Comments and Analyses by Vreme ,
Nezavisni (two
comments), Monitor ,
Arkzin
and Feral Tribune
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA
Filip Svarm of the Belgrade weekly Vreme , discusses in the
June 1, 1996 issue of that magazine the situation which arose with the attendance
of a funeral by the Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic in Belgrade.
1. General Mladic was attending the funeral of a close brother-in-arms.
Death of Bosnian Serb Army General Djordje Djukic's followed a serious
illness and his release from Scheveningen, The Hague Tribunal prison.
He had first been arrested by Bosnian Federation authorities under
strange circumstances, charged with war crimes and finally, he was
the first to be extradited to the Tribunal in this manner. Most of the local
public believes General Djukic was actually killed by The Hague.''
Milosevic could have hardly won support for Mladic's arrest from anyone
in Serbia in such circumstances. He responded to Western diplomats who
had protested against General Mladic's presence in Belgrade by
explaining that funerals are a very important matter for the Serbs.''
Even those in Serbia urging the Bosnian Serb Army commander's arrest
would have probably condemned an arrest at the funeral and claimed
Mladic simply should not have been allowed to enter the country.
2. Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said Mladic's trip to
Belgrade was negligence on part of the state authorities''
and underscored that this should not prompt any major conclusions
about Yugoslavia's stand on the international Tribunal.'' If Mladic is
already slipping through the fingers of the IFOR troops deployed in
Bosnia, why shouldn't he slip through the fingers of the Serbian police?
The local state authorities, as IFOR, too, can only contemplate whether
he wears a wig or dresses as a nun when passing the check points. Also,
General Mladic telephones NATO officers, sends them faxes, regularly
contacts commander of the IFOR ground troops Gen. Michael Walker on
the phone, signs valid documents on the Bosnian Serb Army's relations
with the international forces...
3. The question also arises who in Serbia would arrest General
Mladic---the Interior Ministry or the Military Police. The latter would
hardly agree to this (although it is within their authority) and they
probably would not let the former do it either. Many Yugoslav Army
members consider General Mladic not only a war friend,'' but a
symbol of their own dignity as well. A dissatisfied army, no matter
how marginalised on the political stage, is definitely not an asset
in an election year.
4. Where elections are in question, 93% in the Bosnian Serb Republic
support Mladic and 83% Milosevic according to a recent public opinion
poll conducted by the US International Affairs Agency (USIA). Were
Mladic arrested, Milosevic would not stand a chance at the Bosnian
elections scheduled for September. Not one Bosnian Serb opposition party
would forgive him, including the Socialists. Ex-Prime Minister Rajko
Kasagic, the most cooperative Bosnian Serb according to Western
mediators, said not one nation extradited its leaders.
5. Taking risks and waiting for major events to shift the current
balance of forces are the essence of Milosevic's policy. They are now
reflected in his bet on Gennadi Zyuganov and his Communists at
the Russian elections, as he had once hoped for a putsch against
the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It also explains his
ante on the failure of the Moslem Croat coalition, collapse of the
West's single policy, etc.
All these are reasons why Milosevic did not arrest General Mladic. An
additional reason, which many consider the most important one, is that
Mladic could tell the Hague in detail how the war in Bosnia was waged
and to what aim. Notwithstanding all agreements and accords, it is hard
to believe the Tribunal could avoid raising charges against the Serbian
President. At the time this text was written, Belgrade based independent
news agency Beta quoted informal sources as saying Milosevic was meeting
the Bosnian Serb leadership---Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, Nikola
Koljevic and acting Bosnian Serb Republic President Biljana Plavsic---in
Belgrade. The reason for the meeting was for Karadzic to sign
a statement that he was withdrawing from public life. It seems to be
all Belgrade is offering for the Dayton-envisaged Bosnian elections.
The international community is facing a ``take it or leave it'' option
i.e., if it believes General Mladic and Karadzic are the chief obstacle
to the elections, it should order its own troops to arrest them. Somalia
and the General Aidid incident show why IFOR is not involving itself in
this task, for now at least.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 1, 1996
Dragan Todorovic and Ljiljana Smajlovic of the Belgrade weekly Vreme
look at the pre-electoral situation in Bosnia among the Bosnian Serbs and
Muslim/Croat federation respectively.
Slobodan Milosevic at the Congress of the Socialist Party of the Bosnian
Serb Republic held in Banja Luka on 1 June told his dear comrades''
that he wanted unification of all progressive---Left and democratic
powers in the Bosnian Serb Republic---parties, movements and individuals
into a joint and strong front'' and that all that is progressive
and democratic in the Bosnian Serb Republic should stick together.''
The socialists, to whom these wishes were addressed, announced that
a Leftist election block would be formed and that, apart from
the socialists, it would include also the Party of Private Initiative,
Social-Liberal Party and Independent Dodik.''
The state-controlled media in Serbia also recognized the progressive
and democratic'' in the Left block, so that is all they are informing
about. Others do not exist. And they do exist, even out of the too independent
SDS. With an insight into the situation and Banja Luka Major Radic's
statement that time has come to choose healthy forces, to refresh
the Government, the Parliament and SDS'' and that he who wanted to lead
the people must be morally clean and prove that he had taken nothing during
this war, VREME in early April foretold that the forces gathered round
Radic, Kasagic and Koljevic and the military authorities such as
the Panther'' commander Major Mauzer would try to transform
SDS from within, so the party cleared of the sinful people and deeds
would win the elections. However, this did not happen. Kasagic was
dismissed, there was an attempt to do the same with Radic, Pale is
holding the reins even tighter. What is SDS doing nowadays? It is trying
to control the media in order to remain where it is, with the help
of Seselj's radicals or numerous satellite parties.
As Seselj seems to have demanded too much, they will have to try on
their own to stay in the saddle. Therefore, they decided to
surprise the people---during the campaign, they will formally carry
out privatization by distributing shares. As the deadline for nomination
of presidential candidates and deputies has been shifted from 27 June
to 4 July, a reliable source tells us that a few days prior to nomination
SDS will hold a party assembly in which they will choose the candidates.
Aleksa Buha is planned for the party president, Biljana Plavsic for
the presidential candidate and Momcilo Krajisnik for the Serbs' representative
in the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And where is Karadzic?
Although certain SDS boards hope that if world power wielders
ease, he might become president,'' there is no way---the elections
regulations clearly say that the lists with candidates for the Hague are
not valid. Koljevic is at a crossroads. Before the nominations are handed
in, there is going to be a meeting with Milosevic and Koljevic
hopes he might be the compromise solution because Bosnian Serbs
do not want a Leftist'' president and the world dreads Karadzic's
Rightist'' extremists.
The news is that the Party of Democratic Center from Trebinje,
Fatherland Party from Banja Luka, National Radical Party Nikola
Pasic'' from Banja Luka, Peasant-Radical Party from Kozara Dubica and
Democratic Party from Bijeljina formed the Democratic Patriotic Block
in Bijeljina on 8 June, which is as of 13 June headed by Banja Luka
Mayor Predrag Radic, as a person of special patriotic and
democratic determination.'' The Democratic Patriotic Block declares itself
as a block in the center, the lower limit of the Bosnian Serb Republic's
sovereignty is the Dayton agreement, their aim is to unite with other
state units of the Serbian people, to develop good, primarily economic
relations with the Muslim Croat federation, the state should be based
on the observance of the constitution and laws, have independent
judiciary, free media, professional army, market economy, take care
of refugees, take care of the families of people killed in the war,
members of ethnic minorities and their rights... In a capsule, patriotism
can go along with democracy. If the people accept this program, will
Milosevic admit that this is what is progressive and democratic.''
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 22, 1996
When the war broke out I was in Brussels as the Sarajevo daily
Oslobodjenje'' correspondent from the European Union. Four
years later, I returned to my home-town on business, to stay there for
only 24 hours. The easy, morally comfortable formula which I found in
the summer of 1992, when it became clear that the conflicts would last
longer than Lord Carrington had thought at first, became worn out a long
time ago. (It is a civil, fratricidal war; if I do not have to fight on
the side of my people, I should be damned if I do so on the opposite
side. Even if I did so only by propaganda weapons.)
The first stop on my way back to Sarajevo was Brcko, the town which,
they say, will be the cause and place of the next war. In the village of
Omerbegovaca, where---carefully guarded by IFOR---some forty Muslim and
Croat families are rebuilding their destroyed houses within the Serb
territory of the demarcation zone, I met a talkative, revengeful worker
who told me: Are you Serbian? Do go to Sarajevo, no one will do you
any harm, we are not Chetniks.'' He added: We shall never forgive
them (Serbs). We won't even count the people killed in battles, it
was a war. But we shall not forgive them for the civilians, the
women, children and old people. If they kept the memory of Kosovo
for five hundred years, we shall keep the memory of this for ten
thousand years.''
In Sarajevo I meet my old friends---a magic in which there are
no conflicting sides, like before the war, when we blamed it all
on them'' (the authorities, regime, leaders, nationalist parties).
We accomplish the magic by not weighing anyone's guilt and by not talking
about them,'' but only about the people we loved or did
not love.
Before the war we thought alike, so now we go on talking on credit.
They meet me with enormous trust, so I dig into my war personality
to see if there is anything they should know about me which was not published
in VREME with my signature. I point to the differences between the newly
formed Belgrade and Sarajevo sensibilities.
On my return to Belgrade, I read the newspapers I brought back and
I find a scene in Avdo Sidran's poem entitled Former Buddies:''
I dream that sitting in my houseare two former buddies We are counting
the dead known and unknown scolding Serb fascism Tellingwhat kind of a
story I don't know yet.When one of them the friend of my life said
We should be more careful when judging the Chetniks I throw them out of
the house both with two words only.Get out.Get out.Get out.
Only, in my dream of Sarajevo, the girl-friend of my life, royally
generous, sits till dawn listening to my dreams and doubts and goes to
work in the morning concerned whether the next day would be all right
for me and whether someone might hurt me. She watches me carefully when,
as if joking, she tells me about an old friend of ours who told her not
to let him know when this Chetnik arrives. I dare not tell anyone that
the city does not look as devastated as I expected it to be. I recognize
it by instinct, it is not strange. Like in the first Hollywood films,
the sounds, images, impressions go by at a speed twice as fast as
normal, while my capability to absorb the impressions is the same as it
used to be. In the main streets, about the same concentration of
`rednecks'' exist as in our other towns. As a refugee, I learned
to hate the chauvinist idea that all that is evil has come from somewhere
else: people want to believe in this in every town I have seen since the
war broke out. I recognize the people, buildings, street corners. It is
warm, I can smell the lime tree. I know this is no longer my home, but
I feel at home.
Including the house itself. The wall of my bedroom was struck by the
first grenade which on 2 May 1992 hit the building in 15 Albanska Street
(now called Dolina), two blocks away from Holiday Inn, somewhere half
way between St. Joseph church and Magrbija mosque. The grenade
enormously enlarged the window opening, but the neighbors Vahida and
Fevzija found some kind of a war refuge in my apartment after theirs had
been completely destroyed. Our first post-war encounter was extremely
warm. Neither I nor they have any pretentions concerning my''
apartment. Their apartment will soon be restored and they will be glad
to leave mine. While they were tenants `chez Smajlovic,'' they were
at the same time the most caring guests and the best hosts. They have
a stove in which books burned so well during the four Sarajevo
winters. They burned their things and saved my books. They did not burn
the History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, or Lenin or
Kardelj, let alone Hegel or an Encyclopedia. I am ashamed because of
this while packing several novels to take back to Belgrade.
There are no new tenants in my building. This makes it special. Friends
and acquaintances from the Serbian Civil Council are happy to meet every
Serbian ear'' that returns to the city, even if on business.
I am afraid they might read in my short stay more than is really written
in it. I have only two scheduled business appointments in Sarajevo, with
Michael Steiner and Sejfudin Tokic. I do not know the position of
the Serbs in Sarajevo and I cannot testify whether they are harassed,
but I read in the Sarajevo press that they are. I also read sharp
criticism. I hear jokes upon my arrival at Pale. They laugh at their own
troubles.
A soldier of the Bosnian Serb army recalls what he went through during
the war, winters in trenches, poor meals, enemy offensives and says: Thank
God, common sense has remained. Thank dear God, I am sane, touch wood...
Woman, see if someone is knocking at the door.''
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 22, 1996
Gojko Beric of the Sarajevo weekly Svijet takes a look in the
June 27, 1996, issue of that magazine at the political situation created
by the recent attack on the former Bosnian prime minister and current presidential
candidate Haris Silajdzic. A
After the incident in Cazin, some people from the American politicAl establishment
have stated some of the strongest accusations at the account of Alija Izetbegovic
and his party, attributing them with violence over political opponents.
At a first glance, the US is making it known that it will be brutally open
and intrusive in giving lessons from democratic behavior within the space
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would definitely have some sense if the
American pressure would be evenly spread.But, what is with two other ruling
parties. In the kingdom of power whose spiritual monarch is HDZ (the key
national Croat party in Bosnia, and ruling party in Croatia itself),there
is no place for any other political party, which still does not bother the
official Washington much. The situation in Republika Srpska, more precisely
in Banja Luka, is only somewhat different. There are some opposition parties,
of which two were installed by Milosevic, for the future use of ceding half
of Bosnia to Serbia, but the power is still completely held by the nationalistic
SDS. Still, some thing are now a bit clearer. It was known from before that
the Americans have chosen Silajdzic as their man in Bosnia. They were only
troubled to eliminate Izetbegovic least painfully, who does not only have
the authority of the leader of the majority of the Bosniak population, but
also strong connections in the Islamic world.
The attack on Silajdzic in Cazin enabled Washington to openly place itself
on the side of the recent bosnian prime minister and promote him as their
man for the September elections. For that purpose a political and media
stereotype has been created, according to which Silajdzic is for a unified
and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina and Izetbegovic supposedly is not.
Although neither of the two has given enough proof yet for the positions
which the mentioned stereotype attributes them with, which does not mean
that there are great differences in their political concepts. The problem,
though, lies in the fact that Silajdzic cannot keep multiethnic Bosnia if
this is not desired by the Serbs and Croats, as Izetbegovic cannot destroy
it by himself. The essence of the matter is not in this or that personality,
but in the state of the spirits. Current national parties are not political
parties in the classic sense of the word, but populistic movements. That
is why these parties do not have either clear ideology or economic or social
programs. The cult of the national is propagated as a general living principle,
and the one that does not accept this principle is branded as a national
traitor.
According to the currently accepted standards of Serbdom or Croatdom, the
status of a prestige Serb or Croat is given to former criminals, persons
from the bottom of the pit, marginal characters and primitives which have
affirmed themselves in this war as murderers and pillagers. One of those,
promoted through the media as the hero of the home war, killed Tudjman's
minister of tourism, paid with the sum of 15 thousand Deutch marks.
The guy would, probably, for a larger sum, accept to shoot Tudjman himself.
Bosnia is also abundant with these types. During the war, they have represented
the striking fists of the militarized national parties, enriching themselves
on the way through pillaging and contraband. Today, these are local power
brokers, who do not allow anybody to pass through, the leaders of the gangs
which practically control the entire public life in their area. The only
order in the Western part of Mostar is the one established by Mladen Naletilic
named Tuta.. The mayor, police, and other handles are only a cover for Tuta's
rule. If somebody thinks that Tudjman can remove Tuta when he wishes to,
they are mistaken. And why would he, when he might need Tuta again. Tuta
will always convince the Herzegovinians that he is a greater member of the
HDZ than Tudjman himself.. The one that proves that he is a greater HDZ
supporter is the one that will survive. And, as the communists have spoken,
it is the movement that is important, not the individual. Mr. Izetbegovic
himself probably has a problem with a Tuta of his own. Or a few of them.
The basic idea of such a movement has the role of the brain and the blood
vessels at the same time.
Izetbegovic is maybe intimately against the attackers on Silajdzic, but
does not understand that the beating stick was in the hands of the nature
of the SDA party itself. Even if somebody wanted it, it would be completely
unnecessary to plan such an incident in the key board room of this party.
It could be actually said that Silajdzic hit himself in the head.Up until
recently, he was the second ranking authority of the ruling party, the right
hand of Alija Izetbegovic. Leaving it, he has automatically acquired the
brand of the destroyer of the Bosniak political and national corps. With
this, the hunting season on Silajdzic was open. And, in Cazin, quite a number
of hunters found themselves, ready to carry the execution in the name of
the nation.
Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet , June 27, 1996
Gordan Kovac of the Sarajevo weekly Svijet , examines in the
June 6, 1996, issue of that magazine the current political situation among
the Herzegovina Croats.
The Croat political leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina is sometimes verbally
dedicated to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In action, the situation is completely
different. It does everything to achieve the century old dream
of the Bosnian Croats, their collective movement under the auspice of a
sole Croatian state, the one with its center in Zagreb.
The political lobby from Herzegovina has in that respect, disregarded a
different mood of the Croats from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
first of all Posavina. During the whole course of the bloody bosnian crisis
the Herzegovinians had the monopoly on the decision making about the political
fate of B/H Croats. at that, they were persistent, monolithic and stimulated
by the support of the Croatian president Tudjman, to whom they have actually
delegated the reins of their grand national project. But, recently, it seems
that something is not functioning in that well oiled machine.In Croatia,there
is distinct presence of the so called anti-Herzegovina sentiment, particularly
in Dalmatia. But, the concrete of unity seems to be cracking in Herzegovina
itself.The Herzeg-Bosnian state and the policy of its leaders
is being felt differently in Livno and Tomislavgrad on one side, and Grude
and Siroki Brijeg on the other.
The simmering conflict on these lines exists
and is more and more evident, but, according to current knowledge, it is
not bringing into question the basic premises of the grand national project,
cooked up in the herzeg-bosnian part of bosnia and Herzegovina. The key
contesting question among the Herzegovina Croats is actually the distribution
of the loot. Those in Livno and Tomislavgrad are mostly irked and resistant
to the fact that there is almost none of their people in the ruling structures
of the Herzeg-bosnian state. The knowledgeable Croatian journalists think
that the best indicator of the cracking of the Herzegovina concrete is the
conflict between two of their leading people: Croatian minister of defense
Gojko Susak and Mladen Naletilic-tuta. Susak is the head of the military
political and Tuta of the Mafia lobby, which are joined through these two
leading personae. A frequent guest to Herzegovina, Susak never skipped Tuta's
house. But, recently, he has been evading it in a wide arc. The friendship
broke somewhere. Where, it is still not known even among the knowledgeable
journalistic sources in Zagreb. It is suspected though that money is in
question again, or the fact that Tuta, who for a long time has been somebody
whose opinion has been asked in Herzegovina-Croat political matters, has
maybe overdone it in stressing his importance. The fate of the Croats in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is not decided by far. The divisive status between
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which this population lives, cannot
last permanently.
The part of the problem lies in the fact that very thing does not depend
on Herzegovinians themselves - them least of all. The crux is with Zagreb
and president Tudjman. He is tailoring the fate of Herzegovina and generally
the fate of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is completely another matter
that Tudjman is considered the greatest Herzegovinian of them all. This
is because Herzegovinian is not only the name for people from one part of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the best metaphor for the policy lead by
Franjo Tudjman in recent years.
Source : Sarajevo weekly Svijet , June 6, 1996
THE EVENTS IN KOSOVO
G. Mikic discusses in the June 1, 1996 issue of the Belgrade weekly Vreme
the events among the Albanian opposition in Kosovo.
Ibrahim Rugova, president of the unrecognized Republic of Kosovo''
issued a decree on extending the mandate of members of the parliament
of Kosovo'' for another year.
Rugova made the decision to practically freeze political life within the
parallel, pseudo-state system which ethnic Albanians invented in Kosovo
on May 24 the day the MPs mandates expired. He explained his decision
with overall conditions in Kosovo; police repression and a tense
political and security situation in the province giving his decree
a dimension of political opportunism. His decision was expected. The only
thing that wasn't expected was that he would personally speak up. About
10 days ago an Albanian opposition member voiced doubts that new elections
would be held because Rugova and Kosovo Democratic Alliance (LDK) want
to stay in power as long as possible. But that is just one of
the lesser dimensions of Rugova's decision. Kosovo Social Democrat
Party (SDPK) leader Llulleta Pulla Beqiri told VREME that the decree
extends the mandates of members of a parliament that was never constituted.
She agreed that conditions weren't right for elections but demanded
that the decree be made conditional on an inter-party consensus on
the date to constitute the parliament within six months. Her main
complaint is the insufficient dynamics of the entire Albanian
national movement. There were opportunities to constitute the
parliament in the past four years,'' she said and added that extending
the mandate in this way can only serve to legalize another year of
waiting and doing nothing with the risk of losingcredibility and making
the situation more radical.''
Her reaction recalls the constant inter-Balkan differences on methods of
achieving national goals. Rugova is criticized for two things in his
movement: making it passive and creating a monopoly for himself and his
party in political decisions. One of the latest efforts to make thing
more dynamic was a proposal to make Adem Demaqi, the best known Kosovo
Albanian dissident, an MP without elections.
Rugova's decision was explained by his closest associate Fehmi Agani
with the wish to not interrupt the continuity in political activities.
In a situation when the president's mandate is five years and MPs' four,
there is a danger of an institutional vacuum, Agani told VREME. He
denied that the decree was motivated by the wish to avoid worsening the
conflict with the Serbian authorities and added that it wouldn't be too
rational to organize elections when the parliament stood little chance
of being constituted. He also rejected suggestions that Rugova's
decision was forced by outside elements.
Judging by Rugova's decision, this is a time of political passivism
practically and verbally with the phrase independent Kosovo'' as
the minimum goal. That phrase is in conflict with the insisting of
high ranking visitors, representatives of the international community,
who see Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia with some autonomy.
It's understandable that some in the Albanian block are saying that Rugova's
decree is a suggestion by the international community. Observers wonder
how the situation today is different from 1992 when Albanian elections
were held or what is so dramatically different today from 1991 when
Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population voted on independence in a
referendum.
With the referendum results as a basis, the coordinating committee of
Albanian parties in Yugoslavia (chaired by Rugova) adopted a political
declaration which said that if Yugoslavia's outer borders are changed
Albanians will decide to unite with Albania and create an Albanian
state along ethnic borders in the Balkans.''
The Albanian nationalist dream of Greater Albania melted down when
it ran up against the international community's will. No serious politician
in the world accepted the Kosovo Albanian national project. Every high
ranking official who came to see Albanian national leaders said the
Kosovo problem can only be solved within Serbia while Rugova kept saying
he was happy with the way things were going in building an independent
Kosovo. He told German weekly Der Spiegel that autonomy was a thing of
the past. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said a few days later in
Belgrade that he discussed Kosovo with the Serbian president. I
stressed that we do not support separatist interests in Kosovo,'' he
said.
The plans of the international community in solving the Kosovo problem
are much less painful to Belgrade than the Albanians wanted. Martin
Lutz, a German diplomat in Bildt's team in charge of Kosovo, cast doubts
on internationalizing the problem as the Albanian leaders wanted when
he said an international protectorate is impossible to impose in
Kosovo without Serbia's consent.''
Rugova's decree shows that he isn't ignoring the stands of the
international community. New elections would raise tension after the
series of killings and armed attacks and could easily cause unrest which
would provoke the Serbian authorities and be turned against Rugova. They
would also open unimaginable levels of conflict which could spill over
outside Serbia. In that situation, the best thing was to freeze the
parliament which was never constituted.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 1, 1996
Albanian language Pristina weekly Koha , brought in its issue
of June 12, 1996, an overview of the situation among Kosovo Serbs.
The distress among Kosova Serbs is increasing. None of them really realizes
what will happen with Kosova. Recent manoeuvres in Kosova and the newest
reflection of the events during May and June, inspired the Kosova Serbs
to reconsider their present position. There are some 35.000 signatures
collected by the Serb Resistance Movement and we expect to collect up to
60.000 - claims Momcilo Trajkovic. Albanians and Serbs , continues
Trajkovic should be the ones to discuss the future of Kosova, however,
this would take place after reaching an internal Serb consensus over what
are they willing to do with Kosova! For us, this is primarily the national
and statal Serb issue! We will not allow things to develop
behind the back of Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosova, inside some office
and under the pressure of great powers , expressed directly Cupic.
Therefore, we refuse to participate .
The leaders of this movement are not infuriated only with some high representatives
of the ruling party, but also by JUL, which is engaged in correcting
the SPS and the LDK . This is, therefore a policy of failed brotherhood
and unity! On the question regarding whether Kosova Serbs would accept
to negotiate their future inside the Republic of Kosova, Trajkovic replies:
I cannot perceive the position of Serbs in such Kosova. If something
of the kind would take place, Serbs will abandon Kosova.
What will then happen if the Milosevic couple ignores you, was the next
question to be answered: Then, they are free to come and live in Kosova,
after we abandon it!
However, the leaders of the Serb Resistance Movement emphasized that there
will be no more mass meetings of Serbs and Montenegrins, as it was trend
in the late '80s. What formerly seemed a bashful effort to come out in public,
seems to be a defined emotion of fear and despair towards the policy conducted
by the Serb leadership in Belgrade after Dayton, something that has extremely
upset Kosova Serbs - particularly after the shameful defeat in Krajina.
We don't want the repetition of Bosnia here, and we do not want bloodshed
- concluded finally the Serb Resistance Movement leaders, those who actually
started the so-called yoghurt-revolution and those who promoted
Milosevic into the leader of all Serbs. It appears hard to believe that
their former sympathetic leader will make up his mind to visit Kosova by
midst summer. However, if he is decides to do that, he will surely tell
his compatriots about things that his wife talks about - brotherhood and
unity...
Source: Pristina weekly Koha , June 12, 1996
Teofil Pancic of the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni looks at the
speech of the president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences (SANU) president
Aleksandar Despic about Kosovo, which is stirring wide controversy.
The speech of the SANU president Despic at the last session of this important
national institution caused deep reactions: at the session itself of the
immortals (which had an infamous role in the spiritual
preparation of the newest war) Despic touched upon the theme of Kosovo in
quite an unconventional way, paying no mind to diplomatic language and daily
politics, which thinks that everything is solved by the use of the formulation
that Kosovo is integral part of the territory of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia .
Despic's speech is definitely not the first public discussion of a Serb
intellectual in which the problem of Kosovo is treated through the prism
of division based on the ethnic principle, which would, essentially, mean
extraction of great part of Kosovo from the territory of Serbia, but the
public statement by somebody who is the president of SANU has specific weight.
Maybe that is why sure information streamed through the political-academic
circles that academician Despic is not a solo player , or a
press spokesman of small groups of like-minded characters within
the Academy, but that his speech is a consequence of certain coordination
with the political factors which want to, in a roundabout way, test the
possible reactions, first of all the intellectuals, and then the public.
Such opinions are expressed by both Milan Bozic, one of the leaders of the
oppositionary SPO party and Desimir Tosic, member of the Federal Parliament.
It is known from before that former president of FRY Dobrica Cosic, whose
influence on the events today is not to be neglected, is advocating a specific
form of amputation of Kosovo or its greater part, but accompanied
by Serbian achievements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all within
thorough redefinition of borders within the Balkans, which would
be drawn so that they would suit much more the changed ethnic picture of
these regions.
The maximalists on both sides do not want to hear anything about the division,
but every story about the necessity of delineation and impossibility of
bearable joint life indirectly suits them, since it raises tensions: to
Albanian radicals the whole of Kosovo is not enough, and on the Serbian
side some are preparing themselves for new adventures after
the end of the Bosnian conflict.
Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , June 14, 1996
In its June 15, 1996, issue Belgrade weekly Vreme brought the
reaction to the speech of the President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences
(SANU) on Kosovo.
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) president Aleksandar Despic
caused a stir at the SANU assembly when he said ``the most important
strategic problem in regard to the future of the Serb people and today's
Serbia and Yugoslavia, which is pressuring us from inside and out, is
certainly the problem of Kosovo.''
``We are at a historic crossroads with two paths leading into the
future: one is insisting on Serbia's territorial integrity, the other is
agreeing to the tendency of the ethnic Albanians to create an
independent country by secession from Serbia,'' Despic said.
``In 20-30 years, Serbia will become a country with two peoples of
similar size---a bilingual country with two languages that do not have
the same roots. When the Albanians grab the majority in the Kosovo
parliament and a dominant place in the Serbian and Yugoslav parliaments
we won't care what category they're in. The term minority or nation will
be only academic then. We can live with them in principle
and share the management of the state. What should fool no one is
delusions that this won't happen in a free democratic country, that the
population can be kept out of social trends. The time of apartheid,
which the Albanian leaders imposed on their own people and Serbian leaders
accepted, is past even in Africa and can't be sustained in Europe.
If Serbia becomes a civic state in the future and if the Albanians
accept it, the survival of Kosovo in Serbia's borders will have an
indubitable value. Not only would the roots of our culture remain in
Serbia but a huge energy and resources potential as well.
If the assessment is that it would not be good for the Serbian people,
that the ethnic duplicity is burdened with the insurmountable problems
that caused the breakup of former Yugoslavia then we should start talks
with the people who insist on the secession of Kosovo to discuss
a peaceful, civilized separation and avoid repeating the tragic experience
of the recent past. It is quite realistic to expect that option to
disappoint some circles in the world who want to achieve a kind ofconquest
of Serbia from within. We face perhaps a whole decade in which we can
choose either solution. After that the choice will no longer be there.''
Reactions to Despic's Speech
Kosta Mihajlovic: ``It's not the most favorable idea, due to tactical
reasons, to raise this issue in SANU although it should be discussed
there. That's because the unprepared public could react in ways which
might surprise us.'' (Reply at the assembly)
Vladan Batic, DSS: I agree completely with Momcilo Trajkovic that
Milosevic spoke through Despic. The authorities need SANU only
when it serves their purposes.''
Slobodan Vuksanovic, DS: ``The best formula to solve the Kosovo problem
is bringing the Albanians into Serbia's political life under democratic
standards.''
Ivan Kovacevic, SPO: ``The fact is that, officially or not, Despic
is a ranking SPS official and his speech might have been made to feel
out the mood.''
Desimir Tosic, DC: ``The idea on dividing Kosovo has been present among
a few SANU members for a long time, including Dobrica Cosic. Academy
members who see the resolving of Kosovo realistically never had the courage
to voice that idea. Despic's speech showed that courage is coming
probably after a signal from someone on the side.''
Fehmi Agani, LDK: ``The most important thought is the possible separation.
Although all the implications can't be seen, the Albanians see it as proof
of thefailure of the initial nationalist aggressiveness.''
Azem Vllasi, lawyer from Kosovo, Communist official: ``Despic is one
of those who want Kosovo in Serbia but without Albanians if possible. But,
I like his realistic approach that the Albanians can't always be treated
as a minority.''
Mahmut Bakali, former Kosovo official: ``I understood that SANU spoke
of a peaceful overcoming of the status quo, I didn't feel this was about
a separation with the Albanians or a division of territory. If that
is the case then it is unacceptable.''
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 15, 1996
Albanian language Pristina weekly Koha carried two articles
on the same topic in its issue of June 19, 1996,: one by Bahri Cani from
Belgrade, and another by Ylber Hysa in Pristina.
Despic is preoccupied because some external circles insist firmly that Albanians
from Kosova cannot have an independent state. Analyzing these postures,
Despic underlined that if Albanians will remain in the same state with Serbia,
very soon, within few decades, the number of Serbs and Albanians will be
identical. ...
Within less than 20 years, Serbia will be the country of two, by number,
equal populations - a state with two languages that have different roots.
The Albanian minority is in the demographic expansion that has the attributes
of an explosion. When they will reach the dominant position, firstly in
Kosova and then in Serbia and Yugoslavia, the categories 'minority' or a
'nation' will have only an academical meaning... , Despic accented.
As for the evaluation of the attributes of Albanians, Despic continued:
They have a very wide range of attributes - from assassins and drug-dealers,
to the honest, wise, patriarchal education which should be respected and
the works of distinguished intellectuals.
The lecture of Academician Despic does not have the character of an Academy
document. Nor is the idea for establishing borders between Kosova and Serbia
new. In this moment, numerous uncertainties in regard to this proposal exist,
since Despic has only thrown the bone and departed for holiday!
More important than the very idea is the question: where was
this proposal formulated? Despic's students claim that the Academician has
never avoided high posts, even before being elected the first man of the
Academy. On the contrary. Further on, the election until he was chosen was
repeated several times, so it is clear that Despic could have never been
elected chairman without the blessing of the ruling party. If these could
be considered as arguments, then it is clear that in this case Despic was
only an executor of the stances from above .
Also indicative is the fact that his opening arose no severe reactions during
the Academy session, although there were some debates of the other
stream being registered among the present academicians, however far
from the expected intensity. Also, in the official Serb circles dead
silence still rules. It could have a double echo : either
the idea was launched by them, either this was the testing of the public
opinion pulse by allowing enough space to punish the academician's
madness - since the national cradle cannot be given away nor sold.
Right now, Milosevic is found between the two equally dangerous flames.
On one hand, the threats over the reintroduction of sanctions are very actual,
conditioning the regulation of the status of Kosova for their definite termination.
On the other, although Milosevic appears to have no rival, the possible
slip could take him to the abyss. Therefore, his silence, after such an
important proposal, is understandable. However, there is not much time left,
and Milosevic will be forced to declare what he wants in the case of Kosova.
It seems that Belgrade understands that the preservation of the status-quo
is no longer in the interest of Serbia. It may be that Despic gave himself
more freedom than preferred, and that he claimed on his own all of what
he said. Nevertheless, the aim was reached. The attention of the political
and public opinion was completely concentrated on Kosova. Depending on the
political, party or national belonging, the statements of the Serb politicians
and intellectuals varied. Academician Dejan Medakovic claims that the Albanian
subject, Kosova, is a sphere of direct interest of great world powers. Thus,
he indirectly admitted that the Kosova issue is a problem with an international
character and not an internal, Serbian.
It remains to be seen whether the Albanian subject will have the ability
to utilize this advantage. As for the Serb politicians and the posture that
Kosova should be given back the status of autonomy equal to that of the
1974 Constitution, the first one to state this in public was the chairman
of the Nova Demokratija, Dusan Mihajlovic. After Despic's proposal, the
return of the autonomy was proposed by the center democrats such Desimir
Tosic ( Initially, Kosova should be returned the 1974 autonomy and
afterwards it should be divided by giving Albanians the greatest part of
the territory), as well as Dragoljub Micunovic.
Other personalities advocate the return of the autonomy, however all of
them determined the autonomy that will not have the statal attributes. In
this moment, for the Albanian side it is highly important that Belgrade
is sending signals about a kind of determination for reaching compromises
and not as stated so far - a rump autonomy or the defense of the territorial
integrity at any cost.
Source: Pristina weekly Koha , June 19, 1996
Albanians have time, we don't - said recently the chairman of
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in his interesting opening speech
on Kosova, a speech quite important in the political scene, and not only
in that of Serbia!
In his interesting and courageous approach, the chief-academician Despic
viewed the Kosova problem through the prism of the inner enemy ,
the Albanian demographic weapon that, in the very near future can easily
gnaw the Serb substance and turn Serbia into a binational and bilingual
state... Despic literally said it... and vanished. He is impossible
to be found in Belgrade these days, since he left for vacation! Thus, the
chairman of the Serbian Academy (that was never only the highest Serb national
institution of science and arts!), promoted a balloon that caused within
24 hours the most opposed reactions in the political scene of Serbia. This
was the point, we would say.
The reaction of all Serb opposition parties including the entire specter
of a priori denials of the academic heresy (the party of Arkan),
its content (the SPS), criticism (the DSS utilized the speech for attacking
the actual regime on Kosova, relating it to Despic's idea), up to a kind
of approval (the Democrat's MP to the federal parliament, Desimir Tosic),
followed.
Regardless of whether somebody whispered something in Despic's ear, this
nevertheless discovers a rather peculiar thing: that in the Serb circles
the Kosova issue is looked upon differently and with a vivid acceleration!
Why - this is to be revealed soon. Anyway, this opinion succeeded to horrify
100% of the Kosova Serbs who are already seriously concerned with the Serb
post- Daytonian Realpolitik and who already started signing
petitions and attempts to organize the collective rejection of the Serb
policy towards Kosova.
After this recent case, when the Kosova Serbs were highly distressed by
the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the Dukagjin Field and the border
with Albania, it seems that this has become the most tangible idea to freeze
their veins in this hot, a very hot political summer. But, perhaps this
time, except greetings to the courageous idea , Kosova Albanians
should join the fears of their Serb fellow-citizens. At least, with a small
percentage that would sound: Beware of the Greeks when they bring
you presents...
Source: Pristina weekly Koha , June 19, 1996
Skhelzen Maliqi of the AIM agency writes in the June 21, 1996 issue of the
Podgorica weekly Monitor on the same issue.
The forced diplomatic breakthrough of the Americans in Kosovo, even though
it only has a symbolic importance (it is only an information center), has
been correctly interpreted from the keepers of the strategic national interests
of the Serbs as the end of the illusion that anything in Kosovo can be settled
by force or a one sided dictating from Belgrade. Due to this, it could be
said that Despic's speech came at the right moment, when it is clear to
every thinking Serb, but also to all political parties, that the solution
of the Kosovo problem cannot be prolonged anymore. In that context, the
recent Milosevic statement to Der Spiegel that the Albanians
in Serbia enjoy the greatest rights, as no other minority in the world,
could be seen as a smoke screen for the almost immediate Despic bombshell
about a possible secession of Kosovo.
But, it is not only the outside pressure what has caused the opening of
the Kosovo question. The matter is much more complicated. It could be said
that today in Kosovo there is a cross-cutting and accelerating of all Serbian
troubles. It is really, as Despic said, a great strategic crossroad. Belgrade
today is really burdened with a series of urgent problems. It finds itself
in front of a series of catastrophes or decisive challenges as are: strategic
dilemma whether Serbia will remain in the East or will start moving towards
the West, unstated or doubtful transition of the system from state socialism
in undeveloped state capitalism; the economic crash and gradual confrontation
with the consequences of the technological dead end of large systems; payment
of social consequences of the technological dead-end and already permanent
sufficit of work force, whose number is estimated at one million (10% of
the population)., and many others. In this situation, Kosovo, in such a
catastrophic situation represents for Serbia an additional stone around
the neck, the main immobilizing factor for starting the tide of change.
Seen from this angle, Despic's proposal is not surprising. It can be even
seen as somewhat late. This is shown by reactions in Serbia, of which it
was thought that they will be severe, but it turned out that they were quite
lukewarm and in essence expressed general defeatism, among Serbian nationalists,
as well as liberals and democrats. It seems that both consider Kosovo as
a black hole that is sucking in the future of Serbia, the first
because it is preventing the creation of Serbian ethnic state, and the second
because deeply anomaly relations in Kosovo in the long term lead towards
continuous militarization of Serbia and prevent its true democratization.
The second question which was posed in reactions in Serbia concerning Despic's
proposal was according to whose orders it was given and in whose name he
is giving the proposal. It was stated that Despic is a high official of
the ruling SPS party and that his proposal is actually Milosevic's test
balloon for the idea of the secession of Kosovo, and which is thought to
be part of the secret deal in Dayton. This is though somewhat irrelevant.
The question of Kosovo poses itself quite imperatively to all political
elements in Serbia and it is not, as it was a few years ago, the matter
of party polarizations. Kosovo has been for a long time a question of fierce
internal discussions of those which see themselves responsible for the fate
of Serbia and Serbian nation.
When the current regime is in question, it is closer to the idea of regionalization
of FRY, and within this division of Kosovo into two regions, promoted by
another Serbian academic, Miodrag Jovicic. Regionalization represents a
magic formula of the administrative triumph of the Serbian state-forming
idea, which would, with one hit, annul the Montenegrin statehood created
by the latest constitution of FRY, and at the same time depose of any remaining
remnants of the half a century of Kosovo autonomy. The promoters of this
idea suffer from heavy hypocrisy and double standards, since the support
completely different principles in Bosnia of ethnic division.
The models of kosovo solution proposed by Despic and Jovicic(and probably
Milosevic) could actually have a meeting point in the search for the formula
of division of Kosovo. In Albanian reactions to Despic's proposal which
were quite sustained, the only point of complete rejection was the one about
possible division of Kosovo.
The problem with Kosovo is that the relations today have become such an
anomaly, that joint life and complete integration of Albanians cannot be
foreseen. Keeping Kosovo by force or an attempt of infinite perpetuation
of the state between peace and war and parallel rule, in the end have to
lead to an explosion and war. This war would be one that could not be won.
Despic's idea of delineation with Albanians probably understands, even though
this has not been said aloud, parallel Serbization of the Western
and Northern national borders, meaning forcing of the just formed Serbian
state entity in bosnia and definitive Serbization of Vojvodina. For the
gathering of all Serbs Kosovo is ethnically irrelevant area,
since there lives only 1,5 percent of all Serbs.
New, realistic Serb irredentism to that effect, relatively easy accepts
the amputation of the cradle of serbian statehood , grieving
more for the natural and energy resources of kosovo, than for the mythological
past or manipulated Serb population in Kosovo. Finally, ethnically
concentrated Serbian state, according to these plans, could more easily
reach the long term control of Montenegro and Sandjak.
To remain afloat, the balloon of Serbian irredentism now has to relive itself
of excess baggage. It is a paradox that in that respect Kosovo is on the
top of the list. To save the kosovo myth of Serbian ethnic statehood, the
Serbs will again have to lose Kosovo.
Source: Podgoirca weekly Monitor , June 21, 1996
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