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Serbia

Radivoj Cveticanin of the AIM journalists pool writes in the March 8, 1996 issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" about the party congress of the ruling Socialist party of Serbia.

If the Socialists lead Serbia into the new century, and they are firmly convinced that they will, then they promise that the national per capita will be 2,5 thousand dollars, that gas lines and fast railways will be built (, that a "Europolis" and Opera house will rise in Belgrade, that Nis and Sremski Karlovci will get art academies. Of course, they did not forget cellular phone networks, which they seem to like very much, so they have put it so much forward as an enticing promise to the nation.

The promises, this time, may not be fascinating, but no matter what they are, the Socialist see that they cost nothing. Nobody asks them what happened with the previous ones, least of all themselves. That is why, al usual they let their fancy fly. And, as it is not hard to see in their deeds, there is no program that they will not abandon, if it it shown that they are not capable to realize it, or what is more important, if this program represents some form of obstacle in retaining power.

So, when the Serbian prime minister says at the session that he and his party will insist on "market economy", it could mean what he said, but not necessarily so. The programme for the Serbian socialists was always an unbinding list of intentions which was tempered to the needs of the time. That is why it is more important to interpret, not what comes out of Milosevic's and his party's mouths, but what they, as magicians speak out of their stomachs.

They did all to act as peoples party, and to identify Serbia and Serbian people with themselves. At that, they knew that there are some unfavorable things, particularly if recent past is looked at through open eyes. Milosevic condensed that past in a few sentences. The fall of the national and state project, which was tired out by his party in the hard years of the Yugoslav state and war crisis, with him in the lead, he represented as some form of a natural catastrophe and humanitarian problem.

The broom which cleaned a number of top people after Dayton was completed at this congress. The war lobby - Jovic, Markovic, Vucelic, Pankov - was chased from the scene, Now another group was added, gathering around deposed general secretary Milorad Minic. They are interesting since they comprise of the famous "eight session fighters" which brought Milosevic to power in 1987, making them almost negligible in the current leadership.

What they intend to do in the future, the Socialist intend to do by themselves. Even in Yugoslavia. As far as Serbia is concerned, Milosevic passed on a weak offer, through his teeth, to other political forces. No trace of a recent slogan about a government of national unity. Of all that was said, the only combination and only coalition that is counted on is the one with the "leftist forces", meaning his wife's JUL party.

Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", March 8, 1996

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Perica Vucinic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" discusses in that magazine's issue of March 9,the current political developments in the Sanjak area of Serbia.

A symposium on Bosniaks and Sandjak was held in Novi Pazar on 1-2 March. Ambitiously announced as an ``international symposium,'' the weekend meeting gave no answers, but did restore all the old questions about the Muslims of Sandjak.

There was no dispute about the new name for the people who until recently called themselves Muslim. The newly introduced term ``Bosniaks'' denotes a Slavic people of Muslim religion in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which under the Turkish rule adopted Islam, but not the Turkish language. The Sandjak Muslims accepted the new name without a critical distance. The name was transplanted from a declaration made by the congress of Muslim intellectuals in Sarajevo three years ago, and later accepted by the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As it was explained at the time, the Muslims returned to their century-old name. The Sarajevo decision was accepted by the Muslim intellectual and political circles in Sandjak without a comment.

``Adoption of the name will be a process, but not a long one,'' Mehmedalija Bojic, a historian from Belgrade who spoke at the Novi Pazar meeting, told Vreme. According to him, this name proves that the Muslims are becoming nationally aware. ``The greatest contribution to the awareness heightening of the Muslims into the Bosniak nation was given by the Serbs, Montenegrins and Croats with their anti-Islamic propaganda,'' Bojic said.

The meeting itself, organized by Sefket Krcic, showed a modest scientific potential of the national corps. A member of the Belgrade Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Sefko Alomerovic, as well as other speakers, said that the potential existed but was very inert, suppressed by many self proclaimed alliances and political parties.

In the political and daily usage, the purpose of the direct transplantation of a term from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Sandjak is to show that the Sandjak Muslims and the Muslims in Bosnia are members of the same national corps. Even before the war, the Sandjak Muslims looking for jobs felt that Bosnia was closer to them than parts of Serbia outside Sandjak and when they were enrolling at universities, that Sarajevo was closer than Belgrade. The deep emotional link was made even deeper by this war. If you had happened to be at the Novi Pazar taxi rank to hear the reactions of the taxi-drivers to the Radio Sarajevo report on the Serbs' offensive on Gorazde, you would have realized that bitterness was greater in Novi Pazar than in Sarajevo itself. The identification of the Sandjak Muslims with the Muslims in Bosnia, many of whom were their relatives, could not have been prevented by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by encircling Novi Pazar with tanks in the autumn of 1992, nor by sending reservists to Sandjak. The state in which they lived could not gain their affection through brutal seizure of weapons. School text-books which said that the Muslims were enemies, or that they were actually Serbs, were also discouraging.

With the war ending, the situation has eased and the Muslim-Croat disputes about Mostar have shown that it was not only Belgrade that fought the war against the Muslims. Towards the end of the war, the Serbian regime became less repressive and persistent in the confiscation of weapons.

With the emotions overheated by the war, which are now rapidly cooling down, the Sandjak Muslims with their new name are entering the phase of light national romanticism.

The Bosniak national definition and determination has automatically posed the question of a ``new language.'' The benign language romanticism, as well as the light political one, is accompanied by a total, cold political uncertainty. Sefko Alomerovic is angry: ``They are discussing the past in this meeting and we are having problems with the present and future. No one is asking what will happen. Milosevic will let us be called Bosniaks, but we shall vanish from here. Or he will not, and that could be one of the instruments to force us to move from this region.'' Leader of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) for Sandjak Rasim Ljajic says the first problem is that the authorities are not willing to define the Muslim issue in Sandjak as a problem. The second problem, according to him, is that the authorities will try to maintain the status quo, expecting the Muslim population to continue migrating to their mother country.

In early May 1995, while the war in Bosnia was raging, Ljajic had a round of talks with the representatives of the Serbian authorities. Even before his contact with the regime, Ljajic was called ``Fikret Abdic of Sandjak,'' which might now make his position on the internal level in Sandzak quite uncomfortable. During the talks with the Serbian authorities, Ljajic and his associates posed the questions of human rights, education, culture, police repression, customs, while the authorities solved only some communal problems. However, the SDA leader believes he scored a few points on the international level because he said, ``representatives of the international community got assurances that we want to negotiate.''

Rasim Ljajic is a representative of the political group in Sandjak which maintains that participation in the political life of the state is one of the elements for the fulfillment of national political goals and, as such, he advocates that SDA should participate in the elections. However he has doubts that the government may be doing its best to offer the Muslims reasons to abstain in the elections. He says that the local electoral units are being tailored in order to enable the predominantly Serb-populated units to get a deputy with a far smaller number of votes than in the predominantly Muslim-populated units. ``The government is doing its best to introduce an act according to which our representative is the one they choose for us,'' Ljajic said.

Having failed to make a coalition with other Muslim parties in Sandjak, Ljajic dared to try and go into a broader coalition of the centre with the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Civil Alliance of Serbia (GSS), Democratic Centre (DC), New Democracy (ND) and at least one party of ethnic minorities.

The problem is that ``with the Serbian opposition, you are never sure about the agreements. You have a politician who is with Seselj one day, with Djindjic the next and with an ethnic minority party the next day.'' When this is the way things are and with a public opinion in which politics is based mostly on emotions and not on political practice, Ljaljic's position may be jeopardized by a statement by SPO leader Vuk Draskovic in which he denied the correctness of the national name ``Bosniak'' (although he recognized the Muslims).

The other, clearly distinct, political group of the Sandjak Muslims comprises 18 political parties and various associations from all Sandjak towns. The coalition is dominated by the followers of the former SDA leader Sulejman Ugljanin who is now in exile. The outlines of this political block have been softened by leader of the Reform Democratic Party of Sandjak (RDSS) Izudin Susevic who had ignored Ugljanin's recommendation not to participate in elections. Susevic is said to be the unofficial chief of the coalition. In touch with the dominant, Ugljanin's faction, Susevic has become somewhat sharper. In an interview for Vreme he did not deny the fact that Sandzak was an inseparable part of Serbia, but said that it was a region which should have a special status including independent legislation. This opinion revives a document of the Muslim National Council, signed by Sulejman Ugljanin four years ago.

Susevic speaks on behalf of the whole political block which he represents when he says that the ``Sandzak Muslims are a part of the Bosniak corps, but are not willing to be an ethnic minority in Serbia.'' More precisely: the status of the Muslims will be resolved on reciprocal basis-if the Serbs are a constituent nation in Bosnia, so are the Muslims in Serbia.

This political block maintains that their opponents, represented by Rasim Ljajic, Rizah Gruda, Zevdzo Huric, have already accepted the status of ethnic minority for the Muslims in Serbia and Montenegro.

Both groups, however, are under Sarajevo's magnifying glass. Both of them visited Sarajevo within a short time span and met with Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic. The prevailing opinion in the Sandzak public is that the more popular faction is the one represented by Susevic in Sandzak and by Ugljanin in Sarajevo. The truth is right in the middle---the Bosnian president offered unreserved support to neither of the factions.

``We in Sandzak are the victims of both Sarajevo and Belgrade. Sarajevo is hostile toward the Sandzak Muslims because they are afraid we are going to take up their positions and offices, since the Sandzak Muslims greatly contributed to the defence of Sarajevo and Bosnia,'' Alomerovic said. He maintains that Sarajevo is presently busy with its own problems and that it will deal with the Sandzak topics only as balance between Belgrade and Sarajevo.

The people can deal with the new national name.

Source: Belgrade weekly 'Vreme", March 9, 1996

Kosovo

In its issue of March 20, 1996, Pristina weekly "Koha" brought some of the results of its survey among the Albanian population of Kosovo about the method in which this region's problems could be solved.

For some time now there has been an increase of the number of statements about the necessity of dialogue between Serbs and Albanians, the status of Kosova and Albanian representation in these talks. All these have created a particular political atmosphere which has not been researched for quite some time in Kosova.

"KOHA" carried out an investigation in Pristina and the surroundings, where 283 persons were polled as a chance sample of the population. The data from this research, has been separated in blocs.

It is largely supposed that this year will be the turning point, the beginning of the solution of the Kosova question. So, in reference to these suppositions, we asked the question concerning the possibilities of the initiation of dialogue in 1996. Those who think that there+p-p-p-will not come to such a dialogue do not represent an important majority (11.6%), same as those that have no particular opinion about this (7.07%). Those which think that there can be dialogue, with the good will of both sides, without intermediation or pressure from a third party, make up a minority (11.31%). The majority of persons questioned have declared that dialogue is possible only with pressure exerted by the international factor (69.61%). So if the number of those who believe that dialogue will commence is added to the number of those that believe that dialogue will start with pressure exerted by the international factor, it comes out that the absolute majority expect dialogue to commence in 1996.

On the other hand, the dilemma concerning who will carry out the possible dialogue on behalf of the Albanian party is often manifested among the public opinion. I.e., who should Serbia talk to, so dialogue could have the support and be legitimate. The absolute majority believe that the dialogue should be carried out with the Albanian legal representatives and with the presence of the third party (83.75%), which in one way would also be a warrant for the talks and agreements to be reached. Only 6.01% of the questioned believe that the dialogue should be carried out by someone else, but from the answers of those questioned it has not been possible to determine a more global or widespread position. Therefore, these answers can be considered more as dispersed answers in determined particular postures.

Same is the number of those polled thinking that dialogue should be carried out between the Serb and Albanian sides without the intermediation of a third party. Only 3.89% have no particular position. Concerning the role that Tirana should play in the possible dialogue and in the process of the solution of the Kosova question, the absolute majority has declared that it should be more active, 84.1 %. Those that think that the part played by Tirana should be as it has been so far, compose 8.13%, but only 0.35% think that Tirana should be less active concerning this problem. The number of those of the opinion that Tirana should not play any part at all in the process of the solution of the Kosova question, is not to be considered that negligible (5.65%).

In regard to the status that has the most realistic probabilities of realization, the answers are split between several possibilities, apart from the modality of the independent and sovereign Republic of Kosova, which, according to the survey, appears as the most realistic, 48.41%. It is very interesting that there is no dominating percentage for any of the other statuses. 15.55% of the questioned think that a Republic within the present Yugoslav federation is a realistic probability. The number of those that think that unification with Albania is possible and realistic makes up 9.89% of the polled. There is another fact that was evidenced in this case: that of a limited autonomy and the possibilities or realistic probabilities of such an outcome. The polled that have answered for such a status are small, 7.42%.

While trying to register what the public opinion declares about one or the other status, the question concerning what status they would personally most readily support was posed. From the data gathered, it appears that the majority of the questioned declares itself for the status of an independent, sovereign Republic of Kosova, 72.79%. The data deduced from the results of the survey concerning the unification with Albania are interesting. Only 20.86% of the questioned have declared themselves in favor of this solution. If the fact that this question is tied with what is wished for Kosova's future status, then it comes out that unification with Albania is not a widespread position. The 1974 model autonomy is not so accepted by the polled (1.41%). The same goes for a limited autonomy (0.35%). The number of those pronounced when asked about the consequences these statuses may cause to for peace or war in Kosova, is spread onto the possible options.

Thus, for example, a Republic within the Yugoslav Federation according to the polled (14.84%) is an option which could endanger peace. A Republic, independent and sovereign, which is most acceptable among the polled, comes out as an option which can lead towards war (25.09%). From the data, another worrying fact can be extracted, concerning the possibility of solving the Kosova question, since the public has no position about any of the statuses which would endanger peace. Opinions are divided, and in all status the possibility of endangering peace is expressed. Even a limited autonomy, according to the polled, can lead to war (18.02%). Same thing concerning the 1974 model autonomy, where the polled (5.3%) pronounce that it is a solution which could lead towards war. The unification with Albania is not very far from independent Kosova. The ones thinking that unification with Albania could endanger peace make up 26.86%.

Referring to the status that could evade war, the data is also diverse. Those of the opinion that an independent Republic of Kosova can elude war make up 35.69%. The number of those pronounced that a unification with Albania would elude war, 13.43%, is not small. Here, the number of those polled who think that a limited autonomy is a status which can elude war is increased to 9.89%. Also the number of those that think that the 1974 autonomy model is the status which can elude war is higher, 13.43%. All these data which are extracted from the research, are, at first sight, contradictory and don't speak much for coherence in the public opinion. Such are the impressions gained only if the Serbian non-readiness to offer a solution is taken into consideration. On the other hand, if the public opinion is considered, it comes out that Albanians too can endanger peace in case that there doesn't come to an equitable solution which is close to their demands concerning the Kosova question. If the Serb determined position about the political control of Kosova is taken into account, then at least a status of Kosova with a limited autonomy could elude an open Serb-Albanian conflict, but data show that this can't be considered as a possible solution. This could be the possible interpretation of these results.

The most preferable way to solve the question of Kosova, as far as the polled are concerned, comes out as being dialogue or agreement. For dialogue, as a way of solving the problem, 38.52 of the polled are in favor. Whereas 37.46% are pronounced in favor of a possible conference for Kosova, which would lead towards some standing agreement. Therefore, this category shows that the majority of the polled (75.98%) think that dialogue and agreement are forms which can lead towards the solution. Also the number of those which think that war is the way that can lead to the solution is not small, they make up 17.67% of the persons polled. A very few of the polled have pronounced that nonpolitical tools - violence and terror can lead to the solution of the problem.

Source: Pristina weekly "Koha", March 20, 1996

Vojvodina

In its issue of March 22, 1996, Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" carried a report of Radovan Balac, concerning the new territorial division of Vojvodina

The satellite Socialist majority in the Serbian parliament has passed the Regional plan of the Serbian Republic, at a session without the attendance of the opposition. After a major constitutional tailoring and political wrangles, this Plan was easy to pass, even without major discussion.

This Regional plan of Serbia until the year 2010, only signifies a forcible centralization in the Republic which is unscrupulously carried out since the Milosevic regime is ruling Serbia. There are no provinces envisioned within the plan - there are only regions, even though Vojvodina has its Regional plan since 1978, as does kosovo. All Vojvodina counties had their plans too, but in Serbia, out of 125 counties, only 5 had their own plans.As there are no provinces within the plan, the Vojvodina parliament did not discuss it. Kosovo parliament could not discuss it even if it wanted to, since it does not exist.

Instead of territorial integrity, according to the Regional plan of Serbia, Vojvodina is being split into four artificial units. It is envisioned that four regional plans for Northern Backa, Northern and Middle Banat, Southern Banat and Southern Srem are to be made. Besides that, the area that is to encompass Belgrade jurisdiction, covers one third of Vojvodina.

The organizations that came out publicly against this plan were "Vojvodina club", "Coordination committee of the Manifest for Autonomous Vojvodina" and "New DEmocracy party"- Vojvodina branch.

Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", March 22, 1996

MEDIA AND POLITICS

Split weekly "Feral Tribune" (author Zivko Gruden) looks in its issue of March 18, at the newest changes in the Criminal Law, which, as it says, informally introduces censorship in Croatia.

Two of the newest changes in the Croatian Criminal law substantially infringe into the freedom of free speech - if one is to judge by the current discussion of the proposed changes in the Croatian parliament. The first of those concerns the defamation of 'five untouchables" - the President of the Republic, Parliament, Government, Constitutional and Supreme court. So far, if any of the (four) untouchables felt hurt in public, the state prosecutor, at his request, instigated criminal proceedings. From now, though, the state prosecutor will, in his official capacity, instigate criminal proceedings when he himself evaluates that there is infringement into the character traits of the (five) untouchables. Beforehand he would have to get a written approval of the "hurt" party.

The second change is that it becomes an offence to publish a state secret (if the one publishing it is aware of this fact), and not only giving up of a state secret, as it was so far.

What are the motives for the first proposed change? Most probably, the fact that since the initiative is with the "hurt party" not one case has been instigated. Such a state, has obviously been seen as unsatisfactory in some high places. When the changes are put into effect, a case, for example, could be brough up against a journalist who would write that a high official, one of the five, while receiving a high foreign guest wore a tie which absolutely did not match his shirt, showing in that case his usual lack of taste.

What could be expected in Croatia, and will the jails fill up with journalists ? Those proposing the changes, most probably do not have that as their goal, at least because of "that international factor". Their goal is obviously that the threat of jail itself will be threatening enough, so that even that part of the journalistic profession that did not solely devote itself to glorifying of our well known wonders and wonder makers, is brought into line; that their will to criticize the authorities and publication of unverified opinions and stances - in short, that even without formal introduction of censorship it achieves it.

That is the reason behind the criminalization of the publication of the state secret. This would mean that journalist should give up on the investigation of misuse of authority, since the information about it might be covered with a "state secret" stamp.

Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", March 18, 1996

Serbia

Dejan Anastasijevic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" discusses in the magazine's issue of March 2, 1996, the court order for the closure of the Soros Foundation offices in Yugoslavia.

On Friday, February 23, the Supreme Court of Serbia nullified the official registration of the Soros Foundation in Yugoslavia, meaning that the organizations no longer entitled to any activities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Barely eight days after the takeover of NTV Studio B, another important factor providing a channel of freedom in these troubled waters has ceased to exist. The decision only confirmed one made by the Serbian ministry of culture, dated May 10, 1995, "establishing'' that the co-founder the Federal Executive Council, (the government of the former Yugoslavia), is ineligible as an institution. The registration of the foundation was disputed also because it never stated whether it was a joint company, a state firm or a private enterprise. Its activities were being questioned because it was registered as an institution providing scholarships and international cooperation in science, while it also engaged in humanitarian issues and a wide range of cultural activities.

In addition, the founder of the organization, US multi-millionaire George Soros, was the target of a broad public campaign to proclaim him an enemy of all Serbs. Even his Jewish origin was used as an argument to support this theory. The crucial argument, however, was his signature on one of the petitions demanding military intervention to stop the Serb siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian towns. The rector of Belgrade University then said that George Soros had asked for the bombing of Belgrade and aligned himself with the enemies of this country and its people.

The accusations were accompanied by two which came from the government, unusually open this time: the foundation was charged with providing the independent media with substantial technical assistance, essential for their survival in the local self-styled market conditions, and more importantly-sharply criticized for refusing to distribute large quantities of humanitarian aid (namely medications and medical equipment) through state institutions. The latter case of "uncooperative behaviour,'' probably prompted by justified fear that letting the state in would result in the lion's share of the medications ending up in private pharmacies and the black market, posed a direct and serious threat to the financial interests of some powerful individuals, ranking officials who make large profits from medications sold on the black market. Quite simply, its all about big interests and big money. Last year only, the Soros Foundation distributed aid and equipment worth five million dollars free of charge, which severely affected the price of medications on the black market.

The representatives of the Panonija humanitarian association, 12 medical institutions and five medical factories were the first to suffer from the decision made by the supreme court. They were to receive a large amount of medications, X-ray machines and other medical equipment. Kindergarten children were left without 15,000 toys, 10,000 stationary sets and 10,000 pairs of shoes. Eight artist colonies and about 70 scientific and technological projects will become history, while some 500 scientists, students and experts will be lift without scholarships. The list may be incomplete, but the message voiced by the state to its citizens reads loud and clear: "no one has the right to feed or clothe you except us.''

All opposition parties, (from the Radicals to the Civil Alliance), sharply condemned the ban. The authorities arrogantly replied that political parties should not make it their business to discuss decisions made by the courts, especially if they happen to be the Supreme court, but deal with everyday civic problems (Aleksandar Vulin, spokesman of the Yugoslav United Left---JUL).

It is unlikely that the ban will face serious opposition either at home or abroad. The Americans are currently discussing other issues with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, much more significant for them (such as the implementation of the Dayton treaty and Kosovo). On the other side, opposition parties are so preoccupied with inner-party and inter-party rifts that no one expects them to take action which would actually force the regime to reconsider its decision. Representatives of the foundation will reveal their position and future plans at a press conference on February 29. In the meantime, they released a statement that there are 23 Soros foundations worldwide, from Kirghistan to Haiti, and that none of them had been banned except the one in Yugoslavia.

The same could quite possibly happen in Croatia, whose President Franjo Tudjman openly told Soros that ``it could make better use of its money than give it to Croatian traitors.'' At the same time, the Croatian education ministry turned down Soros' offer to install computers in Croatian school unconditionally and free of charge. The case is yet another example of concerted action by authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb, whose joint project is hampering the vital interests of their own citizens.

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", March 2, 1996

Dejan Anastasijevic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", examines the takeover of the radio station "Penguin" of Belgrade by infamous Zeljko Raznatovic -Arkan.

The station is the Independent Radio Penguin (on 90.9 MHz) which changed its name to Radio Tiger on Monday, March 18. It changed from the hands of businessman Giovanni Di Steffano to the hands of another businessman-Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. Another independent Belgrade radio station changed owners last week and immediately lost its independent label. ``No one is independent today,'' the new editor in chief told reporters in an interpretation of new editorial policies which will no longer include politics but only light music and entertainment.

The event didn't draw the attention of the EU, State Department or Committee to Protect Journalists or even Serbia's opposition. Even the station staff had nothing against the takeover. The station is the Independent Radio Penguin (on 90.9 MHz) which changed its name to Radio Tiger on Monday, March 18. It changed from the hands of businessman Giovanni Di Steffano to the hands of another businessman---Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. Both have an indubitable international reputation; they've been tried both here and abroad for various crimes, and some countries still want them. The station's history is intriguing after changing three owners in six months.

Radio Penguin was set up by the late Radojica Nikcevic in 1990 as the first private and independent station in Belgrade (B 92 radio was years old at the time but was listed as a state company). From the start it was an apolitical station with music and entertainment programs and many call-in shows. Nikcevic brought together a large group of young people who could hardly wait for their opportunity after trying to break through into state owned radio stations. ``We were so full of enthusiasm,'' says Darko Kocijan, the station's first editor in chief. Some things weren't clear: where did Nikcevic get the money for studios and equipment, and why did it take him such a short time to get a frequency license and other permits which this state is loathe to hand out (B 92 is still waiting for most of its permits). He shed some light on the mystery when he bragged that he didn't know which security service he actually worked for: Serbian, Montenegrin or federal. Still, it was a fun station and the salaries were fine.

The first scandal (indirect) broke out in early October 1993 when Nikcevic was killed in the parking lot in front of his other company, the Sumadija building society. That professional killing was never solved. Investigators found only two empty 44 caliber cases by the body and an eyewitness who said two men approached Nikcevic, shot him in the head and disappeared. Two things then came to light. First, Nikcevic had a partner---Di Steffano. Second, just before he died, Nikcevic went to Columbia with Di Steffano. That is interesting because, several months later, foreign drug enforcement agencies asked about Di Steffano in Belgrade and his links with the Medellin cartel.

Di Steffano always denied any involvement in the drug trade and the death of his partner.

Penguin was another channel for Di Steffano to advertise himself. Since he arrived in Belgrade, the Italian businessman originally from Pescara (he doesn't speak Italian but is fluent in English with a slight cockney accent) has posed as the owner of Metro Goldwyn Mayer and a dozen other less important companies who came to Yugoslavia because he loved everything Serb. Most probably, he saw the fantastic opportunities for business under the sanctions and a government that urgently needed illegal financial transactions. Di Steffano was an undoubted expert in that field with a British jail certificate to prove it and trials in France and the US. Like Nikcevic, he had a talent to break through bureaucratic barriers; he got a Yugoslav passport in record time with an address close to the Milosevic residence. But, something went wrong with his relationship with the authorities in April 1994 when he was arrested for foreign currency dealings. He was released quickly but the 70,000 DEM posted as bail was never returned. That didn't reflect on Penguin which continued its good music and entertainment although the salaries were no longer as good.

The next scandal happened on April 27, 1995 when Mija Medak, a driver for the station, was accidentally wounded in the stomach by an unidentified Di Steffano bodyguard. That was the straw that broke the camel's back for most of the staff after the owner's arrogance and irregular salaries. In protest, 52 of the staff of 75 resigned. Some stayed and, with some hastily educated personnel, the station continued broadcasting.

Why Di Steffano decided to let Arkan have the station is a topic of speculation. They're old friends: he paid for Arkan's wedding (300,000 DEM) and bragged that he was a general in Arkan's guard. Add to that Di Steffano's comment that he owes Arkan his life and it's clear that if Raznatovic wanted Penguin, Di Steffano just couldn't refuse. In any case, he's been transferring his attention slowly to Italy where he's one of the 100,000 people who are running for parliament. Also since the sanctions have been lifted and the Medellin cartel is gone, the need for his services is uncertain. That is confirmed by the fact that no one from the ruling party came to his wedding last June.

Another question is why would Arkan need a radio since he controls three magazines (Serb Unity, Bullet and Ring). Arkan's deputy Borislav Pelevic said: ``Tiger won't settle down until it gets a TV frequency license.'' So the delinquent and criminal pastry shop owner and businessman could become a media magnate. But will that help him with the tribunal in The Hague?

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", March 23, 1996

SPECIAL THEMES

In its issue of March 9, 1996, Belgrade weekly "Vreme" brought a special article prepared by a group of its authors, as well as correspondents from Sarajevo and Zagreb, concerning black market and war profiteering in current circumstances on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for Bosnia, recently held a meeting with the three Bosnian Prime Ministers (Bosnian Serb Rajko Kasagic, Sarajevo government Hasan Muratovic and Moslem-Croat Federation Izudin Kapetanovic) in Banja Luka recently. They discussed mutual economic trends.

Fanatical patriots and the uniformed shook their heads; yesterday's enemies are going to start doing business? They said the Serb exodus from Sarajevo showed that nothing can be done together in Bosnia, they said. They forgot that trade flourished throughout the war: guns, food, cigarettes, drugs, services. There was only condition-cash payment in hard currency.

In the midst of the Moslem-Croat fighting in Mostar in 1993, the Bosnian Army (BiH) paid the Bosnian Serb Army's (BSA) Herzegovina corps 20,000 DEM to shell the Croat Defence Council (HVO). The shelling began at a set time but continued past the deadline. Worried Moslem officers contacted the BSA artillery by radio and were told not to worry, the extra is on the house.

That example shows the developed trade in arms, personnel and military services that reached a climax in 1993/94. Serb soldiers wearing HVO uniforms shelled Moslem troops from Serb tanks for 150 DEM a man. With the exception of the Cazin area where both Moslem armies bought weapons from the Krajina Serbs (Fikret Abdic also rented men and materiel) the arms and services trade in central Bosnia was mainly between Serbs and Croats. The Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) got 14,000 tons of fuel through Herzegovina. Serb trucks replaced their plates with Croat registration plates, went to Split to load the fuel and replaced the plates on their way back. Serb-Croat trade died down after the Washington agreement in 1993 and the Croats began trading with the Moslems. Throughout the war the arms trade was a very profitable business.

Former Moslem Prime Minister Hasan Cengic explained how the trade was done in Slovenia's parliament after an arms scandal in 1994. Slovenian Defence Minister Janez Jansa ``discovered'' 120 tons of weapons intended for the BiH at Maribor airport. Cengic said: ``We paid the Slovenian police in cash and with no records. We got 30-35,000 rifles and several hundred pistols from the police. That cost us somewhere between 1.2 and 1.6 million DEM.''

But, the arms trade was not a business under a state and para-state monopoly. Private businessmen, doing small deals, saw their business flourish in 1992 and `93. It started with UNPROFOR in the Krajina. As soon as the UN personnel settled in, traders appeared offering bayonets for $20, hand grenades for $10-15 and pistol ammunition for $1-2 a bullet. Business boomed once the market formed. Since UNPROFOR paid its men in USD there was no problem in adopting the US currency.

The question is why the peacekeepers bought weapons. Part of the answer is supplied by Austrian customs officials. Some 60 of their officers surrounded and searched three buses in late 1993 which were carrying Czech UN troops home. They seized a pistol, six hand grenades and some ammunition. Informed sources said the best prices were paid by the Bosnian Moslems who were short of arms then, especially in Bihac. They bought arms from Serb and Croat dealers at any price.

Another question is where did the Serbs get that surplus of weapons. Informal analyses show that over 60% of the arms left to the them by the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) went missing and they still had enough to go around.

As the war continued, the small deals died off. All three sides had plenty of weapons and the demand dropped drastically. Some Krajina dealers who managed to get some of their stock to Serbia are complaining that not even the Albanians want to buy them now.

Drugs and arms are considered two branches of the same business. An indirect example proves that. During the worst of the Moslem-Croat fighting in October 1993, BiH troops fired a dud mortar shell full of marijuana to the right bank of the Neretva which divided Moslem and Croat areas of Mostar. The HVO sent the dud back filled with cigarettes.

The drugs trade also flourished in the former Yugoslavia war. Prices even dropped lower than before the war and the explanation of that is simple. Many arms dealers were not averse to selling drugs since they were already risking their necks. The demand for drugs grows in wartime and most dealers knew where to get the stuff even before the war. The more so since supplies of modern weapons and drugs are the domain of organized crime. The dealers' paradise was complete because there was no law to avoid. BiH General Jovan Divjak complained early in 1993 that ``dirty money is playing a big role in this war'' and that ``thanks to criminal groups Sarajevo was defended in the first weeks of the war'' but ``they were allowed to do what they wanted for too long.''

In mid-1993, a gram of grass sold for three DEM in Sarajevo, heroin for 50-70 DEM. The prices in Belgrade were five DEM and 80-100 DEM. After dealing with the Sarajevo Mafia that year, the local secret police said a large amount of heroin was found in the home of one of the crime bosses and claimed that supply channel had been cut.

The arms trade is a state monopoly and the drugs trade requires knowledge of specific people, but the cigarette business is believed to be the best, although not most profitable, and safest deal. In the winter of 1992/93, cigarettes were a form of payment in Sarajevo and you could buy anything for them.

Oslobodjenje daily published the story of the tobacco routes in 1993. It said cigarettes were carried on horses, on foot, tractor, across mountain trails. A carton cost 7-10 DEM in Gornji Vakuf, 20 in Fojnica, 30 in Visoko and 70 in Zenica. The Bosnia war holds a record in that respect: one carton of Marlboro was sold for 500 DEM. 50 cartons of medium quality cigarettes could buy a Golf car in central Bosnia in 1993 and early in 1994 a cigarette (any kind) cost five DEM in Vitez. A kilo of tobacco traded for 20 kilos of flour in Gorazde in the winter of '92-93 and cost over 50 DEM. The best tobacco deal was done by Fikret Abdic: he somehow got an unbelievable amount of 20 year old Colombian Galles cigars for his defence forces. Part of them were immediately sold to the BiH 5th corps. When Kladusa fell the 5th corps also captured several tons of Galles.

Every deal has to die for whatever reason but food trade can't. Everything is sold for food: jewelry, antiques, furniture. The Sarajevo black market is a good example. A kilo of sugar sold for 70 DEM, a liter of cooking oil for 35, 30 eggs cost 100 DEM, a new Mazda cost 5,000 and a CD player 80. At the same time, black marketeers in Bihac sold sacks of flour for 100 DEM each but there were times, during battles, when those sacks cost up to 1,000 DEM. A ranking customs official in Tuzla said food came from Bijeljina regularly through the war and added that it was fresh.

Two places in Bosnia were a smuggler's paradise: Kiseljak and Velika Kladusa. In Kladusa, business went on thanks to Abdic. In 1991, he traded with the Croats through his Agrokomerc corporation and supplied the Krajina Serbs. When he was surrounded, something like a duty free zone started operating on the borders of his enclave. It stated when ropes were thrown across the Glina river to link the villages of Gejkovac and Miljakovici. The Serbs sent food, drink and other goods across and the Moslems returned cash. Prices were set in shouting matches across the river. Very soon, Serbs and Moslems began crossing the river to trade. Business really got going once Abdic declared his Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and got the road to Karlovac opened for his trucks. He traded with everyone: Croatia, the Krajina, Serbia, the RS, even the 5th corps which was waging war against him. He had a customs outpost set up near Dvor Na Uni where his police and the Krajina police checked every truck. Soon the Krajina and RS leaders realized Abdic's importance and they cracked down on all small time smugglers. That didn't really help nor did specially formed military police units.

The small smugglers supplied Bihac. Mainly Bihac women did deals, braving their own mine fields to earn money which explains the large number of girls with no legs in the town. Markets popped up along the confrontation lines. Some time before the fall of the Krajina, a Krajina Army unit allegedly opened fire on one of those markets to prevent"illegal trade with the enemy.''

Kiseljak was like Casablanca to Sarajevans. Trade started there in the summer of the first year of war under an agreement between Kiseljak Croats and Ilidza Serbs which was never broken despite serious pressure throughout the war.

Absolutely everything was smuggled in and out of Kiseljak-from powdered eggs and milk to marble for elite Sarajevo clubs. Prices were formed according to the number of middle men: beef was bought in Croatia for 1-2 DEM and sold in Kiseljak for 6-8, Ukrainian UN troops sold it to Sarajevo's Mafia for 20 who sold it on to middle men for over 30 and when it reached the market it cost 50 DEM a kilo, sometimes even 100. The Ilidza Serbs charged a transit tax either in goods or cash. The Kiseljak Mafia won itself a reputation as the most capable and the most brutal in just a few months. Clashes were frequent and some sources said HVO General Tihomir Blaskic (who has been charged with war crimes) was moved out to Vitez from his post as Kiseljak commander because he sided with the wrong group of smugglers. The best example of the supply offered in Kiseljak dates to early 1993: a bomb was thrown into an elite restaurant. In just 20 days its glittering marble, brass and mirrors were replaced from Italy.

The real sharks among that type of businessman were the state and para state officials: political, military and police. Bildt has no reason to fear. If they are not prevented from earning money the Bosnian economy will flourish. The people who invested in smuggling will know how to invest in production. Business is business.

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", March 9, 1996

Newmilitary alliances ?

The Russian minister of defense signed during his visit to Belgrade in February a protocol about military cooperation, nad many have concluded that this an episode in the series of attempts of the Russian Federation to restore, in some form, the Warsaw pact. It is believed that it was actually by Russian recommendation that the Ministry of defense of FRY, signed additional agreements about military cooperation with Romania, Bulgaria, as well as Ukraine and Bielorussia. General Grachov came to Belgrade for a second time, but with more concrete plans than those with which he attempted in Summer of 1994 to give the guarantees to the Serbs in connection with the debate about the Contact group plan. After the personnel change in Moscow at the top of the Foreign ministry, by which the opposition to NATO's intentions to establish a system of security on the East of the continent has been strengthened, so strengthened the confusion in Belgrade about the dilemmas connected with the possible engagement of Serbia in the "Partnership for peace" programme.

This "confusion" of Belgrade, actually, is already seen as some form of policy. On the lines of thinking by which Serbia is attempting to strengthen its diplomatic position in the post-Dayton period through stressing of the Russian presence in the region, is the never publicly denied plan by which the Montenegrin coast is to become a base for Russian marine forces. For the time being, it is the financial reasons that are cited as reason why the battle group, including air carrier "Kuznetsov" did not enter the Adriatic waters, as was planned, connected with the support to the peace process, actually to the Russian air mobile brigade, based in the sector "A" of IFOR in the Northeastern Bosnia.

According to that idea, "Kuznetsov" was supposed to complete the picture of a coalition approach of Russia and NATO in the buildup of confidence after the acceptance of the peace agreements. The carrier was to be located in the Southern Adriatic zone, with the logistic base in the Boka Kotorska Bay. The answers why this did not occur from financial aspects appeAr quite convincing: the movement of this battle group from the Black Sea is an expensive operation.

There are, of course, purely political explanations to this. The spectrum is wide: from the tightening of the Turkish regime for the sailing of Russian ships through the Bosporus straight, through the fears of the Medditeranean members of NATO of the spread of Russian influence, up until the general wish of NATO to keep the dominant position though their permanent marine forces in the Medditeranean.

The plans of the Russian federation about the return, to a lesser or greater extent of its influence to this side of the Carpathian mountains, it seems, have not been discouraged by this. Moreover, it is actually Serbia that is seen as a base for regional expansion of destruction concerning the Western goals symbolized by the "Partnership for Peace". Russian-Serbian military connections are seen as "organic", due to technical-technological dependence of the Yugoslav army from the Russian military industry, but also due to almost identical outlooks on the process of the establishment of new balance of power in Europe, as well as chronic nostalgia for the Cold War era, That is why the unofficial notions that Serbia would soon receive some quantities of Russian weaponry should be interpreted in that context.

So it seems, that the most important import of Russian military effectives since 1988, when then commander of the Yugoslav air force, general Anton Tus (later commander of the Croatian army), made a deal about the purchase os a squadron of "MIG-29", or from the times of never publicly admitted transactions of then minister of defense Veljko Kadijevic with the conspiracy group of general Dmitri Yazov,is on the verge. With the Belgrade protocol, the military of the Russian federation obliged itself, on the bassi of the debt for the Serbian wheat, deliver Serbia a squadron of "MI-24" helicopters, squadron of "MI -29" planes, and an unknown number of ballistic missiles. Maybe the import of the air vehicles would not raise so much interest; but, when the ballistic missiles are in question - the matter slides towards the thinking about new encouragement of dangerous ambitions of Belgrade.

Concerning these missiles, it could definitely be talked about the "C-300" rockets (a form of the US "Patriot" missiles), but also about the realization of an old wish of the Belgrade military top to import ballistic missiles earth-earth, which, with certain modifications could have a higher range for a few hundred kilometers. Also, their heads could be filled with chemical poisons.

As long as 1993, then chief of staff Zivota Panic made a secret visit to Iraq, where he inquired about the Iraqi technological experience in this field.

Serbia has the technological capacity to widen the possibilities of the Russian missile models (before all, in factories like "Krusik" in Valjevo and "Merima" in Krusevac), and it is believed that the work on the basic projects would be strengthened by bringing of Russian military experts to the already existing teams at the "Air Technical Institute" in Zarkovo near Belgrade. What remains is the question of transport of the Russian military contingent for Serbia, but it seems that this was also solved. At least part of the transport will take place through the Bar port in Montenegro: the signatory of the agreement with Grachov, defense minister Pavle Bulatovic made an agreement in Bar, which envisions that the Yugoslavs marine force, "temporarily use a part of the operative coast of the port".

Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", March 15, 1996

Opinions

The chamber of citizens in Federal Parliament met only 14 times (days) in all of 1995. Why? Was it because it didn't have enough draft laws submitted by the federal government and other institutions? Or perhaps the situation in the country is so boring that there's nothing for the chamber to debate?

It was quite natural to assume after the 1990 multi-party elections in Serbia and 1992 federal multi-party elections that the country would slowly and systematically enter a system of pluralism which is called a democracy. Objectively, we know that in all of Eastern Europe the transition between the two systems (communism and democracy) isn't quick. An essential point in a democracy is for the parliament to be on its toes all the time regardless of whether the state is a parliamentary democracy or just a democracy. In that sense what were the activities of the chamber of citizens in the Federal Parliament?

The first thing I can say is that the chamber met only 14 times (days) in all of 1995. Why? Was it because it didn't have enough draft laws submitted by the federal government and other institutions? Or perhaps the situation in the country is so boring that there's nothing for the chamber to debate? The chamber rules state that it works from the first week of February to the end of June and from the first week of September to the end of December every year.

From January 1 to December 26, the federal government submitted 65 draft laws to Parliament. Also, MPs, committee groups and the Yugoslav National Bank submitted 16 draft laws. So Parliament received 81 drafts to debate and the chamber adopted only 23, which leaves 53 drafts to debate. Why wasn't their procedure started if the chamber voted on them in 1995?

The federal government does have a majority even though it suffered some failures with its drafts. The question is why it stood by while some drafts (drafts laws on labour, public information and others) were left on the side?

A large number of opposition MPs claim everything is being done according to plans and a conspiracy.

The public knows that the FRY's foreign policy was never once debated comprehensively during the years of war in Bosnia. That debate was held outside the federal government circle and Parliament. Over those three years four debates were held on the foreign policy during a period of 1,000 days. At the last session of the chamber of citizens the public was excluded because of the short and meek report by Foreign Minister Milutinovic. Everything he said was reported by the press and TV.

Nasa Borba's Vojislava Vignjevic concluded earlier this year that the ruling parties in Montenegro and Serbia ``intended to crush multi-party parliamentarism and they have succeeded.'' The feeling I get from up close says something else: the ruling parties don't sense what multi party parliamentarism is, they're afraid of losing single party rule, unable to compromise or reach a consensus on any important issue. Take a trivial problem as an example: every celebration organized by the authorities in Serbia and at federal level is reserved for government members and their supporters even when no political points are at stake. That was true of the 50th anniversary of Tanjug news agency and the anniversary of the W.W.II. liberation of Belgrade.

Is there a director, in Serbia at least, of a state owned company who isn't a member or active supporter of the ruling party? Is there a single school principal who belongs to the opposition? The directors of Tanjug, Politika, Borba and the three state TV channels are prominent ruling party members and they hold state posts as well. Even the rector of Belgrade University is a federal MP of theruling party.

Take another example which might seem trivial. In the chamber of citizens, I think the deputy speaker presided over a session only once. I haven't seen anything different in the Serbian parliament. The speaker can only be a ruling party member; his deputies can't preside although the rules allow it. In the chamber of citizens, two-thirds of the MPs are directors of mainly state companies; the others all have other jobs and the authorities could say that they're all too busy to meet more often. But the basic issue is this: why does such a small number of people hold so many posts in this system?

Although article 14 of the federal constitution allows political pluralism, and that means a multi-party system, it's clear that in this country the system is one-party after six years of some changes. This isn't a monopoly since a monopoly means no one else is involved. This country is an example of one-party rule. Even institutions that seem to be free-the press as opposed to TV-have been reduced to a minimum through direct intervention. Constitutional court judge Slobodan Vucetic was right when he wrote in NIN weekly last year that today we are"farther from freedom of the press than five years ago.''

I don't believe we fell into this situation because the ruling regime has an ideologist who experiments and introduces novelties. That kind of person is no longer present either in the ruling party or the opposition. There's a wave of opposition to political thinking, reasoning and wise decisions underway. Our regime is more the expression of the heritage of the old one-party regime with people who were in the ruling structures then. The serious question to ask is: how will the country progress if the situations continues to develop the way it is now?

The regime isn't the only one to blame for this situation although it has the most blame to carry. The opposition is headed by fairly gifted and energetic people but they are immature and not serious, at least the majority of them. No one is even trying to do what should have been done in 1990 both here and in relations with the other former Yugoslav republics: find a consensus of the rulers who don't accept changes and the opposition who have no intention of using undemocratic means to topple the regime.

If things go on like this there will be a state of constant confrontation which would develop into a new tragedy after Bosnia. Every internal civil strife or imposition of an undemocratic new regime will only prevent us from getting out of the abyss we fell into in the early 1990s by our own fault primarily.

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme" March 2, 1996

Balkan Media & Policy Monitor

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