Dayton : The longer term effects of Dayton negotiations analyzed (twice) by"Feral Tribune"
Internal political events: political situation in Bosnia discussed by Sarajevo "Dani" and Tuzla "Grafit"
The results of Croatian elections: analyzed by "Globus", "Feral Tribune" and "Arkzin"
"Vreme" takes a look at the situation in Macedonia
The economic catastrophe in Serbia analyzed in detail by "Vreme"
War Crimes: The work of the War Crimes Tribunal discussed by "Monitor"
Srebrenica events looked at by "Vreme"
Human Rights: Is there a possibility amnesty for war resistors in Serbia - "Vreme" attempts an answer
Comments and Analyses: By "Feral Tribune", "AIM", "Republika" and"Vreme"
Media: How to build a media empire in Croatia - "Feral Tribune" takes a look.
Culic says that the current administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnick, could in the long run turn to be an uncomfortable witness for Croatians in the "B 52" hall of the Wright-Patterson base. He could inform the Dayton moderators that not even the largest concessions he has given to Herzegovina Croats, like the constituting of two separate counties in Mostar, did not turn these away from grabbing as much as possible, going as far as open annexation aspirations. To the eventual attempts by Tudjman to escape the blame and shift it towards Herzegovina "extremists", "angered Hans" has at his disposal the notorious case of recent elections, which he could present as the most explicit example of territorial aspirations of Zagreb towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is obvious that for Tudjman, which was greeted in the US by large papers as the "winner of the Balkan war", but also by the publicized intention of the Us state top to "clip the wings" of his triumph, Dayton became the test at which his "muscle buildup" of the last few months did not help him much, and that it was even a handicap for him. It was obvious that mediators first intention was to , as much as it is possible, level the starting positions of the negotiators, so that nobody would be so weak to give up immediately, nor so strong that he could impose solutions to others.
The negotiators were exposed to condescending conditions of physical and media isolation, so just that they could sign one more insincere agreement, differing from the others, if it succeeds in the manner that it will be considered as "the last one". This is obvious from the fact that when a sacrifice was demanded from the negotiators, as a rule came a benefit which will make the sacrifice bearable.
After the demand from Serbian president Milosevic to "deliver" Karadzic and Mladic showed great surprise, even anger, supposedly the Americans did not tell him anything about that in Belgrade. The, on their part, denied that, but are letting Serbian president play the game that will alleviate his return home. Supposedly, he was not asked about anything, and if the pair find themselves in the Hague, Milosevic will direct their sympathizers for all the information to the negotiating cockpit of the "B-52" hall.
It could be actually said, continues Culic, that the Dayton peace construction is wavering as something amorphous and undefined from the moment it gave up on its only strong point. When the Americans turned away from the direct guarantee of the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and veered towards guaranteeing only of the formal preconditions of its survival, and even not all of them - letting it confirm itself as the state union by itself, or to fall apart - everything started to shake.
Since it is clear that the criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be condemned only by the courts of that state, and this is not possible, while from "Herzeg Bosnia" they defiantly shout towards Sarajevo that "Croats can be tried only by other Croats", and something similar is heard from Pale. And, if the crimes pass unpunished in Bosnia, it becomes quite reasonable to expect the same will happen in its neighborhood.
It is also clear that the return of refugees, insisted upon in Dayton, is not possible if it is not guaranteed by relatively strong central authority, since those national/regional ones came into being so that they could gather together only the members of their nation and resettle the others. And if nothing comes of this in Bosnia, it is again quite probable that it will fail anywhere else. That is why the resistance of the Croatian authorities in Jajce to let the Muslim refugees back even for a short while had a dual goal: prevent settling of Bosniaks in Western Bosnia, but as well as the Serbs in the same region, particularly a bit more East, in "Krajina". They, though, even without this, everything was done to make their return murderous and impossible. But nervousness is created on the Croatian side by the first report of Elizabeth Rehn, who replaced Mazowiecki, in which a whole chapter was devoted to the "return and resettlement" of Serbian refugees in Croatia.
It is most probable to expect, concludes Culic, that this question will end up in a forced and tight compromise, which will make the waiting for a new war only a bit prolonged.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", November 13, 1995
The principles on which the Dayton agreement is being based stem from the idea that Bosnia can be retained and ethnically divided at the same time, says Magas. In that manner, the question of the constitutional order is key, but also the most complicated, since there the interests of Belgrade and Sarajevo are completely at odds.
The second difficult question is the division of territory in the 51:49 ratio. As far as the Serbian side is concerned, that is more or less resolved by the situation on the ground, produced by military force and genocide. What remained were the questions of Sarajevo, the Posavina corridor and Gorazde. The third "most difficult question, as defined by Warren Christopher and Richard Holbrooke, is that of the elections.- how to conduct them so that they will be "free and fair" in a country in which most of its citizens are outside of their homes and are not allowed to return to them ? The things are further complicated by the fact that the Serbian and Croatian side obviously read the word "freedom" as "right to ethnic purity", and the word "democracy" as "the absolute rule of one party which embodies the will of the people".
The Americans are mighty, but they cannot make a miracle. And the miracle would be to join sovereignty and integrity of the Bosnian state with its division into two sovereign and integral parts. Sooner or later the Americans will have to choose between Bosnia and Herzegovina on one side, and Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia on the other side. They will also be confronted with a "hard decision" , which they attempted to avoid throughout the war in Bosnia, and that is how to legitimize the division of a n internationally recognized state by force. That is the Rubicon that will be hard to cross for the US and the international community.
Source; Split weekly "Feral Tribune, "November 6, 1995
Vildana Selimbegovic of the Sarajevo monthly "Dani" attempts to answer in the magazine's November 1995 issue the question who is guiding the personnel question in Bosnia.
At the moment when the peace is seriously threatening to throw way all possible excuses caused by the war, the SDA - the ruling "Party for Democratic Action" is confronted by two very important questions: who to renew the state and how to stay in power. The first one can, but does not necessarily have to help the solution of the second one, since up until now SDA has undertaken so many bad moves that there is room for fear.
The events in Croatia and under par results of the ruling HDZ there are additional arguments for the worry. It is useless to analyze all the bad moves of the leading Bosniak party. But the essence of its problem many see in the catastrophically bad personnel policy of the party. And is on absolutely all levels: from the party structures, covering the solutions for the civil ruling bodies up until the hierarchical ladder of the military. Nobody is questioning the parties choice for the president of the state and party itself (Alija Izetbegovic).
Who creates the personnel policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina ? The easiest answer to this would be: Alija Izetbegovic. The undisputed president of all Bosniaks is fully respected by the nation he leads, and which is at all moment swearing in his objectivity and honest criteria. At the same time, he is considered as a person which wants to know everything and be asked about everything. It would be logical that such a president plays a key role in the creation of the personnel policy. But experience shows that the situation is not exactly as such.
It seems that the president does not see some lists so that he would not" get nervous", some he doesn't see, since "they are not so important".
But, nobody should say that the president of the state is the one who has to say yes to everything. What is in question is the creation of the criteria which will more than clearly make a difference between surpassed old models of advancement and the principle of proving oneself with professional capabilities.
The party top does not seem to think that everything is rosy, but it also seems that most of the people there are satisfied with the division of power, influence and might. At least the part to whom the situation is suitable to among them one should search the real creators of the personnel policy which has in the last three and the half years well shaken
the image of the SDA and is still threatening it. To that effect, one should not expect much of the forthcoming change in the party ranks. This does not count the possible leaving of prime minister Haris Silajzic, which would in any event be a radical move. Those who know the president better are looking for something "in the middle": keeping Silajdzic close enough so that he does not go too far, along with secret voting on the confidence for the party top.
Source: Sarajevo monthly "Dani", November 1995
The story is going around thousands of activists of the three national parties, with the open support of the religious circles, according to the pact between them , went throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina ten days before the elections persuading the Muslims to vote for the SDS and HDZ lists, persuading Serbian masses to vote for SDA and HDZ, preaching to the Croatian population to circle the names of the SDS and SDA lists. Behind this was a joint goal bring down the former system and its ruling party.
The results are grotesque paradoxes that in Bosniak regions the winners came from the SDS list on which were the names of those who are the current actors of the crimes and genocide over the Bosniaks; that in the Serbian regions the winner included people with ustashi pedigree and similar. In such circumstances and along with already formed collective/national parties there was no chance for the traditional political organizations. Among other things, also because of their internal differences and fractures. Then ruling SK-SDP remains alone, with no allies. The parties that came out of that organization, were burdened by their origin, also attempting to go at it alone.
Isn't the same thing happening now in the opposing circles ? Haven't many attempts at some form of cooperation among the non national parties failed ? Why did it not succeed that the opposition parties constitute themselves as the fourth political block ?
Some things are changing, since the opposition is on the way to gain another form of relation of international factors towards its importance and role. Before all, due to patient activities of some opposing parties such as SDP, UBSD and the Liberal party. Making numerous connections with similar parties in Europe, breaking numerous internal prejudices and blockades, these parties are reaching the center of the European democratic public and are aiding the building of a new relation of the international factors towards the opposing block in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
But, the main problems of the opposition are on the internal scene, and are connected with their different position in some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One should not be the judgmental, and it should be stated that in the areas where there is a main influence by of SDA and territories under the control of the Bosnian army, there are at least some conditions for the activities of the opposition. But, in the areas where there is parallel rule by the HDZ and HVO the opposing parties have been destroyed and impeded in their activities. Daily protests requesting the return of the multiparty system there are still to no avail.
The main reason lies in the fact that there is a panic fear in the Herzegovina HDZ confronted with the fact that the spirit of pluralism has taken root among the Croatian population, and that it cannot remain the sole and exclusive "representative" of the whole nation, unless it resorts to totalitarian rule.
But the opposition on the SDA territory is not too happy about the position it is in, since this party did not give up on the aspiration to have the monopoly in representing the Bosniak national corps. The existing differences among the opposing parties where not a stumbling block for the formation in Sarajevo a few months ago of a Coordinating committee made up of the representatives of five political parties: Social democratic party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslim Bosniak Organization, Republican party, Croatian Peasant Party and the Union of Bosnian Social democrats. Even though this coordination is quite loose, it has shown itself so far to be a rational form of cooperation and coordination of the political organizations attempting to represent a fourth, separate block.
Source: Tuzla monthly "Grafit" issue no 1, 1995
The Croatian opposition insists, says Kasapovic, that the ruling HDZ would lose these elections, or would, at least, achieve much worse results, if the electoral law was not so obviously tailored according to its political interests, that independent media existed in the country and that there were not manipulations during the elections themselves. But the supposition about the tendency of movement of the electoral body away from HDZ - which became obvious during these elections, can be defended even without these objections of the opposition. This tendency cannot be put in an equation with a large structural breakup in the political will of the voters, but could be its harbinger.
The newest electoral results of the HDZ, and they are formally better, are objectively worse than the electoral results of that party from 1990 and 1992. This stems from the change in the ethnic composition and political and military situation in the country - the factors that have had an important influence on the electoral results of the HDZ - and which should have favored it now more than before.
Having in mind the substantially changed ethnic composition in Croatia between 1990-1995 - in which the percentage of the Serb population has fallen from 12 percent before the war to probable 4-5 percent, changing Croatia from a rather ethnically heterogeneous country into a very ethnically homogenous country - the HDZ had less support of the Croatian electoral body than ever before. HDZ was from the beginning exclusively Croatian party, for which votes came exclusively from Croats. While more than half of the Croats who went to polls in 1990. voted for it, now that number has fallen under a half.
Having in mind the radically changed military-political state in the country, current electoral results are substantially worse than those in 1992. If the highly debatable "particular lists" were not there, it would barely keep the absolute mandatory majority. Current 74 mandates mean the majority of 58,3 percent, and 12 debatable mandates of the Diaspora would reduce the majority to 53,9 percent.
From its inception, relatively speaking, HDZ was the party that had higher support among the rural and half urban population. During these elections, more than before, HDZ acquired the profile as the party pf the Croatian province and rural areas. The elections lost in Split, Rijeka, and for the first time, in Zagreb, are confirmation that the urban population - due to social and cultural reasons - is not inclined to the policies of the ruling party. It should be openly stated that in large urban areas, HDZ, i.e. its "clientistic" political elite is more and more seen primarily as a cultural, and not as a political phenomenon.
HDZ cannot be satisfied even with its regional distribution: it has its strongest support in the economically less developed Croatian regions. The empirical data also shows that age and education structure of the electoral body of HDZ is also getting worse, since its electoral base is more and more comprised of older and less educated people. The party whose political bases are in war and underdeveloped regions, in province and rural areas, among older and less educated voters, actually, has no reason for true satisfaction, even if it won the elections, particularly in the situation when the war is nearing its end, concludes Kasapovic.
Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", November 10, 1995
It is almost certain, says Butkovic, that president Tudjman will not accept any of the opposing candidates for the mayor of Zagreb (which is his constitutional right), which would mean that new elections could be called in Zagreb for the governing bodies of the city.
After his first round of talks in Dayton, Tudjamn held negotiations with opposing leaders, with no success. This meant that HDZ will not enter into coalition with any of the winning parties in Zagreb SDP (Social democrats) HSS (Peasant party) or HSLS(Liberals), which would lead to it losing power in Zagreb, if it is to respect the results of the elections.
One of the participants of the meeting (from the ranks of SDP) told Butkobvic that Tudjman has openly stated that he will not permit opposition parties to nominate the Zagreb mayor. According to this source, Tudjman will attempt to prolong the procedure as much as possible, waiting for a positive occurrence - like a military action in Eastern Slavonia or signing of peace in Dayton, which would serve as a pretext to call new elections in Zagreb.
In the meantime, the opposition is attempting to nominate candidates which have such background that it will be hard for Tudjman to refuse them without solid arguments. The distinct possibility that HDZ and president Tudjman will not accept the the victory of the opposition in Zagreb brings up the possibility of compromising the recent elections in Croatia and their democratic character, concludes the author.
Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", November 10, 1995
The climate in which these elections were held, says Novak, show the indications of deep social changes. The electoral body has shown inclination towards more serious, reliable, non-extreme politicians and parties.
Short-ended success of the re designed HDZ and a complete catastrophe of the "its "brotherly" part HSP (right wing extremists), show that Croatia is returning to the center and the left - particularly left, which is a general trend in all post socialist states. Retrospectively, it is shown that firmer electoral success of the ruling HDZ was only possible in the conditions of the uncontrolled Serb nationalism, as a "strong medicine for a strong ailing", of intimidated and scorned Croats.
A conclusion can already be made that HDZ was not the only possible expression of the nine hundred year old Croatian dream of a state, but only a logical consequence of (then) five year Serbian nationalist engineering.. In perspective, though, HDZ is shown as the only party which is able to hold Croatia in isolation towards all of its neighbors that is their concept of a state, and that is why any attack on manifestations of their chauvinism and xenophobia they see as the attack on the state itself.
In Zagreb itself (where HDZ lost the local elections) in its better days, and since the coming of HDZ to power, this party was received as some form of dirt, party of revolutionaries - primitives, with whom one is forced to meet, communicate, but not necessarily be friendly, because that is the question of personal intellectual and civil dignity. The political message now is clear for all those that want legal security, economic prosperity, liberal social order, HDZ is voided forever. Its only remaining role can be the return of Croatia into its "AVNOJ" borders and then - goodbye. But, they are not that stupid, as they might seem upon a cursory glance.
HDZ members, as limited people o unlimited instincts, know quite well how to foresee these trends. Judging by the recent wave of violence of different kind in Croatia - behind which, in different manners, stands the regime - the reply of HDZ to the possibility itself that they will lose absolute control in the country could be extremely harsh.
In Samobor bullets were fired, for the time being, plastic ones and into the air - on the young lovers of punk rock, but innocent young bystanders too. Goran Flauder, editor of the independent weekly "Boomerang" was beaten up in Osijek fourteen alleged spies were arrested, and during the elections - for the first time - some violent incidents happened. Serious chips are in the game, says Novak, first of all money. The argument by the academician-president that the opposition cannot take over the rule in Zagreb because the country is in danger and the war is on is an ordinary stupidity. The nationalists are even less puritan than communists. Some healthy economy still remains, which needs to be "sold" to the real people. And who are they ? Of course - "all the presidents men".
Recently hotel "Dubrovnik", located in the dead center of Zagreb was sold to one of the lowest bidders and well below its real value. The buyers are, by miracle, the president of the US branch of the HDZ and the secretary of the same party. One of the reasons that HDZ wanted to beat the regional party IDS in Istria, lies in the fact that this region is economically most prosperous, and it will remain so in the coming years. For domestic conditions, a large sums of money are overturned there which are out of the control of the ruling party and its people. They see Istria as Croatian "Eldorado" in comparison with the rest of the country, the money will enrich itself there simply by miracle. The conclusion that solid preconditions for dictatorship are being made in Croatia fall too short - dictatorship is not something that could yet happen - it is factually, although not formally here already.
Source: Zagreb by-wekly "Arkzin., November 10, 1995
A month after the attempted assassination of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, the official version of the event (recently offered to the public by Police Minister Ljubomir Frckovski) says the assassination was organized by a "large, well-known international financial corporation'' from "a neighboring country.'' A man hired by the corporation arrived in Skopje the day before the assassination and, helped by three Macedonian citizens, put together an explosive device somewhere in the suburbs. The day after the explosion of the car-bomb in central Skopje, in which Gligorov was seriously injured, the hired killer left Macedonia to be followed by his aides. When precise details of the event are established, the Macedonian police will demand their extradition from ``a neighboring country.''
The official version offered by Minister Frckovski to a news conference (in the package with his resignation) at first sounded like a sensational story which would start "growing'' and getting new details such as: "who is out to get whom in the Balkans?''
The official version had many cracks and sounded rather confusing. According to its introduction, the motive for the ordered assassination had been political destabilization of Macedonia and this part of the Balkans, "recomposition of the Macedonian leadership'' and the attempt to talk the state out of the "policy of equidistance'' toward the neighbors, advocated by Gligorov. Everything else that was said about the instigators, organizers and executors led to a completely different solution---the removal of Gligorov was motivated by the intention to more easily accomplish various dirty financial deals for which Gligorov had become a great obstacle.
The most complete unofficial version of Gligorov's attempted assassination has been offered by the Skopje weekly ``Puls.'' The weekly last year referred to Macedonian police sources and said that international ``dirty money'' was pressing Macedonia more and more with the ambition of buying the leading party. It was then mentioned that the Eastern Orthodox and Muslim dirty money, i.e. two companies from Sofia---``Multigrup'' and ``Tron''---were actually fighting for domination in Macedonia.
The incomplete scenario of the attempted assassination offered recently by Minister Frckovski has aroused two completely opposite opinions. According to one of them, the most influential minister in the Macedonian government, pressured by his three-week silence on the assassination, does not have too much proof in his hands so he offered the discontented public a general story which may not be too convincing but can be used for the time being.
According to the other opinion, Frckovski knows ``nearly everything'' but, in the interest of the investigation, has not revealed details. In the meantime, both sides are playing Robert Ludlum and writing their own endings of the Balkan thriller which contains everything that the genre requires: car-bombs, ``dirty money,'' retired and active spies, multi-national companies, world and regional interests... and who knows what else.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme" November 6, 1995
A number of media published the shocking news a citizen exchanged 200 US dollars at the ``Jugobanka'' branch office in Kotor. At the official exchange rate, of course, which is three times lower than that on the black market. The director of the ``Jugobanka'' office refused to reveal the citizen's name, but there is doubt whether he was trying to protect him from psychiatrists or mockery.
Many years ago, between the two world wars, editors of certain Belgrade newspapers used to throw away young journalists' articles about such and such honest citizen who found another person's wallet and returned it to the owner---they explained that honesty was not rare so it was no news. It is reasonable to believe that not everyone was honest in the past and that people who respect law can easily be found nowadays, especially if one does not search among the ruling circles. No doubt, a large part of the population lives beyond the law. The proportions of the ``gray economy'' are obvious even if one does not know the official estimates according to which ``gray economy'' equals approximately one half of the official gross product of the national economy.
Despite the known and unknown ways of evading legal obligations, the population is rapidly becoming poorer. From the beginning of this decade to the middle of last year, according to the results of a very extensive expert survey, the number of poor people in Serbia, excluding the provinces, raised from a little over 320,000 to nearly two and a half million. One out of four citizens of Serbia was poor a year ago. Since then the standard of living has dropped even further (an average salary late last year was about 180 German Marks and now it is about 120), so when the new survey results come in, they may prove that one out of three citizens is a pauper now.
The latest expansion of poverty, regardless of numbers, is a result of the growth of prices, i.e. the decrease of real income. Inflation is, as always, more efficient than the any of the population's attempts to maintain the standard of living, so this year's competition between the state and its subjects is to the detriment of the latter. The price controlling policy of the government (actually all three governments) can yield no permanent results so new high inflation is inevitable, Miroljub Labus has told ``Nasa Borba.'' He added that the ``political statements'' made by some politicians, according to which there is no reason for growth of prices until the end of the year, were ``quite senseless.'' Labus, as well as other economy experts, reiterates that the inflation has been accelerated by the state's enormous budget considering the situation of Yugoslav economy. Right at the beginning of this year, which should officially be the year of stabilization, there was not much for economic subjects to do but get into ``gray economy'' either by evading taxes or by transmitting them on to their customers through increased prices. At the same time, the Serbian government kept saying that it was working toward stabilization because it was not going into budget deficit, while in fact it was piling up quasi-budget deficits mostly through losses in the public sector. This resulted in a multiple increase of the price of electricity and the introduction of block-tariff in early October.
It is interesting to mention the time of the last presidential elections when the (then and now) Serbian president first visited oil drills in Turijapolje where, he said, there would be enough oil to cover all our needs and then visited the Serbian Electric Power Industry where, in front of the cameras of the state-owned TV, he managed to convince his hosts that block-tariff was not necessary and that its introduction should be postponed.
Of all the measures from the government's package, the only one which has been carried out is a drastic increase of the price of electricity. On April 1, the price went up by 20 percent, on May 24 by 10 percent, on July 1 by 15 percent and on September 1 by 25 percent. In the meantime, the block-tariff was introduced which means another 50 percent increase. All of this has had almost no effect. The consumers have not stopped using electricity. Many of them do not have much of a choice and the Electric Power Industry still has money problems. It is not even covering the expenses of simple reproduction and is making losses.
The introduction of block-tariff is disputable and there are reasons why it should be abolished. Not only because it has made a confusion and caused revolt of the consumers. The block-tariff is a punishment, its aim was to frighten the consumers and make them use other forms of energy and also to relieve the Electric Power Industry by preventing large-scale damages and a breakdown of the system. Essentially, block tariff is an old-fashioned method and the countries which once used it, have abandoned it. The government engaged an expert team to prepare a program of rational consumption of electricity and adopted this program. The program proposed introduction of three tariffs, but the government, for reasons unknown, chose the block-tariff which was contrary to the proposed program.
Confusion started when consumers were informed about their advance payments calculated on the basis of last year's consumption. Most people complain that they cannot afford to pay that much.
By introducing the block-tariff, the Electric Power Industry has added a new detail to its already bad image. It is a normal thing for a producer in the world to advertise his product, to stimulate consumption and to give discounts or special offers to major consumers. The Serbian Electric Power Industry, however, is punishing its major consumers. Any lawyer could get a case against the introduction of block-tariff if he were interested and brought charges. The catch is in the way electric meters are read.
If block-tariff is applied to monthly consumption, then advance payments calculated on the basis of last year's consumption cannot count because one is to pay only for what is consumed. And this is where the entire construction falls the company does not know, nor will it measure, how much electric power the consumers used in October or any other month to come. Without these figures, they cannot apply the block-tariff. This is the third attempt with block-tariff: the first time, citizens were saved by elections, as has been mentioned, the second time was last year when the decision was made but was not applied, and this year we are yet to see.
Our suggestion is to abolish it, if anyone should care to accept a suggestion from a newspaper article. In normal states, pressured by order and calculations, a citizen would seek help from a business bank, but the banks here are not offering any kind of mutually beneficial protection. They, on the contrary, behave like an extension of the insatiable state. After having discredited the system of current accounts by issuing checks for overdrawn accounts, business banks now seem to be heading toward the other extreme. They are now ``stealing'' money from current and giro account owners and chronically robbing old foreign currency savings in order to cover the losses sustained during the hyper-inflation.
In addition to extremely high commission (1 to 10 percent) for all banking operations---the highest being for the tax on traveling abroad---the most frequent abuses are those which have as an excuse the shortage of cash. Apart from being restricted to drawing only 500 Dinars a day from an account (a restriction which even the National Bank Governor assessed as having no legal grounds), there is a much more difficult problem---how to draw 200 or 300 Dinars from a giro account. Banks admit that the payment ``has been recorded'' but say there is no cash. They suggest transferring the money to the current account. Commission applies to this operation, too. The interest rate on the positive balance on giro and current accounts is about 15 percent per year.
Unlike this, short term loans to citizens, in the form of negative balance on current accounts, has an interest rate of about 20 percent per month, i.e. about 0.6 percent per day. Not only are business banks incapable of offering the impoverished population favorable legal loans for food for winter, timber, household appliances, major repairs or reconstruction, with an interest rate which would by a few percent exceed the downfall of the Dinar, but they are charging the illegal loans at a rate which exceeds the inflation by 50 or more percent. After the disaster with Jezda and Dafina there are not many private banks which would try to specialize for dealing with citizens and there are only individual examples of banks which do not respect state-imposed limits and offer favorable interest rates in order to restore saving which in normal countries represents between 30 and 50 percent of credit potential. Our banks have no money, and any time someone mentions credits for citizens they say the National Bank should take care of them.
Perhaps several joint arrangements, such as offering short term loans only to those who receive their salaries through current accounts, would make an easier life and better banking.
The story of how foreign currency accounts are plundered is a well-known one and the new act which should resolve these problems does not contain many novelties. According to the draft which was submitted to the Yugoslav Parliament some ten days ago, the payment of the six billion US Dollars worth of debt to foreign currency account owners would begin on January 1, 1997. Until then, the banks would have an obligation to offer the foreign currency account owners Dinar equivalent of 50 German Marks every month at the average exchange rate on the day of the payment.
Today, this would mean the rate three times lower than the real exchange rate. In the long run, the fact that 17.2 percent of the primary issue has been given to banks to pay back the old foreign currency savings at the official exchange rate of one Dinar for one Mark shows how lucrative a business this may be. There are some complaints in business banks, however, because they are not interested in the debt to foreign currency account owners, as if it were not part of their balance. They maintain that they are wasting the money which they could now be turning and somebody else will resolve their foreign currency imbalances.
It has been calculated that by paying back the debts by these devaluated payments about 300 million Dollars worth of obligations could be bought in the next three years, which, of course, will not reduce the total debt which is being augmented by interests. Later on, between 1997 and 2007, the state and banks would need about 600 million Dollars a year to service the debts to citizens. The arguments between the state, central bank and business banks on who got the better or the worse part of the ``distribution of foreign currency losses'' are of no importance for this story and the troubled citizens. What is important for them is the fact that neither this nor any other law initiative means brings them any improvement.
In Ruma and its vicinity, as well as in some villages around Novi Sad, peasants have not yet been paid for the wheat, nor have all obligations been fulfilled concerning sunflower, sugar, beet and other autumn cultures. The price of 15 Dinars for a cubic meter of maize is so low that village people are already burning the maize to heat their homes because it is far cheaper than coal and timber. As far back as the memory goes, maize reapers used to work for a cubic meter of maize as their daily wage and now they do not want to reap even for three meters. The peasant is a partner who has no one to turn to with his mass goods, so he is easily blackmailed. Taxes need to be paid and they are no longer low.
The Serbian Government's action to reduce meat prices to the last month's level has turned into a crisis of livestock. Many butchers in Novi Sad did not have an ounce of fresh meat to sell last week because peasants refuse to deliver livestock. In return for the ``reduction of prices,'' the government gave special offers only to state-owned farms and producers.
The situation in cities is even worse. Nebojsa Covic's Belgrade authorities keep reassuring citizens almost daily that block tariff will not be introduced for the consumed water, but there are no reactions to mass protests or even protests of individual officials because of the 40 percent raise of communal service prices. The citizens can relax. They will not be paying for water 7-8 Dinars instead of four which they have been paying, so the raise of communal service prices will not affect them much. Before this latest increase of prices, the communal service prices were raised several times this year, which means that a Belgrade citizen whose communal service bill was about 20 Dinars at the beginning of this year will be paying 100 in October. However, one thing is permanent: the cost of the so-called investment maintenance is the highest on the list of all services, although very few people ever get any money from the substantial fund for the repair of their rapidly dilapidating buildings.
Only occasionally someone from the ruling circles utters something about the squeezing of the citizens by a joint action of inflation and other techniques. The Serbian Private Business Minister last spring on two or three occasions said in public that some of the largest companies which are closest to the ruling circles were not paying taxes. Then the Electric Power Industry said that some of the ``giants'' of the Serbian economy were their major debtors. Governor Avramovic recently said that it was interesting to notice that prices on the green market were not going up while prices of industrial products were.
This is what the subjects of economic and monetary power have been doing this year and who should pay for possible failures. On the other hand, apparent conflicts for monopoly, for another piece of the big budget cake which was taken from the economy and the population in advance, constantly keep arising among the ruling circles. A history expert has said that all of this very much resembles the first days of Nasser's rule in Egypt. The new leader of the country impoverished by the flight of capital strengthened his power by giving his revolutionary followers, unable to pay them, the positions which enabled them to take bribes. Present-day Serbia is not Egypt from half a century ago, of course. This is a lot worse.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme" November 6, 1995
The court at this moment is examining the accusation against more than forty suspects, an indictment was raised against Karadzic and Mladic, but only one accused is in the UN jails, Dusan Tadic, whose case begins soon. The processes against "small fish", Dusko Tadic, or Dragan Nikolic in absentia, of course, have a sense of their on: you do not approach justice with the stance "all or nothing" and even if somebody is convicted for a smaller crime, it is some consolation, to the victims and to the people dreaming of justice in this world. But, at the same time, such processes, as well as everything that is happening concerning this court, decisively underline the contradictions in the idea itself of trying war crimes and the weaknesses in the relation of the international community towards this idea.
Many hopes in the effectiveness of this Court, as it seems, are based on the uncompromising character of Richard Goldstone, who has no intention to let himself get involved in the manipulations of the international bureaucracy, if it decides to cover up war crimes. The indictments against Karadzic and Mladic are witness to that. But, despite Goldstones incorruptibility and tactic to catch the big fish through the small one, this noble court already has difficulties And it can be assumed that these will grow.
The political problems are essential. This was felt by the defenders of Dusan Tadic Michail Vladimiroff and Milan Vujin, so they are effectively using it. The problem is in the consistency of the international community to try war crimes: that there is no discrimination concerning smaller nations, that it does not become a rule that the work of the Court is modified to the decisions of pressure on certain governments and so on.
These criticisms are mostly founded on the moment that was chosen fir the indictments against Karadzic and Mladic and keeping quiet about the responsibility of politicians and officers from Serbia for the war in Bosnia. The indictment against Karadzic and Mladic was submitted when they were discounted for any kind of cooperation stopping the war in Bosnia - before that possibility was mentioned a number of times - but on the level of the UN it was always said that their cooperation is necessary to stop the war.
Slobodan Milosevic is in a similar situation now. It is quite obvious that his responsibility cannot be overlooked, but since he is an indispensable partner in the peace negotiations - the Court is forced to circumvent him... It is a mockery of the dead if the terrible crimes over hundreds of thousands of people are reduced to the responsibility of some drunken executioners and it is cynical if the living act shaken by the crimes, but are at the same time negotiating with the politicians who have planned and given orders for the war and crimes. It is a problem that the UN, as well as the governments of the largest countries have the war crimes reports since the beginning of the war and know without a mistake who is ordering them and who is carrying them out - but have kept quiet due to political considerations, in the same manner they are quiet about the responsibility of Slobodan Milosevic today.
It is not easy for the court, since the legal people do not like when the politicians are pulling them by the nose, and we might be still far away from it, but it would not be a surprise if the activity of the court is slowly stifled, or finishes on small fish, which would be more a mockery of the dead than conduct of justice.
It is also certain, concludes Cerovic, that if the work of the Court is slowed down too much, and even if the peace in Bosnia comes through without paying too much attention to this problem - all formally due to higher interests of those that have survived the massacres - then such a peace would also be mocking the dead, and those living, all in the name of "real-politik", would turn into cynics without feelings.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", October 27, 1995
Ahead of the peace talks in the military base near Dayton, the destiny of the Srebrenica Muslims has come into focus again. The reports of the U.N. and American intelligence services, published by influential media, mention ``liquidation of six to eight thousand Muslims whose remains lie in several mass graves.'' Srebrenica, together with Zepa and Gorazde, is a Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia, which survived the Serb invasion in the spring and summer of 1992, mainly owing to its geographic position.
As many had assumed, Srebrenica fell in mid-July this year. The only question is how and what happened with several thousand civilians. Commander Naser Oric and his soldiers---having found themselves in a hopeless position and with indecisive NATO aviation---had fled in the direction of Tuzla in due time.
In Serbia one cannot obtain other information from the field than that provided by the Bosnian Serb sources. They say that the ``Serb army decided to correct the mistake of the world power-wielders and carry out the real demilitarization of Srebrenica. They did this the way only the Serb heroes do it---quickly, bravely and efficiently. Srebrenica has again become Serbian as had been for centuries.'' The sources failed to mention that, before the war, the population of Srebrenica was 90 percent Muslim.
The twentieth issue of ``Drinski,'' the herald of the Zvornik infantry brigade, published in July, was devoted mostly to the magnificent Srebrenica victory. One can learn from between the lines and from the lines themselves how and who liberated Srebrenica. Commander of the Zvornik brigade Vinko Pandurovic, mentioned as the ``first creator of the great victory,'' said that in the most magnificent victory in this war, ``there was an excellent cooperation of all the structures which participated in the action.'' Another creator Milan Stanojevic said: ``I was aware of how difficult a task it was, considering the fact that my group was mixed.''
Milan Jolovic-the Legend, the commander of the ``Wolves from the Drina'' who were the first to enter the town, said: ``At one moment, when we broke through the Muslim defense line, the criminals started running about the woods.'' The editorial, printed in italics, said: ``In the battles against the raging criminal hordes of the Srebrenica Turks, units of the Zvornik brigade confirmed their qualities once again. On July 15, 16 and 17, our brigade fought an unusual battle with the remaining hordes from Srebrenica, heading toward Tuzla, and with the forces of the Second Corps of the so-called Army of Bosnia Herzegovina.
Bravely and heroically, planned and well-organized, the fighters under the command of Drago Beatovic, Lazar Ristic and Ostoja Stanisic repelled all the attacks from the front, successfully blocked the remaining forces and destroyed them. The commander of the Zvornik brigade praised the commanders Milan Jolovic, Milan Stanojevic, Drago Beatovic and Lazar Ristic and their units for having successfully fulfilled the task. The commander has expressed his full gratitude to all other forces that took part in this action.''
An appropriate question would be who are the ``other forces'' whom the commander thanked for successfully blocking and destroying the remaining forces. Need we say that the ``remaining forces'' were most probably the civilians who were running through the woods and had no chance in the encounter with the ``other forces'' whom the commander thanked. If the ``New York Times'' is lying, why is the Zvornik brigade bulletin doing the same.
Source: Belgrade wekly "Vreme", November 6, 1995
The Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina (RDSV) on October 17 presented a draft law on amnesty for the citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) who refused to report to military service. The draft will be proposed to the parliament on behalf of RDSV and the Civil Alliance of Serbia (GSS) by Blasko Kopilovic, a deputy in the Federal Parliament. Accordingly, the citizens of SFRJ and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) who refused to report to military service should be pardoned, and so should those who helped deserters. The ones who should not be pardoned are those who, after desertion, participated in military operations of armed formations opposed to the Yugoslav army and those who perpetrated a crime against humanity. The proposers say that this law would not pardon future behavior, but would only put an end to the current state.
Both the domestic and international public have forgotten and completely neglected the fact that at the beginning of the war those mobilized protested in Kragujevac, Pozarevac, Pancevo, Smederevo, Valjevo, Topola, Svilajnac, that military camps were deserted by reserve soldiers from Smederevo Arandjelovac, Velika Plana, Topola and Svilajnac and that protests against mobilization broke out in Zabalj, Curug, Kac, Novi Sad, Zrenjanin, Kikinda, Pancevo, Subotica, Backa Topola, Ada and Senta.
Formally, it was a violation of military discipline regulations and the SFRJ Criminal Law which foresaw strict punishment for desertion up to eight years during peace and between three years and the death sentence during war.
The authorities of the time (and they are the same ones now, aren't they, only dressed differently) did not proclaim mobilization in the Yugoslav Official Register but in daily newspapers instead, and the announcement did not have the form of a legal act but was some kind of information from the SFRJ Presidency. Besides, the war was never declared either. The mobilized reserve soldiers on the front were considered volunteers.
After the signing of the Vance-Owen plan, in the spring and summer of 1992 when the war in Bosnia was breaking out, the protest of the ``third Serbia'' was all about the amnesty of deserters and the resistance to a possible new mobilization. During the March 1992 demonstrations in Belgrade (anniversary of March 9, 1991), it was demanded that general amnesty be announced for all those who fled the country because of the war and to ensure their return home. The Academic Council of the Belgrade University at that time proposed to the Serbian Government to allow all those who had left the country ahead and during the war to return without consequences.
The initiative was supported first of all by Milan Bozic, then the Dean of the Mathematical Faculty and Milan Radovanovic, then the Dean of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering. Rajko Vracar, then the Rector of Belgrade University, supported those who advocated amnesty. University professors almost unanimously supported the rebelled students who opposed mobilization and the present Rector Velickovic, then the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, was among the few who approved of the mobilization of students.
In the summer of 1992, Milan Panic's government was talking about the Amnesty Law. The members of the Serbian Radical Party and Lt. Milan Milivojevic on behalf of the Association of Veterans of the 1991-92 war rudely criticized the law. The Parliament of the FR Yugoslavia refused to urgently consider the draft and demanded that the Amnesty Law be passed in the regular procedure, in the package with other acts concerning the army.
The General Staff assessed the draft as negative and Minister of Justice, Tibor Varadi, then said the Defense Ministry had approved of the project and that the General Staff and the Defense Ministry had to bring their stands in accord. Rioters outside the Parliament building cried: ``Tibor-master!'' In the autumn of 1992, Panic lost the elections and ``Serbia which shall not bend'' won, Serbia which would spend another two years chasing ``national traitors'' and fight against ``abstract peace'' (M.Markovic) in order to eventually start claiming that it had always opted for peace which had no alternative.
Chronicler of events in the Defense Minister's cabinet, Dobrila Gajic Glisic, has testified that Slobodan Milosevic in 1991 rejected Minister Simovic's demand to carry out general mobilization, because ``Serbia is not at war,'' but that he demanded punishment of the deserters. The regime did not dare to start a mass persecution of military rebels, but did retain the possibility to do it, in order to increase uncertainty and to cover up its policies. This is why it will be interesting to see how the new initiative will be received now.
If the regime now formally freed of guilt the people who refused to take part in a war which they, long before their superiors, assessed as senseless, it would admit its incapability, guilt and a lack of sense for strategic evaluation. By doing so, it would not be showing mercy but would practically apologize to its citizens. And then it would no longer be this regime.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", October 30, 1995
Recent public beating of "Boomerang" editor in chief Goran Flauder and the method in which that case received some comments in public, forbear the methods in which some misunderstandings between the regime and "unrepentant" journalists in these areas could be resolved - and these conditions could be quite dramatic, without any mutual courtesies. "Croatia is a legal state in which human rights are duly protected, with the tendency of rising the level of that protection". This is the message of Branimir Glavas (head of the Osijek county and the leader of the local HDZ) in the open letter to the president of the Croatian society of Journalists - a week after four of HDZ gorillas broke Flauder's camera and then proceeded to beat him op on the main city square, and after he has, all bloodied up, returned to the paper's editorial office, recognizing two of his assailants, publicly naming them.
But Glavas, as the head of the Osijek-Baranja region is "inclined" to think differently: "The statement that the incident was caused by a policeman in civilian clothing is a complete lie, and it is also hard to believe that this was done by HDZ activists". Moreover:" We are more inclined to think that those responsible for this act are from the circle of people hurt by the untruthful writing of Mr.. Flauder". The following text of the letter rises the dramatic tension - one from "the circle of those hurt" is actually him, head of the Osijek-Baranja region, but according to his statement, due to his many statesman duties, he had no time to deal with Flauder personally.
"Due to occupation of Croatia and more important things I have no time to seek justice through courts or write to organizations for protection of human rights, but you must allow me that in certain situations I have the right to guard my privacy from forceful photographing which was attempted in a number of cases by Mr.. Flauder".
There is no doubt that Glavas is personally responsible for beating of Flauder, while he was "attempting" to photograph preparations for the party meeting on the main square in Osijek: either he directly ordered it, or he created the atmosphere in which it was desirable that "Flauder's ribs be counted" on the first occasion. Not to forget that current correspondent of "Feral Tribune" from London, received his last message from the Osijek head with the content that he will be liquidated.
Of course, those facts have no meaning, since Glavas is in power. But what is so demeaning is the counter-fact: the power is Glavas. The state apparatus did not undertake anything to treat the "Flauder case" in any manner : minister Jarnjak's answer to the president of the IFJ made no sense, and the official Croatian media did not mention this incident with a single word.
Source: Split wekly "Feral Tribune", November 13, 1995
It is said that the radical leader Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Democrats Zoran Djindjic, Vojislav Kostunica heading the Democratic Party of Serbia and Vuk Draskovic, president of the "Serbian Renewal Movement" will jointly enter the next elections. If that would be possible, Serbia and Vojvodina would come into toughest temptations.
Except, sometimes, Draskovic, the other three have absolutely nothing to offer to the voters. The angry nation could, due to the economic catastrophe of their families and the military defeat of Serbia give these parties 40 percent of the vote, but it would only get an influential vengeful block. Since the war is over, this block would attack the Socialists, for the poverty of the population, without any sense of its own responsibility for the support of the Belgrade war politics.
All four parties have demanded changes of borders between Serbia and neighboring Yugoslav states. and all four have named as the main "Serbian question" the territorial expansion of Serbia and introduction of centralized political system in it, without a legal autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. These parties never had programs for a modern Yugoslavia and entrance into Europe, They remained on the level of pathetic Serbian religious holidays, and protection of numeric electoral majority of the backward South over advanced North.
It is almost impossible to imagine a government of these four politicians, even if they would win 51 percent of the vote. Seselj and Kostunica would strive for a military revenge, and push Serbia to finance the Serbs across the surrounding rivers, Djindjic would complain about the unfavorable peace deal, meanwhile he would push his fingers into trade operations, while Draskovic would complain about Serb stupidity, without the strength to formulate a model of new "Serbdom" and advancement of the state.
These four are of such conceited nature, that they would not be able to spurs their personal ambitions and sacrifice them for a joint goal. It cannot be counted here who left whom more times. The tails of treason and collaboration with Milosevic drag themselves since March 9, 1991, DEPOS meeting of 1992, Draskovic's jailing in June 1993, on-off cooperation with the SPS between 1990-1995 and parliamentary quarrels, where the spirit of gypsy camps has replaced opposing cooperation. The four-sided government would hurt Draskovic the hardest. He has a strong individuality and is completely incapable to adhere to discipline.
Each of his public meetings was an example of disorder on the scene. The long periods of peaceful political battle make him nervous. He breaks agreements, not only because he believes he is the next Nikola Pasic (considered the most prominent Serbian politician), but because he is a born populist. He is convinced that he is the harbinger of new waves and a messenger with unbelievable truths. He often is not conscious of the effect of his words, but in difference to other Belgrade nationalist politicians, is able to express public remorse and excuses. He is not revengeful towards his surroundings, but is capable of threatening Croats that "they will not last three days"(March 9, 1991.).
Daraskovic's SPO is still not certain whether it is entering the elections alone, or in the group with nationalistic parties. This party does not need the electoral coalition wit the "Citizens alliance" anymore, it has perfumed itself enough with the UN Declaration. It is fully aware that by itself it cannot garner more than 8-9 percent of the vote. United with nationalistic opposition the entrance into the parliament would be guaranteed, but a big internal fight would break up within the group about the division of parliamentary mandates. Seselj and Djindjic would demand more mandates than Draskovic for themselves, getting for themselves the acknowledgment that they are stronger than him. If he goes at it alone, Draskovic will fare poorly, if he goes at it with the "nationalist brotherhood", he will be humiliated. That is why the coalition of the four parties is not probable.
Actually, the nationalistic coalition would be a great political regression for Serbia. Except for the revenge to the Socialists for their treason of Greater Serbia and cheap anti-communist clamor, there is no transitory program there. None of the four parties understood that the exit from soft communist past of Yugoslavia is only possible with the leadership of US and Western Europe. Instead of faith in capital, they trusted Serbian "renewal" through conquest of somebody else's terrain. Except for Kostunica, the most moral person among the nationalists, all other heads of nationalistic parties have enriched themselves during the war. Giving the rule to them would mean holding Serbia well below the capabilities of Milosevic to bring it at least some offending crumbs of credit capital.
It is a real tragedy that the president of Serbia and his restaurant capitalists, the so called Socialists, are a better political choice for the voters that the strongest opposing parties in Serbia. No matter how much he and his legal criminals bear the lion's share of responsibility for the Serbian catastrophe, plunder of the nation And lawlessness, the reconstruction of the state will go through them, and not through the nationalistic opposition. which becomes expandable after Dayton.
The nationalistic opposition is a servant to Milosevic's communists since 1987, and until today it did not comprehend how boring it is, and how little chance it has to gain power. Until the regular elections in 1997 Milosevic has enough time to raise the living standard of the voters. For that, he will even get some international help. Until 97 the Americans might be able to make the Kosovo Albanians to come to the election polls, which would seal the crash of the hope of Belgrade nationalists that they can overtake the state by themselves. The first one that will run away from the nationalistic camp will be Vuk Draskovic, since he will not go against Americans for anything. He knows that without them there is no peace in Kosovo and movement of Serbia away from economic and political downfalls of Kosovo. No matter how much he is susceptible to myths, he will quickly understand that Kosovo was lost in 1692 and that it has been supplemented by Vojvodina, where the old Kosovo has resettled.
Coming of the Albanians to the election polls would mean calming of the political situation in Kosovo and introduction of legal autonomy of Pristina. Washington would be behind it, guaranteeing that Pristina would not go to Tirana. Possible 25-30 Albanian members of Parliament would firmly resist the Serbian nationalistic opposition. Albanians will, possibly, rather cooperate with Socialists, than that they would be against them.
Actually, concludes Veselinov, Serbia and Vojvodina today need at least two new parties with transitory political programs. Until then, the Serbian future will be formulated by Socialists, and they will cooperate with anybody.
Source: AIM independent news service, November 6, 1995
For years the public appearances of Slobodan Milosevic and Mira Markovic are followed by strong emotions, whether it is adoration or demonization, but also emotionless poking into intimate sphere; as if there is no indifferent bystanders. The analytical approach is lacking.
Milosevic speaks of himself as the protector of Yugoslavia, which was prevented by the world in that grand goal, he was even unjustly branded as nationalist and aggressor, which puzzles him, so he proclaims this absurd, particularly since he sees himself as a promoter of democracy "open sessions" and "live shows", in any manner, "anti bureaucratic course".
Of course, it is rare to find among politicians those who spontaneously, without outside pressure, speak of their mistakes; this could be least expected from those holding power and do not see partner among the rest, but only enemies or simple instruments (Cosic, Panic, Seselj, Karadzic...), and that does not show least of readiness to settle the account of his rule. Still question are open. If there was democracy, would there be his "apparatchik" career ? If there was no Serbian nationalism, would there be populist movement which "shouted him" as the all Serb leader ? If there was none of his militancy, would there be hurried secession, but not only of Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo... but also "Serbian lands"? If he did not put himself in the saddle of military police power, would there be Serb uprising, different new military leaders (and "those in Pale")? And what are all the consequences of the policies hew is carrying out all of these years ? The questions are coming, but there are no answers.
Standing on the same positions is Mira Markovic, the chairperson of the Directorate of the Yugoslav United Left. After her conversation with Hungarian president Genz, she states: "President Genz and me have agreed in the evaluation of the reasons and consequences of the war, we have agree that the war in Yugoslavia was generated by the representatives of the nationalistic forces in every Yugoslav nation". Not a word about Serbian nationalism or populism, among whose instigators she was herself (about she quite often wrote herself in affirmative tone), nor about the militarism of the SK-PJ ("general's party") whose leader she was and still is.
To be truthful, both Milosevic and Markovic could have changed their former opinions, but they are not showing signs of something like that, as well as giving up on the final ideological and ruling exclusiveness. This exclusiveness of the duo which believes that it is always correct, is imposing on the domestic and international public the impression that there is no alternative to them, and why would there be, since they are always on the side of the Good. Even though there is no peace yet, let alone normal life, our duo is "en mass" only washing their own hands.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", October 1-31, 1995
The Tudjman regime , says Djilas, has "solved" the Serbian question in Croatia. The political and intellectual elite in Serbia and Montenegro has pushed the Serbs in Croatia towards rebellion and armed conflict ever since Tudjamn came to power. Frightened by Croatian nationalism, overtaken by the electoral defeat of the Croatian communist party, towards which, due to Partisan tradition, they have leaned, without much sense for democratic political fight, the Serbs in Croatia could not resist taking the road to which this elite was pushing them. But this road has recently, in front of the eyes of the whole world, turned into the highways leading to exile.
The armed conflict did not succeed in protecting national rights and the Croatian flag is flying on the "unconquerable" Knin tower. The policies of the Serbian elite, particularly in the beginning seemed wise. There was too small a number of those who have posed a reasonable question: Can the Serbs infinitely hold some of the mid-Croatian territories - there is only a few hundred thousand of Serbs there, and around three and a half million Croatians only in Croatia itself.
During 1990/91 only the minority of Serbs favored the dialogue with Croatians. These "peaceniks" were accused for cowardice and treason. They were considered naive. But it was actually the idea that only war can solve the Serb question in Croatia that was proven naive. The aggressive Serbian/Montenegrin policies met their full defeat in Croatia. They did not protect the Serbs, they lost territories, and they were humiliated militarily. At the same time, they have politically divided the Serbs, stopped the development of political institutions, ruined the economy, led to international isolation and drew accusations of war crimes. It is pure luck that there is not another domain where defeat is possible; it is certain that Serb-Montenegrin policy would lose there too. The only success is that they have made Franjo Tudjman, a man of little gifts and even less virtue, a statesman and military leader.
The tragedy of Krajina should be lesson for everybody in this region, even the Albanians in Kosovo. It is no secret that many Serb politicians wish that there were no Albanians in Kosovo. It is also not A secret that it came to the mind of many Albanians to start a military rebellion. That is no miracle, taking into consideration that since the late Eighties the Albanians became victims of violence and discrimination, which was no smaller than the Serbs in Croatia in 1990-91. It was lucky for the Albanians that they did not succumb to this temptation. They would risk that the Serb army would, without resistance from great powers which do not condone forceful secession of Kosovo, completely clear some areas of Kosovo from Albanians. The Albanians in Kosovo are too numerous and homogenous that they could be driven away, except in some great war, for which, luckily there is little chance.
Due to this, the Albanian question will not be solved in a harmful manner for them. Inclusion in the political life of Serbia and peaceful, democratic forms of political fight will give best results. This road is slow and often boring. It does not rise the imagination of young people and does not give immediate vent to emotions to those that are persecuted.. But it is the safest way to a goal.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", October 1-31, 1995
Who would have thought that in Serbia the conflict between Zivorad Minovic and Hadzi Dragan Antic shall open up and resolve issues concerning the free press, war and peace, democracy, private enterprise, a law abiding country, even the stability of the Dinar? See how easy it is for a man to appear naive. You thought that you were not the least bit interested in the war of the two heads of a former national institution called Politika and that the only problem was in the fact that they were eating the same bone, when it turned out to be a Biblical conflict of Good and Evil.
Therefore, it doesn't matter that Politika has gone down the drain a long time ago, along with the other national institutions, along with its people. The only important thing being Minovic and Antic. Between the two of them, we are to decide whether we shall redeem ourselves and become happy or whether we shall not. The convenient thing being that this major decision has fallen on the biggest news agency, so that, whoever wins, we immediately find out that we are saved. The way things look now, our savior is Antic, but the situation was so tense and uncertain that it could have been Minovic. Even the police force had to intervene to whisk off the evildoer just as he had managed to, with the help of the Board of Directors, replace Antic without a quorum. And we know what the quorum means to the Serbian people. Which is how Antic managed to, with the help of the same or similar Board of Directors, replace Minovic the very next day. I would rather not open up the issue of the police on this occasion since it has obviously deserved our deepest admiration for its alertness and efficiency while protecting all that is sacred to us. As I am inclined towards ignoring what is regarded as nationally sacred, I must admit that I am not even interested in the quorum, that is, whether Politika's Board of Directors did or did not have a quorum the first or second time, both times, or not at all.
However, they say that there were certain members of that Board who were present on both occasions and who properly first voted for, that is against, Antic that is Minovic. If at least one person acted in such a manner, I hereby wish to commend him. I know that this is not the first time, as it is said, in our recent experience, yet I believe that in just such a case as is this one it serves as an example of commendable, or at least adequate behavior. We should examine this more carefully, since we might, in the future, find ourselves more frequently in situations of such dilemmas and choices.
In politics and in life, as we well know, we usually choose between bad and less bad, sometimes between good and less good, and never between excellent and poor. When things look bad, that means that the alternatives are lousy, when things become worse that means that the differences between the options are becoming hardly discernible, and when you find yourself not being able to see any difference, it is no use pretending that you have really made a choice.
Understandably, people discern and notice all situations with a choice differently, and act in accordance with their own character, values and attitude towards life. Some people always gravitate towards situations of the ``all or nothing'' type and do not accept ``something.'' Some people are happy whenever they find something in nothing. Some people refuse trivial choices awaiting bigger ones, while some others are constantly making tiny choices.
Yet, while all this remains a personal issue, in political choices when public interest is at stake, there definitely should exist some sort of civilization maximum for swindling the people and putting across personal interest as general. Same as with money. Just like the country which is capable of printing the largest amount of money is not also the richest country, so the best politician isn't the one who pulls off the biggest swindle on the largest number of people. In this case, if we are to choose between Zivorad Minovic and Hadzi Dragan Antic, then we have deceit which far extends that civilization maximum. Minovic was a member of the tight propaganda-conspiracy headquarters which created Slobodan Milosevic, and he personally conducted Politika's morbid orchestra of fury, hate and lies.
Ever since then and until today, Politika changed along with Milosevic's policies, but remained as its most important looking glass and one of the pillars of that government.
Whenever his balloon was losing altitude, Milosevic got rid of the extra load and so far has chucked out an imposing number of generals, ministers, general managers, writers, journalists, intellectuals, yet Minovic somehow kept surviving. He was capable of adapting to the new lines and of threatening Milosevic of releasing baggage of mutual sins from the past. Many people surmise on the seriousness of those sins by seeing how long and with what persistence Minovic held on.
Antic's merits are of a younger date, connected to the turning point of the consistent peace policies. However, Politika did not become a normal newspaper, which would, in this context, be the only real difference. Antic himself did not come out as an outstanding peace fighter during the previous period, otherwise he wouldn't have gotten where he now is, just as Minovic is not a man who would have opposed the new policies. If there is a difference between Milosevic's old and new policies, these two are neither to blame nor responsible for it. In their department everything has essentially remained the same. The person who had, caught in a dilemma between the two of them, voted both ways, had probably just expressed his character which doesn't overly burden him. But, I believe that such behavior is a completely legitimate way of answering a wrongly put question. If you don't see a difference, if you feel that the real choice hasn't been offered, you can, without hesitation, accept all that is offered. In the lack of anything better, in the impossibility of resistance, that is also a way to send your message across. They will tell you, of course, that your vote or your ballot is invalid. Of course. For an invalid question---an invalid answer. So let the people like Minovic and Antic, as well as political parties, the regime and opposition, learn to pose better questions.
Actually, there is a great possibility that in Serbia already now, the strongest party, maybe even holding the majority is actually the party of the invalid. Those who have concluded that here there are no possibilities of getting away from Minovic and Antic, so that, in the long run, it is all the same. Those that are competing for power are looking at each other, talking to each other, tripping each other up and an amazingly small number of things has remained on that scene that would have anything to do with public interest. In conflicts such as these a person has the right to even enjoy himself a bit, knowing that the better opponent cannot lose and that it's no pity if of the two bad, only one remains. As for the story that this thing in Politika is only a symbolic expression of a deeper, important, ideological dispute between the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) ``hard wing'' and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) peace-oriented members, even if we were to be presented with serious evidence, I personally would not be able to make a choice. Not because I care to look at the world from a greater distance and refuse to see the differences a priori, but simply because of a lack of faith in anything. On both those sides, if they really do exist, apart from personal prosperity, everything else is also irrelevant.
The alleged nationally concerned and militant movements in SPS have shown themselves to be totally disinterested in those Serbs which that policy has forced to exchange their houses for hovels. That scene has affected the anti-Serbian West more than these patriots. While JUL has embraced those who claim that they are dreaming the old international-brotherhood dream and are worrying the poor people's worries, while counting money acquired from the sponsors under the table. What they wish to say is that their intentions are better, even though they are the same ones that the whole world has seen through a long time ago. This doesn't bother them. Nobody has to believe their alleged visions. The only thing they wish for is that people do not regard them as average, but ideologically backward profiteers. They feel better that way.
All this with Politika and these right and left wings should be looked upon as political exercises and means of keeping in shape to prevent them from sinking into total idleness while awaiting the President's return from America. But, if he is in a bad mood, he could then say something like: ``while I was there doing... you here have invented your own provocation.'' And in order to make the people enjoy the sight of their ruler as he rebukes and replaces various corrupt people, he previously has to surround himself with just such people.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", November 13, 1995
What was not achieved by former "fog seller" and media magnate Robert Maxwell, when he attempted to take over the key Zagreb and Croatian daily "Vjesnik" - was done by Miroslav Kutle. This man became the Croatian media magnate, without much pomp, but also without much of his own money. At least when he started. At that, only his initial overtake, of the Split daily "Slobodna Dalmacija" has raised furor in Croatia and European institutions, but not for long. Now that his company "Globus holding" has grown with geometrical progression, sucking in companies throughout Croatia, his media empire is spreading like wildfire.
After he has conquered Split adding to his ownership of "Slobodna Dalmacija (all its published editions, printing plant and vending network) part - ownership in TV station "TV Marjan", Kutle has started to slowly move towards Zagreb and its media. As those who now state, he already holds part ownership of the Zagreb TV station "ORTV", but also "Tisak" the vending network of the main daily "Vjesnik", as well as editions of "Europapress holding" -which publishes "Globus", "Glorija" and "Arena". The only other "bigger" owner of media in Croatia is the state.
Although there is no hard proof of Kutle denting ownership of "Globus" and its other editions, this story is not without foundation. After the Croatian military action in Krajina a "lightning" appeared in the Globus editorial staff - the first victim being editor-in-chief Dnis Kuljis. Other changes have followed.
There is a widespread opinion that Kutle is being helped by his older brother, an HDZ member of parliament, as well as the "Herzegovina lobby" to which Kutle's family belongs to, but as well as the story that HDZ is using Kutle's company to "launder" its money for party purposes. Actually, it seems that the key is Gojko Susak, Croatian minister of defense, and the "strongman" of the radical and conservative "Herzegovina lobby", considered the only other politician in Croatia with some sort of clout that can rival president Tudjman.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", October 27, 1995
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