BALKAN MEDIA & POLICY MONITOR


Issue 20/21 Vol. 2
October 31, 1995

IN THIS ISSUE:

Macedonia
  • "Fokus", "Vreme", "Monitor", and "Feral Tribune", comment on the assassination attempt on the Macedonian president Gligorov
  • Bosnia

  • "Monitor", "Republika" and "Bumerang" discuss the current situation in Bosnia
  • Croatia

  • "Vreme" analyzes the developments concerning Eastern Slavonia
  • Serbia and Montenegro

  • "Monitor" on the state of relations between two federal partners
  • Internal politics

  • "Vreme" on events in Serbia, "Globus" in Croatia, "Bumerang"(AIM) within the Army of FRY, and "Koha" on Kosovo
  • Comments and Analyses

  • "Nezavisni" compares Milosevic and Gligorov, "Vreme", analyzes possibilities of peace in Bosnia
  • SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:
    The Long-Term Effects of the Croatian Elections

  • these aspects discussed by "Feral Tribune" and "Arkzin"

  • MACEDONIA -

    ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON
    MACEDONIAN PRESIDENT GLIGOROV

    The editorial writer of the weekly "Focus" Nikola Mladenov analyzes the situation in Macedonia and the balance between the political powers, following the attempted assassination on President Gligorov.

    "Is the citing of Gligorov's favorite motto ("Macedonia is everything we have") by Prime Minister Crvenkovski an expression of due respect toward the President, or is precisely Gligorov everything they have in the political battle against the opposition? Is all that immoderacy actually fear, in the event that they might be "left alone?"

    The answer to all these dilemmas will depend, to a great extent, on the outcome of the political confrontation surrounding the assassination attempt, which, it seems, has yet to start. The number of scars that will result from the mutual accusations will certainly not be without any bearing on the public opinion. The final outcome from the competition surrounding the responsibility for the assassination attempt will undoubtedly become apparent only at some future elections. Only then can it be claimed, without a doubt, whether the public believed in the responsibility of the opposition, or if it will point to the authorities as being guilty and incapable of taking care of the common citizen, since they are taking care of their "biggest investment" so negligently.

    Until then, we can only hope that the "reins" will not be tightened any more, because of the danger of complete suffocation of the social organism. Namely, it is quite possible, under the pretence of creating some kind of order in the state, to actually create a dozen new frustrations among the people, and make them the subject of "security interests," instead of those who will come out of these precarious times, in a "mysterious" way, with thicker bank accounts, in order to be able to form the elite that will rule in the next hundred years. This kind of development will definitely not help reduce the danger of new street terror, but it will have an efficient effect in destroying even the smallest desire to view reality with a doze of criticism.

    The right to disagree, to have a different opinion from the official one, will, no doubt, be left to those who will practice the same in a "constructive" way. The degree of constructiveness, on the other hand, will depend on the constructors of the new reality. Everything will smell a bit like "democracy within the socialist alliance..." In order to avoid such a danger, it is necessary, as first, for the President to return to his duties, and to call to account those who did not do everything in their power to reduce the risk from assassination to a minimum.

    And finally, it's quite natural to raise the dilemma, is everything alright in a state, when so much depends on one man?

    Any solution that excludes Gligorov's return in the presidential cabinet and to his duties, even for three days, after which he would eventually withdraw, is creating numerous unknowns. Then, the space for speculations will be wide open.

    Our southern neighbor has put Stojan Andov, Vasil Tupurkovski, Branko Crvenkovski, Ljubomir Frckovski and Blagoja Handziski among the candidates. Seeing they are also counting on those who don't have a constitutional right to candidacy, this raises the dilemma whether we can take their concern about our future seriously. But, whichever way, in this newly-created situation, all combinations are in the game. Even the most impossible one: for Branko Crvenkovski and Ljubomir Frckovski to back Stojan Andov as their candidate. The ways of politics are unpredictable......

    In return, Andov would not take any "reprisals" against the "top cop," because of the slip-ups in Gligorov's security, whereas the eventual assessment that they can put up a good fight in the presidential race only as a team, will force them to leave the settling of their old accounts for some other time. Everything depends on their judgement.And, who can guarantee, in the final run, that they will conclude that they don't have any chances against Tupurkovski, or any other candidate who, encouraged by the undoubted success of Ljubisa Georgievski (in view of the short campaign and minimal political experience) in the last elections, will try to take away the throne from the egotists in front of their nose!?

    Such an assessment could have a considerably different plot. The first thing that would be done then, when viewed logically, is to strip the presidential post from power. The necessary number of votes will be easily achieved, when faced with the common uncertainty. The center will be transferred to Parliament and the elections for filling up his places, seeing that the function of President of RM, regardless of the authority the President would enjoy, will be scaled down to the role of the English Queen. In view of this, quite naturally, there will be no need to organize general elections. It will be quite enough to reach an agreement in Parliament.

    The upcoming three years, in that case, will be used to add the final touches to the privatization and normally, to direct the international help toward enterprises that have a "constructive" approach to the matters. Pending the constitutionally stripping of power of the President, by the Parliament, the debate will go on as to whether Mr. Gligorov can or can't carry out his duties.

    The opposition will make accusations that the group surrounding the President is manipulating him, while the authorities "as is proper," will contradict them with indignation toward those who don't have even an ounce of respect for the people who have indebted the nation.

    Of course, there's also the worst alternative - to really experience the burning of the fuse in these moments, before the series of assassinations which could truly threaten to destabilize this Macedonian region. Taking precisely that into account, it is high time to start a dialogue between the quarreling parties. If they really have no intentions of starting the history and future of these people all over again, precisely by taking over the state helm, it's high time for them to show that in practice. Otherwise, no one will be amnestied from the responsibility that we will collectively have to bear.

    In the end, precisely this is the time when the nation is passing, or failing its graduation exam. Now, it is necessary to be wise in order to come out of the labyrinths that are literally "crying" for the "way out" that's called - a firm hand. Macedonia has yet to take its exam of democratic development.

    And, finally, this is the first serious attack on the determination to solve all problems in a democratic way. There shouldn't be any victors or defeated from this battle... However, therefore there should be minimum tolerance and understanding for the arguments of the other side, which are not contradictory because they "hate the state."

    Source: skopje weekly "Fokus", October 13, 1995


    Nenad Lj. Stefanovic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", writes in the magazine's issue of October 16, on the developments in Macedonia after the assassination attempt on Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov.

    The only politician who has in a completely open manner stated that Macedonia awaits new elections was Menduh Taqi, the representative of the radical Albanian option, who has also announced that the Albanians might show their real strength in those elections. giving an interview to a foreign news agency, Taqi has again opposed the results of the last years census in Macedonia, insisting that there is much more Albanians in this state.

    But it was actually the statement of the leader of the oppositionary nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE, Ljupco Georgievski that has caused much more attention. Right after the assassination attempt, this party has been cited in many analyses, in Macedonia and abroad as the one of the possible culprits who have ordered the assassination. A few days after the attempt, this party was said to have spread out the leaflets in the cities of Prilep and Kicevo, on which there was a photo of Gligorov, with the text "In memoriam" and "traitor Gligorov has died". Georgievski himself has pointed the finger at the Macedonian political top and close collaborators of the Macedonian president, and as the reason he cited their political and economic ambitions.

    Whether it is coincidence or not, the counter-accusations levelled by Georgievski are very similar to those that could have been read in the Bulgarian press.

    Those that are in position to give more firm details, Macedonian police, have not made much headway, or are not saying much at the moment. The first conclusion is that the "writing" of this assassination attempt is characteristic of a style of "one of a well known terrorist organizations in the world", but for the case of the investigation, it was not said which one. The public was told that no one has been arrested yet, but that a large number of people are being investigated, including he issuance of a "photo-robot" of the suspected perpetrator.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme" , October 16, 1995


    Regular commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Stanko Cerovic, analyzes in the magazine's issue of October 13, 1995, the possible background of the assassination attempt on the Macedonian president Gligorov.

    It is always dangerous when too many important things depend only from one man and, peace in Macedonia - meaning in the whole Balkans - depended too much on Gligorov. For him the levy factor was that he was too openly oriented towards the West, meaning US, not because he was pro-American - he is too skillful to be pro or contra anybody - because there are no other organized forces in the world which could guarantee peace. The assassination attempt is surely, at least in its part, geared towards the efforts of the West - now Washington - to impose peace in the Balkans.

    Unfortunately, old truth is confirmed: no matter how conscious of the importance of Gligorov as an ally, the Americans have not even this time, as many other times before, been able to protect such important people. It can be safely stated, says Cerovic, that those who have carried out the assassination attempt are not the real perpetrators. Gligorov has just begun a very sensitive process of settling relations with Belgrade and Athens.

    This was the continuation of the process of diplomatic peace attempts in Bosnia. All in all, the events in Bosnia and Macedonia, are more part of the diplomatic pressure of the US, then the effect of the positive developments on the ground. That is the weak point of the whole process: diplomacy, leaning on a far away and strong power, is opposing almost all regimes and movements which undisputedly rule these parts of the Balkans.The second weak point is that the Americans in their diplomatic effort, since they do not want to intervene more forcefully, do not exude so much pressure on the worst movements and governments, but on those that attempt to be more responsible: this is the case in Bosnia, and now in Macedonia. In those situations, the more exposed are those moderate people, because too much depends on them as persons. The stake in the Balkans now exceeds the states and nations there: now NATO and stability of Europe are at stake.

    All conservative forces, political and criminal, from the former communist area, are opposing the stabilization of the Balkans and the imposition of what is called "American peace". That is why the responsibility for the assassination attempt on Gligorov reaches far and should be searched for in those forces. It can be safely excluded that such an important person at this moment would be attacked by a self-headed group of nationalists.

    It is also useless to guess about conspiracies from Serbia, Greece and Albania - since the risk of eventual Gligorov's demise exceeds them too, although it was symptomatic how all of them were cooperative in relations with him, as if they sensed that it was not important anymore.

    This assassination attempt is a part of a wider political and criminal strategy. This means that the peace will not be kept only by diplomatic efforts of the West, and this region, for which it was already said that it creates overabundance of history, is preparing surprises to diplomats, Western specialists, and what is even worse, to Balkan nations, concludes Cerovic.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", October 13, 1995


    Split weekly "Feral Tribune" (author Predrag Zivkovic) in its issue of October 9, 1995,also commented on the assassination attempt on the Macedonian president Gligorov.

    The moment that the perpetrators chose for their attempt gave cause for speculations that it was a reaction to the beginning steps in establishment of diplomatic relations with Greece and Yugoslavia.

    The Macedonian nationalistic wing, lead by VMRO-DPMNE party, protested vigorously against the manner in which the agreement with Greece was made. The stated that Macedonia was putting itself in a sandwich between Athens and Belgrade and that the agreement was a school example how a country is becoming a satellite. The main blame by the party leader Ljupco Georgievski was put on president Gligorov.

    The members of the VMRO-DPMNE were in the front line of the accused as the possible perpetrators of the assassination, since in some of their public statements after the signing f the agreement called Gligorov "traitor of the nation", demanding his resignation. If this is true, it is hard to believe that the attack came directly from the central party office, since after the agreement Georgievski optimistically predicted that he expects restructuring of the governing coalition block which would enlarge the space for action to his party.

    The second in line of accusations are members of the Albanian extremist wing. The reason for this, besides existing prejudices is probably also in their inability to accustom to the new political circumstances. The editor of the Albanian language magazine in Macedonia "Flaka", is of the opinion that Albanian politicians in Macedonia made a series of big mistakes, particularly in calling of the boycott of the referendum on census in 1991., and voting for the Constitution, which gave the arguments to Macedonian nationalists that the Albanians in Macedonia do not even recognize Macedonian state.

    As some of the possible perpetrators people in Macedonia consider members of some intelligence services, whose goal might be destabilization of the situation in Macedonia. In any case,Gligorov survived the assassination attempt, and it seems Macedonia will too.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", October 9, 1995


    BOSNIA -

    CURRENT SITUATION

    In the October 13, 1995, issue of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Ejub Stikovac comments on the possible development of relations between Croatia and the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia.

    Probably due to the newest "scientific discovery" of Franjo Tudjman that larger part of the Muslims are "of Croatian background", all the cities that were taken over by the Croatian troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina are joining the self-proclaimed state of "Herzeg Bosnia", and Muslim refugees cannot even come close to them, even if they would publicly state that they are "of Croatian background".

    Tudjman is also publicly boasting that he was given a duty by Europe to guard it from the insurgency of Islam and to disable the creation of an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina.It seems though, that some other public figures in Croatia have stated that Croatia also has to guard Europe from Orthodoxy. When everything is added up, it comes out that Europe is an unprotected widow which needs to be protected by an "European" gentleman that Franjo Tudjman is.

    All this would not even deserve any attention that it is not a matter that concerns official allies and formal friends. There are even "scientific" theories developed in Zagreb on that account, says Stikovac, like the one by Sime Djodan, which go that far in proving that Muslim are Croats, that it can be concluded even that one of the Persian kings, under the name of Darious was a Croat, but that he was not aware of the fact.

    What creates most worries is the danger of "Croatization" of the members of this national group in all the areas which will be governed by the Croatian forces after a very possible division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. In that case, it is not impossible to envision that Muslims turn towards Serbia and Montenegro, where a substantial number of the member of their national group are to be found, and there is no greater ambition of their assimilation.

    In any case, in these times, the attempts of assimilation of Muslims could be named "games without borders", but this game could lead to a new armed conflict between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", October 13, 1995


    Belgrade by weekly "Republika", published in its issue of Sept 16-30, 1995, an article on the situation in Bosnia by Zdravko Grebo, one of the independent intellectuals of Sarajevo, who remained in the city during the whole duration of the war in Bosnia.

    In difference to former Yugoslavia, says Grebo, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not only a state but also a society. He says he is fully convinced that Bosnia will exist again.

    The pessimistic part is that a lot of time will pass before that happens. Who will live, will tell how that will look like. This form a simple reason that in our personal and collective tragedy in Bosnia a number of fairly tragic tendencies and interests have met which simply act destructively on the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Now it is fully clear that the BIG world or the international community, whatever that would mean, has from the beginning legitimized the ethnic principle as the exclusive principle of ethnic representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which stands something like this: there, in that country there are some three tribes which due to that hatred exterminate each other and maybe it is wisest and technically most clean solution to separate them somehow. Towards that goal national leaders were legitimized as the negotiators of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at which mr. Alija Izetbegovic has been, without his guilt, transformed into the leader of the Muslims, Mate Boban then, and Dario Kordic now as the leader of the Croats, and Radovan Karadzic probably the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and within that framework a solution for Bosnia is attempted to be found. It is clear to everybody that Bosnia constructed in that manner has no future and that this only means the prolongation of the war, prolongation of the tragedy, of suffering, and that nothing will come out of it.

    In Sarajevo, many ugly things have happened in the last 40 months. Not many beautiful things happened in Sarajevo during this war. Many criminal things happened.But, the thing that did not happen, as far as I know, says Grebo, is revanche. Revenge on the national basis did not happen. This raises the hope that one day people will choose to live a normal life again.

    Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", Sept 16-30, 1995


    Osijek independent weekly "Bumerang", brought in its issue of October 6, 1995, an editorial concerning the developments in Bosnian peace negotiations.

    At this moment, it seems, the world has opted for the division of Bosnia on the ethnic principle, event though this is not its final division not even according to the American plan. The peace plan will attempt to guarantee to each ethnic community return to the territories it lived on before the war and on which it would be able to enjoy its autonomous rights, but not in such a manner that ethnically pure territories would be created - something which Croatian and Serb side hope for - but these will be ethnically mixed areas with parity representation in the governing institutions.

    There are rumors these days about escalation of tension between federal partners in Bosnia, Croats and Muslims. The main cause of this is that both sides, particularly the Croat one, want to put under its jurisdiction the larger possible chunk of freed territory. There armed conflicts going on due to this.

    The tension is particularly rising in the are of Jajce, since HVO is not allowing the Bosniak side the entrance into parts of that city, where Muslims made almost half of the population before the war. The conflict strengthened when the HVO overtook both hydroelectric dams in the are, not giving the Bosniak side any electricity.

    Under the pressure of Americans and Germans, Tudjman has ordered the stop to advancement of the Croatian forces (HV and HVO) and their fortification on the lines they hold. He has also ordered his troops not to give any help to the Bosniaks. All this favors possible reopening of armed conflicts between Croats and Bosniaks and it is almost inevitable that these will occur. The Bosniak will not want to give to HVO the territory unless they are forced to do this, nor will they agree for the Bihac pocket to be cut off from mid-Bosnia, switching form being surrounded by the Serbs, to being surrounded by the Croats.

    Practically, the Croat and Serb side have gotten more that they have expected, but the Bosniaks have been reduced to 25 to 29 percent of the territory, even though they amount to 50 percent of the population of pre-war Bosnia.They will continue persisting on the return of the territories under Serb and Croat control which were taken by force, which the Croat and Serb authorities, of course, will not accept, which would indicate the continuation of the war.The pressure would come not only from the West in that direction, but also from the Islamic world, something that can seriously hurt particularly Croatian interests.

    West of the rivers Neretva and Bosna there is a dangerous conflict of interests between Croats and Bosniaks. Serbs do not play an important role there, since they are conscious that in front of the more superior Croat-Bosniak forces and due to the weakness of the corridor in the Posavina region, they cannot keep the Banjaluka region.

    This does not mean though that Milosevic will not keep on protecting it with full force, not because he intends to keep it, but so that it could serve him as the bargaining chip in attempts to enlarge FRY. He has still not given up on the "smaller Greater Serbia", and intends to spread it to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Eastern Bosnia, but also to parts of Southern Croatia, including a few islands. Since he cannot achieve this by military means , he expects to get this with trades. And this brings us to his basic reason not to give up on the Banjaluka region, even though in essence he gave up on it.He is keeping it as the capital offer to the Croat-Bosniak side, expecting this to be confirmed by the international factors in the final peace agreement.

    Milosevic Banjaluka trump card is a real serious chip, since he is not only offering territory, but is also playing on the massive exodus of Serbs.He does not intend to keep the Serb population there, but it still does not suit them to transfer them to the East, until the international community, particularly pragmatic Americans, do not show the readiness to trade quantity for quality. When this happens in a month or two, Milosevic will give a signal for another resettlement of Serbian people.

    Milosevic is also playing on the card of the breakup of the Croat-Bosniak federation, which is loose anyway, since under its coat a "small greater Croatia" and a "small greater Serbia" are being created. Between them a "small state of Bosnia" will remain. But, it seems, it is the big countries whose word will be the last on this one.


    CROATIA -

    SITUATION IN EASTERN SLAVONIA

    Filip Svarm and Branko Vekic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", wrote in the magazine's issue of October 9, 1995. on the current negotiations concerning re-integration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia.

    Direct Serb-Croat talks on the status of Eastern Slavonija have been under preparation for a long time with a lot of speculation on official Belgrade's stand.

    One thing is certain. The Eastern Slavonija Serbs depend completely on Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, i.e. his assessment of what he can win for them within the US peace initiative.

    Realists claim Milosevic has long been aware that an internationally acceptable solution cannot be found outside Croatia's internationally recognized borders but no one wants the Croatian army (HV) on the banks of the Danube for as long as the Bosnia war continues. So he intends to use Eastern Slavonija as a buffer zone even through the international community. Once the issue is resolved the mutual recognition of FR Yugoslavia and Croatia won't seem like a defeat but a normal thing.

    As part of the agreement on Eastern Slavonija, the Serbs recognized Croatia's borders in principle. Now Zagreb faces a dilemma: should the area be given a wide scope of autonomy to solve the problem of most of the Krajina refugees or should it accept their return home and leave Eastern Slavonija without any autonomy. If it accepts their return, Zagreb has to change its constitution to include minority rights on self-rule in Knin and Glina. That article was suspended by the Croatian parliament because, an official statement said, the number of Serbs in Croatia fell to under 8%.

    The way things are now, Croatia's leaders would rather skip both solutions. But there are signals that international pressure is forcing them to compromise. It still isn't clear what Belgrade will insist on: the return of Krajina refugees to their homes or Serb autonomy in Eastern Slavonija. Autonomy is a priority, at least judging by statements from Eastern Slavonija leaders. Judging by statements fromJUL (a party close to the Serbian president) leaders the return of refugees is the first priority.

    The next round of talks has been scheduled for October 9 in Zagreb.

    Croatia will try to profit from Milosevic's impatience to get the sanctions lifted and some sources said the agreement must come before the UN mandate expires on November 30. Manovic and his negotiators are trying to drag things out and have already proposed a number of new things. Everyone agrees that the talks will be long and hard amid a mood of total mistrust and with both sides trying to outplay each other but that a solution to the issue depends mainly on the way in which the war in former Yugoslavia will end.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", October 9, 1995


    RELATIONS BETWEEN

    SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

    The commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor",Vladimir Jovanovic, discusses in the magazine's issue of October 6, 1995 the current state of relations between two federation partners, Serbia and Montenegro.

    Jovanovic states that at the dawn of the conclusion of the crisis in the region of ex-Yugoslavia Montenegro is still the most inferior political factor in the region, on which nothing much depends on.This situation is best manifested by the reach of Montenegrin influence on the federal army, diplomatic service and finances, which Serbia holds under strong control, while it applies a double-standard policy towards Montenegro which is reduced to the neutralization of the "Montenegrin element".

    Using the methods of "special war", Belgrade is conducting the flow of social events in the direction it likes, meaning the direction of the destruction of consciousness, causing also the destruction if the Montenegrin state area. This is, then, says the author, the war for the hearts and minds of Montenegrins.

    There are two basic methods for this war: information aggression and infiltration of personnel. It is considered that the information aggression is actually the first of the five elements of the war escalation between the two states, while its connection with infiltrated personnel gives - in a certain phase - the answer to the question: is it possible to conquer the country exposed to the special war, in this case Montenegro, by non-violent means ?

    Serbia was successful in streamlining the social processes in Montenegro with which it has realistically and in a long term, threatened the sovereignty of Montenegro. The informational aggression of Serbia on Montenegro has happened ahead of the state coup at the helm in Podgorica and is being kept up with strong censorship of state electronic media and the newspaper "Pobjeda". Censorship, and it is part of the job of police analysts, covers all walks of life, culture, education, even sport, science, economy, and, particularly, the information from the political events.

    Until August 4 of 1994, meaning the period from which "peace has no alternative", the intents of the informational aggression on Montenegro had the orientation to instigate and deepen national, political and religious differences,so to cause mutual mistrust and set conditions for general mayhem in Montenegro.

    At this moment the informational aggression is being kept at the level of motivating the Montenegrin public opinion for the union with Serbia, as, supposedly, the only alternative for Montenegrins, disruption of their internal unity concerning that union, then spreading fear from the Serbian defeat in Bosnia and Croatia, which would, if Montenegro brings into question "joint state" - lead to the aggression of the Bosnian, Croat, NATO and UN armies, and similar stupidities.

    This informational aggression has another goal since 1993.: deepening of social differences, and in general, inflating of radical mistrust towards the government of Montenegro and its prime minister, where the constant elements appear to be, openly or covertly, the information about supposed illegal activities of the Montenegrin prime minister. These goals are supported by the efforts to economically drain Montenegro by imposing customs at Prijepolje, intention to put the border on the Skadar lake (towards Albania) under Serbian police control and the campaign against vacationing on the Montenegrin seaside.

    The matter is operatively concluded when the state news agency "tanjug" is elevated to the indisputable interpreter of events in Bosnia and Croatia, the relations towards former Yugoslav republics and nations, then interpreters of the position of western powers towards the crisis in the region, as to create the impression in the public that from those directions come unfriendly messages and intentions, as to create an untenable situation of no way out and apathy, accepting the current state,so that remaining national reflexes of Montenegrins would atrophy.

    The successful placement of Belgrade information in the media space of Montenegro is favored by the inertia in the small number of state media, their slim personnel, the influence of secret Serb police forces on the personnel movement within the editorial staffs, which, in general, comes as the result of the official course in Podgorica and lack of defined national goals of Montenegro which would be inclined towards integration in the European economic and political space.

    This is the cheapest way to lead Montenegro into a vassal position without the risk of use of violence - which would lead to counter effects. The examples of the personnel aggression in Montenegro are really numerous, but the characteristic example is the case om mr. Branko Kostic.

    This university professor gained full media and political promotion after the overturn of power in Montenegro, even though he also belonged to the "old political guard".

    The pressure and realistic importance of the paramilitary groups in Montenegro that existed particularly in 1992., has melted during the previous two years, when they lost the support of the Montenegrin police, when the subdued suppression and internal breakup of their organization was started, since it was mainly leaning on the Serb military in the border region with Bosnia.

    The fact that the main daily TV news are "richer" than those in Belgrade with reports from Bosnian Serb sources is not a surprise: by retaining a forceful semi-war tension, Montenegro is being kept in a passive position on the diplomatic field, since it remains with Milosevic, who is considered the main negotiator in the name of FRY. Any other different position of Montenegro, even if this was neutral, would bring it up as an important factor in the solution of the crisis, which would enlarge the frequency of diplomatic contacts of Podgorica and a form of international recognition of the Montenegrin state.

    It is becoming evident the Serbian populism is loosing ground in Montenegro after the rapid fall of the "greater Serbian project", which is causing doubts and stratifications within local Serb unionists.

    The project of subduing of Montenegro could become the main goal during the following year of the headless Serbian politics whose leaders are feeling that the march on Lovcen(key mountain in Montenegro) has been cut off half -way and that resistance to arrogant Serbia is spreading even into the parts where it did not exist.

    The aspirations of Belgrade will be centered towards following goals:1.continuation of the media pressure; 2.consolidation of the intelligence network after the uncovering of "moles" at the top of the Montenegro police; 3. development of pro-Serbian opposition within the ruling party in Podgorica with accent on the destruction in administrative institutions; 4. more massive movements of military recruits of Serb origin towards garrisons in Montenegro; 5. limited violent actions and continuation of destabilization in the Boka bay.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", October 6, 1995


    The October 13, 1995 issue of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor"(author is Ljubeta Labovic) continues to discuss the theme of relations between Serbia and Montenegro.

    The indications of the global settlement of the Yugoslav crisis have significant influence on the character of relations in the Serbian-Montenegrin federation. The military defeats and loss of war in Bosnia and Croatia are seriously damaging the pillars of the regime in Serbia and that charismatic role of Slobodan Milosevic, who is an important tying factor of Montenegro to FRY.

    In this light, says the author, one has to view the recent statement by Vuk Draskovic, a possible new coalition partner of the ruling Socialists, that he has "always for and still is for Greater Serbia, and that the "main pillars" of that "Greater Serbia" will be Serbia proper and Montenegro.

    His elaboration, he thinks, has thought-out political and propaganda implications:- to act in a mediating way in the sense of keeping up the "Greater Serbia" concept as the end goal; - by forcing this extremism, to keep Montenegro under the illusion of "equality" in the federation; - to give credibility to the nominal Montenegro regime as a serious political factor, which by standing up to the extreme stance of "Greater Serbia", supposedly, supports "true equality" and "protects" Montenegrin state and national interests; - to neutralize through this DPS(ruling Montenegrin party) "equality" the activities of the Montenegrin democratic opposition, and present the concept of an independent and sovereign Montenegro as useless and dangerous; - to cause fear from bloody conflicts within Montenegro itself, if it would choose the independence path, which would stimulate old Montenegrin divisions; - to strengthen and motivate the activities of the Serbian parties and SPS in Montenegro, which radically stimulates the inflow of Serbian national and greater state ideology.

    This activity strengthens tendencies towards unitarization and regionalization of the "modern federation" into counties, after the betterment of its status on the international scene. All this would not be possible unless the Montenegrin regime is not actin in a compatible manner: it is supporting the idea of the FRY as the optimal framework for the future of Montenegro, by practically abolishing its own Ministry of foreign affairs, stimulating the strengthening of the role and position of the "Army of Yugoslavia" in Montenegro, and other.

    Now that military events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia are nearing calm, the policy of Belgrade towards Montenegro is showing in a more open and aggressive form.The question of democratic relation towards Montenegro does not exist in any variation of the democratization of Serbia. Due to that, there is practically noncooperation of the Serbian opposition with the Montenegrin democratic opposition on the civil-liberal principles.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", October 13, 1995


    INTERNAL POLITICAL EVENTS

    SERBIA

    Zoran Jelicic writes in the October 16, issue of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" on the political conflict between Mirjana Markovic (mrs. Milosevic), leader of the left (communist) party "JUL", and Mihajlo Markovic, one of the key ideologues of the ruling SPS (Socialist) party.

    Jelicic says that mrs. Markovic has state in one of the more recent promotions of her party that "If the Yugoslav left foes not involve itself in a more serious manner in the political life of the society, there is the danger that a primitive, criminal capitalism, South american style will be established in Serbia. This fear I tie with the idea of absolute, total privatization of all that is worth, as well as the intention to have unlimited access given to foreign capital".

    The leader of "JUL" did not uncover to the wider public who, and where are those so powerful instigators of "total privatization". It is a public secret though, that the Serbian top has recently ordered the story to be begun about transition and privatization, but even those that have carried out the order have uncovered that this is mainly the preparation of the terrain for the negotiations with international monetary institutions after the lifting of sanctions and the return, or the acceptance of FRY in the UN.

    In any case, from that campaign, there is no possibility for the birth of the idea of "total privatization", nor could it be close to serious people and experts, no matter what their personal opinions are. The fear of Mirjana Markovic from total privatization is followed with the hope that the conditions will be created for "social well being, equality of people in the work process, free schooling and education". The road for the fruition of that hope leads through "the richness of ownership forms", but in a such economic milieu which will, through time "disable exploitation and depravation". JUL does not even close the door to foreign capital, but "under the premise that this process will be organised by the rules of the game which will border precisely the reach and character of this process", as mrs. Markovic made clear.

    In his remarks for the academic seminar held in Belgrade about the goals and roads of societies in transition, Mihajlo Markovic states that there is no need to categorize Serbia as a society in transition. He concludes that "due to the fact that unregulated liberal capitalism is an outdated form of economic and social life, belonging to nineteenth century, this project, though out, supported and financed from most conservative centers in West did not have a progressive character and was in that respect doomed. Five years of its promotion were enough to show its catastrophic consequences.

    To that effect, Markovic states, one cannot speak about transition in Serbia, since "not for one moment" has it gone by that road: "the only thing that can be talked about in Serbia is about gradual, evolutive transformation of the society from autocratic to democratic socialism - which was started even in fifties and sixties, so that after a long term stagnation and crisis it would reach its decisive breakthrough and radical social transformation in the period from 1989. and 1995."

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", October 16, 1995


    CROATIA

    Zagreb weekly "Globus" in its issue of October 20, 1995,(Djurdjica Klancir) gives more details on the conflict between Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and one of the Croatian strongman, member of the Parliament of the ruling HDZ, and alleged war criminal Tomislav Mercep.

    The author says that the political career of Mercep was definitively ended on October 15, when during the HDZ party conference he was not elected in the Executive council of the party, while president Tudjman himself accused him of "creating secret terrorist organizations". Mercep announced that he will remain a plain member of the party., that he is renouncing his parliamentary seat and that he is resigning as a counsellor in the Croatian police force. Nobody attempted to stop him.

    Those in the know have said that Mercep for a longer period of time now is not showing up at the official and semi-official gatherings of the party or state elite. Particularly during the operation "Storm": Mercep was not seen even as the adviser to the state police, nor as the leader of the "Union of Croatian volunteers", nor as a politician.The sources close to the police say: even ahead of the "Storm", Mercep was put under the control regime, a form of house arrest.

    It seems that from "a higher instance", probably the office of the President, it was ordered that Mercep and his "Mercepovci" not in any form can take part in the military and post-military operations. If that is so, it would mean that even president Tudjman has implicitly admitted that Mercep is the type of a warrior that, to say the least, causes problems. On the other hand, this would mean that president Tudjman has admitted that only now.

    First "dark spots" of Mercep and his troops, the type that will follow him through all of his military and political career, cropped up as early as 1991. in Vukovar. There were rumors of "specific" investigations in the cellar of the Police station in Vukovar, about people who were disappearing...At one point during that year, he was even arrested by his collaborators and his apartment searched. But it was never revealed what was looked for that time, or what was found. The same afternoon he was allowed to collect his family and leave for Zagreb.

    Even at that time Mercep was well connected with the political top in Zagreb: a position as a counsellor in the state police was made up only for him. Actually, Mercep was allowed to open up "his own branch" within the police. he became the man for connection with volunteers, people of "very different profiles", who wished to go to the front.He provided them with IDs of police reservists, legalizing their status in that manner.

    The first destination of his volunteers was the city of Gospic, where Mercep was later proclaimed honorary citizen. It is true that Gospic was defended, but soon information came into public, which was never investigated by the Croatian judicial authorities, that Serbian civilians disappeared in the city.

    In a formal conversation with the local police, in the beginning of 1992., Mercep stated that "when he would find out that they ("his boys") would kill some Chetnik, he would not mind, but would try to protect them".

    Pakrac Poljana was next, And the events there were even noted by the international institutions for human rights. A number of Mercep's volunteers were arrested initially on the basis of that evidence, but were later released due to "an error in the arresting formalities".Two of them later became his formal bodyguards while he had political and party functions.

    During the mentioned party congress Tudjman said that he is even called by "Vatican and people around Holly father" warning him about Mercep's activities, that Mercep was even the obstacle of HDZ becoming member of the Demochristian union of Europe.

    As the sources from the War Tribunal in the Hague says, cites the author, the case of Pakracka Poljana is the one of the suspicious case in Croatia that is nearing its completion, and the key figure there was Mercep. It seems that people in the HDZ decided that it would be very uncomfortable if the accusation from the Hague would come to the address of the member of the executive board. Still, Merceps salute with the arm straight up after he resigned at the Congress was received with an extremely loud applause...

    Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", October 20, 1995


    FRY - STATE OF THE MILITARY

    Vasilije Stefanovic of the independent journalists pool AIM writes from Belgrade for the Osijek weekly "Bumerang" about the current state in the military of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

    Stefanovic says that a number of independent analysts in Belgrade insist that what is keeping the Army of Yugoslavia from entering in a new conflict in the region of former Yugoslavia is a number of strategic and important unknowns. First, an unfavorable diplomatic position in the negotiations about Bosnia, second, unsolved question of the financing of the armed forces and third, the technological backwardness of the forces themselves.

    The Yugoslav army, hit hard by the sanctions, is desperately attempting to keep the combat readiness at some useful level. The last military account of some billion and six hundred million dinars has shown to be to small for the needs of the army too large for the new state. At the same time, the problem of financing of the army does not correspond at all with the programmes of economic reform. It is a known fact that the programme of governor Avramovic partly became reality because of the reduction of the military budget.

    In an interview to the Podgorica magazine "Polis" the chief of staff, general Perisic has said that the ranks of the army were left by some tens of PhDs, Mas, and around three hundred college graduates. On the other hand, the number of officers with the unsolved housing situation has grown to some 25 - 26 thousand.

    It is also a public secret that the air force pilots are leaving the country en masse seeking work abroad with small airline companies, and top engineers are transferring to private companies.

    At the same time, another important process is on - ethnic cleansing of the military corps.Except a small number of Hungarians and Muslims, the Army of Yugoslavia is practically Serb-Montenegrin.

    What is going on ? After the Army retreated into the borders of FRY, the ethnic cleansing of the officers cadre has been conducted, but then also the recruiting has been filtered. First, the measures towards the Albanians were strengthened, and then towards the Hungarians.

    This resulted that already in 1993. the officers started complaining that the garrisons are half empty, since even the Serbs did not show much interest to serve the one year service. One of the attempted solutions is to keep the ones in the service a bit longer. The other is to call up the reservists, whose service lasts for a month, sometimes longer, mainly guarding the barracks.

    The defining of the doctrine is still ongoing - while the neighboring countries, including former Yugoslav republics are going under the NATO umbrella, the Serb Montenegrin army is gliding in open air, waiting for something to be resolved.

    Source: Osijek weekly "Bumerang", October 6, 1995


    KOSOVO

    Baton Haxiu of the Pristina Albanian language weekly "Koha", writes in the October 10, 1995, issue on the current situation in the province. Autonomy, a magic word constantly repeated in ordinary talks in Kosova these days. Where does this solution, which was never part of the options of the Kosovan political parties, come from?

    For a long time, these statements were not paid any attention to in Kosova, and optimistic statements would be revealed without any political concept or pragmatism.

    The first break happened at the London Conference and after Carrington's Plan. Even though that plan seemed to be much more favorable than any others presented so far, because it was limited with Knin's precedent which has now been destroyed. A stiff atmosphere was created afterwards, and the whole national plan wasrestricted to individuals and the expectations that everything would be solved according to the promises that derived from the optimistic statements.

    The sentences "our peaceful policy is supported" was since then interpreted by some political circles as a support for the independence of Kosova. Not even the statements at the American Congress didn't upset the Albanians and their political structure, even in cases when it was nakedly said that: "The International Community is largely opposing independent Kosova. The majority of the states are concerned that the secession of Kosova from Serbia can not be applied pacifically...".

    Even though they knew, because they had heard it so many times, people started believing in the three theories which had circulated in the branches and sub-branches of the parties in Kosova, that "Kosova had the absolute support of the West"; "The solution to Kosova's problem is closed in Ibrahim Rugova's envelope (!)" and "All intellectual heads of Kosova are gathered around the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova".

    A diplomat, speaking of these three theses, explained the phenomenon in this way: It is true that Kosova and Rugova have the supportof the West, but only for the peaceful policy; claiming that Rugova holds the solution to Kosova's problem in his pocket is also true, but that solution is autonomy - as far as it concerns the foreign diplomatic and political circles. In regard to the third thesis,Ican't say whether the best intellectuals are gathered around him, but I have spoken to other intellectuals outside his circle, and I ascertain that they have a higher intellectual and diplomatic level than the ones I have met at Mr.Rugova's (sic).

    The second break occurred when many intellectuals who visited Kosova later, found themselves with three or more options, which according to them, was more a result of the static application of the international terminology and nit a result of a real political and diplomatic analysis. Having in mind these difficulties, the Albanian side presented "softened" requests about the political status of Kosova, e.g. "Kosova, independent and neutral state under international civil trusteeship". All these titles would be envied by any state which has sovereignty and independence, they would say.

    For arguments sake, we will quote statements delivered at the American Congress, which usually served as grounds for our politics. Inregard to the trusteeship, the statement was the following: "We have large reserves towards the practicality of such option. Serbia's consent would be necessary for any application of this idea. This, can'tbe imposed. The US government will continue raising Kosova's issue and the need for the restoration of the autonomy".

    And, for this reason, one could hear foreign diplomats visiting Kosova ask: "if great powers would recognize Kosva's independence, then could Kosova manage to safeguard it without war?". And then further on, an ascertainment: "But, if the great powers would consider that recognizing sovereign Kosova would mean expanding war, which would signify its conversion into a Balkans war, then the priority would be not to recognize Kosova asan independent state, regardless of whether it deserves is or not".

    Diplomats would add, "there is no war here". There were even cases in which high ranked officialswould ask our officials: "We listened to your problems and requests, but tell us, how can we help your independence?"

    All of these ended with the dilemma whether we were capable of elaborating a national policy to accomplish what was promised to the people in Kosova during the 1992 free elections. Once again it should be reminded that the promises were the constitution of stratal institutions and a serious organization of our policy and institutions.

    And now, there is more talk than ever that we have created fictitious institutions just to forget the problem asphyxiating us all over. The third break came with the elaboration of the Vance-Owen Plan which forgot Kosova, treating it determinately as a territory in which the sovereignty of Serbia ought to be established. Everyone was awaiting for the issue of Krajina to be solved, and it would have set a precedent for Kosova. And so, some isolated voices were heard, e.g. Azem Vllasi's, saying "the establishment autonomy is possible, as a provisional phase towards statehood". This statement was criticized also because, apart from the optimistic verbal statements of some politicians, nothing new was happening in Kosova.

    The fourth break came with Sali Berisha's visit to the US. Many finally got it clear, that whatever was said so far, is nil. SaliBerisha declared, not hesitating at all: "There were promises about the reinstallment of the democratic space in Kosova". This was the message and agreement of the Albanian President. Full stop!

    Immediately afterwards, LDK's vice-chairman Hydajet Hyseni comes out and in the name of the people declares: "Rugova will sign for the Republic and never for an Autonomy", while the other vice-chairman, Fehmi Agani, declares to VOA: "America's Plan to recognize the Serbian statal entity in Bosnia with possibilities for confederacy links with Serbia opens paths for Kosova and similar solutions". What should we do, and wh should we listen to? This ascertainment only proves the fact that our whole policy is based on expectations and profiting on the results of the conflict between the other parts in conflict. But doesn't this ascertainment have a counter-argument? What if Bosnian Serbs don't accept these confederacy links?

    Finally, all these parallels end with Holbrooke's and Bildt's plan, who didn't include Kosova in the global solution, at all.In continuation to all of this, the list of accounts in completed with Kinkel's statement about the redefinition of the former Yugoslav space, that "Serbia is requested to have a just posture towards the minorities, especially in Kosova". This ascertainment is followed wit a statement of Senator Dole, referring to American assistance for Kosova and the Former Yugoslavia, when he said: "The Clinton Administration Plan doesn't include Kosova's issue. This is wrong".

    The same day, President Rugova declared: "I am optimistic, more than ever"!

    Source: Pristina weekly "Koha, October 10, 1995


    COMMENTS AND ANALYSES

    Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" (author Teofil Pancic), comments in the magazines issue of October 6, the current political moves of the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic on the international scene, particularly development of relations with Macedonia.

    Judging by the results of the Belgrade meeting of Slobodan Milosevic and Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, the official Serbia has begun to recognize that on its southern and western borders some new states have formed and that they will not disappear only because Serbia has firmly closed both of its eyes. Milosevic considers that it is least painful to begin such a process form Macedonia, the only of the ex-Yu republics with which Serbia and JNA did not go to war.

    Macedonia survived four seasons of the Balkan war hysteria with miraculous success: even though within former FRY it was considered underdeveloped, today the standard of its citizens is in some aspects higher that the one in war caught Croatia and "stone freeze socialism" Serbia; even though it is practically without an army, with the wise policy of equidistance towards its neighbors and leaning on NATO umbrella, it was able to guard its security and territorial integrity: the cool relations between Macedonians and numerous population of ethnic Albanians, have escaped bloodshed due to wisdom of the politics of Skopje.

    This all does not mean that this small South slavic state is lead by geniuses and giants; the matter is much simpler; the people in power there are normal people lacking ambition to create "great history" through blood of their and somebody else's citizens.

    Even though it has for a long time established diplomatic relations with great powers and other neighbors, with Serbia(FRY) Macedonia had no luck: blaming unsolved Macedonian - Greek relations, official Belgrade has refused to recognize diplomatically that at the end of the famous "southern railway", there is another south slavic state.

    Serbia is now pushed into a corner and Milosevic is feverishly looking for the formula of recognizing as cheaply everything that he could have recognized as far as 1991/92 at a much smaller cost. Macedonia, of course, has no interest to make things harder for him, meaning that Belgrade will get another embassy soon.

    The assassination attempt on the Macedonian president Gligorov, the man who has, probably, spent more years in Belgrade than in Skopje, will not be able to more seriously influence (in a negative manner) the establishment of normal state relations, since it has been order by those whom this southern slavic normalization is not to taste.

    After he has somehow sewed up his seam, Milosevic will have to get back to a much harder and unforeseeable task of smoothing relations with those that he conducted a war against. This will be a much harder and nauseating job, since on the both sides of the front stand half military nationalistic regimes lead by a pompous dictator, bumbling provincial Muslim priest and unscrupulous apparatchik.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", October 6, 1995


    The main commentator of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", Stojan Cerovic, wrote in the magazine's issue of October 2, 1995, about the current situation in Bosnia.

    The New York agreement on Bosnia's future structure shows that the US strategy is directed at the immediate end to the war, leaving all sides enough perfidious hope that they will derive some profit for themselve later.

    Bosnia is actually guaranteed only one year or---two end the war, heal the heaviest wounds and prove it exists. America cannot do more than offer it this chance and will definitely not keep it plugged in to the artificial heart and lungs forever. Bosnia needs much more time, but it will now have to get to work and try to achieve this. It would now be much easier for the Serbs, Croats and Moslems to give up and untangle themselves from each other. I believe that all of them share the worst nightmare---the vision of a joint assembly in which the MPs watch each other out of the corner of their eyes and deliberate who had burned whose house, and then vote peacefully and unanimously.

    Bosnia will be rebuilt or preserved neither by the Serbs, the Croats, the Moslems nor by the Americans. Only Bosnians can do that; if there is still enough of them on all sides, if they have the power, the will and the time to overcome the huge and horrible war barriers and patch up their ripped up country. They enjoy the support of America and most of the world, but, in Bosnia they are represented by no one, not on government nor leader. They cannot overwhelm all three of their nations and faiths, but without them, these nations will be unable to sit down at the same table.

    Serbs and Croats largely believe that Bosnia had never existed, which serves as proof that it can never exist. They do not wonder whether there had ever been a Bosnian Serb Republic or the CroatianHerzeg-Bosnia. Moslems are no longer sure they really need all of Bosnia which cannot belong to them alone, so they are keeping a little state of their own in reserve. However, neither Sarajevo nor central Bosnia ever belonged only to them. All of them now view Bosnia as somewhat unnatural, while they and their ethnic territories seem ridiculous, absurd, grotesque and a hundred times more unnatural to everyone watching them from the outside.

    Milosevic has obviously become the least obstacle standing in the way of the success of Holbrooke's mission. He no longer invests his hopes in the Russians, he is not interested in any special relations with Karadzic's wretched state and he would gladly exchange it for the lifting of the sanctions. The question arises whether these sanctions are still worrying him. He has not appeared in public for so long, he' distanced himself so much that no one knows anymore what he is actually doing. As if only Holbrooke's visits remind him where he's living and what day of the week it is. While Serbia is ruled by our memory of him.

    Karadzic also calmed down after hearing NATO's arguments. He is now satisfied because Serbs will be equally treated in Bosnia. He no longer demands 65% of the territories and access to the sea, and he would even take an oath that life together is possible, although, of course, deep inside he hopes this misfortune will somehow be avoided. With a little help of para-psychological espionage, it is easy to conclude that Croats and Moslems now represent Holbrooke's greatest problem.

    Croatia is unstoppably expanding before Tudjman's eyes, while Izetbegovic is no longer sure who is his greater enemy---the Serbs or the Croats, whether he should continue warring, whether he prefers a larger, secular state or a smaller, but religiously more close-knit one.

    It seems that the secret of Holbrooke's hitherto success lies at least partially in the deadly tempo he has imposed on his partners, as if he realizes he must not give them time to think in peace. As soon as he leaves, they begin their analyzing and their morbid calculations, but here he comes again. Just as they began looking for gaps in the agreed-upon principles of Bosnia's structure, he went a step further, talking about territories and demarcation. Everyone agrees that this will be the hardest knot to disentangle. It remains to be seen, but if the resolution of this issue is staved off too much, we can be sure nothing will come out of Bosnia. Maps and demarcations are truly important only in case of a division, and if this possibility is even indirectly incorporated in the plan, it will be implemented in keeping with Murphy's Law, the only law everyone in Bosnia respects.

    It seems Americans are investing too much hope in free elections in Bosnia and have not made inquiries enough about who runs the TV there.

    We here witnessed time and again how TV determined the elections and made the people vote against their deepest interests. The people here are not used to recognizing or caring about their interests and areprone to courageous deeds to their own detriment. That is all that has been done here in the past few years. If that weren't the case, Serbia and Croatia would now both realize that Bosnia's survival would bring precisely the two of them great relief and help them get out of the vicious circle of hatred. Bosnia's survival would be bad, shatterin news for Serbian and Croatian Fascism.

    As regards Serbia, it is already exhausted and impoverished from paying the price of national dignity, something neither the outside world nor the local national opposition have sufficiently noticed. Nothing has been on sale or had a price here for a long time; everything can now be bought for petty change. As Serbia was not at war, it cannot hope for any aid from the world to rebuild itself; but, since it was at war, it might even be required to pay reparations, if it had something to pay with. This is why someone will undoubtedly come up with the idea to urge Karadzic to hold on to Bosnia firmly, and when the aid arrives, send some brotherly alms across the Drina.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", October 2, 1995


    THE LONG TERM EFFECTS
    OF THE CROATIAN ELECTIONS

    All the comments and analyses leading to the just held Croatian parliamentary elections (October 29, 1995), particularly in the Croatian press, have indicated that the victory of the president Tudjman's ruling HDZ party can hardly be brought into question. A number of them though, have asked themselves what will be the balance of political forces within Croatia after these elections, and what do they bring politically. In this special supplement to the issue 20/21, we bring characteristic articles from independent Croatian press - from Split weekly "Feral Tribune" and from Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin".

    Milan Gavrovic of "Feral Tribune" un the magazine's issue of October 2, 1995, said that the most important message with which the Croatian opposition was saluted upon the dissolution of the previous Parliament was - that after the elections it will not be there anymore.

    In that manner, the representatives of the ruling party have helped to formulate the responsibility Croatian opposition carries today: it must prevent turning of Croatia into a totalitarian state.

    For example, dr. Nedeljko Mihanovic, a high official states that Franjo Tudjman should be elected president for life, while at the same time, leaks are coming out of the government offices that change of Croatia into a duchy is being prepared. In that manner, the Croatian political system would become "purely presidential, so that the president meaning the duke, would be above the parliament. Everything else is only the question of technique.

    This all explains why the ruling party is doing all its best to win two third majority. Because it did not have enough of the power it held so far, and two third majority would give it complete (total) power, including the possibility to change the constitution in such a manner that to establish permanently the system of complete (total) power. Still, the opposition is acting at a slow three fourths pace, and their leaders are repeating old slogans. The agreement to split the candidacies in part of the elections is a big step for the opposition, but still only a small step for democracy.

    But, it will become all clear soon. First of all, whether the Croatian opposition is up to the responsibility that has fallen on its shoulders. The conscience about that responsibility should immediately unite the complete Croatian democratic opposition. The differences that exist in their political programmes will not have any significance during these elections. It is not being decided now whether Croatia will be liberal or socialdemocratic, regional or centralist, right or left, blue or green... There is only one dilemma open: whether it will be democratic or totalitarian.

    There is something in the fact that from the oppositionary politicians the ones that are warning about totalitarianism are the renegades from the HDZ. For example, Dragutin Hlad, for example, is even using the term fascism.The larger part of others has so far spoken about such "tendencies".This careful formulation, is probably, not only an effect of the fear created within HDZ state, but also by the realization that totalitarianism, along with nation, class or democracy - is hard to pin down.

    When only one question is being posed at the elections, to which there are only two possible answers, it would be logical that only two parties would take part in them. One of them is HDZ, whose intentions are known, and the other should be united opposition, with the goal of establishment of the democratic Croatian state.

    The electoral system devised (supposedly) by dr. Smiljko Sokol is based on the assumption that the opposition will remain disunited. Then it would be much easier for those who are disappointed with the results of the HDZ governing to make up their minds, and particularly those which state that they have nobody to vote for. It would also diminish the advantage given to HDZ by the monopoly it has on TV, radio and larger part of the daily press.

    What would be the long - term duty if the opposition is to take charge at one point ? It would have to turn the TV, army and police into non-party , state institutions, reduce the powers of the president into the constitutional framework and stop crime and corruption, which are covered with ideology of HDZ "Croatian patriotism". Only then would time come for liberalism, social democracy, regionalism, and other.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", October 2, 1995


    In the light of the elections, Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" examines in the magazine's issue of October 9, 1995, the promises given by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman during his reign and wether he kept them.

    There is no doubt that president Tudjman is something else this autumn than he was this spring, which he most happily underlines himself, first of all in front of citizens of Split, and then those of Vinkovci in front of whom he flattered himself that he has kept the promises he has given.

    Then he asked them that they themselves rise the level he has to reach. But, it was immediately obvious that those watching have not only changed the opinion about the Croatian president, but also the evaluation system by which they are judging him. Some see the signs of strength in the creation of the largest ethnic state in this region, others praise him as a good tactician who has outsmarted too flattered Milosevic, showing that he has skill for which he was not known so far. from here could stem large misunderstandings, which can be avoided only if the onlookers could answer the question: would they love such a president ?

    As it is known, Unprofor (later UNCRO) mandate was not cancelled as was threatened, but it started retreating itself, after Croatia broke Krajina. This can really look as a big Tudjman victory over the slowness of the international community, but things can be also threated in the manner that it, by slowing down Croatian president, saved Croatia from the folly of a premature war, leading him, in that manner circumvently to victory.

    In his "state of the nation" address in 1994. Tudjman has announced that the acceptance of Croatia in the Council of Europe is nearing its completion and that it will probably follow in the spring of the next (1995) year. Since all stated terms have passed, even now the estimates are heard that Croatia is waiting for the last two candidates - FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seems that even Zagreb is not waiting for the better, since rough and conceited statements were sent towards Strasburg that it is not important anyway, since the only important thing is the position of Croatia as a "regional power".

    This all sounds as if it was stated that after Knin, the fall of Strasburg will be easy ! But, instead of a new "Storm", it is more probable that within the framework of the programme of help for reconstruction and development comes a administratively thorough recapitulation of the effects of that action. This even more since the international organizations have there their own debts, since it is more or less clear that without the quiet support from the West, the military actions would not have come about. But, there also would not be such thorough ethnic cleaning of Krajina and western Bosnia.

    The newest pressures indicate that Croatia has infringed on the "rules of the house", since international factors have pressured her into inaugurating the Constitutional law on minorities, which was the condition for her recognition. Croatia has, on the other hand, thrown out this law in an urgent procedure, like dirty water, even though Tudjman boasted only a year ago in the Parliament that this law guarantees the highest "world standard of protection of rights of ethnic communities or national minorities".

    This is for Eurocrats somewhat more complicated problem that the one it awaits it with Belgrade. It is clear that FRY also has to build a mechanism of protection of humanrights, which will be extremely hard, since antieurpeism there was for years official ideology, and it partly still is. But the Croatian case is more complex, which has built that mechanism first, but has then destroyed it. What is worst, this movement backwards is to be expected on all the lines of the political system, even though Tudjman has stated that Croatia could be "compared with the most developed democratic states", so that there is nothing necessary that should be changed.

    Tudjman has also, on the same occasion made the assessment that "Croatian information system is among those most free in the developed world". That is probably why, in the first distribution of frequencies for the electronic media he cut the space for those independent ones, while those less obedient were disabled to develop.

    This last thing has already acquired the form of the rule: the worse the things stand in real life, the regime will be more persistent in protecting the monopoly on the terms and figures which describe the situation.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", October 9, 1995


    The effects of the elections were discussed by Boris Raseta in the Zagreb fortnightly "Arkzin" in the magazine's issue of October 13, 1995.

    The main question is open: will the electoral body at these elections decide to support the complete policy of Tudjman or not. The official paper "Vjesnik" shows the advantage of the ruling HDZ, weekly "Globus" gives a slight edge to the opposition. The global relation is fifty-fifty. The poll conducted by an independent agency for the opposition parties shows that HDZ is close to two thirds majority.

    The HDZ victory will signify the confirmation of the policies conducted so far. The extrapolation of the political trends so far, can serve as a possibility for a safe prognosis the trends of the Croatian politics to come. First - and most important, towards the "outside" the process of factual annexation of "Herzeg-Bosnia" will continue. Except for the customs, it already functions as part of Croatia anyway. Herzeg-Bosnians have the right to citizenship, passports, their military and police uniforms are the same as in Croatia, they watch Croatian TV and pay in traditional Croatian currencies: Kuna and DM. They are doubly Croat - they are "diaspora" and constitutive nation in Bosnia nad Herzegovina, which is legalistic alchemy worth of the best.

    The more Herzegbosnian Croatian "community" establishes itself today, the more trouble with it will come tomorrow. Herzeg Bosnia did not become "recognized entity" as "Republika Srpska", but it still exists as a (firm, though) "parastate", so that the question of its status within the federation is a subject of future discussions. In other words, if an agreement is achieved about "the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina out of two entities", a question remains of internal arrangements of the federal entity itself. Where will the Croats live ? Where will the Bosniaks live ? If separately, who will get what territories ? If together, how will coexistence be established ?

    Tudjman leads a policy in a manner that he signs everything and realizes nothing. But this lie can go as far as the West want to close one eye - but when it wants to see could be best felt by the Bosnian Serbs in the last few months.

    Mostar is an attempt at a pilot model - on it the federation stands or falls - but it did not evolve far: it is obvious that HDZ wants a gradual petrification within the Federation of separate national territories, where the Bosniak part would be tied to Croatia only as a favor to Europe, which, as HDZ says, gave the Croats a mandate to "humanize" the Bosniaks. This thesis, which Tudjman presented in an interview to "Le Figaro" serves only as a gradual creation of a climate for final separation of Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What will be the results and methods of this separation can only be speculated now. Tudjman's Bosnian policy has only come half way now, that is why he needs the infamous two thirds majority.

    The elections of '95 are the most important after those of 1990 and represent the plebiscite on the future. The first question was: of Croatia, the question now is which Croatia.

    In that sense, the complete opposition, contrary to "ceterum ceseo" of Tudjman and HDZ is advocating the unity of the neighboring Bosnian state, and there lies the key difference between them, and this will be the decisive political question in the coming period. Since, until the Bosnian war is ended, Croatia cannot move forward, if for nothing else, then because of the international financial help which represents the only tool for economic recovery.

    If for nothing else, then for a fact that HDZ does not have, except for the (ultra-nationalistic) HSP party of Ante Djapic, real allies among the larger political parties, is evidence that there are two differing visions of the Croatian future. For the moment- on the rethorical level - that difference is very rough( the main substance of the larger part of electoral rethoric strategies of the oppositionary parties is still nationalism and collective versus liberalism and individualism), but still very important.

    Both HDZ and the opposition are stating that they are for "Europe", "legal state", "well being", "human rights", "highest standards"..., but, it is proven that HDZ has no will to put these proclamations to life, as much as the opposition has no strength, knowledge and decisiveness to show that it really stands for them.

    Source: Zagreb fortnightly "Arkzin", October 13, 1995


    Balkan Media & Policy Monitor

    and its regular supplement is a by-monthly publication.
    Editor: Ruzica Zivkovic.

    This publication is supported and sponsored by:

  • IKV - Den Haag,
  • Pax Christi (Nederland) - Utrecht,
  • Press Now - Amsterdam and
  • hCa (Western Liason Office) - Den Haag.

    Contact adress: Celebesstraat 60 , PO 85893, 2508 CN The Hague,The Netherlands,
    tel. 31 (0)70 350 7100,
    fax 354 26 11.
    e-mail:ikv@antenna.nl

    Special supplements, as well as previous (promotional) issues available at special request.


    Monitor Index War Zone MediaFilter