BALKAN MEDIA & POLICY MONITOR


Isseu 18/19 Vol. 2

September 30, 1995.
IN THIS ISSUE:

  • "Monitor" on the current military balance in the Balkan conflict
  • "Vreme" developments on the war fronts in Bosnia
  • "Monitor" about the war and the diplomacy
  • "Arkzin" what could happen in Bosnia after the war
  • "Feral Tribune" is Bosnia being partitioned or not
  • "Vreme" - Croatia correspondent on the situation in Knin
  • "Globus" - is Croatia becoming a duchy instead of a republic
  • "Feral Tribune" - attempts of the ruling party in Croatia to destabilize the opposition
  • "Vreme" Croatia correspondent on the forthcoming elections
  • "Vreme" and "Nezavisni" on the political purges and activities of JUL party in Serbia
  • "Nezavisni" on privatization of the economy in Serbia
  • "AIM" ("Monitor") on settling of Serb refugees in Kosovo
  • Comments and analyses by "Nezavisni", "Vreme", "NIN", and "Feral Tribune"
  • "Republika" on the state of NGO activities in Serbia
  • "Nezavisni" about the overtaking of the independent magazine "Svetlost"
  • DOSSIER: "Vreme" and "Arkzin" on the future position of Serbs in Croatia

  • The Yugoslav crisis-
    current military balance

    Foreign affairs and military commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, discusses in the September 15, 1995, issue of the magazine the current military balance between the warring sides in the Balkan conflict.

    The Serbs are falling apart militarily and that is the nightmarish reality of those who started to believe in the illusion about the indestructible celestial warriors. The Croatian tanks have after some thirty hours rune over the "serbian Fort Apache" - Knin, so now the supporters of the conspiracy theory Milosevic-Tudjman are left to spread around stale schemes based, in lack of other proof, on "London lunch " conversations.

    These are prisoners of their own stupidity: the Knin storm has forced in Southeast of Europe a new, so called real-politik in which brute force is answered with even more brute force.

    The sweet dreams about the Serbian military power, which were taken as a doctrine geared towards the legalization of Greater Serbia, were broken by the charge of the Croat Guard brigades, and now many are seeing the reprise of that in Bosnia. It was hard to foresee such an outcome if the logic of this war is not comprehended.All relevant combat potentials, especially human ones, are on the side of the Croat-Bosnian alliance and those are, in a long-term sense, coming to the fore: the Serbs have no realistic goals in this war, the conquered territories are economically and militarily unviable, and it is impossible to legalize them internationally; the personnel and other potentials of the JNA, after four years of the war, the Serbs have mainly exhausted, and on the organizational plane they were not able to carry out the reform by which the defense of the conquered territories could be possible.

    At this moment, the Serbian position is equal to a catastrophe: one of the three "state" does not exist anymore, and the diplomatic position is declining proportionally to the weakening of the positions on the front.

    The massive NATO air strikes have weakened the potential of the Mladic army so much, that the breakdown of the other para state is in sight. Due to this, there are some diplomatic advances, but the conditions for a final peace are not there - and they won't be there - before the final battle - in Bosnia. Probably in Eastern Slavonia too. If by mid-autumn the Serb encirclement around Sarajevo is broken, general Mladic will loose control over the war in Bosnia, threatening his army partition into a number of separate units. In any variant, the breakdown of his army is realistic by the period of April-May-June of next year by the latest, by which time the following factors of the crisis will crystallize: fictious capitulation in Belgrade, meaning possible recognition of Bosnia and Croatia, and in accordance with that, possible measures of repression- a green light to Croatia to break down the Slavonia-Baranja corps, with which it would exit on the Danube at Vukovar, lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian army and check-mate on the corridor at Brcko...

    But, two crisis regions are fanning the dreams of the Serbian army in Bosnia that the "Army of Yugoslavia" will eventually enter the war: Eastern Slavonia and Herzegovina. These regions are bordering Serbia nad Montenegro and represent some sort of a buffer to the charging Croatian army. While he sees no intention of the FRY side to get involved in Herzegovina, the author considers the situation in Eastern Slavonia somewhat different.

    The fact remains that the battle in the are won't come "cheap", that the Serbian resistance will be strong, but in the long term futile.According to one version, chief of staff of the Yugoslav army, general Perisic was some time ago in Vukovar, telling local commanders that they have to last at least ten days, and then to expect help. Just like in the case of Knin: first, then, guard the operative base so that the one that is supposedly coming to help would have something to defend.

    Eastern slavonia is a tempting zone for Belgrade: with Baranja, Serbia would control both sides of the Danube waterways. It is, of course, a temptation to Zagreb too: Vukovar is a symbol of Croatian suffering, a great national wound would remain without it, and Croatia would not be a "Danubian" country.The Serbs who live in the region though, do not want to see Croatian soldiers on the Danube, which is a precondition for any kind of a "special status".

    The conflict could be avoided in the case of a sudden breakthrough f peace in Bosnia.Belgrade is, besides a hard economic and diplomatic position, now also confronted with the loss of real military position in the region. The rising Croatian militarism is a serious threat to Serbia itself. According to Jovanovic's assessment,the Croatian army is at this moment most combat ready military in the Southeast of Europe.

    Serbia has an unsolvable problem in the case that it really reacts militarily outside of its borders - any action of that kind would be energetically punished by NATO air force, and the political gain through that action would be meaningless in its effect, and catastrophic in its consequences. Serbia needs at least six to eight weeks to enter a total war with Croatia, while Croatia for something like that needs two to three weeks at most. In that period it would achieve operative - strategic initiative, and the combat would be transferred into Milosevic's yard, which could complicate his internal position.

    Milosevic, actually, does not want to lose his last trump card - generally accepted opinion about Serbia as a military superpower on the Balkans. War with the Croatian army could bring things down to earth in that respect, and that is the critical line at which a general havoc could break out in the region, particularly in Kosovo and about the Hungarians in Vojvodina. All forms of military escalation West of the line Prevlaka-Scepan polje -Drina-Lipovac - Danube in this phase could not bring about more serious tension among the Balkan neighbors, at least while Serbia stays on the sidelines.

    The assessments of the Belgrade generals about the perspectives of the Serbian positions on the fronts across the Drina river where tragically contrary to the evolvement of events, and nobody believed that NATO air strikes will take place. In the circles around the Serbian president - a cynical communist - a new climate of "peace promoters" arose, as the expression of Serbian helplessness, so nationalism is going "out of fashion" and the complete strategy boils down to relaxation, keeping quiet and silence. In all of that, the generals are staying away from worse evil.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", September 15, 1995


    Bosnia -
    current developments on the war fronts

    Milos Vasic and Filip Schwarm, main military and geo-political commentators of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" discuss in the magazine's issue of September 25, 1995. Current military developments in the Bosnian war.

    A matrix of refugees' routes has become one of the best indicators of the military and political situation in the area held by the Serbs on the west bank of the Drina. No one can know an army better than its own people, or as Nikola Koljevic explained in implicitly in a statement to FoNet, Serb troops began to retreat after the Croatian artillery pounded villages behind the defence line, fearing for the fate of their families.

    The same happened during the fall of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc, and especially during the fall of Krajina: troops were fighting back until the civilians evacuated the attacked area and then laid their arms and ran after their families.

    Some analysts have recently come out with a theory that the Bosnian Serbs are deliberately ceding the territories which will eventually be given to the other side under the Contact Group's or any other's maps. But this theory can hardly withstand the following arguments: the Serbs have never ceded anything deliberately, because in the long run that would mean suicide. Furthermore, if rumors about such a deal supposedly spread among the people, every next attack would trigger a massive movement of civilians from the attacked area since no one know what the alleged maps include. The advocates of this theory must also bear in mind that the theory of international complot against the Serbs is the main political philosophy of the Republika Srpska.

    The latest developments were rather caused by a psychological factor: the awareness that the national project of a Greater Serbia has failed and that the time has come to pay the bills.

    NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serbs have heavily damaged their telecommunications, logistic and traffic capacities. Rule number one of modern warfare, the command-communications-control coordination, was degraded to World War I level, and only mobile radio links (which are very easy to monitor) remained opened. The Bosnians and Croats naturally assessed that this was the right time to launch an offensive. Their offensive was relatively successful, but---as so many times before it showed the need to redefine the relationship between the two mutually suspicious partners: the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina.

    That this is not an easy job became clear during a meeting between Tudjman and Izetbegovic last week. The meeting produced no concrete results, but a statement released after the talks said the problem of ``liberated'' territories would be solved in political talks, regardless of what territory was captured by whose troops.

    What are Croatia's options at the moment? There is reason to believe that Croatia's ruling HDZ has seriously divided over the Bosnian issue---the traditional nationalists who have aspirations on the whole of Bosnia (as far east as to the Drina, which they call the ``flower of the Croatian people'') on one side, and the revisionists (Tudjman and Herzegovinians) who envision the division of Bosnia with the Serbs (Karadjordjevo , etc.) on the other side.

    The first faction is willing to negotiate with Zagreb on all forms of confederation and federation, trying to buy the time until they can have the entire Bosnia. The other faction is relying on the recent and ongoing military victories, which will make it easier to divide Bosnia into a sparrow in the hand (Branko Tudjman, the ``royal'' commentator in Vecernji list explained that ``borders are drawn by troops'') and a pigeon on the tree in which they have no interest.

    Sarajevo has been aware of this and Gen. Jovan Divjak, assistant commander of the BiH army, warned of this threat shortly after the fall of Glamoc and Bosansko Grahovo. Minister Sacirbey said the government in Sarajevo was ready for a dialogue ``with competent officials in the Banja Luka region, to make it possible for the local population to stay in their homes and to avert a possible fighting in the area.'' He did not name the ``competent officials,'' but said they ``are not war criminals or people who do not accept the territorial integrity of BiH.'' The calls to Banja Luka to negotiate with Sarajevo (through the mediation of Britain, whose foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind offered to find a Serb negotiator for a ``political dialogue of such crucial an importance'') is another illustration of the Bosnians anxiety that the Croatian military help could undermine their efforts to preserve the integrity of Bosnia.

    Banja Luka's leader, Predrag Radic, refused the offer for talks, and chief-of-staff of the BSA, Gen. Manojlo Milovanovic, ordered his troops to fight until the last man and urged the population to ignore various rumors. He said that no deal had been made and that the enemy would be defeated in the Bosnian Krajina. Radovan Karadzic kept silent from Tuesday to Thursday, and BSA commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, was hospitalized.

    Parliament speaker, Momcilo Krajisnik, said he did ``not understand Izetbegovic's statements that he will not accept a division of Bosnia.'' Meanwhile, Milosevic was negotiating with Holbrooke on behalf of the entire Serb nation, and his people reacted calmly to the crisis in Banja Luka.

    In brief, Bosnia was on the fronts divided into portions that do not correspond to the Contact Group map. The warring parties now hold about 50% of Bosnia each, but with their key communications routes and corridors opened they are holding knives under each other's throats.

    On the other hand, this could be the basis for a future hypothetical peace agreement. The only question is whether this agreement will include Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and their teams in Pale.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", September 25, 1995


    The editor of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Miodrag Vukmanovic, comments in the magazine's issue of September 22, 1995, the current developments concerning the war in Bosnia.

    Giving open hands to Milosevic to conduct the peace negotiations in the name of the Bosnian Serbs, the leadership in Pale has "willingly" cancelled itself as the official political subject, by which its relation towards the peace process became irrelevant.

    But, since Milosevic's representation is marked with limited mandate, meaning it is only in the function of signing the peace, the problem of legitimate representation of the Bosnian Serbs will become current after fifty thousand NATO soldiers are distributed on the borders of sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina and its internal "entities" after a larger number of refugees return to their regions, and after, under the supervision of world community, the preparations for the introduction of constitutionality and democratic institutions are made in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    The furious Holbrooke diplomacy does not leave any space for slack by the Belgrade regime. Milosevic cannot make any excuses that Pale is not listening to him, and general Mladic's kidneys must have weakened by the defeats his corps have received from the air and from the joint Bosnian-Croat troops. It seems that people who insist that the recent successful offensive of the joint troops is in the function of the territorial division in the percentages provisioned by the Contact group plan, by the order from Belgrade, are not far away from the truth.

    With some accuracy it could be stated that the army of "Republika Srpska", which does not know anymore who is commanding it, nor what it is fighting for, is in complete disarray.

    After the war is lost,says Vukmanovic, in places where some order exists, in the worst case, the losers, those that have survived, stay without a state, and in the most favorable circumstances of responsibility, the governments fall, while generals shoot themselves in the forehead, saving the honor of the nation. The Serbian-Montenegrin war shame, which is now showing the ugly part of its face, still did not reach that level from which one can see all of the misery of the policy which is forcing the facts and is thus is confirmed in defeats.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", September 22, 1995


    Bosnia - after the war

    One of the main commentators of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", Boris Raseta, discusses in the magazine's issue of September 1, 1995, the possible developments in Bosnia after the acceptance of the proposed peace plan and its financial aid package.

    As the integral part of the political project of post-Yugoslav Balkans, comes the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such Bosnia is seen as containing three parts, which are technically called, Bosniak, Croat and Serb.Tudjman, in an interview states that Bosniaks are actually Croats. Thus we arrive at the final project: Bosnia split into two "entities": Serbian (Republika Srpska) and Croat (BiH Federation), which the Bosniaks see as the new nucleus for integration of whole of Bosnia, and Croats as one of its provinces, in which the Muslims will play a secondary role. The Serbs, of course, see themselves in "Greater Serbia" - with delay, but as much that it costs, it costs.

    The new American plan seemingly starts from such a dual division, so Croats and Serbs believe that the will - at least to a greater extent - come to theirs. Situation seems iretractable: ethnic cleansings are legalized, changes of borders - with cosmetic excuses - genocide is legalized, and opening of room for future creators of new realities.

    It seems that new realities have been formed, as the basis for tomorrow. They will be recognized from the international community, and tomorrow, ethnically pure states will, freely and unhindered, embark into a better tomorrow. But is that so ? Four million people have been uprooted. This is one whole Croatia. Krajina is empty, Eastern Bosnia is empty, Sarajevo and Banja Luka are being emptied, and Mostar only exists as a geographical term on the map.

    Is there enough energy to "voluntarily" resettle, or "settle" these people in other areas ? Are there financial funds which will finance their survival, until they are prepared to live from their work on foreign, scorched land ? Is there a policy able enough to persuade them that the "individual frustration" is negligible compared with "national interest"? Economy,, commerce, agriculture - what people in essence live from - is outside of the sphere of interest of all post-Yugoslav states.

    In the end, thinks Raseta, the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have to be definitive. If Bosnia is divided on the principle 49/51, the Serbs will get a large, but poor piece of land, and will remain - if they separate themselves - outside of the "Marshall plan", which is being prepared for this country. If this plan is carried out in the manner that the credits could be received only in Zenica, Sarajevo or Tuzla, will not that force the Serbs and Croats to rush into lines in front of the banks which give money, and to quickly forget century old dreams ?

    Knowing human behaviour, it is not hard to conclude that it will be so. One does not live from century old dreams. It could come to that, that the American dollars, or German marks, will destroy "Republika Srpska" and "Herzeg Bosnia", in a quicker and quieter manner than "tomahawks" and "lunas", so that post-war borders will be identical to the pre-war ones,only with the fact that what is between them will be much tragic, poorer and emptier.

    Anyway, as those who know have stated, in current talks with Holbrooke Milosevic mainly showed his interest for the financial help, and not so much for the confederation with "Republika Srpska". And, the confederation between Croatia and BiH Federation can pass through only with Tudjman, and only coupled with great violence towards the mood of Croats from Croatia.

    Source: Zagreb by-weekly"Arkzin", September 1, 1995


    Bosnia - current developments

    Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" also comments in the magazine's issue of September 18, 1995, on the current developments in Bosnia.

    Culic says that the eventual joining of the "BiH Federation" to Croatia would open the question of divided identity of another two million Bosniaks, which would, according to Ante Prkacin, a high official of the ruling HDZ party, be a dangerous firework in the Croatian pocket.Still, this high official believes that such an arrangement will not come about, the opinion shared by Zdravko Tomac of the Social democrats (former communists). This might be a possibility, says Culic, since the Geneva agreement does not mention confederal ties of "Republika Srpska" with Yugoslavia, and BiH Federation with Croatia, but remained on the undefined term of "special relations".

    But, he says, even if it was correct that by erasing "confederations of the neighbors" demoted the pretensions across Drina and Una rivers, mounting of two strong "entities" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the problem of division has only been transferred into another, much more sensitive place. It starts to be active from the inside. If bosnia would find enough internal strength, it could survive. But since such forces are not in sight - the bosniaks have reduced the military advantage of the Serbs, but the Croats have enlarge it, which became a political mentor of Bosnia and Herzegovina - it is more probable that Bosnia is left to die off by itself.

    The counter argument to this could be that Izetbegovic himself, through the Split agreement, let Tudjman open the Western door of Bosnia and Herzegovina and take as much of Serbian areas as he needs, as to "fill the breadroll". This is formally true, but it is also obvious that Tudjman will do what he intended in the first place even without the assistance of sarajevo. This is proven by the case of Prevlaka straight, which he will, as he pointed out in a recent interview, trade for the Dubrovnik backbone.

    The exchange is done on the account of the third - the territory given belongs to Bosnia.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", September 18, 1995


    Croatia - situation in the Knin krajina

    B.Vekic, one of the correspondents of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" in Croatia, wrote on the situation in Knin after it was retaken by the Croatian army in the magazine's issue of September 18, 1995.

    Shortly after operation Storm was over in Krajina (Serb held Croatia), Croatian President Tudjman appeared in public to address his favorite topic---the resettling of displaced Croats. He said that this meant the end of times when the Croats could be forced out of Croatia. This is the time to go back, he said and called on all Croats in diaspora to return to their fatherland. According to some estimates, the Croatian diaspora is one of the biggest in the world with over three million Croats living abroad. Prospective resettles are offered Krajina and also other areas, primarily Istria.

    The president's latest call is only one in a series of similar appeals. He was calling Croats from Romania to settle in Istria; he was inviting back Croats from Austria; he was offering Croatia's biggest and richest peninsula to Croats from central Bosnia.

    But his wishes and promises turned out to be in strong collision with the reality: neither did Romanian Croats come to Istria, nor were the Bosnian Croats welcomed there. Returnees from Austria can be counted on the fingers of one hand---they are mostly retired Croats and (in some cases) businessmen. None of the newly-resettled groups have managed to adapt itself into the Croatian social life. On the other hand, over 150,000 Croats left Croatia in four years of war.

    The masterminds of ``new realities'' are (not) hiding their satisfaction at the sight of such a large number of displaced people, being aware that this demographic mass will change the ethnic map of Croatia as a whole and some of its parts in particular. In brief, all these people are seen as a material for ethnic engineering. Calculations of various amateur demographers, on which the regime's optimism is based, stem from the following assumption: some 200,000 Serbs, who moved from Krajina in early August, have left the place for some 200,000 displaced Croats who fled to Croatia from the war-stricken areas. With the almost identical figure, they reckon, it would be easy to move Croat refugees into the Serb houses. (Croatia has also somewhat less than 200,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees).

    But the actual situation in Krajina is far from promising. Krajina is a nice and attractive place, but only if observed from Zagreb and in (Croatian Radio and Television) HRT's stories. In reality today, it looks like a post-cataclysm landscape from ``The Day After'' or any other movie of the sort.

    Estimates made by European observers and human rights organizations in Zagreb say that over 38,000 houses have been destroyed in Krajina, which---assuming that an average house is worth 40,000 DM---puts the overall damage at some 1.5 million DM. This is approximately a sum Croatia can earn in two good tourist seasons. Industrial facilities have also suffered different degree of damage: TVIK of Knin can restart the production soon, and so can a factory in Slunj and sawmills in Vrhovine and Licki Osik. But with the technology ruined and a serious lack of labor force, the reconstruction of the area will take large amounts of money and time. In Croatia's developed areas as well, the industry is facing a collapse, as 13,000 people are unemployed in Sibenik alone.

    Croatia's reconstruction minister, Jure Radic, came to the idea recently that the monastery of Trappists in Banjaluka should be moved to Donji Lapac (including the monastery building itself). A bishopric was recently set up in Srb, the first one in the predominantly (almost 100%) Serb-populated town. In Vojnic, a Catholic mass was held for the first time in the one hundred year history of the area. The authorities thought that once the Church settles in these areas, the population will follow suit.

    Judging from the current situation, most of Krajina will remain unpopulated. World statistics show that only one-fourth of the displaced people decide to return to their homes and Croatia will probably not be be an exception. But Knin, which did not suffer heavy damage and which lies on an important communications route and close to the seaside, stands a good chance of starting to live again very soon---with new inhabitants, of course. Some 600 applications have been received so far for the renting of business premises in the town. Similar will happen with Petrinja, Plitvice and places in the valleys of the Kupa and Una rivers.

    Unless these areas are repopulated by next spring (which is technically infeasible) or the Serb refugees return to their homes (which is politically infeasible)---grass and weeds will overgrow towns and villages in Krajina and that will be the region's second death.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", September 18, 1995


    Croatia - possible constitutional change

    Darko Hudelist of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", specialized for political scoops, writes in the magazine's issue of September 25, 1995, about a possible constitutional change in Croatia, by which this republic would become a duchy.

    Hudelist states that the paper has found from a number of independent sources that the draft of the new constitution is already made (written supposedly by one of the republic's experts on the matter, dr. Smiljko Sokol), where its key new provision would be cancellation of the republic and introduction of the duchy. This is coupled with a speculation that president Tudjman will, after the December elections, which he is almost certain to win, introduce the pure presidential system, under which he will have the right to impose a suspentionary veto on any decision of the Croatian parliament. The essence of the cancellation of the Republic and introduction of the duchy, says the author, is in the attempt to secure absolute power and rule.

    First of all, with the proclamation of the Duchy of Croatia, the two chamber parliament would automatically be disbanded, and the right of veto of the "Zupanija" chamber of Parliament would automatically be transferred to the newly throned duke. At the same time, Tudjman, as the new duke, would unite in his position all of the ingerencies and rights of the president of the Republic, president of the government.

    Tudjman is conscious of the fact that the introduction of the pure presidential system, with one chamber parliament (this time even formally marginalized, and with the ruler who would unite the functions of the president and the prime minister, would not be such a popular measure accepted by the Croats. So, he is playing the duchy card, attempting to use the historical mask, to which the Croatians are emotionally tied, to introduce what he cares most for - the pure presidential system.That this procedure is on track is seen in the recent statements of one of Tudjman's closest aides - Vladimir Seks, who said that it is necessary to introduce a strong centralized state, which will be able to solve all of the cumulated problems.

    According to the draft, Tudjman would not only simply be the head of the duchy power structure, but as a duke, will stand above that power structure and its members. The duchy rule would be monocratic, in the spirit of a pure presidential system. Tudjman would also have the unlimited right to be nominated for the duke, formally elected by the parliament, meaning he would be in power for life. He would also embody the position of the prime minister, which would formally cease to exist.

    This would also mean that the judiciary would be extremely sidelined.Hudelist reminds that according to the rule set in the 14th century, one who would defamate the duke, would be convicted as a traitor.

    Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", September 25, 1995


    Croatia - internal political scene

    In the September 11, 1995, issue of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune", the magazine's internal policy commentator Zoran Daskalovic, writes about the activities of the ruling HDZ party to destabilize the Croatian opposition. After the "Lighting" and the "Storm", Croatia got a "Fox". While the first two operations were geared against the Serbs in Croatia and retaking of occupied territories, the "Fox" was supposed to pacify the largest elections opponent - the "Croatian Social-Liberal party"(HSLS). Under this code, a number of officials from the different levels of the HSLS have for a year attempted to take the party leadership, turning the Liberals into a branch of the ruling HDZ party. The party leader Drazen Budisa and his supporters got hold of the written document about this action only a year after this action was undertaken.

    Through these or similar methods, as far as 1990. Franjo Tudjman and a group of his like-minded supporters have overtaken the leadership of the HDZ, eliminating the part of the party founders and competitors for leading party positions. Since then, and whenever that is necessary, with president Tudjman as the key figure, they have been securing their dominance of the party and in the state apparatus, as well as all key segments of social life. In the "Initiative" for the overtake of HSLS, which the current leaders of the party consider to be written by the Croat secret police, there is a basic message for the rebelling group: "For you, the most important thing is the interest and as stronger power as possible. That is the idea of all that you are doing". Along with that, go the planned methods of attracting people: "prizes, blackmail, promises,buying off, agitation, advertising, interests, power, suggestions, attracting and distracting attention, compensations, campaigns of low blows and other".

    although the elections are on the brink, and the campaign, at least the informal one, has already begun, in the leadership of the Liberals they are convinced that the "foxes" failed, and that this will have marginal influence on the party. It is the question though, says Daskalovic, how will the voters react, particularly those undecided ones, of which part has already been won by HDZ with the "Lightning" and "Storm". Buying off and retaking of certain leaders of the oppositionary parties, not only brings down the rating of those parties, but stimulates electoral abstention, which suits the ruling party.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", September 11, 1995


    Belgrade weekly's "Vreme" correspondent from Croatia, B. Vekic, wrote in the magazine's issue of September 25, 1995, on the forthcoming winter elections.

    Vladimir Seks on Wednesday, September 20, dismissed the House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament. According to the Constitution, President Tudjman is to schedule new parliamentary elections within 60 days. Thus, the electoral race, anticipated in Croatia in mid-summer, and as far as the ruling party was concerned begun after operation `Flash', has officially started. The elections have been scheduled for December. This is probably the time limit in which the ruling party could rely on the popularity gained by military operation `Storm', undertaken at the time when the party's rating was at its lowest and threatening to drop even further.

    Operation `Storm', which HDZ officials take credit for and consider as purely a party matter, has raised HDZ popularity to the heavens. At least that is what surveys say: 50 percent of the citizens of Croatia would now vote for HDZ, 60 percent of the voters would vote for Tudjman, while as many as a quarter of them would elect him president for life. Tudjman acted in his usual Leninist manner: if he had announced elections a day earlier, it would have been too early, if he had announced them a day later, it would have been too late. Never in the past four years has HDZ been so strong.

    Breaking down the opposition: HDZ has, of course, almost completed all the preparations for the forthcoming elections. Nothing has been left to chance. First came the personnel consolidation which simply broke down the weak Croatian opposition. Deputy of the Croatian National Party Mirko Tankosic joined HDZ and was the first Serb in the ruling party. Others joined in after him. Damir Zoric, of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) joined HDZ saying that the party's national dimension was more important to him than the liberal dimension. He was followed by Mate Mestrovic, son of the renowned sculptor Ivan Mestrovic, who said that liberalism was too highly ranked in HSLS and that HSLS leader Drazen Budisa had not been ``overwhelmed enough'' by the Croatian army's victory in operation `Storm'.

    At the same time, the media got the final blow. The state had been controlling over 90 percent of the media and now `Globus', the privately owned weekly with the highest circulation in Croatia, had to replace its editor-in chief Denis Kuljis who practically made the weekly.

    Kuljis was replaced apparently under the pressure of the ruling party by Davor Butkovic, until recently Kuljis's deputy, who will be running the weekly in a different way, certainly less dangerous for HDZ. So the Split weekly `Feral' has remained the only influential independent newspaper in Croatia, which certainly cannot significantly affect the electorate when all other dailies and electronic media resemble one another so much that it is difficult to tell them apart.

    The new Electoral Law enables the Croatian diaspora to elect representatives in the Parliament, which is one of the few cases of this kind in the world. The Croats living abroad will elect as many as 12 representatives, which means that (unless a miracle occurs) HDZ can count on 12 more seats in the Parliament. At the same time, the number of Serb representatives has been cut down to three, although there has been no census, and Bosnian Muslims got no seats at all (though they used to be the second-largest ethnic minority, after the Serbs, and are now certainly the largest). This urged Alija Izetbegovic to write a letter to Tudjman asking him to ensure one seat for them. There has been no reply to this request so far.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", September 25, 1995


    Serbia - internal politics

    Ivan Radovanovic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", discusses in the magazine's issue of September 11, 1995. the current political scene in Serbia, particularly within the ranks of the ruling Socialist party (SPS).

    Hunters from the United Left of Yugoslavia (JUL) were delighted when the President of Serbia officially opened the hunting season. They happily oiled their rifles and began with their work. It was the JUL sympathizers who started the rumors that Milorad Vucelic will be sacked.The technology is still the same: Milorad Minic, until recently one of Milosevic's most trusted men, heard of the sacking of Milorad Vucelic,the director of Serbian Radio-Television, from the press.

    A political analyst from Belgrade interpreted this as a ``clear signal:'' ``you were not good enough; I can sack you whenever I like; 'and will you be more careful in the future?'' As a serious autocrat, Milosevic simply decided the time has come for him to shake his associates a bit, as a reminder that he still means business and to prepare them for all the tasks that await them. Minic fared well in the whole combination. Vucelic did not.

    The clean-up began soon after the famous session of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) when the now insignificant Mihajlo Markovic, an academic and former ideologist of the SPS, tried to say something against Milosevic's policies. Reports that none of those present responded to these criticisms are untrue. Quite a few of them spoke, and the first one to realize that the whole affair will not end just like that was Ivica Dacic,spokesman for the SPS.

    If Milosevic carefully analyzed, and we can be sure that he did, who said what during the session, Dacic's support to his peacemaking policies will not be forgotten. Just as Borisav Jovic,Aleksa Jokic, Radovan Pankov,Zoran Andjelkovic and others who to a lesser or greater extent supported Mihajlovic's views (though of course none of them said anything bad about Milosevic either) are unlikely to be forgiven.

    Serbia's most powerful man hardly needed a better excuse.Important and less important people were removed from their posts without explanation. Vucelic was the biggest beast so far. At the same time Aleksa Jokic started to crumble, and was informed on the eve of the meeting that he was no longer president of the Republic's Committee for Refugees.

    Those who consider themselves well informed are of the opinion that Vucelic was a victim of a ``court intrigue,'' not uncommon in any dictator's entourage. First of all someone started a rumor which reached Milosevic's ears, about Vucelic being a member of the so-called ``war lobby'' within the SPS.Later on, someone told the boss about certain financial dealings by the director of Serbian Radio and Television who was then proclaimed a member of the ``techno-managerial lobby''(a label used to describe those who are in favor of privatization).

    In the end, this time quite correctly, Vucelic's ``negative attitude''towards JUL (party led by Mirjana Markovic, President Milosevic's wife) was revealed, and all that was needed then was a meeting of the SPS's Main Board and a hint to Milosevic that the stories about ``some people'' trying to unseat him are true.

    Unlike certain SPS officials, JUL ``hit-men'' who greeted the hunting season, knew both of the debate about the sacking which took place at the Cabinet meeting and that Dragoljub Milanovic will be Vucelic's successor. They were also very well informed about who's position within the SPS is unsteady. ``Everybody's'' was one JUL official's malicious comment.

    Ever since JUL was inaugurated, it was obvious that it is working on a quiet ``occupation'' of the SPS and the creation of some form of parallel government. JUL openly cast an eye on several key positions in Serbia (Serbian Electricity Board, the Forestry Commission, Ministry of Finances, part of ``Jugopetrol's'' oil business, the media... ); it has good connections in the Serbian government and police (Unkovic, Bogdanovic, Ccerovic);it got involved in diplomacy (the appointment of Dojcilo Maslovaric as the Yugoslav ambassador to the Vatican), and most importantly, via Mirjana Markovic it ensured almost completely Milosevic's support.

    JUL needs only one thing before it can take over the whole country: the massive executive and organizational apparatus which the SPS has. This is why, in recent weeks, Mrs. Markovic insisted on a final merger of the two organizations, a step Milosevic is not quite ready for. In the end JUL retreated a little, but continued with the active participation in the hunt for marked socialists (or maybe even a random sample of them), and continued pursuing its ambition to have as many cabinet seats as possible in some future Serbian government. One of the fiercest battles in the whole little war in which participants do not know which side they belong to, will be the one in the key daily newspaper ``Politika.''

    In this battle, at least we will know who the sides are. Dragan Hadzi Antic, the Director of ``Politika'' is on one side while Zivorad Minovic, Chairman of the Board of ``Politika Ltd.'' is on the other. The former favors JUL while the latter favors above all himself but also the ``hard-core'' of the SPS (which includes Milomir Minic). Both of them have undisguised pretensions to become the only spokesman and interpreter of Milosevic's policies. That would be one of the few positions in Serbia which would ensure a regular, daily contact with the ``boss.'' This right to know exactly what the ``boss'' thinks implies power. Great power.

    Minovic's departure would mean that Milosevic decided to finish the job he started. Well informed sources claim that the chairman of ``Politika Ltd.'' will be followed by quite a few other Socialists; that everything the international community demands will be signed; that Milosevic will turn to young and fresh forces within the ruling party, reconstruct the Cabinet and call an election next December. If Minovic remains where he is, the whole above mentioned plan will have to be, at least to some extent, altered.

    For the time being, the latter option is unlikely. Dragan Hadzi Antic visited the Serbian President quite a few times in the last ten or so days, while Minovic did not. Some sources announced that he received ``full support'' to remove Minovic from ``Politika'' and recent events confirm these speculations. On Wednesday Slobodan Ignjatovic, former Federal Minister of Information, Director of Radio and TV (RTV) ``Politika,'' and Minovic's ``confidant,'' was sacked though the events behind his removal are even more important. Until recently, 51% of RTV ``Politika'' was owned by ``Politika Ltd.,'' that is by Minovic.

    However, after a change in the company statute, Minovic has nothing more to do with RTV ``Politika,'' while 51% of its shares have been divided between ``Politika'' newspaper (Antic) and the ``Politika'' printing house. Also Antic was appointed new Director of RTV ``Politika.'' There was no official announcement of a Cabinet reshuffle, though unofficially---it will happen in the next couple of weeks.

    An agreement with JUL already existed while according to some sources, Milosevic offered Draskovic ``everything he wants except the Ministry of the Interior'' and a deal was reached without further ado. All this happened because many even more important negotiators than Holbrooke, await Milosevic and his famous sofa. If the sanctions are lifted, Yugoslavia and Serbia will have to talk to those who have the money (World Bank, IMF, International Bank for Development). It is already known that they will want to see``stable social and political conditions'' in the country.The coalition government of national unity and Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) within it are nothing other than a positive reply to that question.

    Besides, such a government would enable Milosevic to begin preparations for elections which will be held later this year, if everything goes according to plan. He would have behind him a consolidated SPS with its ``organizational'' potential, peace, the lifting of sanctions, and the unified voice of an until recently divided political block: SPS,JUL, SPO, New Democracy, Civil Union. Another hope is that such a move would marginalize the rest of the opposition (Serbian Radical Party, Democratic Party, Democratic Party of Serbia) the popularity of which, according to certain polls, increased in recent months.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", September 11, 1995


    Nikola Vlahovic writes in the September 22, 1995,issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" about the activities of the "JUL" the neo-communist party headed by Mirjana Markovic, wife of the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and its wider implications.

    Officially and from the "main post" it was forbidden to have dual membership in the "JUL" and the ruling Socialist party (SPS). This action was undertaken by one part of the SPS as to secure the weakening of its political power and possible "quiet" state coup. This, of course, is not official, but is abundantly clear.

    JUL has, in the shortest possible period, used a trick, participating in power through these "dual members": Milan Milutinovic, federal minister of foreign affairs, Dojcilo Maslovaric, Serbian secretary for foreign affairs (slated for ambassador in Vatican), Leposava Milicevic, Serbian health minister, Radmilo Bogdanovic, former Serbian police chief and current head of the Second chamber of the Federal Parliament, Bratislava Buba Morina, the head of the Refugee secretariat, Danilo Z. Markovic, ambassador in Moscow, Zlatan Perucic, head of "Beobanka"(the largest bank in the country), Slobodan Unkovic, one of the university heads, minister in the Serb government and future ambassador to China, Dragan Hadzi-Antic, editor-in-chief of the main daily "Politika".

    The list continues and includes also Bogoljub Karic of the infamous "Karic brothers company". So what this all means for the coming six months, asks the author.

    Now it is quite obvious, he states, that there will be no elections until the end of 1995. Half-year time out will be a chance for the president of all the Serbs here, and all the Serbs still to come, to clear the ranks and make some for of ideological differentiation, as in good old times. A new "Eighth session" is also possible. Since, if it was seen well from the SPS scout tower, taking a joint walk were former federal president Dobrica Cosic, former key SPS ideologue Mihailo Markovic and Milorad Vucelic (after which the latter became a former head of the Serbian TV), and this resembled a gathering of conspirators which spoke something secretive.

    It seems they were overheard by "Whom It Was Necessary", and that was the end.

    The youngest was to go first. Waiting in line are academics Vasilije Krestic, Kosta Mihailovic,Budimir Kosutic and Antonije Isakovic, director of the "Politika" publishing house Zivorad Minovic, and, of course, Mihailo Markovic and Dobrica Cosic. This is also only a part of the list of those which have touched "Number One" reading slowly an accusation for the war catastrophe along with his name.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" September 22, 1995


    Serbia- Privatization of the economy

    In its issue of August 31, 1995. Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" carried the discussion by dr. Tomislav Z. Nikolic on the official oppositions to the process of privatization in Serbia.

    The author states that economists are demanding a quick and comprehensive privatization, conscious of the fact that the erosion of the so called social ownership has advanced so far, that soon there might be nothing left to privatize, having in mind that they are also aware of the fact that you cannot privatize everything.

    Nikolic cites another professor - J. Rankovic, who has calculated that on the level of FRY, in the yeAr 1994. 6 million DEM of the social capital have been "swallowed", for how much the expenditures exceeded the available social product.In other words, if the expenditure is always greater by a third of the mass that we can use, than that loss is nothing else than eating up of the substance, contrary to the statements of the politicians that even with the sanctions, we were able to retain the capital.

    The ruling regime will never accept that as a fact, in the same manner as it was never told in public how much of hard currency left for Greece, Cyprus, as well as other parts of the capitalist world. For that reason, the inflation will occur, in spite of the measures of the economic policy, since they have been conceived as the extinguishing of the fire with a glass of water. To cover up its part in stimulating inflation, which is eating up the social capital, the regime will always stress the stabilization goals, but will run away from the measures which would be of use for those goals.

    The new wave of refugees, whose fate is tied to the economic power of the country, will become, whether they want it or not, a new excuse for opening the vents of the currency printing office in Topcider (Belgrade suburb), so that we will be witnesses of the repeating of the statements of the key people of the Central bank that printing of money is necessary so to satisfy the growing social needs of the population. In such conditions, the Dinar will again acquire the function of social redistribution of poverty, instead that economic policy is used, along with extinction of the socialist system, to regain the economic functions of the currency.

    The volume of the pending catastrophe is reflected in the fact that the society will be more and more oriented to use the current capital, without a chance to replenish it, let alone enlarge it. The end result will be, if this bizarre set of macroeconomic elements remains is drastic impoverishment of the society, loss of elementary preconditions for a civilized survival.

    It has to be added, says the author,that the programme of monetary reconstruction, to which key politicians in power swear to today, is an obstacle to the necessary changes of the system, since, for a certain period of time, it was a substitute for the economic system itself. In other words, the Programme of the Governor of the Central bank Avramovic attempted to be a symbiosis of the economic system and economic policy, but it was obvious that with such characteristics it can last only a few months, and nothing more.

    What economists insist is the necessity that has to be comprehended is that inflation and hyperinflation are a product of the conditions where the so called social and state ownership dominate, and based on them, the regime which, unfortunately, does not know the category of responsibility for its actions, or what it omitted to do.

    When true economy is to be considered, says the author, its rules should be respected, and they indicate that private ownership has no alternative, which means that the economy cannot be effective in a country where so called social and state companies dominate.

    Since the question in the economy is the interests, it is understandable why the regime is running away from privatization - it is aware that the current structure of ownership gives it a wide area of rule without responsibility.Will the future elections change the structure of power?

    Many believe that the worsening of the economic and social situation will influence the regime to "come to its senses", but they forget that the previous elections were held in the conditions when the monetary breakdown was at its peak. So, the people has the regime it deserves, concludes Nikolic.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", August 31, 1995


    Kosovo - refugees

    Podgorica weekly "Monitor" published in its issue of August 25, 1995. a report by the AIM correspondent from Pristina Shkelzen Maliqi concerning the situation created in Kosovo with the inflow of Serb refugees from Krajina and Bosnia.

    According to the official data, in the first week of the massive arrival of refugees, some one thousand were settled in Kosovo. The Albanian sources there cite the number of three thousand.In any manner, looking from the aspect of real numbers, it is shown again that Kosovo is the least desirable haven for Serbian refugees. From the whole number of "old" refugees from 1991-1992.,only 0,3 percent settled in Kosovo, while the number of new refugees in Kosovo is momentarily 2,5 percent at most.

    Since the refugees are still coming, these probably will not be definitive numbers. According to obviously uncoordinated statements by the Serbian officials, this time around between 5 and 16 thousand refugees should settle in Kosovo.

    It is indicative though thar the Kosovo end of the Krajina exodus provoked stronger political reactions, even larger media attention than the one to Vojvodina, where the situation is objectively much more dramatic, since the settlement of refugees, as was the case in 1991. and 1992.is coupled with pressures and expulsion of local population, first of all Croats, and indirectly the Hungarians.

    Since the Serbs have, through previous colonizations, achieved majority in multiethnic Vojvodina, they are now allowed, and this suits Belgrade the most, to fill up the Vojvodina ethnic well and permanently secure ethnic domination. The only relevant minority, the Hungarians, does not have enough strength, and it also seems the will, to resist the obvious attempts at the change of ethnic structure.

    The situation is different in Kosovo. First of all, Kosovo does not fall into the circle of the Bosnian-Panonian circle of the war ant "humanitarian" ethnic dealienation, but represent the most unstable part of another set of inter ethnic and inter state relations and interests, which includes the whole Southern part of the Balkan peninsula. Even though Serbia is the connection to both of these circles, it is also not allowed to spill the crisis from one pot into the other. For that reason it is not a coincidence that quickly and loudly came the protests from the governments of Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey when it was announced that part of the refugees will be streamlined towards Kosovo.It can be assumed that this also causes worries for Bulgaria.The warnings also came from the US and many European countries.

    In Kosovo for a few years now a sensitive status quo situation is holding, which could be easily disbalanced, leading to an explosion. Kosovo is a timed mine of a new Balkan war, which scares many.On the other hand, the insistence of Belgrade on the "humanitarian" aspect and "sovereign" right to decide where on "its territory" it will distribute the refugees, is not convincing enough.

    The Milosevic regime is not interested at this moment to further make the relations tense in Kosovo, or to cause a new war, whose consequences could be even more catastrophic for Serbia than those of the current one. The announcements of massive colonization and sending of few thousand of refugees to Kosovo, could be considered more as the vents which should prevent a possible explosion of discontent of Serbian extremists in Kosovo and Serbia, more than a provocation towards the Albanians.

    But, it is clear to the regime in Belgrade that it cannot solve "favorably" the Kosovo question without a war and instigation of a massive exodus of Albanians. The colonization of Kosovo with refugees and in other manners, in the conditions when the Albanians constitute 90 percent of the population, in peaceful situation represents practically an unattainable project, even if it was undertaken in a planned and long term manner.

    The second, even greater problem for an effective colonization of Kosovo represents the resistance of the refugees, which do not want to be resettled from one crisis are to another. There is talk of people jumping off trains so to escape resettlement in Kosovo. Psychologically and politically, this is the end of the Kosovo myth among the Serbs. For them it has become a foreign, Albanian land, for which they will not sacrifice themselves, since there is no point in it.

    But, even though there is no danger of effective Serbian colonization of Kosovo, there is a sure danger of all variants of war which will be alight for years, or which will come suddenly ablaze.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", August 25, 1995


    Comments and Analyses

    Regular commentator of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni",Jan Briza, wrote a comment in the magazine's issue of September 15, 1995, dealing with possible policies to be undertaken by the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic.

    Inclusion of the American cruise missiles in the bombing of Bosnian Serbs, says Briza, is more than a clear sign that the Western military alliance has firmly decided not only to punish the warmongering general Mladic, but, at the same time, to destroy the main centers of once powerful system of anti-aircraft defence of former Yugoslavia. If it succeeds, and it probably will, this would practically mean that current Yugoslavia will be prActically disarmed too.The goal of this undertaking is to deny the Serbs their military supremacy up until now and forcing them to sit at the negotiating table. At the same time, this would eliminate Yugoslavia as a regional power.

    If we are to believe some military commentators cited by the press, the destruction of the anti-aircraft defence in Bosnia will make even Belgrade vulnerable. An attack from the West, for example of the Croatian aircraft,could be, in that case registered only when the enemy closes in only a few minutes of flight to the capital. This would be too late for its effective defence.

    Mladic's stubborn refusal to remove the heavy artillery around Sarajevo came as it was ordered by the Western statesmen, who were breaking their heads how to explain such a massive use of NATO power.

    The thing becomes even more interesting when it is viewed in the light of the Agreement by which president Slobodan Milosevic got the mandate to represent the interests of Bosnian Serbs. A delicate question can be asked concerning this: does he, or doesn't he control general Mladic ? If the answer is affirmative, the the next question could be: why is he allowing him to destroy the defence capabilities of the country and weaken Serbian negotiating position ?

    In the case of a negative answer, it is unclear what is Milosevic doing at the negotiating table when Mladic is the one that decides about war and peace in Bosnia.

    It could be conceived that Milosevic and Mladic are acting As a team, playing at that on the "Russian card". But, they are making a grave mistake if they are expecting to get from Moscow something more then up until now, meaning verbal support. Recent public protest by president Yeltsin against NATO bombardments is, probably, the maximum they can expect in that respect.

    In any case, why would Russia - militarily weaker that the West and impoverished, confront itself with the whole world putting its own fate into a gamble because of the mistaken policy of Slobodan Milosevic and his protegees on the other side of the Drina river ? In the end, why would Yeltsin do more for Belgrade than what Milosevic recently did for Knin ?

    Russia undeniably has its interests in the Balkans, as it did in the past, but they are not of vital interest to it, as they were not in the past. So, only somebody who has lost a sense of reality can believe that Milosevic will be able to take a Russian trump card out of his sleeve.

    Milosevic surely is not the one who does not have the sense of reality. At least when undertaking tactical moves is in question.He knows that he cannot play with "the Russian card" against the whole world, but he is still waving with it, because it is useful for him to create an illusion with the domestic public that he is not alone, and that Russia will stand behind him if "the push comes to shove".

    If by any chance an opportunity rises to use the Russians for "our cause" in the peace negotiations, and later, he will surely not miss it. While he needs it he will flirt with "our Orthodox Slavic brethren", as was done by his great predecessor, Tito with our "class brothers" in the "first socialist state".

    The epilogue will be, without a doubt, as in that joke when Tito came to the crossroads where the roads split towards capitalism and communism so he ordered the driver to give the sign for a left turn and drive right. When the peace comes to these areas, says Briza, and that day is drawing close, Milosevic will, if he wants to remain in power, attempt with all his powers to tie himself to the West. The reason is simple.Russia does not have the capital, nor the technology for post-war reconstruction that would take out this impoverished and ravaged country from all kinds of backwardness.

    As things stand now, the West will probably accept him. The reason is also very simple. The opposition on either side of the Drina river does not offer at this moment anybody who can for a foreseeable period of time be a true alternative to Milosevic. What they will think of him at the same time is another matter, concludes the author.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", September 15, 1995


    Chief commentator of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" Stojan Cerovic, writes in the magazine's issue of September 18, 1995, on the current developments in Bosnia.

    When the Geneva agreement was being reached, many well-informed observers maintained that Bosnia was more divided than complete and that the Serbs gained the most. This was true on paper, and this was the first time that the Serbs won something at the negotiating table where they had always been beaten. On the field, however, everything had changed and hardly anyone took into account the new direction and speed of events. The ratio of forces was fixed only for a moment in Geneva and was altered shortly after that.

    The NATO intervention resumed and became stronger. Gen. Mladic, who had been expected to halt the belligerent Karadzic, suddenly seemed to have become involved in a private war with NATO. It is unknown whether it was his self-willed decision to suffer or he was letting his army be crushed for the benefit of someone else. At any rate, he did not make a large enough, symbolic and real gesture of yielding which would halt the intervention.

    Mladic did get into the position of serious extortion but the Serbian side had hardly any objections to what he did. The Serbs have become such fatalists that they believe nothing depends on what they do. They are madly convinced that mankind had long ago decided to destroy them forever as a hopelessly harmful subgroup and a stupid error of ethnic evolution. And when you know that your fate is predetermined in such a way, you free yourself of all considerations, do what you like, destroy and set on fire everything around you, to get at least some vengeance in advance.

    And when the punishment finally reaches you, you may be convinced that this is the fate which would have reached you anyway.

    As soon as it was internationally recognized, the Bosnian Serb Republic started crumbling and breaking to pieces the way Bosnia did after it had been internationally recognized. As if a rule had been established there according to which legality and reality are always out of step and you cannot have both, which is a result of the logic of force. The NATO intervention, apart from punishing the Serbs, was meant to help establish the ratio of forces, which would promise the implementation of the peace solution, i.e. have the Serbs withdraw to the designated area.

    The problem is that it is practically impossible to prescribe the correct dose for such an action, to have enough but not too much of it. One did not need to be Nostradamus to guess that Croats and Muslims would try to take the advantage and attack lines of Serb refugees. While Gen. Mladic was quarrelling about Sarajevo, his positions were being destroyed and central Bosnian towns were falling.

    This is beginning to look like a terrible avalanche that cannot be halted. Who will then give the Serbs the promised 49 percent; who will have the understanding for their additional cries for justice if they lose on the field more than they had gained and they gather on the strip by the Drina?

    During the long four years they had been building a dreadful image of themselves; Karadzic and Mladic had become personifications of brutal murderers, terrorists and arsonists, and the whole world watched the pictures of war crimes and listened to their cynical justifications. It takes much longer than a single day to change that image and before the world becomes aware that it should feel sorry for the Serbs, Croats and Muslims might do a lot of dirty business. The last thing Serbs needed at this moment was a visit by the Russian Duma delegation and a pile of empty promises and brotherly encouragement intended for the Russian internal scene. The Serbs' reliance on Russia and the attempts to have it clash with the West about the Balkans have resulted in nothing but the West's strengthened support of Croatia. In relation to the Serbs, the role of Russian nationalists may only be such as was the role of Belgrade nationalists---Milosevic's and Seselj's---in relation to the Serbs in Krajina. So much about Moscow's defence of Belgrade or Banjaluka.

    The size of Bosnian Serbs' defeat now depends largely on America, not only because it is capable of stopping NATO, but because it is perhaps also capable of controlling Croatian and Muslim ambitions and appetites. There is hope that America, in the interest of permanent stabilization in the Balkans, does not want to allow the Serbs' complete breakdown which would bring masses of new refugees to Serbia and lead to unrest and chaos in the center and perhaps a series of clashes on the borders. The question is whether any force can slow down the demoralization and deterioration of Karadzic's state and halt the unpredictable chain reaction.

    There is no hope, however, that the people here will ever completely sober up, learn to understand and accept the reasons for the defeat and find a vaccine against any future madness. Not many people here are ready to tell the real, self-accusing story and there is little hope that such a story may become official history. But whatever the official history may be, it must be better and healthier than the one which would be written about the Serbian victory in a war such as this one fought by Karadzic and Mladic in Bosnia. This is the only comforting thought this week.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", September 18, 1995


    One of the most renowned foreign policy commentators in Serbia, Aleksandar Nenadovic, wrote in the September 22, 1995, issue of the Belgrade weekly "NIN" about the current phase in the negotiations for finding peace in Bosnia, and its effects on Serbian politics.

    Conscious that in this Balkan mess they have made serious mistakes themselves, including inexcusable misses, the foreign mediating governments, seem to be in a hurry now to redeem themselves. In that name, under the auspices of UN and NATO, with ongoing reminders that the worst peace is better than armed violence with no limits, a bizarre combination was tailored for extinguishing the fire that threatens the security of the whole of the European continent: air strikes on Serbs, verbal warnings to Croats and Bosniaks, political and territorial compromise offers to all warring sides and enticing promises for the economic reconstruction of the whole region.

    With public protestations, but quiet, essential agreement of Russia, and with close cooperation of the Serbian president as the main linchpin and realiser among the Serbs, this Western cocktail without a precedent should forge a final abandonment of the war option in Croatia and Bosnia too.

    Discussing the effects of the obvious "end game" of the war on Serbian politics, Nenadovic says that the regime that has installed itself through the thundering political noise that the freedom has no price has precisely calculated that it has to protect itself and what is left of its gullible population though "peace at any price".

    New, sober reality is doing its part. It forces upon the demagogues of the military adventure at least tactical sobering up. But sobering that has been forced, first of all, by another's stronger military power could hardly be long-lasting and thorough. Even now, there are signs that the Serbian "eye to eye" with the new reality , which is, from Knin to Belgrade, mildly put discouraging, could be reduced to deepening of traumas which where shamelessly used for instigating and excusing deadly military adventureism. Very agile at this are, angry nationalistic nostalgics, rushing at the current regime, not because of its authoritarian self will, or for the responsibility for the war and sanctions, but because of the "national treason".

    Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN", September 22, 1995


    Regular commentator of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune", Luka Vincetic, discusses in the September 11, 1995 issue of the magazine the effects of the exile of the Serb population from Croatia.

    In the light of the messages of the Catholic church, says Vincetic, not one military victory should not lead the political leaders to such triumphalistic behaviour that has been given after the "Storm" to the Croatian public by the "Freedom train". Except the fact that this was a monster of self willed rule - this was, from the Christian standpoint of view, a dirty glossing up of a military success, similar to the ones of the Roman emperors, who ate and drank while exhausted defeated soldiers were wiggling under their feet.

    The exile of the Serbian population from Krajina is the tragedy of one part of the Croatian people in any case: whether we look at it this or that way, meaning whether we accuse the Croatian regime for it or sending a message through their misery that "every evil returns to the one that instigated it".

    Vincetic is of the opinion that Krajina Serbs "left" Croatia because this was a logical end of a situation, a sinful one, as they would say in the church, which did not know about tolerance, joint life, pluralism, modern concept of the state...

    But, even with all their chauvinistic madness even before HDZ came to power, it should not be said that the current Croatian regime attempted to dissuade "Serbian rebels" in their behaviour, but even if any Croatian authority behaved like a saint, it would "burn up" in Krajina anyway, since there was no place there for even a single Croat, let alone Croatian rule.

    Those are the facts, tragic and awful in themselves, as well as the fact of the exile of part of the people of one state is horror and evil, because it broke over the backs of innocent, helpless and honest ones. On both sides. As if all the Croats are cutthroats, murderers, Serb haters ,,, and all Serbs Chetniks, ruffians and madmen.

    For that reason, it is puzzling that so many media and some serious Catholics have accepted without any reservations the reports of the Croatian authorities that all reports of evil doings are malicious inventions.Something that seems to have been done so that every Serb looses any eventual notion for return to the homeland in Croatia.Something like Tudjman's words of "happy trails of Serbs from Krajina", should not have been welcomed by church bells.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", September 11, 1995


    NGO's and Peace organizations - Serbia

    Zarko Paunovic discusses in the September 1-15, 1995, issue of the Belgrade by-weekly "Republika" the reality of the situation among different civil and peace organizations in FRY, particularly Serbia.

    The author states that the number of these organizations is not great, but also, the number that does exist, unfortunately, does not represent a particular quality. This is best shown by the variety and number of activities of these organizations, as well as by their results. If they are not able to solve the problems for which they were formed, then they undertake those activities that enable them to, somehow, remain on the public scene.

    This "simulation of activities" is, as the author sees it, threefold: -Formation of new groups and organizations - The problem lies in the fact that new groups are formed from existing groups, by the people who have already been engaged in previous organizations. These new groups have similar or practically the same goals and programs as the groups they stemmed from. This produces more diminutive and small groups, consisting of same people, quarreling among themselves and closed for a wider circle of sympathizers and members. This situation creates an impression in the public of the strengthening of the alternative, but in reality leads to the weakening of those groups and de-motivation of potential sympathizers and members - Coordination syndrome - Many of these groups, which are sometimes a goal in themselves, who have small membership and do not know what to do, see their salvation in the possibility to coordinate the activities of all other groups.coordination of many things is necessary and useful, but it cannot be carried out by everybody. To even make it possible it is essential to have the organizations and groups which actually do something and there is something to coordinate.

    On the other hand, setting up of coordination can be very profitable, since international NGO's, particularly foundations, like to cooperate with only one instead wit all, through whom they can carry out their work and realize projects. The author cites the example of the humanitarian organization "Grana" from Belgrade, whose organizers made an agreement with other NGO humanitarian organizations about formation of an information centre, and then simply took of and left the country.

    - Preparation and realization of projects for the sake of abroad - Paunovic cites this as an almost dominant form of activity. Many groups and organizations are inclined to prepare projects which are more geared towards foreign foundations and sponsors then for domestic use. The largest part of this are administrative activities of writing projects, and after their fulfillment, writing of reports.Foreign projects which are realized in domestic arrangements bring numerous travels and seminars, to which local activists readily go to, but a problem arises when the question arises of organizing those locally or transferring the knowledge to others here, actually the purpose of those contacts and seminars.

    Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", September 1015, 1995


    Media

    Serbia
    Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" (author Ankica Vesic) writes in its issue of September 8, 1995. on the attempts to retake the regional independent weekly from Kragujevac (mid-Serbia) "Svetlost" by the regime.

    For three years the weekly "Svetlost" is a bone in the throat of the socialist power-holders in Kragujevac. For three years it cannot forgive itself for the speed and "thoughtlessness" with which it let the paper be privatized.The paper requested that anyway, bit, the decision to curtail its official financing was taken by the leadership of the county.This was done not because they wanted to be forthcoming to the request of the journalists, but because they were firmly convinced that "Svetlost" will cease to exist without thebudgetary money in a few months.

    Even though it had tough moments, "Svetlost" strengthened financially, which enabled it to peacefully and without anybodys influence, write independently, objectively and critically, not shying away from naming the occurrences and people with their actual names. In that manner, it drew to the side of the truth a great number of citizens of Kragujevac. This is what was actually bothering the Socialist oligarchy in Belgrade and Kragujevac - not "Svetlost" but the truth.

    And the truth was that Kragujevac was heading backwards, that it became true province, a nest of crime, contraband, overnight millionaires, a city of affairs, in which key roles are played exactly by its main politicians.Attaching to the name of the paper exactly what they were doing - threatening the social ownership, and wishing to hide away from the public all of its misses, stupidities, unlawfulness and other.

    In an attempt to kill the paper in any manner possible, and to do it overnight, the officials transformed the social company which did not exist for three years.On August 31, during the session of the county parliament, they made the strategy, passed it early in the morning by the sleepy representatives, realized it, verified in the county court the same day, sending its representatives immediately to take over the paper. The papers they sent were so rushed, that it was obvious that the decision was illegal.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", September 8, 1995


    Dossier:

    Croatia -Future position of the Serbs
    In its issue of September 11, Belgrade weekly "Vreme" (author Filip Schwarm), reported on the regular session of its "Round table", this time devoted to the future position of the Serbs in Croatia.

    Vreme on August 30 organized a round table on the position and future of Serbs who fled Croatia and the possibility of them returning to their homes. The participants in the round table were: Dusan Ecimovic---on behalf of the Initiative Board for Serbs' Return to Croatia, Jovan Vejnovic---ex-Yugoslav diplomat born in Knin, Dr. Konstantin Obradovic and Dr Gaso Knezevic---international public and private law experts at the Belgrade Law College, Dr. Vojislav Vukcevic---co-founder of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and General Secretary of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), and Sonja Biserko---representative of the Helsinki Human Rights Board.

    Dr. Knezevic: ``The right to ownership is guaranteed as a human right As regards the internal law, Croatia has a provision in its Constitution guaranteeing the right of property. Compared to the provisions of the other Constitutions adopted by states created on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, this provision is the best.

    But this, of course, does not have to mean anything, as practice has shown: In July 1991, Croatia passed an order infringing upon the right of property by banning firms headquartered in Serbia and Montenegro to dispose of their property in Croatia. Serbia reacted a month later with an even worse order, banning both legal and physical Croatian and Slovene entities the same right.

    The fact that the people have left those parts means nothing when ownership is in question. They remain the owners of real and movable property. Croatia, I am convinced, will not take a comprehensive measure, that is, pass a general act, to infringe upon that ownership by confiscating it. However, it has limited it already---it has banned the right to dispose of it. Croatia, therefore will not confiscate the property, but I think it will not be in the least willing to reimburse the damages through a fair court trial for a pile of ashes or to move out a Croatian national and return the house to its previous condition.

    The question arises who is responsible.I personally maintain that the problem of this property will be resolved through individual struggles and I am very pessimistic. When I say individual struggle, I mean thatea ch individual owner of Serbian origin will go to Croatia and prove his property is in question. His success will depend on the defendant and the plaintiff. Many do not know who burnt their house down. I doubt that Croatia as a state will be drawn into the litigation.

    What can professionally be done to help is to form an expert team, draft a project and see what legal bases exist to protect the property. That would be a great thing to do because it would provide at least legal instructions for those individuals on how to protect their rights better in Croatia, through Croatian lawyers.''

    Dr. Obradovic: `` According to the law of war, the Croatian army and state are called to account on behalf of all those acting in their name and on their behalf even if they are not members of the armed forces. The army which is advancing, which is conquering a certain territory, is obliged to protect everything that does not pertain to the military. The military property belongs to it,but the civilian does not. And it is called to account if it is not protected.

    So, what is in question here are serious violations of the Geneva conventions, particularly since this war has gone beyond the limits of an internal conflict in character and become a combination of an international and internal conflict. Croatia's responsibility should exist and it should be obliged to make reparations to these people. But someone has to negotiate on their behalf---a state would be best. FR of Yugoslavia could be that state: it could resort to one technicality: the 1976 Citizenship Law and, under it, proclaim these people its citizens and then, at least when property is in question, act in their behalf and seek reparations.

    Ecimovic: ``This May, after the flash in Western Slavonija, a lot of the people who sobered up from the fear and the panic and began reporting to the High Commissioner and the Red Cross in Banjaluka and Belgrade and saying they wanted to go home. Some of them got in touch with the Croatian Bureau. The Croatian side said it had nothing against their return and that they should make lists. A list with 95 names was submitted and all of the signatories were approved return. But then, the whole thing halted on the Serbian side: Karadzic wanted to settle the people from Western Slavonija in the Bosnian Krajina, Martic and Hadzic wanted them in Eastern Slavonija, while Serbia furtively, to tell the truth, was thinking of moving them to Kosovo. We planned that they return by the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. Croatian Internal Minister Ivan Jarnjak's cabinet guaranteed their safe passage. UN official in Zagreb Paolo Rafone worked on it. He visited Belgrade in an effort to talk with the Serbian authorities, Radmilo Bogdanovic for example---but in vain.

    The greatest problem was how to ensure their safety on part of the highway through Eastern Slavonija---from Lipovac to Batrovac. We knew Hadzic would let those people pass only if Serbia ordered him to. As this did not happen, the idea of returning to Western Slavonija died out and failed. These people, however, still want to return home.''

    Dr. Vukcevic: ``I think Eastern Slavonija could now be the polygon for making up what has been lost. Only partially, however, and much more painstakingly. Eastern Slavonija (I sincerely hope there will be no armed conflict there) will in the future see those who left it gradually coming back. It remains to be seen whether this will happen after Plan Z 4 is signed---which I doubt.

    However, this draft plan is liable to changes. I cannot say now how many and what kind of changes in regard to the actual situation will be made. However, there is no doubt that Eastern Slavonija will induce the resolution of a dual question: the return of Serbian refugees to where they came from and of Croatian refugees to Eastern Slavonija.''

    Dr. Obrad ovic: ``From the formal, legal point of view, Croatia had urbi et orbi declared: ``Stay, do not go! You have now left of your own free will, I wave to you, good-bye!'' This means that the international community cannot force Croatia to enable the return of the Krajina refugees.

    On the other hand, the following question arises: who will speak on behalf of those people, who will negotiate with Croatia. The structures of their authorities which Croatia does not recognize and considers them piratical and rebellious, have fallen apart by themselves. In view of the behavior of the Knin authorities, no one now has the impudence to impose them as the negotiators. FR of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has washed its hands of the Krajina issue. It never formally recognized Krajina. It would not be proper if it stepped out to represent them now.

    The first step would be that the refugees somehow organize themselves and then be represented by some new people, who will be able to win at least a kind of observer status at the future peace conferences. For, unless the Yugoslav and Croatian regimes have the political will to organize their return, this is the only alternative. It is my impression that the international community is not very interested in raising this question. It is for now prepared to sweep everything under the rug, just so the war ends, that is the most important thing for them.

    International law is actually formed on the basis of practice. First we have practice and then the people sit down and think of ways of resolving a question. This question has no previous practice. For, when the Geneva conventions and additional protocols were drawn up, no one had the faintest idea that something like ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia could happen.''

    Biserko: ``Besides this action toward Croatia through the international community, an action must be conducted in respect to these authorities. First of all, the refugees' status in FR of Yugoslavia should be regulated. Second, the authorities should urge their return to Croatia on the international level and, third, institutions capable of resolving these problems should be found. I believe that CSCE, i.e. OSCE, might be useful. Moreover, since Croatia has assumed the obligation to let in an OSCE mission. So, there is a committee for minority collective rights.''

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", September 11, 1995


    Croatia - The position of Serbs

    In the September 1 1995, issue of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", Tatjana Tagirov discusses the new Croatian law concerning the property of exiled Serbs from the Republic.

    The announced confiscation of the property of exiled Serbs, will get a legal form if the proposed text is accepted at the forthcoming session of the Croatian parliament. According to the experience so far, such an outcome should not be doubted.

    Questions arise after reading only the first few provisions. The first category of confiscated property is the one of the Serbs who have recently left Krajina. The other grab concerns the Serbs and Montenegrins - the citizens of (then still) Socialist REpublic of Croatia, since their "absence" is counted from the date when the Serb rebellion in Krajina started (august 1990.) - who have left anywhere - Serbia, Hungary, US, Mars or hell. The third grab concerns those Serbs and Montenegrins and other non-Croats who have, during the duration of "brotherhood and unity" built their weekend homes, or had property (even family property), and have moved to then Eastern part of the Country.

    As the paragraph 4, of article 2, states: The provisions of this law concern the property which is co-owned by citizens of Republic of Croatia and persons who are not Croat citizens".

    Defining a preclusive term for the owners of the property, along with giving conditions which are impossible to fulfill (since the return in the current situation is impossible), represents a legal nonsense and an offer which actually does not exist. The LAw represents a malicious fiction for all Serbs owners of the property and exiled from the territory of Croatia. For those who will be able to do the impossible and jump over all the hurdles of this Law, there is a long and uncertain procedure ahead.

    Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", September 1, 1995


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