an escalation of
violence which will only shorten the agony.
If the Family opts for civil war who can it count on? Obviously it
is counting on the police as its main force but that isn't as simple
as it seems. To achieve the critical mass needed for efficient police
support for a state of emergency, i.e. personal dictatorship, certai
psychological conditions are needed like the death of a policeman or
some similar sudden escalation of violence. The police are a solid
world, closed up and they don't allow anyone to go after their
people. On the other hand, everything has an ending: the amount of
people on the street and the overall mood in Serbia are slowly biting
into the police motivation to defend the regime at any cost.
The actions of the police will depend on the overall political
mood in Serbia. Even if the Family opts for a coup d'etat and
dictatorship, the first days of resistance will be crucial to the
behavior of the police: if resistance is massive and fierce the
outcome will be uncertain. The other thing, the SPS nomenclature and
it Opus Dei; JUL isn't insignificant because there are a lot of them
and they're organized but there are problems there: there is a
visible crumbling and rising tension within. The counter-rally on
December 24 pushed them back fundamentally: they were embarrassed and
the people bussed in to Belgrade took bad news back to the rest of
the republic. The internal SPS-JUL strife is growing as well.
Even if things were ideal in the main regime pillars and they
aren't, there can be no civil war or state of emergency without at
least silent support from the Yugoslav Army (VJ). The VJ's attitude
towards the Family is conditioned by the entire history of the
Balkans since 1991: VJ officers haven't forgotten their embarrassment
on March 9, 1991, nor the three wars they lost nor the purges of the
army. In April 1996, VJ chief of staff General Momcilo Perisic said
he had things to tell the press but won't because he's a disciplined
soldier.
All through this crisis the VJ has kept silent
demonstratively; Perisic went to Romania demonstratively and even
more demonstratively he didn't appear on Milosevic's sofa during a
visit by the Ukrainian defense minister; FRY Defense Minister Pavle
Bulatovic openly complained about the military budget in federal
parliament; VJ salaries were systematically late. The people
fraternized with soldiers who found themselves at protests by chance
at least twice.
Then, just before the New Year, a letter by ``a large group of
officers'' in the Nis army district, especially the 63d parachute
brigade, appeared. That document was titled Excerpts From a
Declaration sent to the students of Nis, the Nais independent TV
station, Telegraf daily, General Perisic and Slobodan Milosevic. The
document says the ``moment is historic,'' that ``if we don't get
smart we'll only go to ruin,'' that ``we are non political'' but also
that ``we are not indifferent to where Serbia is heading.'' It warned
the Zajedno coalition that ``power is sweet'' and to watch what
they're doing or the army and students will topple them in six months
and not to ``promise too much.'' It told Slobodan Milosevic to ``get
smart'' and ``stand with the people.'' It said Milosevic had
``belittled officers in the war of 91/92 and tried to turn them into
minor figures in this country'' (traditionally a very serious
accusation).
The document also says he is the only one to blame for
the war. The anonymous officers warned the Serbian president that
``we fell for your trick once that the former Yugoslav National Army
was the only one to blame for the breakup of the former state'' and
that ``we won't allow Serbia to be ruined and we certainly won't side
against our people'' and that ``if need be we'll stand at the head of
the Serbian people'' and that their weapons will never be turned
against the people. The authenticity of the document is still under
dispute; on the other hand, no conspirator has ever declared himself
publicly. The form is being disputed but the content is convincing: a
large number of army officers feel what the letter says.When the
letter was circulated among the public an unpleasant silenc ensued.
Some army sources said a letter of that content really was sent;
other sources said Perisic went on a sudden trip to Nis. Then, on
December 30, the General Staff Information Service issued a statement
which said a lot of things: we're non-political and a factor of
stability and integrity and so on. The only thing not in the
statement is the only thing Milosevic cares about: there is no
direct, nor in fact any, support from the VJ to Milosevic against the
opposition; the general staff didn't attack the opposition.
Milosevic's time is running out; the Family has increasingly
less options. The only way to secure His political survival is in
compromising the people around Him; bring them to a point where they
can't go back and can't get out. He was always the champion in doing
just that and we should fear a coup d'etat aimed at compromising the
state apparatus and his followers and bringing them to a point where
they have only one way out: stay with Him to the end. We'll see soon
whether the police, army, state apparatus and Milosevic followers
agree to be dragged into that.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
January 4, 1997
Podgorica weekly "Monitor" (author Seki Radoncic), examines in its
issue of December 20, 1996, the reflection of events in Serba on
Montenegro.
A quite propaganda is very active these days throughout Montenegro
- the police intrigues are geared towards two of the most numerous
populations. The supporters of the sovereign Montenegro were fed the
story "from reliable sources" that Milo (Djukanovic - the prime
minister) and Momir (Bulatovic - the president), will, in the case of
the fall of Milosevic, make montenegro an independent state. The
supporters of the federation are fed the disinformation that
president Bulatovic has secret meetings with the leaders of the
Zajedno coalition. All this is garnered with the story from the
closest surroundings of prime minister that "Djukanovic" is not on
speaking terms with Milosevic for almost three years now. So, the
process of removal of Milosevic's political fate from that of
Montenegro has begun.
The manner in which the great personnel changes in Serbia will
reflect on Montenegro is a question which does not only bother the
Montenegrin political top. Since the political puzzle in Belgrade is
still not resolved, such a question might seem premature, but sooner
or later, it will come to the fore.
Dragan Soc a member of the Montenegrin parliament representing
oppositionary National party says that the most important question is
whether when the mentor falls, his assitans will fall too. Soc thinks
that the Podgrocia team has shown a high level of political
manouvring and manipulation. They have always made some small
movements away from Milosevic and have shown themselves as unwillng
accomplices, unable to resist - almost the victims. All this is good
make up, but they have never attempted to make any real move away
from Milosevic, or, god forbid, to use constitutional mechanisms to
effectively prevent Milosevic's moves.
But, those small gestures can,
at a certain point, be converted into a large capital, that is, into
a ticket for the transfer of the Bulatovic team from Milosevic's into
a democracy train. Of course, they will be forced to pay a certain
price in the form of greater openess of the media, respect of human
rights, but they will buy time to wash themselves of the policies
undertaken so far and to consolidate and continue their power in the
feud called Montenegro - not disturbing the big guys. How this will
reflect on us, citizens of Montenegro, nobody will care.
Will Montenegro, in the case of the fall of Miloseic and
democratization in Serbia, remain the last bastion of totalitarianism
in Europe ? One does not have to be too politically acute to realize
that democratization in Serbia does not suit the Podgorica regime. If
facts concerning the freedom of party activity, freedom of speech,
operation of state media and activities of the police are put in
order and if a parallel is drawn between Podgorica and Belgrade, then
a conclusion can be made that the Podgorica regime is even more rigid
that that in Belgrade.
Still, the departure of Milosevic and arrival of democratic forces
at the Serbian helm wi,, sooner or later, lead to the departure of
the Podgorica regime. The democratic forces in Montenegro would then
gain in political initiative. The international position of the
official Podgroica would complicate, since that would be then the
last bastion of communism in Europe.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor",
December 20, 1996
Jovan Radovanovic of the Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" writes on the
position of the Montenegrin leadership concerning the current
stituation in Serbia in the December 31, 1996 issue of this paper.
The leadership of the DPS party, and at the same time the
leadership of Montenegro, after waiting and measuring of the balance
of power, probably estimating that the Sebian ship is seriously
rocking, took the side of the "democratic solution" of the current
conflict.With this move, the Montenegrin leadership is attempting to
strengthen the painstakingly built image in the West that it is,
after all, "something else" in comparison to Milosevic.
The Prime minister Djukanovic, who has been at war with the JUL
party and its leader (Ms. Milosevic) for a long time anyway, was the
first one "in the field", syaing very opnely in an inyterview for the
ex-patriate daily "Vesti" that if there were any manipulations in the
local elections in Serbia, than this could be only carried out by the
ruling party. He also stated that it would be best if the results of
the second round of the elections were reinstated so that "we do not
loose time", thinking at that moment at the losses that could be
easily measured in hard currency, if the West, and particularly the
US, re-instate sanctions towards Yugoslavia.
The Montenegrin opposition was able to initiate a discussion in
the Montenegrin parliament about the events in Serbia - it was able
to do something that the Serbian opposition was not. In his interview
to the Paris daily "Figaro", the Montenegrin president Momir
Bulatovic, uncovered, as a witness, that Milosevic knew quite well
that his SPS party lost both Belgrade and Nis in the elections. The
"icing on the cake" was provided by the third "hero" - Svetozar
Marovic, the president of the Montenegrin parliament who received the
delegation of the student "Protest '96" from Belgrade, giving them
full support.
In his concluding remarks to the Montenegrin Parliament, Milo
Djukanovic stated that he will "use the constitutional
prerogativesand protect the state interests of Montenegro" if the
Serbian state leadership is not cooperative and timely in the work on
the re-integration into the international community !He stressed that
Montenegro, in difference tothe other federal unit, actually has very
good relations with the world and that it does not intend to suffer
some possible sanctions due tothe policies of the Serbian leadership.
As a realistic politician, Djukanovic lastly added that this
framework has to be dealt with jointly with Serbia, so that "FRY
would rid itself of the sanctions dead wight". His finance minister
announced at the same session the introduction of a Montenegrin
currency unit, if the authorities in Serbia continue with
uncontrolled printing of money and instigation of new hyperinflation
!
Was it possible to expect such statements from the three
Montenegrin leaders only a month or two ago ? And, what do they mean?
According to some of those knoledgeable in the ongoings in the
Montenegrin top, thes, actually, have been waiting for quite some
time for a good opportunity to wriggle themselves out of the heavy
hand of the one that has brought them to power, and to become
somewhat more independent. Some skirmishes have occurred previously,
such as the quarrles about the taking over of the customs revenues
from Montenegro, then a small "trade war" between the two republics,
when at one point the inter-state border turned into a border between
two states ! Then there were long discussion whether montenegroould
have a ministry of foreign affairs, without considering the fact that
Serbia did have one at the same time when this was contrary to the
constitution of the FRY.
Some poison arrows were directed from the JUL leadership towards
Podgorica, particularly towards Djukanovic, but "the boys" did not
remain in debt. The clash took place also in the very hot field of
the privatisation of the economy, so there were anouncementsthat the
FRY could be "the only state with two systems".
Milosevic has put his Montenegrin "protegees" into some hot water.
On one side, under constant pressure from its opposition and its
statements that they actully do not differ in any manner from the
Serbian regime, under accusations that they have "sold out" on the
century long statehood of Montenegrotying themselves to Milosevic,
and on the other, carried by better reception in all of the more
important offices of the world and the possibility to "capitalize" -
they have found themselves in a lot of problems. do they, with the
mentioned statements, assessing that Milosevic has been weakened
enough, they pave the way for a gradual breakup with the Big Brother
? Or, does thi mean that the predictions of many analysts and
observers of the Yugoslav situation from the beginning of this
crisis, that the one that has destroyed the "big" federation will,
sooner or later, destroy the "small" or "rump" one too ?
Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba",
December 31, 1996
AIM correspondents from Sarajevo (Tatjana Ivanova), Ljubljana
(Janja Klasinc) and Zagreb (Tatjana Tagirov) take a look at the views
in Bosnian, Slvenian and Croatian media and public at the events in
Serbia in the December 27, 1996 issue of the Belgrade independent
workers union by-weekly "Nezavisnost".
"Beautiful conscience burns beautifully" is the title of the
article in the New Year's issue of the Bosnia and Herzegovina weekly
"Svijet". The paraphrase of the title of the cult film of the Autumn
in Belgrade "Beutiful villages burn beautifully" maybe presents the
essence the writing of the Bosnian papers about the events in
Belgrade. The official, state TV is not passing up a single chance to
begin its prime time news magazine at 19,30 with garnered images from
Belgrade streets. The anchors of the Bosnian TV do not hide a does of
maliciousness, or in the best case, they attempt to bring in a dose
of humor. Mainly these are the reports in the style of "bread and
ganes(war)" for the widest public, and all in the hope that they will
forget their daily situation and that they could feel the releif that
"the bear is dancing in front of somebody elses door". Quite a cheap
thrill.
At the same time, the daily paper "Oslobodjenje", from the
beginning, mainly informs its readers "from a distance", using AIM
reports too. As with other media, they are not sending their
reporters "on the spot". Its commentator Gojko Beric, sees the
situation in the first page commentary as such:
"Slobodan Milosevic was able to conclude another, his last, feat:
to divide Serbia into two uncompromising twilight zones. The dictator
who did everything to make a political monolith and spread its
borders far to the West, is now confronting a logical conclusion of
his adventure".
Beric concludes his article with a prognosis that the true Serbian
finals will take place next year (1997), at the presidential
elections: "The uncrowned Serbian king looks quite miserable today.
He is even abandoned by those to whom he was an unconditional boss.
Coming against him is also the nationalistic leadership of the
Bosnian Serbs, whom he supported and helped in the genocidal
dismemberment of Bosnia. That is a just reward for a Serbian fuhrer,
aroung whose neck the noose of his evil politics is tightening".
Source: Belgrade by-weekly
"Nezavisnost",December 27,1996
In her report from Ljubljana, Janja Klasinc says that the events
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have not been at the main stage
of interest of the Sovenian media. This is not mainly due because the
public does not have the interest for those, but because of the
editorial policies of the Slovenian media which have in all respects
attempted to minimise the interest for the former capital and its
surroundings. But, the recent events in Belgrade have changed that
practice. Student and opposition demonstrations have returned Serbia
to the front pages and at the top of all news.
The average Slovenian is probably better informed about what is
happening in Serbia than an average Serbian. It is interesting that
active role in the reporting is taken by the national TV, which is
traditionally not inclined towards more extensive reporting from FRY.
Although there are more reports than comments, the writers of the
Slovenian media express much more sympathy towards the opposition,
and above all towards the students, than towards the authorities.
There is no euphoria in the support for the opposition, but the
principle that the electoral victory has to be recognized is
stressed. The prevailing opinion is that the change in power in
Belgrade cannot bring anything much better than the current one. The
Slovenians remmber the large doese of accord of the position and
opposition concerning the national question.
The commentator of the influential weekly "Mladina", Jasa Zlobec
writes: 'via dolorosa' is yet awaiting the Serbs. The worst is yet to
come. As Cicero said: The victory in civil wars is always wicked.
Serbs have rich experience with that too".
The media writes, but the official politics is silent. At a recent
press conference, when directly asked about the events in Serbia,
Slovenian president Milan Kucan even said: "I do not want to comment
them, since that is an internal question of Serbia and Yugoslavia!"
Source: Belgrade by-weekly
"Nezavisnost",December 27,1996
T,atjana Tagirov says that the official media in Zagreb
characterizes Vuk Draskovic as a controversial politician and a
nationalist, Zoran Djindjic as " a favorite of Pale who has resisted
the prosecution of Radovan Karadzic", wgile Vesna Pesic is
characterized as "an unimportant and uninfluential figure within the
coalition". Of course, the students and their protest and their
specific "autonomy" is a fact that is not completely clear to the
average Croatian media consumer.
But the restraint in the official media has its roots, mainly in
the Zagreb "happening of the people". With the returno of the "father
of the nation" form the medical treatment in the US, when he got
really angry at the demonstrators with the "yugocommunist markings"
since "we are, after all, middle Europe" in difference to "that
Byzanthium there" (something that was comfirmed by some leaders of
Croatian political parties, stating that there could be no parallel
between Zagreb and Belgrade) , things gt the form of the traditional
"Croatian silence".
The reason for all this might lie in the fact that all that has
happened in Belgrade could have (and should have) happened in Zagreb.
This is due to the fact that both regimes are so much alike - the
"two guarantors of the peace in the region" are almost identical in
their ruling styles, and in many other respects, while the economic
situation is equally desperate, so it is quite possible to draw the
parallels.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly
"Nezavisnost", December 27,1996
Monitor Index | War Zone | MediaFilter
