Issue 42 - Elections in Bosnia, Vol. 2, October 25, 1996
THEMATIC ISSUE:
Issue 42 - Elections in Bosnia, Vol. 2, October 25, 1996
ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA - EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES |
One of many election manuals published by various idle bureaucratic institutes,
states that the process of voting consists of ``five phases:''
``1. At the
voting station a controller checks whether a voter has already voted by
positioning his finger over an ultraviolet spotlight.
When the instructions are so detailed, then the most complicated elections
in the world are of pressing matter. ``Elections in Bosnia have no alternative.''
This statement, frequently repeated by politicians, has become a slogan
of forthcoming elections on September 14th. It certainly uncovers the firm
will to conduct the elections, but it seems that it also hides unavoidable
irregularities of the events to come.
Major irregularities (let's not use the word ``frauds'') stem from the
fact that it is not entirely known how scattered and where exactly the Bosnian
electorate is located.
According to the data of the Banjaluka office of OSCE, it could consist
of 2.900,000 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina registered as eligible for
voting. The speaker of OSCE in Banjaluka Tomas Miljerina has said at a press
conference that 850,000 refugees would vote. Some 503,000 of them registered
to vote in the communities where they lived in 1991, and 130,000 in the
communities where they currently live. The same data shows that 209,000
citizens of BIH have the right to return to the communities where they lived
in 1991.
The number of displaced persons (those who remained in BIH but in communities
different from their residence in 1991) equals the number of refugees.
Some 389,500 of them will vote in person and 143,000 of them in absence.
They will vote in communities where they lived in 1991. The majority of
those are Moslems and Croats. Some 295,00 of the displaced have decided
to vote in the places of their new residence and the majority of them are
Serbs. The number of persons that have not changed their place of residence
is around 1.200,000.
The electoral strategy of the three national bodies that were at war
until a year ago depends on the votes of refugees.
A comparison of the ethnic map of BIH's inhabitants of 1991 with that
of 1996 shows that a minority lives in their pre-war home towns. For example,
Srebrenica was previously predominantly inhabited by Moslems (75.20%) and
now by Serbs. Drvar was mostly inhabited by Serbs with minor participation
of Croats and Moslems, and now by Croats. Moslems who fled from Jajce to
Travnik cannot enter Jajce where they once had a relative majority, because
it is now almost 100% inhabited by Croats.
For those whose borders between the entities are consider as state borders,
Brcko is the town of ``to be or not to be.'' If it would belong to the
Federation, Republika Srpska would be cut into half; if it would remain
in RS, Zubak has said to the Bosnian Moslems that they could only dream
of the roads through Hercegovina to the sea coast; they would not have
the exit to the highway once called ``the road of brotherhood and unity.''
Both sides have arguments based on the concentration of the population.
Thus, primarily thanks to the votes of the refugees who have renounced
their home towns, the Serbian party has 35,000 people registered for voting
in Brcko. This exceeds the pre-war number of Serbs in that town by 70%.
The other side conducts the same policy.
Caught in the middle of the collision of two strategies written with
``the invisible ink,'' those who want nothing else but to return home, seem
helpless and naive.
The data of the PIK (Privremena izborna komisija, Temporary Electoral
Committee) shows that voting will be conducted at 4,400 voting stations
in 109 communities and 10 cantons. The citizens of BIH will have the choice
to vote for one of 24 political parties, 5 coalitions and mutual lists
and 3 independent candidates, which totals 3,398 candidates
If the activities of counting the voting ballots flow as planned, the
results of presidential elections for the Presidency of BIH, Federal House
of Representatives of BIH, the President of Republika Srpska and the Presidency
of BIH Federation will be known by September 18th. The results for the Parliament
of BIH Federation and the Parliament of RS will be announced by September
19th. PIK will confirm the results of the first post-war elections in BIH
on September 25th.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , September 14,1996
In the same issue of Vreme , Bojan Babic looks at the same
question.
Just a few days before the voters in Republika Srpska will arrive at
the voting stations, the leaders of the ruling Serbian Democratic Party
have warned their followers that ``officially exhibiting the posters of
Radovan Karadzic is contrary to the essence of the verbal and written agreement
with the representatives of the international community, and electoral rules.''
``Prohibition'' from the top of SDS came, however, after the pre-electoral
caravan of the party, with Karadzic's posters of course, has crusaded all
over RS and held rallies in almost each and every village. A few days ago
in Bijeljina, for example, only Karadzic's posters could be seen at the
central town square. Many of them were embellished with flowers, arranged
like some sort of laurel wreath thus clearly acknowledging who is to be
considered as the only ``Serbian blooming flower'' (no matter how prohibited)
and who is to be the winner of the forthcoming elections.
The rally in Bijeljina was one of the worst and the least convincing
performances of the SDS leaders. Over 3,000 people were gathered at the
City Square. Just as the first speaker exclaimed ``God is with Serbs,''
the rain shower started, which probably disturbed the speakers. From the
SDS's first team, the best in form was Aleksa Buha. He mostly dealt with
the Dayton Agreement and kept persuading those present that there is no
way BIH will reintegrate today, almost a year after Dayton, although many
would gladly witness it.
Probably tired of various rallies (even two or three daily), Momcilo
Krajisnik, lacking inspiration at the rally in Bijeljina, has improvised
several times on the theme of Serbian women who should do ``those things''
and ``bear us children.''
The thesis of ``one hundred percent patriots'' was developed later on
by Biljana Plavsic. She warned that all the others must ``seek the opinion
from Belgrade or somewhere else,'' while only SDS has it head office in
its people. Plavsic reminded the citizens of Bijeljina of the fact that
she was with them right after the ``freeing'' of the city at the beginning
of the war, in April 1992, and that she has never forgotten them.
The same evening, in the central news show of TV Pale, it was announced
that, in spite of the rain, the rally in Bijeljina attracted 10 thousand
people. The majority of the parties have, however, decided to organize
their last rallies in Brcko. On Sunday it was done by the socialists, reinforced
for the occasion by Nebojsa Covic. In reply to Covic, the radicals wanted
to bring Vladimir Zhirinovski on Monday, but the guest from Russia was not
allowed to cross the border and support the Serb bretheren. Zhirinovski
and Vojislav Seselj waited for several hours at the border crossing near
Raca in vain, but the Serbian police were merciless. Regardless of this
handicap, the radicals were no different from all the other parties that
have recently organized rallies in Brcko. They all announced that the destiny
of the city is at the same time the destiny of RS and that there can be
no compromise, no matter what the arbitrary committee decides.
Similar messages were sent by Alija Izetbegovic from the other side of
the border. Under the falling rain he spoke to several thousand Moslem
refugees from Brcko. He promised them a fast return to the city they had
to leave, because if not, ``there will be trouble.''
On the very day of the elections 31,000 refugees from Serbia who decided
to vote in this city should arrive to Brcko, and also an unknown number
of Moslems. If the numerous refugee votes ``for Brcko'' sent by mail are
to be added to this, it could easily happen that many more voters vote
in Brcko than in Sarajevo.
Just a few kilometers from the place where the socialists, radicals and
Izetbegovic spoke about no compromises over Brcko, on the flea market ``Arizona''
at one of the crossings between the two entities, big trade was going on
between Serbs, Moslems and Croats. For months now, everyone has been bringing
to this market what the others lack. Serbian green peppers, Slovenian beer,
Croatian detergent powder, salt from Tuzla, blue jeans from Novi Pazar,
foreign chocolates, cigarettes, satellite antennas, tapes with songs by
Semsa Suljagic and Ceca Velickovic... All is sold for deutch marks, of
course. The market is open seven days in a week, 24 hours a day, regardless
to the weather conditions.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , September 14, 1996
Ljiljana Smajlovic takes a look at the results of the Bosnian elections
in the September 28,1996, issue of Vreme .
Three national parties of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serb Democratic Party---SDS,
Party of Democratic Action---SDA and Croat Democratic Union HDZ) won six
years ago, won this year, and would have won the next year too had the voting
accidentally been postponed. This probably is currently the only comfort
to the supporters of united, multi-ethnical and multi cultural Bosnia-Herzegovina
who spent the whole summer appealing zealously and with substantiated arguments
to Bill Clinton to prolong the Dayton deadline and postpone the elections
for four, six or more months.
However, nothing is the same as in November 1992 in Bosnia, when the
ethnic parties for the first time gained the mandate to support the interests
of their three nations during the splitting of the country (Yugoslavia).
The leaders of the SDA, SDS and HDZ terminated the pre electoral rallies
six months earlier by hugs, meaning literally, physically embracing each
other. Putting the ideological similarities in the foreground, they appealed
to their voters to help ``brotherly'' national parties when voting for the
Presidency of B-H, in order to mutually defeat the communists and reformists.
(At that time, all voters, regardless to their nationality, voted for all
seven members of the collective chief of the state, electing two Serbs,
two Croats, two Moslems and one from the category of ``other'' nations and
nationalities. The victory was taken by the candidates of national parties:
with a little help from Serbs and Moslems, Stjepan Kljujic won 100,000
votes more than his party HDZ. This means that along with all Croat votes,
he won several tens of thousands of ``brotherly'' votes.
The latest elections passed with no fraternization, not even the fake
and pretended one. Instead of ideological similarities, former coalition
partners saw enormous differences between them, impossible to overcome.
Any comparison insulted them.
Voters from the territory of B-H Federation had to decide whether to
give their votes to the Bosniak or the Croat candidate for the Presidency
of B-H which right up front made senseless any pre-electoral coalition
or any exchange of votes. Moslems and Croats voted for the representatives
of their people. What the others did, i.e. Serbs, was not overly interesting
to anyone since they represent a politically irrelevant force scarce in
number within this entity.
The same cannot be said, though, for the Moslems that voted on the territory
of Republika Srpska (in absence or in person). Voters in Republika Srpska
could only vote for the Serbian member of the B-H Presidency, as derived
from the Dayton Constitution of B-H. This probably was the reason why quite
a number of Moslems who escaped from Republika Srpska decided not to vote
in their previous home towns. Many of them explained to the journalists
that they did not wish to vote in RS because there they could not vote
for Alija Izetbegovic directly, and ``I want to vote for Alija, and if it
is not possible to vote for him there, I shall not vote there...''
Having a situation as such, SDA decided to apply the strategy of ``the
lesser of the two evils,'' which came to be the only evident case of fraternization
of the kind witnessed in 1990. SDA advised their electorate from the territory
of RS to vote for Mladen Ivanic, the major opponent to Momcilo Krajisnik
for the position of the chief of the Dayton Bosnia. There is also piece
of evidence for this, in the form of the fly published by this party in
order to help their supporters to manage the complicated voting procedure.
At the same time, this is the only brotherly help between Serbs and Moslems
in the course of the latest elections. The difference is that Alija Izetbegovic
did not help Radovan Karadzic as during previous elections when the SDS
candidate Nikola Koljevic, racing for one of the two Serbian seats in the
B-H Presidency, barely defeated the reformist Nenad Kecmanovic with the
help of SDA votes. This time Alija has ``helped'' Milosevic, i.e. his candidate.
On the other hand, the Moslems directed to vote in Republika Srpska
ensured the status of respectability to SDA. Its candidate Abid Djozic
was the third in the race for the position of the president of RS (he had
101,588 out of the recounted 971,455 votes registered in RS). Biljana Plavsic
won very convincingly with 639,675 votes, but Djozic won only 60,000 votes
less than Zivko Radisic, Milosevic's candidate and the president of the
Socialist Party of RS, but he won two and a half times more votes than
the popular ex-mayor of Banjaluka Predrag Radic (who won only 44,207 out
of the recounted 971,455 votes). SDA was the third in the race for the
representatives from RS in the B-H House of Representatives, wining 9.29%
of votes and the fourth party by its importance in the Peoples Assembly
of RS, where it won 6.5% seats.
Less than a hundred thousand votes used by the Moslems in the battle
fields of RS was a brave and risky move of SDA. It was evident by the results
of voting for the three-members Presidency of B-H. Moslem electorate is
bigger than Serb, but Alija Izetbegovic beat tightly Momcilo Krajisnik
in the race for the position of the President of B-H (the Dayton Agreement
stipulates that this position wins the one of the three candidates who
collects most votes). Izetbegovic won by some 40,000 votes (730,000 compared
to 690,000 votes won by Krajisnik). The difference would have been much
more comfortable and convincing had all of the Moslem refugees been given
the opportunity to vote for their leader. This way 100,000 of them gave
their vote to Mladen Ivanic, and they grin bitterly when the foreign journalists
admire the thus far unknown political fact that Republika Srpska has ``even
300,000 temperate Serbs that voted for the temperate Ivanic.''
Any worthy comparative analysis of the elections of 1990 and 1996 must
first of all give an answer to the question whether greater or lesser
ethnical homogenization of the electorate was achieved this year or in the
elections six years ago. However, the problem is that the electorate remained
unknown in many aspects even to those who ordered, organized and paid the
elections. Not even the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in
Europe, under whose wing the Bosnian elections of September 14th happened,
has the idea of the dimensions of the B-H electorate. The Bosnian party
asserts that 250,000 of its citizens were killed in the war, but this assertion
was sometimes denied, and sometimes proven. The elections were started with
the idea that the registration of voters might show the number of voters
with the right to vote after the war. It was only known that in 1990 there
were 3,144,353 registered voters and that for the Parliament of B-H voted
2,339,958 voters.
Seven days after the elections and six days after
the leaders of the international community greeted the elections, which
passed surprisingly calmly according to many estimates, a scandal happened.
It turned out that the experts from the OSCE had an assumption of the number
of people that might vote. They assumed in advance that B-H's electorate
numbers now around 2.9 million citizens, and that 2,341,000 might vote.
It seems that the experts from both entities made the calculations the
same way, because the expectations of the OSCE were not only fulfilled
but surpassed. According to the estimates of independent monitors and the
UN controllers themselves, 103% out of the number of voters which OSCE
set as the possible maximum voted.
Under current conditions, it is not possible to find out the dimension
of the electorate, so the suspicions abut the elections will probably be
tough and long-lasting. On Sunday, three days before the previously set
deadline for the official announcement of the results of the elections
(it should have been September 25th), OSCE gave hints that the recounting
and the subsequent control of the ballots could last longer than previously
planned, admitting numerous mistakes and the duplicating of the records.
As for the homogenization, it is conspicuous that SDS and SDA have convincing
and in percentage very close majorities in the representative bodies. SDS
won 60% of votes for the National Assembly of RS, and SDA in the corresponding
House of Representatives of the B-H Federation has the majority of 57%.
SDS won 59% of seats for representatives from the area of Serb entity in
the House of Representatives of B-H, and SDA won 55% of seats for the representatives
of the Federation of B-H. It seems that SDA and SDS have equal political
power, each within its people. The electoral victory of Alija Izetbegovic
over his opponents (the closest to him was Haris Silajdzic with 123,734
votes) is more convincing than the victory of Momcilo Krajisnik over his
Serb opponents. (Ivanic is closer to Krajisnik than Silajdzic is to Izetbegovic.)
Both Izetbegovic and Krajisnik have, however, won more votes than their
parties (SDA won 677,500 votes in the elections for the House of Representatives
of B-H compared to Izetbegovic's 740,000; while Krajisnik won 100,000 votes
more than SDS in the race for the same office, or 690,373 compared to 575,870
votes for SDS).
HDZ won 17% of the electorate in 1990, which was exactly the share of
Croats in B-H's population. Now HDZ has 24% of the electorate of the Federation,
but the territory is now reduced and has less citizens, with increased Croat
population. Before the war, Sarajevo had 5% of Croats. HDZ has won 5% of
votes on September 14th in the canton of Sarajevo.
The three pre-war national parties won in the first post-war elections,but
only one of them still with its pre-war leader. Stjepan Kljujic parted form
HDZ by his own free will, and Radovan Karadzic parted from SDS thanks to
Carl Bildt, helped a little by Richard Holbrooke and the Tribunal from Hague,
at least nominally. Karadzic is today the man whose name Momcilo Krajisnik
does not dare to mention in public, but his face is smiling from all facades
along the road Zvornik-Pale. Only Alija Izetbegovic remained where he was
before the war. He still has something in common with Karadzic. They both
are the objects of mythology amongst their people. The face of Alija Izetbegovic
cannot be seen on the posters in Sarajevo (those malicious say it is because
the Prophet does not have his pictures taken). There are only posters with
his statements and handwriting (``Both East and West support us,'' signed
``Alija Izetbegovic'').
No matter whether they have old or new leaders, the parties have not
changed their disposition. They could not preserve peaceful Bosnia six years
ago. Everything seems the same today, except that nothing is in Bosnian
hands any more. All state affairs will be crucially influenced by foreigners
authorized by the international community. There will be as much of Bosnia
as the Americans desire, i.e. as much pressure on the three sides and two
entities as the Americans are ready to put.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme September 28, 1996
Dejan Anastasijevic of the Belgrade weekly Vreme writes in
the September 21, issue of the magazine on the electoral situation in the
City of Mostar
Three months after local elections and three years after the introduction
of the European Union protectorate, Mostar appears more divided than ever.
Even the famous wine ``Zilavka'' exists in a Croatian and a Moslem flavor.
On Tuesday last week, four days before the elections in Bosnia, several
hundred Moslems gathered in the old quarter of the city to watch the state
championships for jumps into the Neretva river. Just as in pre war time,
the contestants' names were announced over a loudspeaker, the three members
jury judged, while the spectators commented and, at times, cheered. Everything
seemed as it used to be, except for one small detail: instead of jumping
from the Old Bridge, demolished during the Moslem-Croat clash in 1993,
the contestants jumped from an improvised platform built right next to
the narrow suspension bridge which today connects the two banks of the
Neretva. This made the entire event less of a sports competition, and more
of a somewhat sad, and somewhat obscene theatrical performance.
The Boulevard
of Aleksa Santic running along the west bank of the Neretva, which was
the front line during the Moslem-Croat war, still divides the city in two.
That line is never crossed but out of great urge, especially not by the
men eligible for military service. The two parts of the city even have the
plates with street names in different colors: in the Moslem part of the
city they are blue or green, while in the Croat part they are red and bear
the names of ``esteemed'' Croats like Mile Budak and Bruno Busic. The Boulevard
is now simply called the ``Boulevard'' and is patrolled by the WEU police
and the mixed Croat-Moslem patrols.
However, a black Mercedes without registration plates passes the street
on some nights with mysterious people firing occasionally at the Moslem
passers by, sometimes even throwing a grenade.
In spite of all efforts made so far and the fact that the international
or mixed patrols and the black Mercedes passed each other at several occasions,
the investigation is still marking time.
Things are not much better with the joint city administration, which almost
never meets even though the Croats have ceased the boycott. Formally, the
administration should be managed by the mayor Ivo Prskalo and his deputy
Safet Orucevic. In reality, however, Orucevic and Prskalo do not meet, each
sitting on his side of the Boulevard. The recently-elected Prskalo is considered
to be moderate in his beliefs, but many believe that behind the scene, the
Croat part of the city is ruled by the former mayor Mijo Brajkovic. The
central HDZ rally, at which Prskalo has not been seen in the lodge and Brajkovic
was honored to open the gathering, proved Brajkovic's existing popularity.
Speaking at this occasion about the Moslem requests to return to their homeland
on the west side, he said: ``The bridge was not erected so that they could
pass on this side, but for us to pass there, to the Croat land.'' The applause
that followed was loud.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , September 21, 1996
Perica Vucinic of the Belgrade weekly Vreme examines in the
magazine's issue of September 14, 1996, the political background of the
Bosnian elections.
According to the data of the Banjaluka office of OSCE, it could consist
of 2.900,000 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina registered as eligible for
voting.
2. A voter proceeds
to the person in charge to check whether his name is registered in the voting
log. A voter should identify himself by showing an identification document.
3. A voter's finger should then be marked by invisible ink. There's no
reason to be concerned about invisible ink. It is noticeable only when
exposed to the ultraviolet spotlight and disappears in a week.
4. A voter
is then given voting files; he marks one item in each ballot by a check
mark (X) and folds each ballot. Discretion is guaranteed. Only voters know
who they voted for.
5. Finally, voters put each ballot into the box of
corresponding color. That's all. Voting is completed.''
The story from 1990 has repeated itself as far as the civil opposition
is concerned. The civil parties were better accepted in the cities than
in the villages, but nowhere greatly. The Association of Communists---SDP
won 274,000 votes in 1990 in the entire territory of B-H. The Joint List,
coalition of five parties that together with SDP includes the former reformists
(now called UBSD), and the Croatian Peasant Party, Republican Party and
Moslem-Bosniak Organization, now won 100,000 votes in the elections for
the House of Representatives of B-H, or 7.14% of votes.