BALKAN MEDIA & POLICY MONITOR

The foreign policy commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic wrote in the magazine's issue of May 26, 1995. That the days of persuasion of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic by the US envoy Robert Frasure turned into a a circus, and the diplomacy of the leading world power was humiliated by the man who bears the burden of crime in the region of former Yugoslavia.

The chief commentator of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", Stojan Cerovic, discusses in the magazine's issue of May 29, 1995. The background of the unification initiative between Bosnian and Croatian Serbs.

The same issue of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" carried an article on the subject of unification by Filip Svarm and Petar Svacic.

One of the correspondents of the independent news pool "AIM" from Belgrade, Slobodan Reljic, discussed in his report of June 3, 1995, carried by the Belgrade "Radio B 92" the aspects of the negotiations between Serbian president Milosevic and the US on the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The question of the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia -Yugoslavia is discussed in the commentary by Gojko Beric, published in the weekly international edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje" of June 8-15, 1995.

In its continued series of articles on the situation in Bosnia named "Bosnia play-off ", Split weekly "Feral Tribune" brought in its issue of June 5,1995., a detailed commentary by Marinko Culic.

CURRENT EVENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it evolved in the direction of further conflict, was of key focus to the media in the region. Due to the abundance of information and written comments and analyses on various aspects of this situation, "Balkan Media & Policy Monitor " has prepared this special issue to cover the key texts presented in the previous month on this subject.

Nomination of general Mile Mrksic for the commander of Serbian army in Croatia showed that there was no "turn" in policy. But, asks Jovanovic, why did international community keep quiet concerning this classic proof of involvement across the river Drina; answering that it might be found when it is connected with lukewarm reactions to the dossier of the renegade Serbian agent Cedomir Mihajlovic.Obviously, somebody wants to turn Milosevic into a hero in the awkwardly thought out end to the Yugoslav hell.

Jovanovic thinks that Milosevic remains on the Greater Serbian positions and that everything else is a bluff and police gossip about so called heavy quarrels with the "war lobby". Belgrade remains on the hardline positions of the Greater Serbian strategy, and the differences crop up concerning the method and timing of the legalization of different results.

Anyway, if the clashes in Western Slavonia persisted, would there have been a military reaction from Serbia ? Jovanovic says that his sources told him that the army staff was inclined towards this approach, and that Milosevic was consulted on some preparatory measures. One of the commanders of Serbian units in Western Slavonia made statement to one Belgrade weekly that during the clashes he was phoned by chief of staff of the Yugoslav army general Momcilo Perisic, who gave him operative advice...

So, says Jovanovic, there is no essential change in matters. Bosnia will not be recognized by Serbia until Serbian nationalism has been beaten, fundamentally and completely, solely by military force. This, since there is no nationally responsible and cooperative operative government in Belgrade, unfortunately, is the only road that leads to the calming of the situation.

Milosevic is ready - from communistic and nationalistic reasons - to lead a hundred year anti-Western policy, the politics of bloody suffocation of the rights of numerically smaller surrounding nations and human rights in FRY, since this is the politics that keeps him in power. Any other solution would lead Serbia towards democratic and economic recovery, but in this country rich with Ottoman tradition and subordinate mentality, the visions are turned in the opposite direction.

On a wider plane, continues Jovanovic, the things are more or less lear: absolutely not one strategic document of Belgrade which deals with the position of Serbia in its surroundings, does not count with the existence of independent Bosnia and its borders on the Drina river. New sphere of influence of Western democracy, according to those documents, would be kept on a thin belt of Croatian coast and geographically undefined regions of Central Bosnia, in Serbian encirclement, with diminished possibilities for economic and political maneuvering.

On the other hand, the ethnically cleansed belt in Eastern Bosnia, "cut" the propaganda tool named "green transversal" of Kosovo and Sandjak with Bosnia, which - according to Serbian strategists - solves the future problems with Kosovo, which remains cut in such a manner. Such a theory would be correct if it would be possible: the solution of the problem of Kosovo, meaning the "oversaturation" of Albanians there, is impossible to solve in any other manner than a violent one, like in Bosnia.

Many think, says jovanovic, that the recognition of Bosnia would not stop the war there, The war would be localized in such a manner, preventing its spread towards south-east. It seems though, that during summer or beginning of autumn there could come a frontal clash of Bosnia and Croatia with rebelling Serbs. This process would be rushed by the proclamation of "Western Serbia". This would lead to the retreat of the greater part of the UN troops from Bosnia. This would most probably lead to a creation of a climate within the military and state leadership of Serbia, to send into Bosnia limited interventionist military forces, positioning them on a number of strategic areas, by which they would use the created vacuum completely. Such a plan, insists jovanovic, exist in the military chief command.

The vital and most sensitive areas of control territories of Bosnia along Serbia are found in the quadrant of river Drina - Krivaja - river Bosna - river Sava. In that region in the northeAst Bosnia two Bosnian enclaves are located (Srebrenica and Zepa ), bosnian basin with Tuzla in it, Bosnian forts of Olovo and Kladanj, strategically important mt. Ozren and Majevica and finally - the Corridor.

To this area, having in mind the demographic potential in Macva and the region of Western valley of river Morava, it is possible to organize some sort of a mobilization within the context of the Belgrade army, which would have as a goal to force river Drina and spread into a combat order towards Bosnian positions, so to take an offensive operation from numerous positions towards Tuzla, with operative engagement of bosnian Serb troops.

The final goal: occupy the territory south of the corridor until the line Kladanj - Ribnica - Voluca. The estimated number of personnel would be around 30 thousand troops. This would definitely prompt a reaction from NATO planes over Bosnia, which would begin with demonstrative flights, and then, even go into action. Anything that would happen later on, is out of the zone of relevant assumptions, concludes Jovanovic.

Source; Podgorica weekly "Monitor", May 26, 1995.

We were almost on the way to forget why the Serbs have actually ventured into this war, when somebody in Knin mentioned unification. Oh, yes, that was that word from the beginning of this. Now it sounds strange and crazy, as if that was infinitely a long time ago.

There must be something in that word when it was able to set fire to the people and to burn down so many houses and cities. But, the reserves of that fuel, obviously, are scraping the bottom, because if they weren't, Milosevic would not enter the bargaining with the Americans. Now he is offering, in the form of the recognition of Bosnia, exactly that used story about the unification in the exchange for the lifting of sanctions. He did not succeed, but that job will be concluded, sooner or later. He only has to persuade those that don't believe anything he says that he will not deal anymore in unification and similar great endeavors and that he is slowly dismantling what he has done so far, as long as he cannot return everything into the state it was in before.

Milosevic's problem is that he cannot find a good replacement for unification. He is not even offered a role of the "Lifter" of sanctions; to become a half-pardoned criminal instead of a Unifier, doesn't look well, it seems. It could even become risky.

Not everybody in Serbia has realized that everything was useless, because it was not told to them in such a clarified manner.They were only told that Serbs were right, that they have even won, but that for now it is best to forget all that.Those who do not understand this logic, are now sticking to Seselj and others who are heating the not everybody in Serbia has realized that everything was useless, because it was not told to them in such a clarified manner. They were only told that Serbs were right, that they have even won, but that for now it is best to forget all that.Those who do not understand this logic, are now sticking to Seselj and others who are heating the remnants of the myth about victory and treason.

All this, after Serbs have made a common stand behind Milosevic, five-six years ago, like never before. In the manner in which people could agree only about evil: when they are getting ready to commit evil and when they are promised that it will pay off and even be sanctified. To see where that leads, continues Cerovic, they only needed to look at some old German and Italian documentaries. From greatest unity come remnants of the myth about victory and treason.

Easily planned and nicely drawn big Serbian state now comprises tree, or five, mainly temporary and provisionary parts. There is no more one leader, but everywhere two or three, which are trying to stab each other in the back. There will definitely be no unification, even Knin and Pale are barely holding and are loosing faith in the future. Serbia has still not definitely defined its western borders, and it still does not know what it will do with Kosovo, so that this formless and chaotic state is run by sheer inspiration.Even the strength of the union with Montenegro is equal to the authority of the federal president Zoran Lilic.

The current outcome is known, and the perspective could only be a little or a lot worse. All Serbian leaders, and hopefully a good part of the people, are now undoubtedly aware of that. That is why the renewed story of unification seems unreal and fake. It is, by all probability, only another desperate bluff which has to extend the life of those small, temporary statesmen of the type as Martic and Karadzic, and to create an impression that they are still in the game and that they are still making some moves, even off the board.

By the number of announcements of unification, says Cerovic, Serbs are starting to resemble Arabic countries. The manner around here have acquired much of an oriental flavour: a little bit of fighting, a little bit of brotherhood, swearing, playing hurt and unification.

This time, they say, it is serious. The parliament in Banja Luka was delighted and unanimous, which is particularly suspicious. From those acclamations, nothing came to be. And, haven't the Bosnian Serbs shown how much the Serbian unity lies on their hearts, while the Croats have conducted "peaceful re-integration" of Western Slavonia. If they were for it, they could have attempted the unification while they stood better and were on the rise, and their opponents still attempting to consolidate themselves.

But, everybody wanted his own duchy, and besides that, they depended too much on Milosevic who was putting on the brakes, since he coldly calculated out that the unification would draw him into a big war, with good chances that he would draw the big world powers on his back and loose it.

Karadzic and Martic are now speaking about unification not because of delight but out of fear. Not that the Serbs would live happily together, but that they would be able to save their skin. In a situations like these, the statesmen of their "qualities" and scruples will only look how to trick one another, at which the one that is stronger comes out as the more skilfully one.

Karadzic would definitely like to take over from Krajina the arms and the militarily able part of the population. He is not interested in the rest, the least to pick a fight with the Croats. The perspective of such a unification would amount to move of Martic and his company to the Bosnian side and a gradual delivery of Krajina to Croatia, probably under the conditions worse than they would get without the unification and in cooperation with international arbiters.

This unification, besides not being able to save or make things better, actually leads towards departure from Krajina, but also represents spitting in the face of the whole international community and all those that have spent all that money, energy, prestige and political capital in the search of a compromise plan and peaceful solution. If one talks about national treason, I don't see anybody who can outdo these unifiers. I also can't see, says Cerovic, who can Karadzic plan the unification and at the same time send a message to the world that he is ready to discuss the contact group plan.

Even though he might recognize Bosnia and Croatia, it is not certain that Milosevic has given up on the unification. He is probably hoping, or would like to promise that this will be a part of his long term strategy, but first of all he has to upgrade the relations with the world. People close to him think that in Bosnia the most important and the hardest part of the job has already been done and that the Serbs could stop shooting now.

In the future, it seems, it would be enough that they refuse any cooperation, boycott every agreement, to play stupid and impossible to handle, until everybody gets sick of them and lets them go wherever they want. Cerovic says that he does not think that this could succeed, and that he does not understand why somebody would want such unification and such a state which would owe its existence solely to its being civilisationally indigestible.

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", May 29, 1994.

The authors state that many think that the basic motive of this turbo unification of the Serbs on the other side of the Drina river is in the attempt to prevent Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to recognize the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Actually, if the recognition is to come about, Pale would be forced, sooner or later, to accept the peace plan of the contact group and most on what Krajina could ount on is a high level of autonomy in Croatia within the Z-4 plan.

With the unification, the leaders there will attempt to prove, as Karadzic has stated at one point, "that Serbian politics is not being conducted from one center", and that, no matter what is accepted by the Serbian president, nothing will change in the field, and the escalation of the war would become completely inevitable. If they succeed in their intentions, significant reduction or lifting of the sanctions which Milosevic is attempting to forge, would become an irrelevant subject.

What is interesting also,the authors write, is the reaction from Belgrade to Karadzic's statement that he is ready "to treat the plan of the contact group as the basis for negotiations". He was brushed off, and told that there is no need for him to "treat it" in any manner, but to accept it as the official Belgrade and the international community expect of him. All this happened, as it was informally found out, after a recent meeting between Milosevic and Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik (president of the Bosnian Serb parliament). At that meeting, they were not asked anymore to accept the contact group maps, but, if they really wish anything good to happen to their people, to resign.

On the Knin side, many think that the initiative for the unification came from the newly appointed prime minister, and former foreign minister Milan Babic (leader of the strongest party in Krajina), because he wanted to preempt a possible military coup by president Milan Martic.

According to another interpretation, it is an attempt of Babic to secure some form or other of existence of Krajina outside of Croatia, when the Bosnian Serbs accept the contact group maps - after the unification, Karadzic can, as a condition for the mentioned acceptance, demand the remaining of Krajina in the joint state. Maybe not in its entirety, but a big part of it, which would probably dampen the dissatisfaction in the Bosnian Serb state.

According to this interpretation, Croatia would find its compensation in Eastern Slavonia, for which Knin and Pale are not interested in.

Actually, the unification of Serbs across Drina into a state which should be called "United Serb Krajina", beyond allthe bragging of the leaders over there, particularly Karadzic, show more for the final breakdown of the project called "all Serbs in one state" than its renaissance.

One of the key reasons for that is the atmosphere in Serbia, where there is no more readiness to involve itself into the war for their "brethren". This could be also sent from the fact that the oppositionary block gave the unification idea a very lukewarm support. Furthermore, the Serbs across Drina are weakening more and more militarily, while the Croatian and Bosnian army are strengthening, so they would neither be able to win the war or continue it indefinitely; from the beginning of the year, actually, they have only been going through defeats.

Along with that, the population there is exhausted by the war to continue with the bloodletting for the project which does not even have the support in Serbia anymore. For all these reasons, the announced unification in the first instance is an attempt by their leaders to escape the consequences for all that they have brought along with Milosevic. The difference is only in that, that they have to pay for all of it, and he doesn't. That is why, after the unification, if it would serve that they remain in power, they will be ready to begin the process of separation.

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", May 29, 1995.

In a complicated situation, by involving himself in the freeing of UN hostages held by the Bosnian Serbs, Slobodan Milosevic, until recently the "butcher of the Balkans", presented himself to the world as a "cooperative politician", and what is even more important for him - as the only one who can productively influence the Bosnian Serbs. This gesture of his, confirmed that the negotiations have entered the final phase, because, besides the fact that he committed a "good deed", Milosevic has shown that he has given up on his often repeated phrase that Karadzic's state is an independent entity, and that, besides introducing sanctions against it, there is nothing more he can do about the situation there.

No matter how paradoxical it looks, if the "hostage crisis" in Bosnia did not happen, Milosevic would have needed to invent it. His "sympathizers" in the Contact group (Russia, after this openly supported by France and Great Britain) could, through a practical lesson, show the Americans that for the Serbs, at least in Serbia, the stick is not a better offer than a carrot.

The world was disappointed with the tough American stance which rebounded off Milosevic's unbending - that this was a weak offer for a serious trade.

The author states that those who think that Milosevic will have serious trouble to explain "the sale" of "brothers across Drina", of course, are not correct. Everybody is sick of the war, and there is also the hope - it does not matter that it is wrong - that along with the sanctions, poverty will also go away. It only remains, that Milosevic agrees with the americans about the price.

In any case, the acceptance of the Bosnian Serbs to turn the UNPROFOR hostages, their "strong weapon", into a "valuable political point"for Milosevic, probably announces a different set of relations between Belgrade and Pale. On one side under great pressure, on the other freed from the responsibility that he is "returning the territories for which Serbian blood was spilled", Radovan Karadzic could crop up as a negotiator. The return of UNPROFOR hostages to Milosevic's chief of security, Jovica Stanisic, shows also, that the Serbian president is the only one that seems to have some "secret powers", with which, at least to some extent, he can control the behaviour of the regime in Pale.

Source: Independent news pool AIM, through Radio "B92" e-mail service, June 3, 1995.

The thesis that is mentioned by many key international actors, says Beric, that to stop the war in Bosnia it is necessary to do much more than only to formally recognize it is in an obvious contradiction with insistent attempts of the international community to grab that recognition somehow in the trade with Milosevic. There could be no harm from the recognition.

But, what is the use of that recognition if it will not lead to peace? The leading powers obviously think that in that case the danger of the war spreading across the Bosnian borders would diminish considerably, while for everything else they do not seem to care much. Current piling up of UN soldiers and naval forces of NATO to the borders of close contact with Bosnian Serbs, will hardly change the essence of things. The chances of a direct military confrontation are smaller than before the downing of the American F-16.

The situation is, says Beric, actually paradoxical in multiple ways. After a series of intimidations arranged to in by the unscrupulous general Mladic, the West raised the level of its combat readiness, with a simultaneous threat that it will withdraw its soldiers from Bosnia "unless the peace is established soon". But, this will not be done by anybody who raises the policy of equidistance towards "all three sides" as the principle of top justice, whether that is Moscow or Washington.

The West insists that in its handling of the war in bosnia it has achieved two diplomatic advances: it lead Croats and Bosniaks to conclude an agreement on the Federation, and that they caused a rift between Milosevic and Bosnian Serbs. In comparison to this, Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia, nad later, of Croatia would be proclaimed as a triumph of Western diplomacy. Since this would ease Clinton's position in the election campaign, Washington is ready to pay Milosevic more than it would be willing to do in the circumstances.

If the estimate that the recognition will materialise soon, the Bosnian drama will enter a new turn,. The West will give a sigh of relief, thinking that the war in Bosnia has been bottled up. Milosevic will grab the rich loot in the form of lifting of sanctions, and sign up with the European peacemaker's club. He would leave the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia to themselves, sending them to conduct direct contacts with Sarajevo and or Zagreb, something the international community will also do.

If Karadzic and Martic continue to bring him harm, he will be able to say that he has nothing to do with them anymore. He did when he recruited them as the first line fighters for "Greater Serbia, but now he needs people who have a different opinion about the conduct of such a project. General Mladic would also be driven to the wall, for whom it is stated that he is closer and closer to Milosevic. But he does not have anywhere to go anymore. The ambition to become Serbian Napoleon threw him into the mud of war crimes and international terrorism. Milosevic will last somewhat longer, at least as is necessary to renew great friendship and square the accounts with Tudjman.

Source: Weekly international edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje", June 8-15,1995.

Radovan Karadzic will not survive this year, and it is quite possible that he will fall by this autumn. This was an assessment made by some better Croatian political analysts (general Antun Tus), and this assessment acquires a particular sense since this is believed also by some members of the opposition in Pale.

The influence of this opposition today seems to be negligible to the Pale regime. But it raises considerably in the light of the mentioned assessment, because if Karadzic really falls, and the international community follows through on the plan he suicidally refuses, there will be a sudden rise in importance of every Bosnian Serb who has kept in his outlook Bosnia nad Herzegovina as a whole state, even in a very decentralized form, as it will probably be. From the standpoint of Serbian national interests this could be of crucial importance. This due to the fact that the Bosnian Serbs, through the mindless politics of the current leadership in Pale have practically excluded themselves from Bosnia and it could happen that they will not participate in its reconstruction as an active political subject.

The existence of the civil opposition in Sarajevo and other cities, and particularly in Pale, could prove to be life saving for this nation.

That is why it is no surprise that Milosevic is attempting to present himself as the mentor of the Pale opposition, which is only partly true, and there are indications that he is encouraging the meetings of this group with the Bosnian side. It could be said then, thinks Culic, that even in the hardest moments of his rule, Milosevic is able to find some alternative solutions.

This particularly comes to the fore when it is compared to the Croatian policy towards Bosnia, which does not have to maneuver in such claustrophobic conditions as the Serbian one, but which has handicapped itself with a stiff and inflexible stances and steps.

It is obvious that Tudjman, who has more influence on Bosnian Croats than Milosevic on Bosnian Serbs, in his policy towards Bosnia, does not find, and does not even look for, alternative solutions. The decision to give the state medals to the complete state and political leadership of the "Herzeg - Bosnia", even to that part that by the end of the year might receive invitations from the Hague, only proves this.

It has already become a tradition that, when the events in Bosnia take a shape of hanging on its existence, the official Croatia takes on a position of over sagacious preoccupation with itself. By the statements of minister of defense Gojko Susak which took as a possibility that at one point Karadzic might be given a signal to take the Bosnian Serb territory out of Bosnia, it is probably considered in these circles that a time is coming for Zagreb to take the Bosnian Federation out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if the Bosniak do not accept that, than the cutting out of "Herzeg - Bosnia" will do.

That this idea has concluded its phase of fermentation and has turned into a more solid form, is confirmed by the deposed prime minister of Krajina Mikelic, who confirmed the gossip that last winter the representatives of Pale secretly visited Zagreb. It is probable though, that after the headless challenge Karadzic threw to the world, Pale are not a key card in Tudjman's deck anymore, but there is a renewal of secret missions of his negotiator Hrvoje Sarinic to Belgrade.

So, it is quite probable that behind the scenes preparations are made for the reprise of Karadjordjevo, and that new bed sheets are being laid between Belgrade and Zagreb for the old matrimonial bed. It was never known much about that often mentioned deal, except that it has been made, so that nobody counted up the risks that stem out of it for Croatia.

Even though Zagreb was against the confederal bridging of the Drina river, it is possible that the interests are overlapping on that basis, so that some new deal on the practical division of Bosnia is reached.

As was the case so far, that would be an agreement in which the given word is worth little, and where Milosevic would probably want to keep the partner on a long stick, even blackmail him, since the international sponsors are not asking him to recognize Croatia along with bosnia and Herzegovina, so that with calming of relations with Sarajevo, he could forcibly pressure Zagreb to accept the Z-4 plan.

Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", June 5, 1995.

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