Kosovo


Fehim Rexhepi of the "AIM" news pool looks at the development of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the July 10, 1998 issue of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor."

In difference to numerous illegal groups and organizations which have been active during the whole period after the Second World War, KLA is the first one representing itself to the Kosovo public through direct military activity. With its first statement of February 16, 1996, KLA has taken upon itself the responsibility for synchronized activity and armed attacks of a number of bombing actions and armed attacks in Pristina, Kosovo Mitrovica, Pec, Podujevo, Suva Reka and Vucitrn during the night between February 4 and 15. The target of the attacks were places where Serb refugees from Croatia were settled.

Since the Albanian movement, or better said, its absolutely dominant part lead by Ibrahim Rugova has rested on the support of the world in the achievement of its proclaimed goals, it was logical to conclude that representation of the movement in a terrorist suit was in the best political and diplomatic interest of Belgrade. It is interesting that the same logic was followed by the Serb authorities. They have hardly waited for any incident to happen so that the responsibility could be attached to KLA, which was always qualified as a terrorist organization. In spite of the fact that publicly a certain dose of restraint was expressed, in individual statements of officials and other politicians, in the media and in the propaganda war in general, no room for doubt was being left.

It turned out that the great Serbian energy invested in the propaganda against KLA went in a great measure in favor of its popularity. It seems that it was actually the Serb propaganda that has contributed the most in dragging KLA out of deep secrecy, and even it becoming a public political factor, not only in Kosovo.

The turnaround for all involved came about the end of November of 1997 in Drenica. The inhabitants of some Drenica villages around Lausa have made armed resistance on two occasions on November 25, gainst the entry of smaller police units. In a second attempt, a punitive police group supported by a number of armored vehicles was also resisted. The next day, November 26, the action was continued, but with much more serious forces.

Regulation of relations between KLA and the Albanian parties, that is, the Albanian politics is a particularly complex problem, the solution of which will not be able to escape the heated inter - Albanian burdens, created in the last decades. The leader of Kosovo Albanians, Rugova, has recently shown pretensions to put them under his control. But, currently there is no possibility for this to happen, since in Kosovo, even though some state institutions are being invoked, they have never been constituted under a procedure which the Albanians attributed to themselves. On the other hand, Adem Demaqi has offered to become, along with his party, the political wing of the KLA.

The solution of this burning intra - political question is not in sight, mainly due to non - existence of state institutions in Kosovo, but no lesser problems are created by inter- Albanian rivalries, and personal ambitions. The KLA representative themselves have not said anything about this question. There are former assessments of the KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi that KLA is a non partisan and non ideological organization and that party pluralism is a luxury in current conditions.

The complex problem of relations between the politicians and rebels, are sharpened by American contacts with KLA representatives and the announced readiness of other Western states to follow suit. On one hand, this means practical recognition of KLA as a military and political factor. It is logical that in a peace process, the main word is held by the politicians, that is, the representatives of the people. Due to this, the contacts with Americans and other inevitably put in KLA’s lap decision concerning its political representation.

The least know facts about the KLA are its military and command structure. From the public announcements of KLA so far, it could be concluded that, along with the General Staff, there are at least two regional operative centers, one for Drenica and other for Dukadjini, which encomapasess the Decan-Djakovica region. It seems that within the system of vertical subordination, there are also two lower levels of command. But, it is not known whether this vertical structure is equally valid for all combatants and equally applicable to all units. That is, within the Albanian upsurge movement there are territorial units, connected mainly with local regions and soldiers who have previous military experience or have passed through a more detailed military training.

It is commonly thought that Albania is the center for the training of KLA units. This could only be partially true. Although there is no data, the most probable premise is that the status of the so called soldier, at least in the initial stage of the Kosovo war, is held mainly by the former JNA officers, members of the police or combatants in the Croatian and Bosnian wars. But, the majority of the current Albanian fighters gained their first knowledge in the improvised training centers in Kosovo territories under the control of the rebels themselves. All combatants, including the territorials, before they get arms have to pass through at least month and a half of military training, which includes physical conditioning and handling of arms.



Source: Podgorica weekly īMonitor" July 10, 1998