ISSUE 28/29 Vol. 3
                                           
February 29,1996.

IN THIS ISSUE:

  • "Svijet" and "Feral Tribune" on the situation in Mostar

  • "Monitor" on the reunification of Sarajevo

  • "Vreme" on the political implications of the refugee crisis in Tuzla

  • "Vreme" on the political situation among Bosnian Serbs

  • "Svijet" on the politics within Bosnian government army

  • "Republika" on ex-Yugoslav republics and Europe

  • "Nezavisni" on the political prospects within Serbia

  • "Monitor" on the succession of the former Yugoslav state

  • "Arkzin" on the "Manifesto for autonomous Vojvodina"

  • "Nezavisni" on the prospects in the Federal election in FR Yugoslavia

  • "Feral Tribune" on the relations between the regime and opposition in Croatia

  • "Globus" on the changes in the Croatian secret service

  • "Nezavisni" on the background of the arms reduction talks in Vienna

  • "Globus" on the purges within Croatian military

  • "Arkzin" on the political effects of the Dayton agreements

  • "Vreme" on the policies of the political couple Milosevic-Markovic;

  • "Koha" on the views of Albanians in Albania about Albanians in Kosovo

  • "Koha" on the political situation in Macedonia

  • "Arkzin" and "Nezavisni" on the situation in the media

  • "Nezavisni","Feral Tribune" and "Vreme" on war crimes

  • "Nezavisni" on human rights in Serbia

  • SITUATION IN BOSNIA

    In its initial issue of February 1,1996, renewed Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", brought a analysis by Vlastimir Mijovic, concerning the developments in the reintegration process of the divided city of Mostar.

    Mijovic says that Hans Koschnick angered Haris Silajdzic and the mayor of the Muslim part of town Safet Orucevic and particularly the citizens, with the minimalistic proposal for the territory of the "safety" district. He openly played into the hand of Brajkovic (the other half-mayor of Mostar). Not even a bucket of cold water could freeze the hearts which were unsuspectedly warmed by the fist thumping of the German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel and his promise that if Franjo Tudjman does not bring to senses "his" citizens of Mostar, the problems will be solved by arbitration. Everybody expected that the arbitration and European-administration will punish the Croats and reword the Bosniaks. They were wrong.

    Haris Silajdzic threw his rage at the controversial German. But, says Mijovic he only says what European heads think up and say to be put in practice. Otherwise he would be punished and severely corrected for his acts. This is confirmed by Koschnick himself. After the failure of the negotiations concerning a district, he left for his new opinion to European capitals.

    The so talked about district is supposed to be a savior idea for the unification of Mostar. That word and idea, by the way, are not mentioned in the all encompassing Dayton agreement, where only six (three plus three) national majority counties are mentioned. The "sides" have agreed to seek an additional solution by themselves. The problem, after all, returned to the beginning. It is the district, as a central and joint super-county. This is seen by Orucevic as a small door for a large reunification of the city, and his colleague Brajkovic as a territorial concession with which he saves his principle of the ethnic division of Mostar. Orucevic offered Brajkovic the first mayor's mandate, but to no avail. Brajkovic insists on the "reality". The city is, in other words, being divided according to well dug trenches of long ago.

    Silajdzic insisted that the district has to be the nucleus of the Mostar reintegration, and such a Mostar for the reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, there are other opinions, for example that of Jadranko Prlic, who says that the solution of the Mostar question is important for the Federation, but that it is not decisive. Actually, this echoes the opinion of the Croatian president Tudjman, who is trying to take away the limelight from Mostar.

    The whole truth actually cannot be squeezed into the bullies or the "groups that are terrorizing the city". The politics is also involved, and the one of high caliber at that. Zagreb and its Herzegovina executors have not given up on their old plans about Mostar as the (exclusive) Croatian capital and on "Herzeg Bosnia" as a quasi-region of the Croatian republic. Towards that goal, only the tactics is being changed now: the strategy remains

    Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", February 1, 1996
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    The main commentary of the February 12, 1996 issue of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" is devoted to the situation in Mostar.

    After the Mostar masses have done with Hans Koschnick, the local radio has frequently repeated the slogan that explained the greatness of the victory: "Europe does not live here anymore!" Koschnick spokesmen made ironic comments about the Croatian journalists which have described the demonstrations as tame and innocent, that one could get the impression that even Koschnick joined the masses, and not that he was under the blockade and a threat of a lynch for almost an hour.

    But it is not a question of pure profession here. DemonstrAtions against Koschnick irresistibly resemble, even in detail, last years street attack on the bishop of Mostar Ratko Peric, who was also caught in the street and then mistreated and insulted for hours. The difference is only that then the rage has partly transferred to the local authorities, who have fitted themselves in so much this time, that the mayor of the right bank, Mijo Brajkovic has already given instructions to Mostarians about another gathering in a weeks time: official building of a Catholic church was to be started in the Seventh district, which Koschnick supposedly gave to the Muslims.

    Actually, Brajkovic is considered as the most moderate among the Herzegovina Croat officials - something like Kresimir Zubak - and this time both of them were in the front line in the attacks on the European administrator.

    In essence,the arbitration was only casus belli, told to the street warriors from some local headquarters, and after some pause, supported from Zagreb. Did zagreb, by studdering and distancing form the "methods" actually attempt to cover up its being caught in the act, or bad conscience, is not the most important thing, since from the stance of end effects there should be no difference.

    But such thinking cannot be applied to the case of Sarajevo, which up until now had said nothing, with or without studdering. In that manner, an impression is created that in this case one is speaking in the name of two, while synchronized attacks on Haris Silajdzic - accused by the Croats as the one who pushed Koschnick in the "crime" - reveal the level of cooperation of the main parties of Croats and Muslims: HDZ gets spoils in Mostar, SDA get power in Bosnia.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", February 12, 1996
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    In the February 23, 1996, issue of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" Esad Kocan analyzes the situation developing with the reunification of Sarajevo.

    Kocan says that opinions in Pale concerning this obligation under the Dayton agreement differ. According to the report of the state Serbian TV, prime minister Kasagic felt relief when the agreement on the takeover by the Bosnian government was coordinated. The Serbs on the edges of Sarajevo for four years had to get into their heads the theory that the unified Bosnia and Sarajevo have to be destroyed by all available arguments spread around the hills. Now, though,in a crash course, they are being thought the science that life in Sarajevo, now that it is coming into the hands of the Federation of two other nations is a completely normal thing.

    On the same state of facts, Karadzic and Mladic are drawing a completely different set of conclusions. From Sarajevo suburbs which they have to give up, there are reports of organized leaving. The operation has already been prepared in advance, so it is already known in which cities in Podrinje and Posavina "Serb Sarajevo" is to be located. The witnesses say that best results in the action named "never again with the Turks", Karadzic people have in Hadzici. That suburb had 24 thousand inhabitants before the war; 64 percent were Bosniaks. They were all expelled at the beginning of the war, and there, in accordance with national geography, the most numerous became Serbs brought there from central Bosnia.

    The Serb central national committee never counted as their own all those Serbs that remained loyal to bosnia. The fact that 150 thousand of them spent the war on the territory under the control of Bosnian army was being hid like national shame. There is a hurry in Bosnia. In podrinje, it was not enough, as is interpreted by those naive ones, to expel the Bosniaks. Crime there appeared as a practical political need - it was important to make sure they never come back. Karadzic and Mladic earned their rank as war criminals due to a precise coordination of goals and means in creating their state. The "state former" from Pale knows about the inconsistencies of the West and that is why he is in the hurry to fill up "nationally perspective terrains next to the mother state". When the dislocation of Sarajevo Serbs ends, it will turn up that at least half of the citizens of the young republic lives in somebody elses houses. Every furor goes in favor of Karadzic.
    Kocan concludes that the time of nightmares is coming for warriors. If Milosevic, after four years of massacring Sarajevo discovered that Serbs can live there normally, it is not excluded that those that he took to war start thinking: if it is possible on Miljacka river (Sarajevo), why could it not be possible on Drina river (Eastern Bosnia).

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", February, 23, 1996
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    Vehid Jahic of the AIM agency, writes in the February 10, 1996, issue of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" about the situationwith refugees in Tuzla and its effect on the Bosnian internal politics.

    Several-day long protest of the exiled Srebrenica citizens in the Tuzla Drina Valley Canton has culminated with violence and a "clash'' of the demonstrators and the police who were defending the Cantonal Government building.

    The protests actually began a few months ago in Vozuca, a village near Zavidovici. The exiles were demanding better conditions for themselves and their children, more food, clothing, shoes, adequate accommodation and health care. Some 1,800 people from Srebrenica were placed in the destroyed village of Vozuca which was the front line until recently. Their days in exile passed without electricity, school, health care. Feeling dissatisfied and abandoned, the people from Srebrenica blocked the Tuzla-Zavidovici-Zenica road demanding from the Bosnian authorities to resolve their status. Former minister for refugees Muharem Cero visited them and promised their situation would improve shortly. However, record remains that the first protest of the Srebrenica exiles was based on social issues and the question of what happened to the eight to nine thousand men who disappeared after Karadzic had seized Srebrenica.

    The authorities started some activities concerning the improvement of the material status of the exiles in Vozuca, but those were only minor attempts. At the end of last and the beginning of this month, thousands of Srebrenica exiles now living in the Tuzla area started protesting outside the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) building in Tuzla. The demonstrators demanded that the ICRC tell them the truth about the disappeared Srebrenica citizens. After they got the bureaucratic reply that the ICRC were ``working on it,'' they broke into the building and destroyed the ground floor. ICRC officers shut themselves in the offices on the upper floors of the building, all the roads in and out of Tuzla were blocked for hours.

    According to many of the exiles, Srebrenica was an object of trade for the Bosnian government who did not let them go abroad after the town was seized, but kept them ``for show'' in Bosnia-Herzegovina.---Everything is clear now! They didn't let us go so they could get humanitarian aid and money over our backs. The donations were not used for us, the authorities kept them for themselves. That money was not spent on us! We are thirsty, hungry, we sleep in tents in this cold, without clothes, shoes, enough food---said Zejneba Mesic from Srebrenica, now placed in the elementary school building in Zivinice. Many of the demonstrators were in uniforms---they were the soldiers who had survived the Srebrenica golgotha. They accused the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the state leadership of theft and malverzations.

    The state-controlled media have, of course, kept quiet about the sharp criticism of the current government and the socio-political demands of the Srebrenica exiles. The information published by the state-controlled Radio-Television Bosnia-Herzegovina and the newspapers close to the ruling circles was edited so as to show that the people from Srebrenica were angry with the international community because of the issues which had arisen.

    It is a paradox that Tuzla Regional government is aware red cent how much money international relief organizations spend on projects in Tuzla if these organizations are working directly, and not through Cantonal government, for example Norwegian National help or Norwegian church help, but they do not know what is happening with the money which they have directly available.

    For example what is whit five million dollars which was sent by Dutch government for the refugees of Srebrenica. It is not told here as well as how much money came in to special funds opened in the name of Srebrenica as is the party account of the SDA.

    President of the Canton Izet Hadzic also member of the SDA leadership insists that the half of the money received from the Dutch government has been spent, supposedly for the adaptation of living quarters in brcko and Srebrenik where 22 000 square meters has been secured.

    About the other half meaning 2,5 millions dollars, there is no word.

    But it is knowen that the SDA and bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic personally gave donation to the refugees in Vozuca in the amount of 2 millions DEM but this money " frozen" because nobody wonted or knew how to spend them. In the end it seems that Bosnia and Herzegovina regime has underestimated the problem of refugees. Since the return of refugees even with the signatures on the Agreement is practically not allowed.

    Dew to that the Srebrenica people in Tuzla lost their patience which is expected through out in Bosnia.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", February 10, 1996
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    Dragan Stavljanin of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", discusses in the magazine's issue of February 10, the current political situation among Bosnian Serbs.

    Although the exact date of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been announced yet, the pre-election fever has begun in the Bosnian Serb Republic, so the recruitment of voters might become a topic more attractive than the implementation of the peace agreement.

    Twenty-four political parties and associations have been registered so far. In expectation of the election rules, they are developing their election strategies.

    A major problem, both legally and technically, will be the forming of voting lists. Although a census was not explicitly foreseen by the Dayton agreement, it seems to be the only way of registering all the voters, many of whom have left their homes. At the same time, this would encourage them to return to their homes. The defining of the electorate in such circumstances is a rather complicated undertaking, so the question is whether the elections are likely to be held by September which is the deadline according to the peace agreement.

    The political struggle in the Bosnian Serb Republic will occur chiefly between two blocks: the left---headed by the Socialist Party (SPS), including the Independent Social-Democrats, the Yugoslav United Left (JUL)---and the right---comprising ruling Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbian Radical Party. Since the war is over, the parties of the civil option, such as the Liberal Party from Banjaluka, are gaining importance.

    Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic has apparently abandoned his intention to let someone more loyal than Karadzic head the Bosnian Serb Republic before the elections. The most frequently mentioned name was Nikola Koljevic, Bosnian Serb vice president. However, he has opted for the SPS branch in Banjaluka.

    "Our party has more and more followers,'' says Dragutin Ilic, the head of the Bosnian Serb Republic branch of SPS and the director of the Banjaluka Ambulance." The establishment of peace has made a new environment in which the citizens now can hear what the socialists advocate, they see that our programme offers possibilities for the accomplishment of their aims. Members of the Socialist Party have a moral integrity and people trust them. They managed to keep their dignity during the war and they did not offend either the authorities or citizens of non-Serb nationality who live with us.''

    Another party which attracts attention are the Independent Social-Democrats. This party has grown out of the Club of seven independent MP's in the Bosnian Serb Republic Parliament. The party leader is Milorad Dodik who became MP as member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Reformists in the first elections. He is a businessman, owner of a furniture factory, who spends much time in Belgrade.

    According to Secretary of SDS Presidency Vladimir Verkis, the ruling party is"busy with the implementation of the Dayton agreement, economic stabilization of the Bosnian Serb Republic and enforcement of the state.'' The Presidency was recently formed as an executive body which is to visit the entire RS territory and see who they can count with. "SDS will certainly try to purify its membership, to freshen up, get new personnel, in order to successfully compete with other parties in the forthcoming elections,'' said Verkis.

    However, SDS personnel basis is obviously rather narrow. The party must get rid of some compromised persons, even in the leadership, if it wants to gain confidence of the voters. On the other hand, it can hardly expect to attract new people. This is why no major personnel purge should be expected in SDS, but more or less cosmetic changes. In the meantime, opposition parties are mercilessly attacking the ruling party, as part of their pre-election strategy.

    When it comes to national policy, the Bosnian Serb leadership believes it has been successful. "I think we have done the maximum in the circumstances we are in, having got the Bosnian Serb Republic as a state in a rather large territory,'' said Verkis.

    Of course, the voters will be far more interested in the actual position of the Bosnian Serb Republic and how normal life would be restored. When it comes to economy, everybody wants economic cooperation with the world and with the neighbouring countries, in order to solve the social problems of the impoverished people, invalids, families whose members were killed in the war. However, the opinions about the constitutional and legal position of the Bosnian Serb Republic vary. While most parties maintain that unification with Serbia is a priority, the Liberal Party maintains it would be disastrous for the Bosnian Serbs.

    "We want the implementation of the Dayton agreement,'' said Liberal Party leader Miodrag Zivanovic. ``This means that our activities will be directed toward the development of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its structure will be different, but Bosnia-Herzegovina is a chance for co-existence and for the resolution of not only the Serbian but also of the Croatian and Muslim issues.''

    The forthcoming elections in the Bosnian Serb Republic are important not only for its parties but also for the parties in Serbia. The socialists in the Bosnian Serb Republic believe that if they lose, which they doubt, their party comrades in Belgrade will find it much more difficult to stay in power. This is why opposition parties in Serbia are planning to be active across the Drina river. Apart form the radicals, whose Secretary General Aleksandar Vucic says his party has the best chances, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Democratic Party will also take part in the elections.

    Although with an enormous burden, including the fact that the party leader Radovan Karadzic has been accused of war crimes, SDS is not without chances. As a ruling party, it will try to take advantage of the media which it controls. It will attempt to gain popularity by taking care of the refugees, invalids, families whose members were killed in the war and by raising pensions and salaries ahead of the elections.

    In the first elections, the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for national parties. This time, according to Milorad Dodik, the voters will not opt for party programmes, but for the capable and uncompromised individuals. However, after everything that has happened, it will be difficult to gain the trust of the homeless, impoverished, wounded, confused, disgraced and embittered who only want to settle down somewhere and start living a normal life. This is why some estimates say a large number of people will abstain in the forthcoming elections in the Bosnian Serb Republic.

    Source:Belgrade weekly " Vreme" February 10,1966
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    The president of the Serbian European movement (and a former minister of Foreign affairs of former Yugoslavia in early Seventies) Mirko Tepavac, analyzes the possibilities of Croatia and particularly Serbia of being accepted to the Council of Europe and establishing closer relations to the European union.

    It is a much more based fear, says Tepavac that Yugoslavia will be the last European country (possibly along with Croatia) which will be accepted by the Council and the Union. This not because they hate us so much, but because the impoverished and degraded Yugoslavia has to pass a much longer road to come to level with the European standards. It is too much that we should be afraid of joining European union, when it is afraid of exactly the same thing. There is much more reason to be afraid that we will, as far as Europe is concerned, have to remain for quite a long time the way we are, if that is what we want.

    Instead of a priori rejection of Europe, it would be much better that we seriously take into consideration the preconditions on which Europe insists. None of those aspiring to join Europe is even thinking of changing these conditions, but is attempting to fulfill them as soon as possible. The European union thoroughly insists that its members set up full market economy, to respect civil and human rights, as well as those of national groups and national minorities, to be open and democratic societies, to respect freedom of information and scrupulously apply the standards of the Union and OSCE. These changes cannot be "an act" as is being done here with privatization, parliamentarism, minority rights and freedom of the media.

    Attempts, to which, unfortunately, we are so inclined towards, to change everything so that it actually remains the same will not be accepted. Anything can be changed but political monopoly and the nature of the ruling system. In the same manner that Serbia was notable to present itself as peaceful while it was militant, it will also not succeed to falsely present itself as democratic, if it remains state-socialist, party and authoritarian state.

    We are inventing in vain the world in which we would like to live in, unwilling to live in the world as it is. We wanted Yugoslavia without the Slovenes, Europe without the Germans and the World without the Americans. We should accept the reality, as long as we are not able to change it. Only real and thorough changes can return us back into the world. The same forces that have lead us into the war are carrying the resistance against modernization euriopeization, leaning on the weakened but still vital nationalism and parochial consciousness. This conflict ill not end up in a draw, and it is quite unlikely that it will end up without serious confrontations, even dramatic conflicts. The war has easily recently found its people among us. The peace has to finds its own, before the costumed warmongers adapt to it.

    Also, without settling the relations with neighbors nobody can expect the hospitability of Europe. Luckily, this also concerns all of our old and new neighbors. EU is not without its own internal problems and conflict of interests, and it cannot expect from others to be ideal. But, there is one essential difference. The Union solves its discrepancies through compromise, patiently and tolerantly. For half a century of Union's existence, not one problem between its members did not threaten with a conflict or did it end up in a breakup.

    Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", January 1-31, 1996
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    The leader of the oppositionary Vojvodina party "The League of Socialdemocrats", Nenad Canak, examines in the February 2, 1996 issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" the prospects for the political situation in Yugoslavia in the coming period.

    In difference to the regimes of Hitler and Stalin, the regime of slobodan Milosevic has no political platform, nor any ideological traits which would enable drawing of conclusions concerning the direction of its political activity. The activities of the regime are tied exclusively to the safeguarding of power. So, the form of the rule of Slobodan Milosevic defines the political platform of the party in power, and not vice versa. The cosmetic corrections of this scheme come out of a direct need to form a better picture of the regime in the eyes of the foreign investors.

    Due to the activity of "cosmetics", the image has been somewhat changed in the domain of ownership, one party system and "freedom of the media", and now looks like this: All forms of ownership are allowed, but only the state companies whose directors are the "believers" of the ruling regime have the possibility to make profitable deals. The rest serve as an alibi against the accusations of "stifling of private initiative". In practice, these private companies are under constant pressure of the intentional political state regulations and "financial police", which serves the purpose that somebody would not get "too rich" and in that manner gain material capabilities to finance, for example the oppositionary parties. There is also another type of "private companies, possessed by the high officials of the regime and they solely serve the purpose of spilling of funds into the pocket of the ruling oligarchy, so they can be placed in the category of "para-state companies".

    Formally proclaimed multi party system in our case is only kept at the level of existence of number of political organizations, while system solutions that should enable the true coming to life of the multipartyism, simply, not even after five years, are in existence. In the situation of a over the half majority of the regime voting machine in the lawmaking Parliaments, there is a grotesque division of the oppositionary parties on "parliamentarian" and "non-parliamentarian", since neither have any possibility to do anything through the Parliaments. The financing of the parties is not regulated, nor is the media following of their activities. In other words, the regime leaves the possibility to the opposition to exist in the conditions of financial poverty and anonymity, while it feeds the illusion of a multi party system with favoring of "para-parties" like "New DEmocracy", JUL, and similar, even transmitting some lesser state functions to them.

    The freedom of the media is in a similar situation like the parties. Knowing the power of certain media, the regime decided for the monopoly over TV, radio and daily press, while it let the opposition to promote its stances, and with great difficulty in the weekly private and semi-private magazines, mainly of local character. In other words, besides "Nasa Borba", there is not one paper that in some manner covers the whole country, and in which an opinion differing with that of the regime could be heard.

    Through all said, it is obvious that the regime of Slobodan Milosevic is a classic totalitarian regime, without any other purpose than de-ideologized retaining of power. Those comprising the regime are not gathered around a defined idea or a programme, but around purely personal interest, whether it is the power, more or something else. Since the whole regime is hinging on the leader, the influence of an individual is amounts to exactly to the level of his favor with the leader. If that favor is on the vane, so is the influence

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", February 2, 1996
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    SUCCESSION OF THE FORMER
    YUGOSLAV STATE

    Beba Marusic of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", discusses in the February 2, 1996, issue of the magazine the state of current negotiations about the succession of the former Yugoslav state.

    The outcry of the Montenegrin bankers that their accounts abroad are unfrozen only "conditionally", and that anybody's complain can block them again, is the part of the story about the difference between suspension and lifting of the sanctions.

    By opening the story of succession of the former state, the regime would finally bring down the thesis with which it has fed for too long the warriors and voters, about "secessionist republics", and "guardians" of Yugoslavia which have even kept its name.

    It is becoming clear that there will be problems with the use of financial assets of the state and the banks until the final agreement on succession can be seen from the statements of different representatives of the successor states. The head of the Croatian succession team, Bozo Marendic, has recently stated on Croatian TV that due to the unprecise formulation of the UN Security Council resolution 1.022, Croatia had to resort to legal measures through courts in a number of Western countries to prevent the Yugoslav national bank to use these funds, at which she was quite successful. Later, he said, Slovenia and partly the other two republics (Macedonia and Bosnia) joined in on this activity.

    The four former Yugoslav republic are unified in their fight for the favorable succession of the former state, but each has its own specific interest when the division of assets and debts is in question. This is shown by the recent Skopje meeting of Macedonian and Slovenian president Kucan and Gligorov, as well as by some financial-political manoeuvres by Slovenia and Croatia. Explaining the Macedonian-Slovenian stance on succession, Gligorov said: "We cannot be secessionists, we will attempt in the future that the letter of the Badintter opinion be put in practice, accepted by the UN, that the former Yugoslav state has disintegrated.

    Nobody argues that the current Yugoslavia is not a successor, but it is not the only one". Having in mind these talks, as well as the visit of the Slovenian foreign minister to Sarajevo, where the succession was also the subject, and also the Zagreb talks, the official Belgrade press did not resist to make a biting comment that "Slovenia, through incessant diplomatic activity in the last few months in Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia is attempting to strengthen the impression that the secessionist republics are equal inheritors of the SFRY".

    The preliminary acceptance of the consortium of the world banks in New York to exclude Slovenia from the Yugoslav debtor package, and a possible separate signing of an agreement about its debts and dynamics of repayment, caused strong reactions in Belgrade. This maneuver of the Slovenian government opened up the question of a debt of 700 million US dollars, which the banks over there owe to the banks in FRY, as well as the question of its repayment through courts and the possibility of evading obligations whose guarantor was the Yugoslav National bank of the former country.

    When the debts of Croatia are in question, the officials there think that the application of succession has developed further in that segment, but that the job is not finished yet. The final division will be made on the basis of the succession Agreement, and the temporary quote for Croatia, amounting to 28,49 percent, will, it seems, be revised, according to political concessions on the line Belgrade - Zagreb. It seems that that Belgrade will reduce, or take over a part of the Croatian debt in exchange for the support of the automatic return to the UN membership, which would automatically recognize the right to the continuity between SFRY and FRY.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", February 2, 1996
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    INTERNAL POLITICAL EVENTS

    Milena Putnik of the AIM Agency comments in the January 19, 1996, issue of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" on the political developments concerning the "Manifesto for Autonomous Vojvodina", issued by a number of parties and individuals from this province of Serbia.

    Putnik says that the "Manifesto", recently signed by 17 NGO's and oppositionary political parties, have unsuspectedly raised passions on the usually very dull political scene of Vojvodina. Manifesto insists on the changes in the Serbian an Yugoslav constitution, with the goal that Vojvodina would get back economic, political, legal and cultural autonomy. It does not ask for a state: monetary policy, customs, military and foreign policy would remain in hands of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

    This is not a first document issued after the "Yoghurt anti-bureaucratic revolution" of 1988 - suspending the autonomy with the passage of the Serbian constitution, which warns of the specifics of Vojvodina. Something else is new. First of all, the attempt to unify all forces which think that the autonomy is a condition for survival of Vojvodina. This was the first time that, either through acceptance of, or resistance towards the "Manifesto", in some way, disparate political ideas have united. Even those whose idea of any kind of autonomy is in one thing: that Vojvodina has been robbed and that this cannot go on anymore.

    The question of autonomy gained legitimacy on the political scene. The subdued stance of the ruling Socialist party of Serbia, probably only speaks of the fact that they have still not decided what to do. There was no mass critical noise about this document, maybe even because the fact that the tougher socialist faction in Vojvodina "got fired" within its party.

    The "Manifesto" itself came into being as an initiative of the "Vojvodina club", and the independent, six member, parliamentary group in Vojvodina assembly, lead by the Novi Sad journalist Mile Isakov (editor of the "Nezavisni" weekly). Vojvodina club is a non-party association, whose existence the regime is attempting to hide through a heavy media blockade, while "thinks as Vojvodina club" is seen by the regime Novi Sad daily "Dnevnik" as one of the worst epithets. Three parties have joined in: The League of Vojvodina Social democrats (of Nenad Canak), National peasants party ( of Dragan Veselinov) and All-national Democratic Front of Vojvodina (lead by Zivojin Berisavljevic, one of the former leading communists of Vojvodina, deposed by Slobodan Milosevic).

    The Manifesto was supported (but not signed) by "Reformist democratic party of Vojvodina" New DEmocracy of Vojvodina, The Union of Vojvodina Hungarians and Democratic union of Vojvodina Hungarians (all of these parties have members in the Parliament). The opinion was still not given by the ruling Socialist, its satellite JUL(of ms. Markovic-Milosevic), Democratic party (of Zoran Djindjic) and Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic (later partially supported it - op.ed). Negative comments were given by Democratic Party of Serbia (of Vojislav Kostunica), The communist party and Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj.

    Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", January 19, 1996
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    The leader of another party - Peasants national Party, Dragan Veselinov, assesses the chances of the non-ruling parties at the autumn elections in FR Yugoslavia.

    The federal elections will solve an enigma that is running through the political life for the last two years, and that is JUL, the United Yugoslav Left. This party has no individual strength. Its president, ms. Mira Markovic (mrs. Milosevic) has no personal popularity, nor does anybody consider her as a serious political opponent. Her party is of a parasite nature to the ruling Socialists, without any clear political orientation. It could gain a seat or two if it enters the elections individually, but not without, electoral manipulations of the socialist computers.

    Ms. Markovic is against privatization, but not against the unlawful privatization of the villa in Belgrade for her family, she is against nationalism - but she never condemned Serbian nationalism and revanchism of her 'communists", she is against the war - but she never condemned the theft of the property of the former Yugoslav communist party by socialists and her party, she is against privileges - but she never condemned the privileged issuance of import-export licenses to members of her and her husband's party.She is for the modern federation - but she never said a word against the destruction of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, she is for democracy - but she never explained why her and socialist's censorship on TV, radio and in the press is so strong.

    The political field Veselinov sees also includes the leaders of the Radicals, Democrats, Serbian democratic party, Seselj, Djindjic and Kostunica, and there is a possibility that they will enter the elections jointly. These parties are warmongering and anti-federalist, and they will play the game as the Serb patriotic front, either together or by themselves. They are bound together by the centralistic views of the internal order within Serbia, greater serbian programme and lack of any sense of personal responsibility for the tragedy which hit the state in the last eight years. But, they can also separate in the middle of the election campaign.

    If they show up jointly at the elections, that would mean that they are scared that separately they will gain less seats than the last time. The problem with the joint appearance is in that that none of the parties would know how much they are worth by themselves.

    It is not impossible that these parties would be joined by the Serbian Renewal Movement. Personal differences and mistrust between the leaders of the four parties would then have to be suppressed and a very tight programme of joint action would have to be formulated, so that they could stay in power in the case of a victory. There, Seselj would be the greatest obstacle in the group. He has no programme, except populistic slogans devoted to pensioners, workers, pregnant women and impoverished students.

    Only the Kosovo Albanians do not give any signs of pre-election activity. It is too early for that, since the Americans have not pushed them yet to return to Serbia, nor have they pushed Serbia to give Kosovo a strong legal autonomy and police independence.

    The Montenegrin opposition will enter the federal elections. It could only happen that Liberals of Slavko Perovic will remain at home. Their tactics so far has been not to enter the Federal parliament, since they want to see Montenegro outside of Yugoslavia. The rest of the opposition, whether it is pro-Serbian or pro-Montenegrin, will go to the polls, even though that part also does not exclude Montenegrin independence from its programmes.

    Serbian and Montenegrin socialists are counting that they will surely win at the federal polls. They are probably right. Both parties are the symbols of national political puberty of their respective nations. Both parties are part of the general criminality within the state, where armed robbery and cheating have become the object of worship. These parties are not so much liked as the public fears them, and due to the fear of worse tomorrow, votes for them.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", February 2, 1996
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    Zoran Daskalovic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" discusses in the magazine's issue of February 19, 1996, the reasons for the acceptance of the State Revision Bureau by the SDP Party (former Communists).

    Exactly on Valentines day, the socialdemocrats of Ivica Racan fell into the arms of HDZ, turning the back to their electoral coalition partners from the opposition. Optin for the version of the conclusions about the report of the State Bureau for revision, which HDZ offered to the opposition as a compromise proposal, even though on the Parliamentary menu they had the conclusion versions served by the Liberals on one side, and also HS and IDS, the SDP deepened the rift in the already cracking ranks of the oppositionary coalition.

    Party leader Racan later said that they did not vote for one of the two oppositionary proposals, since nobody invited them to participate in their preparation, and since they are not "the five percent party" anymore, one cannot act like that towards them, expecting that they will be silent passengers.

    Actually, seeing that conflicts are a permanent state in the ranks of the opposition, HDZ was able to achieve the announced breaking of the "unprincipled coalition" and enlarge its chances on the repeated elections in Zagreb And local elections which follow throughout Croatia.After this step by SDP by which this party wants to implant a greater role for itself, even by any means, among the opposition internal conflicts within every party is on, with a similar dilemma: should they remain hostage to Tudjman and HDZ totalitaristic politics or did time arrive for a more transparent and decisive clash with it ?

    This duality is hard to solve, since none of the parties by themselves are up to the task to get in the clinch with HDZ. There is less and less solutions. It is possible to vegetate carefully on the political scene and not get into conflict too much over the main elements of the Tudjman and HDZ policy. On the other hand, it is also possible to make a bigger oppositionary bite, but then retreat immediately, making a concession, and even quietly get slapped.

    Of course, so far it has been seen that the most effective was joint offering of the alternative to the voters, even though coalition partners have reneged on each other in many instances. So far, anyway, everything that has been done, has greatly suited HDZ, and particularly Tudjman and his policies, concludes Daskalovic.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", February, 19, 1996


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