BALKAN MEDIA & POLICY MONITOR


ISSUE 24/25 Vol. 2
December 29,1995.
IN THIS ISSUE:

After Dayton and Paris agreements

  • "Vreme" gives a general overview of the agreements
  • "Arkzin" on the consequences of the agreements on the future of the region
  • "Feral Tribune" on the contents of the military annexes
  • "Monitor" on "who gained and who lost what"
  • "Nezavisni" on the agreement's consequences on Serbia
  • "Vreme"("Arkzin") on the consequences for Croatia
  • "Nova Makedonija" on the Macedonian view of the agreements
  • War Crimes

  • "Arkzin" analyzes newest inditement of the Hague Tribunal
  • Internal political events

    Bosnia
  • "Monitor" on the background of the resignation of the Bosnian foreign minister Sacirbey
  • "NIN" on the political developments among Bosnian Serbs

    Croatia

  • "Arkzin" on the conflict between President Tudjman and the Croatian opposition concerning election results in Zagreb

    Macedonia

  • "Vecer" on the developments in the investigation of the assassination attempton the Macedonian president Gligorov

    Serbia

  • "Feral Tribune" on the political effect of the "Jovic diaries"
  • "Vreme" on the purge in the ruling Socialist party
  • Comments and Analyses

  • "Feral Tribune" on the advent of ultra-right politics in Croatia
  • "Monitor" on the possibility of peaceful solution in Kosovo

    Media

  • "NIN" on the latest split in the independent daily "Nasa Borba"

  • After "Dayton" and "Paris"

    Ljiljana Smajlovic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" gave the general overview of the agreements in the magazine's issue of November 27, 1995.

    The devil one knows is better than the devil one doesn't, and in the case of the Dayton documents the unknown devil hides in the hundred or so typed pages of annexes.

    The peace package for Bosnia has one main document -two typed pages which presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic initialed in Dayton on October 21-and 11 annexes. But, the devil one knows is better than the devil one doesn't, and in the case of the Dayton documents the unknown devil hides in the hundred or so typed pages of annexes (on preserving Bosnia as a unitary state within its internationally recognized borders with two equal entities, a new constitution, territorial division, constitutional court, human rights, reconstruction, return of refugees, elections, separation of the armed forces with a four kilometer buffer zone and an international police force).

    The 11 points of the main document titled General Framework of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the warring sides just accept and welcome the arrangements. The arrangements are detailed in the 11 annexes. That framework was published immediately and the US sponsors of the peace talks handed out a resume of the agreement on another couple of pages. Forty eight hours after the Dayton agreement was initialed the public still had no access to the annexes. Any judgment has to wait for the implementation details of the agreement as envisaged in the annexes.

    For example, the agreement includes the return of refugees to their homes. That is a praiseworthy principle which has to be part of any agreement on Bosnia especially one sponsored by the leaders of ``the free world'' (as every American president sees himself). The Dayton agreement includes an article that allowed Bill Clinton to tell the press at the White House that refugees will be able to return home. But only an insight into the details of the agreement will show who how will return, and whose return will be guaranteed. For the time being, all we know is that NATO will have two jobs to do in Bosnia. The first is to supervise the withdrawal of the armed forces to positions two kilometers from the demarcation lines (that is aimed at creating a four kilometer buffer zone which will be expanded to eight except in Sarajevo, Gorazde and Brcko which will have special demarcation lines). The second job is to remove land mines, enable the free movement of humanitarian organizations and the return of refugees.

    NATO troops can bring Moslem refugees back to Foca (if there are any who want to return to the town which belongs to the Bosnian Serbs). But, what will they do when they find someone living in the refugees' old homes? A direct answer to that cannot be found in the annexes. The solution is taken for granted (they won't do a thing but will take the refugees to nearest offices of the commission for the return of refugees). As long as a copy of the annexes is not available, politicians (Serbian, American, Croatian, Bosnian, whatever) will be able to present their own version and vision. Until the text of the agreement is made public, politicians will be able to insist on some aspects of the agreement and leave out or minimize other aspects.

    Two days after Dayton, most people in Belgrade didn't know that the UN Security Council hadn't suspended all the sanctions against FR Yugoslavia. The so-called ``outer wall'' sanctions are still in place which means the FRY still doesn't have access to international organizations or financial institutions. More importantly, the suspension of those sanctions is not linked to Dayton or the Bosnia crisis. The resume of the Dayton agreement said those sanctions will remain in place until Serbia responds to international concerns in other areas such as Kosovo and its cooperation with the Hague tribunal.

    The Dayton vision of the future of the Balkans means Bosnia will be a unitary state. It will be called the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and will consist of two entities: the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation (i.e. the Moslem-Croat federation) spreading across 51% of it territory and the Republic of Srpska (49%). Sarajevo will be inside the Federation and will be open to all Bosnian citizens but not to all the armies: the RS army has to withdraw from the suburbs of Hadzici, Ilijas, Vogosca and Ilidza. The resume says the warring sides will withdraw from the demarcation lines within 30 days and will withdraw their units to barracks within 120 days in order to win each other's trust. The agreement adds that all units that cannot be housed in barracks have to be demobilized.

    It remains unclear how the Federation will impose its authority over Serb suburbs of Sarajevo but there's no doubt that the Dayton agreement is firm on Sarajevo regardless of Momcilo Krajisnik's objections.

    The Washington Post (Wednesday, November 22) quoted a US diplomat who said that at one point in the negotiations, Milosevic turned to Haris Silajdzic: ``You deserve Sarajevo. You lived in it for three years while it was bombed. Let it be your capitol.''

    The Dayton agreement is firmest on territorial division. The Ohio peace talks reached a final agreement on resolving all territorial disputes which caused the war, its creators claim. In that case, there are several inevitable conclusions. Serbs, who comprised a third of the Bosnian population, captured and, with international blessing.

    Dayton, managed to keep a half of Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs waged two battles in this war: one for the corridor and one for Sarajevo. They haven't completely won the first yet and they lost the second. The Serbs lost Sarajevo because they never captured it completely, and they are given the control over the corridor for a year conditionally.

    There's a rumor in Washington that Milosevic might have been verbal assurances about the outcome of the international arbitration. The corridor issue is fundamentally linked to what the Bosnian Serbs see as the issue of all issues: a state. The battle Milosevic waged for the corridor in Dayton was not the battle over few kilometers of territory, but for the continuity of Serb lands and the survival of the Serb state. Whatever the ideological differences between Milosevic and Krajisnik, the one thing they had in common was the wish to turn the internal borders of Bosnia, defined under international arbitration, into external borders. Just like 1991 when we watched Yugoslavia's internal administrative borders become international.

    The new demarcation line that was agreed in Dayton is almost identical to the cease-fire line except for 40 square kilometers around Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo (which will be returned to the Serbs) and a belt of land linking Gorazde to Sarajevo (eight to 15 kilometers wide with a new road to be built on it). The Serb corridor to Brcko stays as it was but the fate of Brcko hasn't been resolved definitely: a final solution will be found through arbitration within a year. The arbitration commission will include on representative each from the RS and Federation and a representative of the international community.

    The republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina will have two armies-the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and Federation Army. The most important army in Bosnia over the next year will be NATO.

    No one has said yet whether the Implementation Force (IFOR) will be part of law enforcement in Bosnia as the Moslems demanded or will just secure the demarcation lines. It's a public secret that the Bosnians also demanded but didn't get written US promises that their army will receive supplies of sophisticated weaponry soon. The Clinton administration promised that kind of aid in case the BSA doesn't disarm in accord with the Dayton agreement. That agreement envisages arms control mechanisms which would impose limits on the numbers of tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters on the warring sides within 180 days. If the three sides can't agree on those limits an automatic limit falls into place which the FRY, Croatia and Bosnia agreed to in Ohio.

    The least mentioned issue in the 48 hours following Dayton was the one that most occupied negotiators over the past year: confederal links between the FRY and RS, i.e. Federation and Croatia. The constitutional agreement has the most unknown details, including some key details. Bosnia is supposed to get a two chamber parliament with two thirds of its members elected from the Federation and a three member presidency (a Serb, Croat and Moslem), a ministerial council (government), constitutional court, central bank and single currency. The central authorities will have control over foreign policy, customs, immigration, monetary policies, implementation of international law, traffic between the entities, control of air traffic and international financial obligations. Only the details of the agreement will show whether Bosnia will be a loose confederacy with the RS having a high degree of autonomy which will allow it to leave painlessly one day or will be a serious state. Robert Haydn, law professor at the University of Pittsburgh saw a draft of the agreement early in November. He said that document, which may have suffered numerous changes meanwhile, minimizes the Geneva and New York agreements and imposes a strong central authority. For example, the RS right to veto a presidency decision is minimized with an article that says disputes are left to the arbitration of the constitutional court. Since that court includes four representatives of the international community, Haydn said, the Moslems would need only one vote to get a ruling it their favor. He also warned of a trap in the article that says the quorum in parliament is a simple majority. That means parliament can legitimately meet without a single Serb member.

    J ust before this war began, the parliament in Bosnia took decision without its Serb members (the memorandum on sovereignty, decision to hold a referendum on independence, declaration of independence). In that case, the right of Serb parliament members to vote against any decision loses all meaning.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", November 27, 1995


    The economic editor of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" discusses in the magazine's issue of December 8, 1995, the consequences of the peace agreement on the future of the region of former Yugoslavia.

    Matic says that the Dayton agreement does not only bring an unjust and suspicious peace into these regions, but also clearly defines the outlines of the economic development. This means: turn towards each other and deal and trade among each other, and don't push as to show you more clearly what you have to do. To calm down the presidents of the maligned states, Clinton appeared to give them what they wanted: lifting of sanctions to Milosevic and the fact that the criminal can slip unpunished, an independent and complete(?) Croatia to Tudjman, a recognized (and divided) Bosnia and Herzegovina to Alija Izetbegovic, about whose prosperity decisions are made by NATO in agreement with Islamic states. Translated into real life this means that to all in the region of former Yugoslavia only one chance is given: new unity that would in the beginning find its excuse before all in the economy.

    If we take a look at the current state in the new states it will become clear that not one of them has moved much so that it could not remember how it was doing five to six years ago. Slovenians and Macedonians have kept their former communists and are glowing that they were not drawn into the war with the rest of the former state, but are still fearful of changes. Macedonia awaits with uncertainty the results of the new elections- Kiro Gligorov survived an assassination attempt, but there is no successor in sight. Milan Kucan is like a house pet to Slovenians. But, the economic development did not take off in Slovenia as everybody expected after the secession, Europe did not go crazy for a small tidy state, in which everybody seems reasonable at first sight. Italy has halted its entrance into European integrations, and the reserves from socialism have already melted away. That is why the Slovenians have immediately understood the sign from the world and have accepted the role which was suggested to them. They have recognized FRY sticking to the motto: if there is money we'll split it, and until we agree on it, we'll trade. Keeping themselves for four years aside from the Balkan primitives that attempt to solve problems with war, Slovenes are now smacking their lips at the thought at the large an hungry Serbian market, and even to the "newly composed Croatian millionaires are not repulsive at the same thought. Some are already ready for the opening of the motor and rail ways, conscious that only those that are first get the best piece of the cake.

    The other side is not asleep either. The war it begun with statements like "we don't want Slovenian sweaters" and "serbia can feed half of Europe, and not only Krajina and 'Republika Srpska', it end with creation of preconditions for easier trade. The banker Milosevic has devalued the dinar first (nice coincidence that now Croatian and FRY currency are on 1:1 parity, which will ease the border trade) so that he would make his own production more competitive. Along with political negotiations he entered the economic ones, getting a number of promises (not in any manner worse than the ones that Croatia is bringing home) about the creation of normal economic ties with the rest of the world.

    The idyll can begin now. Although the slogans about "brotherhood and unity" and cultural exchange can wait a bit, the Milan Panic model "we do not have to love each other, but we can do business", will be accepted in the end. Tightly holding the reigns in its hands, the US will dictate the direction. Not a single financial aid package or a bank credit will not be given for projects which do not encompass the larger area of former Yugoslavia and do not serve everybody, at best the larger part of the Balkans.

    The international business lobby which includes Western Europe and US, is unanimous in the assessment that all countries of the former Yugoslavia individually represent a bottomless pit, but joined in an integrated unit which does not have to be called a federation or integration, but has to be just that, represent a development possibility. This was told to everybody, including Kucan and Gligorov. Of course, Serbia is in a hurry. Milosevic's attempt to return some life into the dying Serbian economy has to be successful so that he could save his head (at least until he would take over an international bank on Cyprus or Malta, for example). Tudjman is not indifferent either. The election results in the cities, Zagreb in particular, show that the whole concept is shaky and that he cannot count on the place in history that he has designated for himself. The care of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has suffered the most will be practically taken over by the international community. This will be an attempt to save face foe idly watching the extinction of the population in that state.

    Yugoslavia was the most drastic example of the events after the fall of socialism. Socialism has produced a critical mass in all countries that has destroyed it. It was the question of those who have gained most from it: free education, cheap social and health security, pensions sufficient for survival.

    No matter whether they were directly involved in the war or if they were only scathed by its consequences, the states of former Yugoslavia are in a same situation (destroyed economies with a thin layer of unjustly enriched and a middle class blown out of its mind, showing signs of slowly regaining consciousness), with an additional wight of sick nationalistic leaders who are refusing to yield power even when they lose it in elections. For that reason, Clinton has switched all his energy to this region. He is ready to help all if they help him. NATO troop are not there only to guard Bosnia from Serb terror. Their duty is to bring free elections in all states of former Yugoslavia. But under certain condition. They will be won by those parties supported by (US) NATO. And these are (America grew up after the fall of Gorbachov) more the reformed communists of the Ante Markovic type, than SPS, HDZ or SDA. The first to recognize this will have the chance the president of the presidency of the integrated states in the region of former Yugoslavia. Or something like that.

    Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", December 8, 1995


    In its issue of December 4, 1995, Split weekly "Feral Tribune" brings the article of Drago Hedl, who, in the aftermath of the Dayton and Paris agreements, analyzes the agreements reached between Croatia and NATO.

    In a few days, says Hedl, the borders of the internationally recognized, sovereign, independent, our only and eternal Croatia will become one of the softest in the world.Not only will the travellers from all over the world, individually, but also in large groups, enter Croatia without passports and visas, but they will not be obliged to register the goods they bring, or take out of Croatia, nor will they be obliged to pay any duties or customs. The borders of the Croatian state will be so soft, that they will remind those that are crossing them to the skins of ripe bananas. The association of a ripe banana will, in that manner, become the first fruit of the long Dayton negotiations and numerous signatures.

    Among those signatures put on the pile of Dayton papers by the Croatian delegation, of particular educational value is the agreement between Republic of Croatia and NATO alliance,which concerns the status of NATO forces in the sovereign and independent Croatia. Legally tidy order of the 23 articles of the Agreement seem not to take much notice of the proudly stressed Croatian independence and sovereignty, with which there was so much shouting about in the last few years.

    The Croatian government "understanding the urgency of the arrival of the NATO forces", will exclude the NATO personnel from the obligation of possessing passports and visas, as the Article 4 says. It states though that the members of the NATO forces will possess identity cards that the Croatian authorities can request to view. But, this request cannot cause stopping or lateness in the operations.

    Also, Croatia will treat as valid and operable the drivers licenses issued to the members of the NATO troops by their respective countries. The Article 7 is also interesting: if the members of the NATO forces, during their sojourn in Croatia comity any kind of a criminal act or misdemanour, they will be liable only according to the legal system of their countries. None of the NATO personnel can be arrested or jailed by the Croatian authorities.

    The long list of privileges listed by Hedl, also includes privileges to the citizens of Croatia that will be employed by NATO during their operations. These persons will enjoy immunity and will also not be liable to prosecution for anything done un during their official service. Also they will not be liable to military service, but will also be free of income tax for the salaries received for service to NATO.

    The high level of similarity in opinion that was shown by Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic in Dayton was also shown in the fact that all three of them signed the identical agreement with NATO. Of course, each on a separate piece of paper, since it is the question of independent, sovereign states, after all.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", December 4, 1995


    The chief commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, analyzes the peace agreement in the magazine's issue of December 1, 1995.

    What did those participating in the negotiations gain and what did they loose, asks Jovanovic.

    Dayton is the political testament and broken leftover of the Serbian national programmes from Nineteenth century, on. The most sore point for the Serbs in the agreement lies in two facts: factual recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even more painful, in the form of the establishment of a strong international protectorate executed by NATO.

    Milosevic gave in Dayton everything he could at this moment, and gained in return - the farce named "lifting of sanctions". In practice, this actually means little.The approach to international political organizations and financial institutions is still closed, linked to internal political questions, particularly the cooperation with the Hague tribunal and human rights in Kosovo.

    Another page of painful conflicts is being open. This, first of all, means that Milosevic will have to, under the umbrella of cooperation with the Hague tribunal to enter into a clash with his collaborators of yesteryear. With the problems he has with Kosovo albanians he is opening the question of the constitutional order of the FRY, and this at the moment when Montenegrin grumbling is becoming louder and louder.

    Across the Drina - despair and uncertainty. The entity named Republika Srpska encompasses 49 percent of the Bosnian territory, but which is peripheral and less important. Along with that, the question of the Brcko corridor remains open, so that the only important region there, Banjaluka, rots waiting for the turn of events, surrounded by Bosnian and Croatian armies, looking towards Serbia.

    General Tudjman is claimed by many to be the biggest winner of the negotiations. But, the Croatian opposition is criticizing him for treason of national interests. There were many local protests, particularly in Dubrovnik and Western Herzegovina. So in that manner, the Croatian policy in Bosnia suddenly lost its swing. The peace agreement envisages that "all foreign troops" leave Bosnian territory, which includes the units of the Croatian army. This could definitely weaken the appetites of the agrarian fascists of Wester Herzegovina.

    Actually, the Bosnian delegation might be the biggest winner in Dayton, thinks Jovanovic. A decisive military force is coming to Bosnia, which will definitely not go into Mladic's favor. It is believed that the Sarajevo administration has received some more precise promises of the USe concerning the military shipments and training of the bosnian army, which should, through time, become the superior military power on the Bosnian territory.This is also due to the clear constitutional provisions for Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly concerning the Parliament, single currency, passports and other.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor, December 1, 1995


    The same subject is explored by Jan Briza in the November 24, 1995 issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni".

    If the Yugo-crisis starts to subside, and it seems that it will, this will also have a positive effect on the still chaotic relations between Washington and Moscow. If not, divided Bosnia could become the object of rivalry of the two great powers and a cause of the rise of some new "Berlin wall".

    If this was to happen after all, FRY and the territories held by the Bosnian Serbs will find themselves in the "interest sphere" of Moscow. Then they would be the only ones from the group of former socialist states of Europe and newly formed states in the region of former Yugoslavia which did not place themselves under the western defence "umbrella", under the "Partnership for Peace" programme. This, of course, does not mean that Belgrade and Pale have by that fact chosen a "wrong side". By no means.

    The problem is of completely different nature. The problem is not in the choice of the side itself, but with the tying to those forces in Moscow which still dream about the renewal of the Soviet Union and the division of the world on East and West. To make the problem greater for us, those forces are actually encouraged from Belgrade and Pale. Who does not believe this should only read the recently published diaries of the former President of the Presidency of the SFRY Borisav Jovic, and he'll have a clear picture.

    The renewal of the bipolar world and the "cold war" would be favorable to the regime here because it would give him a free hand in the general territory grab of the former state. The conflict of interests and the balance of fear between East and West would completely completely paralyze any kind of "unwanted" meddling of the international community.

    The satanization of the modern West and championing of the "world of yesterday" in Russia, from which all smart Russians are shying away, could have catastrophic political and economic consequences for the future of this country. Maybe even for the whole region. In any case, for the rise of a new "Berlin wall" and evading of reforms in the direction of establishment of true parliamentary democracy, legal state and market economy will not lead us towards Europe.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", November 24, 1995


    The reception of the agreements in the Croatian political circles was analysed by Boris Raseta (of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin") in Belgrade weekly "Vreme", of November 27, 1995.

    The agreement to end the war did not satisfy the aspirations of many in Croatia. The people who aren't happy are the people who come from areas that now, according to the agreement signed in Dayton, belong to the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS). The greatest bitterness is shown by people coming from the Posavina area. ``We are bitter, betrayed and tricked,'' said a letter to Franjo Tudjman from Croatian parliament deputies whose origins are in these parts.

    The Croat National Council in Bosnia also rejected the trade of territories and recognition of the Serb entity. The Posavina is the most painful issue to them. They explained that ``Milosevic said several times that he and Tudjman had agreed on the area long ago'' and traded for Serb areas of western Bosnia which Croat forces captured recently. Tudjman is also reported to have been pressuring the Bosnian Croats in his negotiating team to accept the agreement, which, according to them, was the reason why Moslem-Croat Federation President Kresimir Zubak resigned.

    ``We are aghast but not surprised,'' said Ante Djapic, president of the Croatia Party of Rights. ``This was all about the division of Bosnia and it turns out that all sides are equally to blame. This is just a preparation for a new war.''

    The Istrian Democratic Alliance said that a temporary peace has been signed with Serbia reaping the greatest profits and Bosnia losing the most along with Croatia.

    Dobroslav Paraga's Party of Rights reacted similarly: ``This is Milosevic's political and military triumph. He won and Croatia lost. This is a shameless capitulation before Belgrade and America.''

    ``The Serbs in Bosanski Brod celebrated and fired shots in the air while the Croats are grieving,'' said Zdravko Tomac.

    The Croatian Peasants' Party said the agreement rewards the aggressor. Croatia's Social Liberal party is also unhappy: ``Milosevic achieved a vital step in creating Greater Serbia: crossing over the Drina and access to the southern part of Croatia's Adriatic. We fell the agreement is bad for the state of Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia.'' The party wants a referendum on the agreement.

    Croatia's independent democrats (Mesic, Manolic) also rejected the basic principles of the agreement. Mesic said the trade of the Posavina for western Bosnia has already been agreed, ``and it seems something similar has happened with Prevlaka, only this time Tudjman did not specify how much of the coast Croatia is to lose.'' ``If Bosnia remains united, what good are these agreement,'' Mesic said and concluded that the Karadjordjevo agreement (Milosevic-Tudjman) was present in Dayton in great measure. He added that the Erdut agreement should be viewed in the same manner, and that ``every document Hrvoje Sarinic signs is surely detrimental to Croatia.''

    The only party in Croatia that welcomed the agreement without reservation was Pupovac's Independent Serb Party.

    Ivan Lovrencic, the most prominent Croat writer in Bosnia, also protested the agreement. He said Croat refugees from Bosnia were being handed flyers offering them new homes in the areas of Kupres, Drvar, Sipovo, Glamoc and Bosansko Grahovo. The flyer ends with the words: ``Make yourself at home here where we have lived since the seventh century.''

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", November 27, 1995


    In its editorial of December 2, 1995, Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija" gave the Macedonian view of the agreements.

    It is starting to become clear of what is expecting Macedonia after the initiation of the Dayton mega-agreement and the compromise behind closed doors in the Air-Force Base Dayton which was not known until the negotiations started. This agreement announced the end of the war in Bosnia - Herzegovina, however it brings good and bad news for Macedonia.

    Let's first talk about the good ones. If the peace in Bosnia is finally reached that will add to stable prosperity of Macedonia without constant threats of the possible spreading of the war. The corridor North-South will start to function again and the northern border will be de blocked. So, it is obvious that there will be positive effects of the agreement. Yet, it is not as simple. During the last several years we have learnt to live and work in half-war conditions, as a region which is close to the war areas and as a part of the zone with high risks for the possible spreading of the war. The US weekly "Time" in the last two editions says US troops may be deployed in Macedonia after Bosnia. So, Macedonia is on the first place of the possible countries where US troops may be deployed. After Macedonia are Cuba, Taiwan, Kurdistan, etc. "Time" says reaching peace in Bosnia does not guarantee the peace in Macedonia and Kosovo. Serbs may again start the ethnic cleansing and initiate a new crisis, concluded "Time".

    Now, after Dayton, Pandora's Box is again opened for Macedonia, and problems, one by one will start to appear. The withdrawal of sanctions surprised the illegal economy, Serbia introduced custom taxes to Macedonia, Croatia recognized the legal continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the former federation. The issue of the succession is becoming more actual and successors of the federation have a legitimate right to inherit properties of the former state. The one who has got the 'key' will try to inherit all the property. All of that mentioned above is the bad news for Macedonia. Analysts knew that such news will be announced soon after the peace agreement on Bosnia is reached.

    What does small Macedonia get? Will Croatia and Serbia determine the destiny of the smaller 'Balkan tribes'? What has been promised Milosevic to sign the agreement? Does our Government know about it? Has Macedonia been promised some finances to remain silent on the succession issue? Should we expect Tudjman to have sense of the Macedonian needs? Everyone knows that he would do anything to get East Slavonia, and he certainly does not care about the Macedonian right for succession over part of the property of the former state. Is the 'market' of Milosevic and Tudjman in Dayton sponsored by the United States really important to Macedonia? It is yet to be found out what does all have to do with the succession of assets. If all newly formed states recognize themselves after the agreement is signed in Paris, it will indicate that the succession issue will be left for future agreements and negotiations, or even international arbitration. Macedonian position concerning the issue, the official one, is that " Macedonia as a legal successor of former Yugoslavia takes over privileges and liabilities equally with the other former Yugoslav republics"., and that, concerning the succession, "rights and liabilities will be resolved in accordance of the agreement with the other Yugoslav republics". It is important to know whether Macedonia is a part of the Dayton or the post-Dayton package, yet there are no indications that there has been any agreements concerning Macedonia. The comparison of Macedonia with the Pandora's Box is not suitable since after all evil, the only thing that remained in the box was the hope. Macedonia does not have vain hopes.

    Source: Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija", December 2, 1995, through MILS daily


    War Crimes

    Toni Gabric of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", discusses in the magazine's issue of November 24, 1995. The problems concerning the prosecution of the war criminals.

    The feat is, at least for now, nearing its end, and the time is coming to pay the bill, says Gabric. The latest moves of Richard Goldstone, the man that is causing many participants of the war events in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to have sleepless nights, have caused open furor at the top of the regimes in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade and Bosnian para-states.

    The question will the Hague processes cause only extinction among "small fry" and in that manner, turn into a farce, or will they attempt to reach the political heights in search for those most responsible, has finally got its answer. So, it is not the main question anymore whether the decision has been made to prosecute those responsible in the highest positions, but whether enough evidence will be gathered necessary for raising the inditements. Parallel with the raising of inditements against the group from the highest levels of Herzegovina Croat military and civil leadership, headed by Dario Kordic, the possibility is mentioned in the world public of rising the inditements also against some other persons from the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian top. The Slovenian TV has reported, based on the report from anonymous sources in the Hague has announced the inditement against "former head of Herzeg-Bosnia, current high official of the Croatian oil industry", American journalist Roy Gutman, does the same for (Croatian minister of defense) Gojko Susak and some others in the Croatian leadership, while Italian newspaper "La Reppublica" cites former top Croatian official Josip Manolic, that he is willing to participate in the proceedings of the Tribunal in the process against Franjo Tudjman (he denied the statement concerning Tudjman in a brief conversation with the author of the text, but was evasive concerning the one about the participation in the proceedings).

    From the current standpoint, it should matter very much to both Croatian and Yugoslav authorities to show clean hands in the Bosnian conflict, towards which, the one in Croatia, seemed almost as a child's play.In that respect, Milosevic proved himself to be more skillful. He formally does not have a branch of his party in Bosnia, formally he has for a long time cooled relations with Radovan Karadzic, and has no intention of naming Ratko Mladic the chief inspector of the Yugoslav army. Still, the Serbian, but also the Croatian leaders have enough reasons to worry due to some formulations written in the inditement of the president of the Bosnian HDZ and the other five. The freshest example indicating Tudjman's real position in the Herzegovina army is the recall of Tihomir Blaskic to Zagreb and placement of Zivko Budimir as the chief of staff of the HVO.

    Contrary to all attempts for rational interpretation of the personnel switch, it is close to say that this is a peculiar "chess blindness". The exchange of Blaskic with Budimir could be the expression of the confusion caused by the persistence of judge Goldstone to really conclude his job.

    Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", November 24, 1995


    Internal political situations

    Bosnia- Radovan Miljanic of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" looks in the November 24, 1995 issue of that magazine for the reasons behind the resignation of the Bosnian foreign minister , Mohammed Sacirbey.

    When Sacirbey arrived in Bosnia to become the minister, he began his job with great trust of president Izetbegovic, but also equal suspicion of the prime minister Haris Silajdzic, who is, according to many polls, the most popular Muslim politician in Bosnia. Those who know political circumstances in Sarajevo well say that in general, there are not many political differences between the two, since both Silajdzic and Sacirbey support the creation of a secular, civil Bosnia, but that the disagreements, which have recently turned into intolerance,are the fruit of rivalry and vainness, mostly on assigned to Silajdzic.

    In this situation, besides the unreserved support of the President, Sacirbey's weight in Sarajevo does not carry much. In such circumstances, in the balance of political power and problems with the language - Sacirbey remained, as far as the population was concerned, a sympathetic foreigner of Bosnian origin. That is why the first conflicts with Izetbegovic resulted in Sacirbey's drawing of the resignation card.

    It seems that the minister was disappointed in the president for the first time in Dayton, due to his leniency. The strong American political machinery has obviously crushed some strong standpoints of the Bosnian delegation, so the president started loosing credibility in The minister's eyes. Obviously, Alija Izetbegovic became aware that the negotiations on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina are trade and bargaining after all. Sacirbey understood that too, but could not accept it, so he found the exit in the resignation, not waiting for the result.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", November 24, 1995


    Belgrade weekly "NIN" (author Dragan Janjic of the independent "BETA" news agency) in its issue of December 8, 1995, discusses the situation in the political circles of the Bosnian Serbs.

    The leadership of the bosnian Serbs is confronted with threatening, and, it seems, very deep internal divisions. A number of smaller non parliamentarian parties that are strongly against Radovan Karadzic are gathered in Banjaluka, and their influence is steadily rising. Those parties are seeking, and are receiving support in Belgrade. also on the rise is the number of the members of Parliament of the Bosnian Serbs from the Banjaluka area which are turning against Karadzic. The observers in Banjaluka insist that in that area Belgrade has already achieved "the decisive influence", and that, in political sense, it is lost to Karadzic.

    For the final (and successful) attack on the leader of Bosnian Serbs the only missing link is a person in the highest political top which would be ready, not only to replace Karadzic, but also to place itself on the head of the campaign against him. Well informed sources connected with the Bosnian Serbs say that the Serbian president Milosevic has ultimatively demanded from his choice, RS vice president Nikola Koljevic, to publicly declare himself against "his" president.

    According to the same source, Koljevic, has earlier accepted to "at some point" replace Karadzic, since he did not completely agree with the policies he has lead. He has refused, though, to openly attack him, but is now pushed in the corner, and had to accept that too. The open confrontation is to be expected relatively soon, and a big part in this is to be played by the future capital of Republika Srpska, Banjaluka.

    Serbian president Milosevic has reached an agreement before Dayton negotiations with Karadzic about his "quiet departure" form the post of the president of Republika Srpska, but is now angry about his wavering about this.

    The observers in Belgrade also believe that the status of Sarajevo that has been agreed in Dayton is also one of the instruments of Milosevic pressure on Karadzic. Milosevic was aware that he was about to achieve the full support in the strongest centre of Republika Srpska - Banjaluka. Karadzic had still the influence in Pale and Serbian part of Sarajevo. With the status of Sarajevo according to the agreement this influence has been weakened considerably.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN", December 8, 1995


    Croatia- Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" brought in its issue of December 8, 1995 an article by Predrag Raos concerning the conflict arisen between president Tudjman and his ruling HDZ party and the opposition, concerning the naming of the mayor of Zagreb.

    The conflict between Zagreb and the state head has lead Croatia to the verge of a new political crisis. What was announced happened, even though nobody wanted to believe it: president Tudjman decided to invoke his "democratic rights", as he says, against the will of the citizens of the Croatian capital, and not allow the creation of "an oppositionary situation". Continuously forcing his own party position in front of his state function, Tudjman has added a new quality to the situation.

    It seems though thar the decision to boycott the constitutive sessions of the relevant city councils created a storm on the closed sessions of the HDZ leadership. A story leaked out that Tudjman was among the rare ones that were forcing this strategy, while the majority warned that it is the wrong one and that in the long term it leads the party to its ruin. But in compliance with the HDZ concept of democracy, it was the weight of the president that decided, so the members of the HDZ list, lead by Ranko Marinkonvic, got a free day that Saturday.

    Since the two members of the satellite party HSP of Ante Djapic, joined the boycott, the number of the parliamentarians at the constitutive session fell bellow the necessary two thirds. But in all of this, says the author, there is a legal "Catch 22", since the HDZ was pushing the respect of a procedure that was still not accepted, and which was created exactly in a manner to allow the blocking of the work of the city and county institutions. It would be wrong to reduce the Zagreb "case" to its legal dimension, since the problem does not lie there. It is particularly important to Franjo Tudjman and HDZ to keep the control over Zagreb, which could become the decisive lever for bringing down their position in the Republic. HDZ controls quite a number of the economic potential of Zagreb, which represents, it seems (official figures are never given), an important source of the party financing. The oppositionary leaders have already announced the uncovering of all economic shenanigans which happened in the last few years, measuring in hundreds of millions in Croatian currency. Taking away at least a part of the Zagreb electronic media from the hands of the HDZ, the opposition could disable the media monopoly dictated rom the Presidential palace, leading the public from the information blockade.

    During the press conference set up to denounce the mayor-elect Goran Granic, HDZ official Ivan Milas called the complete opposition a mixture of communists and fascists "who are now creating some national front". There is only a small step necessary from those qualifications from this statement to the one about the necessity of jailing of the complete opposition.

    For the majority in the opposition, the limitation of the rights of the political parties is the key proof of the illegitimate acting of the regime, while they are not ready to evaluate so strictly many other illegitimacies. By conducting the session of the county and city councils, the opposition has definitely undertaken the best possible move, moving the ball in the court of the ruling HDZ.

    Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", December 8, 1995


    Macedonia- Skopje daily "Vecer" in its issue of December 6, 1995, discusses the current state of the investigation in the assassination attempt on the Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov.

    The investigation on the assassination attempt on President Gligorov entered a new, general phase, after the rational police action last Saturday. Several questions arose which will be answered periodically, after everything that was reached by the investigation will be analyzed. Information close to Internal Ministry sources say the aim of the aforementioned police action in some of the Skopje districts was to find the missing chain , i.e. the link between the sand found in the car-bomb 'ami-8' parked in the street Macedonia in the center of Skopje. It is already known that a sack with sand was placed in the vehicle so the explosion would be directed toward the President's car.

    There is certain evidence that the sand had been taken from the region of Kisela Voda. Namely, some persons were noticed the night before the assassination that loaded sand in sacks from the sand hill in the area. Sacks were loaded in a white car 'Zastava 101'!? The question that is to be answered is who were the people who loaded the sand identical to the specimen from the investigation? The police action was also aimed to reveal the young guy (from 25 to 32 years old) who bought the car at the Skopje automobile fair, and who was later noticed in Kisela Voda. That young man is a suspected of being the one who parked the car-bomb near hotel 'Bristol' in the street Macedonia. There are some indications that the suspect parked the car and hid in or near 'Bristol'. The young man with brown hair is probably disturbed! He has probably come out from the his hiding place.

    After the assassination attempt the rider of the 'ami 8', the man of the photo fit picture created by German experts and announced immediately after the attempt, has been hiding in Skopje, mostly in Kisela Voda, and then has disappeared!? Before he disappeared, he had been questioned by the police, and there are some witnesses that remember his looks and who helped the experts to create the the photo fit picture. He has disappeared on October 12, which means that nine days after the attempt he had been hiding somewhere in the town with a great risk to be caught. Some information say he had escaped in Canada.

    The great action last Friday, two months after the attempt on President's life is directly aimed toward the suspect. Police has information that the suspect has returned to Skopje the night before the action, i.e. last Friday, and placed somewhere in Kisela Voda. The police announcement warned citizens not to take any measures in case they meet the suspect, but report as soon as possible on the telephone number 120-120, or in the closest police station, as the man is dangerous. This announcement implies that the suspect is presently in Skopje. It is even assumed that he had come back to organize another diversion. It is not clear whether the man on the photograph is a photo fit picture or an original photograph of the suspect. According to photograph experts, the photograph is a smoothly created photo fit picture.

    Source: Skopje daily "Vecer", December 6, 1995, through MILS daily e-mail service


    Serbia- Milan Gavrovic comments in the November 27, 1995, issue of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" about the recent events in Serbia, particularly concerning the controversial book of Borisav Jovic, the former member of the Federal presidency of the SFRY and a close associate of the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic.

    Something strange is happening with the book of dr. Jovic,"The Last Days of SFRY - the excerpts from the diaries". It appeared in Belgrade exactly at the time when Milosevic left for Dayton - and then promptly disappeared from the stores. While the salesmen where explaining that it was sold out and that the second edition is expected, the managing director of the "Politika" publishing house (the main state daily, which also published the book), Zivorad Minovic was replaced, soon after which police knocked on his door.

    The first comments in Belgrade state that the book is sincere, but a question is also posed why did Jovic confess now what is officially denied: - that the project of "all Serbs in one state" was conducted, that Serbia did participate in the war; that the Serbian and military top acted as a unified conspirative group,; that it was the intention to drive Slovenia and Croatia out of Yugoslavia, except that the Serb areas were to be taken away from Croatia; that the ethnic cleansing in 1991, was conducted on Milosevic's orders, with the goal that the Yugoslav army would be turned into a Serb one... The event so far have shown that Slobodan Milosevic understood well why it was now that dr. Jovic decided to show the pages of his diaries kept between 1989 and 1992.

    Contrary to first impressions, the disintegration of Yugoslavia is not the main theme of Jovic's book. The question posed now, is not who were the disintegrators of Yugoslavia, but who were the Balkan butchers. Since almost two years ago that title was given by "New York Times" to Slobodan Milosevic, it is becoming evident, concludes the author, that once the key Milosevic aide, Borisav Jovic is becoming the key witness against him.

    The book was, on its promotion presented by another discarder supporter, Mihailo Markovic (former key ideologue of the Socialist party), another member of the "hard line", discarder at the moment when Milosevic stated changing his wardrobe from military fatigues into a white angel dress with a olive branch in his hand. This has made some to conclude that this is the duel among the Serbian top.

    But, it seems that closer to truth is the journalist of the daily "Nasa Borba", Ivan Torov, who wrote that Jovic is attempting, on the verge of the inevitable establishment of guilt for the war and the national tragedy to show that there was a substantial difference in the guilt of individual actors.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", November 27, 1995


    Ivan Radovanovic and Radoslav Grujic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", analyze in the magazine's issue of December 11, 1995, the latest purge among the top ranks of the ruling socialist party in Serbia.

    Slobodan Milosevic actually acted as a true head of the house. He returned from a trip, brought in order and then calmy left frightened members of the household to carry out themselves what he has thought out. This is best seen from the news that the Executive board of the Socialist party held a meeting at which it was decided to hold elections at all level of the party organization.

    All of the rest will move on by itself. The Executive board will nominate for the heads of local, county,city and regional organizations the people that are to the liking of the president of the Party and Serbia, those will be elected and SPS will carry on as if nothing has happened.

    Due to all this, all that has happened within the SPS, the departure of Borisav Jovic, chief ideologue Mihajlo Markovic, head of TV Milorad Vucelic, last warnings to Radovan Pankov (Vojvodina party head) and Slobodan Jovanovic (director of the official "Tanjug" news agency), the curtailing of the functions of the party general secretary Minic, the forthcoming elections- they all have to be seen not only as "the bosses whim", but as a part of a long and serious process.

    It should not be forgotten that Milosevic went into new policy with the acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan and all the moves he has undertaken since then went into the direction of the end we are witnessing now.

    First he has organized elections and after them formed some new coalitions (the formal coalition with the "New Democracy" party), which have enabled him to fairly easily overcome the split with his partner until then - the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj. Along with that, he has secured the support, formal and informal, of all oppositionary parties which had the peaceful solution of the Balkan crisis as a part of their programme.

    Due to that, the large part of the president's job was done by SPO, Citizens Alliance, Democratic Center of Dragoljub Micunovic and all others that have promoted the idea of "peace without alternative".

    The most serious and important move the president of Serbia drew with the formation of the JUL )(United Yugoslav left), the party headed by his wife and chief ideologue of the new peace option - Mirjana Markovic.

    So as one part of the opposition, its nationalistic part, was weakened and gradually removed by the use of the other, so was, with the help of JUL, began the process of removal of anything that presents an obstacle to the new policy in the SPS itself.

    Along with a massive media promotion., JUL received an abundance of real information, it was personally strengthened with the people from the SPS, Mirjana Markovic was given control over some of the most influential media, and what was left do be done, was the creation of "new forces"within the SPS. Within those circumstances, those that were to be removed could do nothing. Or even worse, whatever they would do, would bounce back in a wrong manner to them.

    First were "cleaned" the media from which the doomed could possibly defend themselves - the Serbian TV was cleared quickly,while for the director of the daily "Politika", Zivorad Minovic, the police had to be called for help. So, Milosevic came back to a clear terrain. The furor he created afterwards was made more for the demonstration of strength than for the actual need.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", December 11, 1995


    Comments and Analyses

    The editor of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune", Viktor Ivancic, comments in the magazine's issue of November 20, 1995., on the revival of ultra-right in Croatia.

    A new/old division of Croats is happening, comments Ivancic: on those that are proud of the acts done like by people like Dario Kordic and co. and on those that are ashamed of their deeds. The latter, though, are very careful, substantially quiet, or in the ideal case, dead. The former, "in the name of the Croatian nation", are pompously emptying their stomach, splattering that contents all over the state media, offering it as the unique national imperative and ideological obligation "par excellence".

    In his inaugural interview, the Croatian premier (Z. Matesa), named the Hague Tribunal as the gathering of charlatans which did not gather convincing evidence; actually, as an institution with which Croatia will cooperate "but in the framework of its own interests and state policy"(!). In the interest of such a policy, the Croatian president moved by his order on of the potential war criminals to a high position in the Croatian army.

    This and other activities of the ruling party in particular, are an attempt at creating a all-national moral plebiscite: We won't give away our criminals! But the dogma of such an effort - particularly since it is pushed to be accepted in in a plebiscitary fashion - in its background has only one message, which presupposes the final moral frustration: The crime - that is all of us ! Pushing the whole nation to accept such an ethical standard could be done only in the name of an idea that is at its basic morally distorted. It is bizarre, says Ivancic, that our "gut theoretician" call it the state.

    The fresh contingent of ustashi nostalgics, tAking into protection the character of the "Independent State of Croatia" (from the Second World War), is used to insist that the only guilty ones of the crimes in its name are "unreasonable individuals", and not the whole nation. But now, it is expected that the whole nation stands behind "unreasonable individuals", those that have bloodied their hands, while they decidedly did not have any freedom ambitions. And that is where the hellish ethical conspiracy lies - instead of the old saying that "there is bad seed in every crop", we should, "as the real Croats", as a part of an unitary and undivided national body, sign the death warrant to our own dignity and jointly shout: There is no crop among these bad seeds!

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", November 20, 1995


    Prominent oppositionary politician and commentator Dragan Veselinov discusses in the December 15, 1995 issue of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" the still open question of Kosovo.

    According to Veselinov, for years Belgrade is not proposing anything concerning this question, putting all responsibility for the Kosovo chaos on Rugova and his disciplined supporters. It is wasting a lot of money on the financing on the extraordinary state and lawlessness, with which it is further spreading the political gap between the regime and the Albanian regional counterweight. Already living in Kosovo are hundreds of thousands of young people who since 1980. onwards live in the atmosphere of siege, spying, night clashes, treason, sarcasm and national hatred. The Albanians are turned into a guerilla collective which is kept out of the battle only by the fear of open conflict and uncertain result. They have channelled everything into another direction, to build a parallel state, waiting with a finished administrative, educational and political infrastructure for the independence day.

    That is why the American intervention in Kosovo is inevitable. Serbia is not able to solve the Kosovo question, since it broke all relations with the Albanians, destroyed the autonomy of Kosovo and prepared the Serbian population for the war. Milosevic and his nationalistic clique, as well as the Belgrade nationalistic opposition, hate the decentralized political system and think that they can neglect the historical, cultural and economic differences of Serbia through dictatorship from Terazije(Belgrade). Belgrade is not offering anything to albanians, and this lack of democracy and development in Serbia additionally convinces them that secession is their only solution.

    The Albanians are saying: "we had the autonomy, it was taken away from us, now there is no return, we want a state". This is, particularly after Dayton, the wrong approach. This is provocating a military conflict in which Serbia could, in difference to its Croatian and Bosnian campaign, gain very serious Balkan and European allies for the protection of its "Christian" borders. Rugova seems to understand this, but is not able to retreat. He blocked himself even before 1990 and the new Serbian constitution, when he asked for independent Kosovo. With his "all or nothing" tactics, he brought the Albanians to the point where their retreat to autonomy positions prevents the saving of his political face. If they would accept autonomy, or if there is no better solution in Serbia thAn that for Europe and the US, he would have to resign. Somebody has to open the channel of dialogue with Belgrade, and this probably will not be Rugova.

    It is clear to Serbia that it cannot and should not drain itself in Kosovo, and it is clear to the Albanians that they will not get independent Kosovo. There, a "transitionary solution" is needed. Now kosovo should be detached from Serbia, but that it should still remain within its borders. The Albanians should receive such constitutional autonomy that they practically get a state, but that they do not have an army. Only the Americans can create such a creature, but then they would have to remain in Kosovo with its army, so that nobody would think that the kosovo solution is going only in its favor.

    Rugova wants the protectorate over Kosovo that would tomorrow lead to the proclamation of Pristina as the capital of the independent Kosovo. He will not get that. Washington and Brussels do not want "green transversal" across Europe. It is better for them to leave kosovo in Serbia and to politically tie Kosovo to development of Serbia through long term international rule, rather than pave the way for Greater Albania. Serbia is still way too developed for Albania and for that reason it can cool the seccessionistic ambitions of "Rugovists".

    Albanians in kosovo should be given more than autonomy and less than a state, leaving Kosovo to Serbia, but in a manner that it does not have it. If Beograd would be reasonable, it will wait for the next integration, it will rely on the American and European intervention.

    This should have been done in 1988 and not by introducing the nationalistic and spiteful constitution of 1990. Serbian nationalist are incapable of solving the Kosovo problem. They are useless as politicians. The Americans must come. That is the best way for Serbia into capitalism, and rid itself of all that is backward including Milosevic.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", December 1, 1995


    Media

    Petar Ignja of the Belgrade weekly "NIN" examines in the magazine's issue of December 8, 1995, the split in the independent daily "Nasa Borba".

    There are more newspapers, they are more and more free, but this does not mean that this nation will be smarter, says Ignja.

    The story of "Nasa Borba", no matter how long it is, can be shortened into few sentences. It is a question of a conflict in the transitional period - from self-management to private ownership. This does not mean that the conflict was inevitable, but it did not fall from the sky and the least of all was it a surprise. When the state decided to discipline old "Borba" according to an autocratic recipe, all important journalists refused to stay in the state owned paper and left along with the owner, Dusan Mijic, who founded private "Nasa Borba". Then the owner Mijic decided to bring "his man" as the editor in chief. Both Mijic and the other group were right. Only the other group forgot who was giving the money. When the clash came, Mijic "saved his head", but his candidate failed. Finally, a well known journalist, Mirko Klarin, became the editor, which should have brought peace.

    But there was none of it. A very strong team of editors, of whom the owner did not think much, decided to rebel. So the owner suspended four important editors and introduced disciplinary measures against them. The explanation was that they formed another publishing house, which was, as he stated, against the law. The owner insists that this has nothing to do with the conflict within "Nasa Borba", but only with the law. But who in Serbia will believe that is hard to say.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN", December 8, 1995


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