BALKAN MEDIA & POLICY MONITOR

NEWS AND ANALYSIS DIGEST

ISSUE 13/14 VOL 2 June 8, 1995.


IN THIS ISSUE:

The current situation in Croatia
  • The independent news pool "AIM", presented on June 8 1995. an article from one of its Belgrade correspondents, Dragan Cicic and assessment on the new developments in the Serb political circles in Krajina, particularly Eastern Slavonia.

  • Independent Split weekly"Feral Tribune" carried in its issue of May 29,1995. a report by Drago Hedl on the possible atrocities committed during the Croatian offensive in Western Slavonia.

  • In its issue of June 19, 1995, Zagreb weekly "Globus" published an extensive poll it has conducted among the Serb population in Western Slavonia after this region has been re-taken by Croatia.

  • Belgrade radio station "B92" reported on June 11,1995. about a recent conference in Paris entitled "The economic development of the Balkans and Southeastern Europe".

  • Comments and Analyses
  • Commentator of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", Davor Butkovic, wrote in that magazine's issue of May 26, 1995. on the possibility of a new Conferences on former Yugoslavia, and speculations that it would formalize the change of borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  • The possibility of new, wider military developments is also discussed by Marinko Culic in the May 29, issue of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune".

  • Independent Skopje weekly "Makedonsko Delo", published in its issue of June 9, a commentary on various advice given from abroad to Macedonia concerning its internal and external policies.

  • The weekly international edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje", carried in its June 8-15, issue a transcript of an article from Novi Sad (Vojvodina) independent weekly "Nezavisni", by the leader of the Vojvodina "League of Social Democrats", Nenad Canak, concerning the possibility of a civil war in Serbia.

  • Belgrade independent daily "Nasa Borba" brought a profile by Dragoljub Petrovic of the Milosevic's negotiator in the UN hostage crisis, Jovica Stanisic, head of the Serbian security service.


  • Strategic considerations
  • Foreign policy commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, examines in that magazine's issue of May 19 the reality of the theory that Moscow has intentions to make a military port in the Boka kotorska bay in Montenegro.


  • Serbia - the questions of minorities, nationalism...
  • Belgrade weekly "Vreme" in their issues of May 15 and 22 had as key themes detailed reports on two burning questions -the relations between the regime and the minorities in Serbia and nationalism, this second theme base on excerpts from a book by Dusan Kecmanovic, titled "The Mass psychology of Nationalism".


  • Interviews
  • Belgrade weekly "Vreme", published in its issue of May 22, an interview with Joze Pirjevec, professor of history at the University on Padova, Italy, who recently published his fourth thematic book tied with the region of former Yugoslavia, called "The Serbs, Croats, Slovenians - the history of three nations".

  • Split weekly "Feral Tribune" brought in its issue of June 5 an interview with Dragutin Hlad, a former Croatian emigre, and later official of the ruling HDZ party, who has recently, after dissatisfaction, left its ranks.


  • THE POLITICAL STANCE AND INVOLVEMENT OF
    THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
  • Last month saw the publication of a series of articles in the press of Serbia and Montenegro which deal with the political stance and involvement of the Serbian Orthodox church, stimulated by the more and more evident rift between the Orthodox church and the authorities in Serbia, concerning the handling of the Bosnian Serbs and the relation towards the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here we present a digest of some of the more indicative of the articles published.

  • The similar theme of the moderate and"hawkish" line in the Serbian Orthodox church is explored in the Sunday edition of the Belgrade independent daily "Nasa Borba" of June 3-4, by Ejub Stikovac.

  • "Nasa Borba" published a joining article in the same issue by Nikola Todorovic, concerning the situation in the churches "across the river Drina".


  • The current situation in Croatia

    The independent news pool AIM, presented on June 8 1995. an article form one of its Belgrade correspondents, Dragan Cicic and assessment on the new developments in the Serb political circles in Krajina, particularly Eastern Slavonia.

    Cicic says that the area of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, known as "Sector East" will probably proclaim independence if the proclaimed unification of Bosnian and Krajina Serbs is carried through. This has been stated by Goran Hadzic, an almost forgotten political figure, who went from the media limelight after he lost the elections in Krajina. Before that, he has taken over the presidential seat of the unrecognized Krajina state from Milan Babic, after the refusal to accept the "Vance plan", when Babic fell out of Milosevic's grace. Hadzic, who has always been close to the Serbian president, is now returning "through the large door", onto the local political scene. He has formed the "Coordinating committee for Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem".

    Members of this committee are also some other officials from Sector East, including all the presidents of the local counties. Hadzic insists that the newly formed body is only serving the purpose stated in its name: coordination. We don't want commanders from Pale - the county presidents in Eastern Slavonia simply want to cooperate more effectively among themselves through an institution like this one, says Hadzic. - This necessity arose mostly because we are not territorially tied with the rest of the Krajina territory. Along with that,on the example of Western Slavonia, we became convinced that the government in Knin does not care adequately for its territories.

    such statements, says Cicic, do not leave a room for doubts. His committee sent a letter to the political top in Knin, in which it warns it that "the urgent separate unification of the "Serbian Republic" and the "Republic of Serb Krajina" represents an act which is not in the function of the fulfillment of this basic goal, but actually leads do new, harmful divisions in the Serbian nation, and is actually in the function of political in-fighting of the Pale leadership and Seselj's Radicals with the legal leadership in Serbia and Fr Yugoslavia".

    The further go on saying that the decision on the unification is "in the function of breaking up of Krajina, since it is natural that slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (SBZS) will not bring into question their ties with Vojvodina, Serbia and Yugoslavia".

    The same letter says that "self-will, bullying behaviour, stimulation of the lynch politics through ordered demonstrations, drastic violation of the constitutional order and the legal system and similar,are present in everyday activities in the western part of Krajina, but will not be tolerated in (SBZS)".

    Lastly:

    " We have no intention to put our military, human, natural and production resources under the command of Pale, since this would be a sure way into a tragedy of this area and these people".
    This distancing from Knin still does not have an institutional form. Hadzic firmly insists that his coordinating committee does not have some purely political functions and will not have them in the future. But... - If a break with Serbia is to come about, some other body would be formed, with different ingerencies - says Hadzic.

    This body would have a primary goal to organize a referendum in these areas if the unification goes through. On it, the population of this region would state whether it accepts the unification. Even though this referendum is not imminent, the preparations for it have already been made. The local population is already thinking hard how to position itself in case that Knin and Pale proclaim the new state anyway.

    Most of the people say that they have made their decision. - We will never act against the interests of Serbia, Knin and Pale are far, and Belgrade is near - Such opinions are supported by almost everybody, from the officers to factory secretaries. They stress that they are not against all-Serb unification in principle, but this is not the moment for it.Hadzic insists that ninety nine percent of the population here thinks that we cannot go on without Serbia. The remaining one percent also knows this, but is under the influence of Pale and some oppositionary parties from Belgrade.

    Answering the accusations from Knin that he is actually the transmission of the Belgrade politics, and the official one at that, the Eastern Slavonain leader states that the Serbian regime re elected by the people, whose will he has to respect: 300 thousand Serbs from Krajina do not have the right to impose its will on 10 million Serbs in Serbia.

    It seems, says the author, that the result of the referendum would be such that the roads of Knin and Eastern Slavonia would separate. Hadzic insists that this would not mean a proclamation of a new state on the territory of Sector East. The sixth article of the Declaration on unification brought by Krajina says that the unification will proceed only if it is not against the interests of FRY - insists Hadzic - the breaking of this principle would mean that Krajina is seceding. The support that Hadzic enjoys in the area is conditioned, first of all, by the positions of Belgrade,which always had a much greater impact in slavonia than further West.

    An important role in spreading this interest is played not only by the closeness of Serbia, but also by three local radio stations, which have a programs with a clear profile. Many observers assess that the impact on those who have not decided yet is payed by the presence of Arkan and his "Tigers".

    Zeljko Raznatovic has, after a long period, returned to Erdut, where he has organized a new base. It is equipped with anti-aircraft guns, which are not placed towards the separation lines with the Croatian army. The base is secured by heavily armed commandos in black uniforms, who, under full equipment, march through Eastern Slavonia. Mr. Hadzic, whose adviser Arkan used to be, rejects the possibility that these units are a warning to the local population. "I know nothing on their presence, I only met Arkan accidentally a few days ago," said Hadizc to the author.

    Source: Independent news pool "AIM", through "B92" e-mail service, June 8,1995.


    Independent Split weekly carried in its issue of May 29,1995. a report by Drago Hedl on the possible atrocities committed during the Croatian offensive in Western Slavonia.

    Hedl says that at the graveyard in Okucani the spot that the UN experts have marked as a possible mass grave is quite visible. Freshly dug earth in the form of an rectangle 15 meters long and 10 meters wide,can be found at the Northwest part of the graveyard. The tracks of bulldozers with which the earth was levelled, are still visible, even though a lot of rain fell at the time Hedl visited.The spot is not guarded and can be reached easily.

    A 65. year old pensioner from Okucani insists he was an eyewitness to what happened. He told that he heard shots and screams, sometime around midnight on April 30., a night before the action of the Croatian army started. A group of civilians, soldiers among them, he insists, finding out what is to happen, attempted to run away during the night across the bridge on the river Sava into Bosnia. He says that they were shot,in the attempt to prevent them, the special units from Knin and Banja Luka. The bodies lay scattered until the Croatian army entered Okucani, and buried them in the mass grave.

    Hedl then visited the other location mentioned in the foreign press reports, in Vrbovljani, where freshly dug , and then levelled earth is visible. It resembles two larger graves, located one next to the other. Here though, the magazine's photographer was questioned by the patrol of the military police.Hedl says that near the grave are visible signs of a military battle: parts of military uniform and destructed weapons, as well as a lot of empty ammunition shells.

    The author then points out to the visible discrepancies given by high Croatian officials (minister of defence Susak, and deputy prime minister Ivica Kostovic) as to the number of killed Serb nationals in this offensive. While Susak mentioned 350 killed in his statement in front of the Croatian parliament, Kostovic gave the number of 188 people at an official press conference. This discrepancy, as well as obscure level of information given out by the regime, obviously forced by the pressure of the news presented in the foreign media, open the possibility for various questions and interpretations.

    One of those is that the two locations pointed out by UN experts, in Okucani and Vrbovljani, are intentionally so visible, so that it would seem that Croatian authorities are not hiding anything. According to these sources, it is only a matter of :"real cover up" of possible mass graves near the cities and villages of Covac, Smrtic, Medare, Paklenica, Raic and Jasenovac.

    One of the Croatian organizations which oversees the respect of human rights insists that it has the data that a possible mass grave can be found in Gornja Trnava, halfway between Okucani and Nova Gradiska. According to the statement of an older Serbian person, the largest number of civilians was killed in the panicked run towards the bridge in Nova Gradiska. There was a cue of cars, tractors and other civilian vehicles, but among them were also military vehicles - tanks, transporters and other, so the Croatian army shot at them.

    Hedl asks whether minister used a "free expression" to show the superiority of the Croatian army, or did deputy prime minister Kostovic lower the numbers , as well as other relevant and unanswered questions concerning the opinions of UN experts and other obscured details of this action, to which there seam to be no available answers of the moment. It could be highly unpleasant for Croatia, concludes Hedl, if it would come out that the "lightning" had its dark side.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", May 29, 1995.


    In its issue of June 19, 1995, Zagreb weekly "Globus" published an extensive poll it has conducted among the Serb population in Western Slavonia after this region has been re-taken by Croatia.

    Dr. josip Zupanov, who headed the research and wrote the comments, says that the polling was riddled with problems. In Pakrac, the pollers were able to find members of the Serbian population only in the area of the local unit "Gavrinica", and the nearby village of Seovici, at the places were citizenship documents and certificates for re-settlement out of Croatia were being issued. There, they heard statements about Croatia being an Ustashi state, in which nothing good expects them, but also statements of loyalty to the newly arrived officials.

    The greater number of the polled were men. Women were seen mostly on the road, awaiting the announced return of their husbands, sons and brothers from the "collection centers" in Varazdin and Bjelovar. They accepted the conversation, but not to be polled. They will form their opinions only when their whole family is gathered. Here are the the results of the poll:

  • Asked which party is most acceptable to you in Croatia,

    the polled gave the equal share to the ruling HDZ and the Serbian SNS party - 14.2 %. The key oppositionary party HSLS got 4.2 %.

    -The title of the most acceptable politician was shared by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Serbian politician Milan Djukic - 16.7%. The oppositionary politician Drazen Budisa and prominent Serbian politician Milorad Pupovac each got 5.0%.

  • Asked whether they consider Croatia of today as an Ustashi state,

    17.5% said yes, 58.3% said no, 9.2% answered that they did not know and 15.% did not want to give an answer.

  • Asked what do they feel towards Croatia, the answers were as following:

    fear - 22.5%, hatred 0.8%, mistrust 38.3%, no feelings 19.2%.

  • Do you think that the citizens of Serbian nationality, after the introduction of Croatian rule in Western slavonia, will have all the rights guaranteed by the Croatian constitution:

    yes was an answer of 23.3%, no of 24.2%, and 51.7% did not know.

  • How would you describe the behaviour of the Croatian police and army after the operation "Lightening":

    Fair 39.2%, Rough 5 %, Individuals actedbadly - 50.8%, no answer 5%.

  • Would you agree that your children go to Croatian schools and be thought Croatian educational programme:

    yes 20.8%, no 30.8%, don't know 35.8*, no answer 12.6%.

  • Would you like the reconstruction of Yugoslavia:

    yes 49.2%, no 15.8%, don't know 30%, no answer 5%.

    Besides this, very characteristic were the response to the question "Why do you think the rebellion against Croatian rule occurred?". The largest part(33,3%) said that the Serbian nationals did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, 31,7 said that they were afraid of the terror, and only 13,3% said that the rebellion was organized by JNA and Belgrade.

    Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", June 19,1995.


    Belgrade radio station B92 reported on June 11,1995. about a recent conference in Paris entitled "The economic development of the Balkans and Southeastern Europe", bringing, among other things, excerpts from the presentation of the former President of the Communist party of Yugoslavia (from Croatia), Stipe Suvar, who discussed the demographic results of the Yugoslav cataclysm.

    According to Suvar,now a professor in Zagreb, so far on the territory of former Yugoslavia at least 150,00 people died, 250,000 were injured. Suvar said that he gathered the data for his study on the basis of already published data in domestic and foreign sources, and on the basis of his personal documentation. Among these people, the largest number belongs to Muslims, then Serbs and then Croats, states Suvar.

    Under the pressure of war, or the economic and social conditions, two and half million people have moved away (most from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then Croatia), and the policies of ethnic cleansing and so called humane resettlement have lead to ethnic homogenization of the newly formed states and para-states.

    Due to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of Serbs in that republic has been brought down from 1,3 million to 700,000 people, and Croats from 750 thousand to 400 thousand, says Suvar in his analysis.

    The number of people eligible for military service who have left the territory of former Yugoslavia has so far reached the number of 700 thousand. From Serbia that number amounts to 300 thousand, and from Croatia 100 thousand. At least half a million of highly and high educated people moved out of the territory of former Yugoslavia in their most productive age, mostly to West European countries.

    The number of employed on the whole territory of former Yugoslavia has been reduces from 6.7 million to three million people, and of those three million, 900,00 people (30 %) is employed in nine armies and six police forces. On every employed there is one pensioner. The unemployment has reached endemic proportions: in Slovenia, 130,00 people are looking for a job, in Croatia 260,00, in FRY over 750,00, in Macedonia around 200,000. The number of unproductive employed is also very high. In the states on the territory of former Yugoslavia around two million people are receiving aid from humanitarian organizations, and half a million social aid.

    Making an assessment of the demographic situation in the republics of former Yugoslavia, Suvar said that Slovenia will be a state which, for a long time, will not have more than two million people, of which 98 % will be Slovens. In Croatia, no matter how the Krajina problem will be solved, Serbs will amount to 4 % of the population, and Croats to 95 %, estimates Suvar.

    According to his opinion, Vojvodina has already become "more Serbian than it ever was", but the ratio of Serbs and Montenegrins in the overall population of Kosovo will be on further decline, "in spite of the proclamations of new colonization". "Slovenians,Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Muslims will not settle and employ in each others states anymore, but all of them will, some more, some less, re-settle in the world, said Suvar in his study presented at this Paris conference.

    Source: Independent Belgrade Radio "B92", through its daily e-mail service., June 11, 1995.


    Comments and Analyses

    Usually well informed commentator of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", Davor Butkovic, wrote in that magazine's issue of May 26, 1995. on the possibility of a new Conferences on former Yugoslavia, and speculations that it would formalize the change of borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Presenting the above statement, Butkovic says that he got such information from a high ranking Croatian diplomat.

    According to this source, this information was a part of discussions during the recent tenure of US negotiator Robert Frasure in Belgrade, during one of his attempt to persuade Serbian president Slobodan milosevic to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    The information says that Frasure has offered Milosevic very favorable conditions for the recognition of Bosnia. The proposal though, according to Butkovic, contains an obligation that Milosevic has still hard time swallowing - and that is the stricter control of the Yugoslav border towards Bosnia and Croatia. Butkovic insists that this control of the borders is the main reason that the agreement on the Bosnian recognition has not been arranged.

    The unaimed Croatian diplomatic sources also told Butkovic that the oil embargo is another sticking point - Russia is supporting the Yugoslav demand that its lifting be included in the package, while US and Germany are still against that possibility.

    The hard part for the Bosnian government seems to lie in the fact that under the current proposal, it would be obliged to formally accept the dual Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would comprise the Muslim?croat federation and the Serbian part of Bosnia. It is true, says Butkovic, that it has already accepted this condition, but this was at the time when the Muslim and Croat side accepted everything, knowing that the Serbian side will refuse. Acceptance of this condition now, would mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina would only formally retain its external borders, and that it will actually disintegrate.

    Croatian foreign policy circles which Butkovic cites estimate that the goal of the whole Frasure negotiating process is not the actual search for the lasting solution for Bosnia with the act of recognition itself, but the separation of Milosevic from Martic(in Croatia) and Karadzic (in Bosnia), and later, attempting to find the solution through pressure on isolated and weakened Bosnian and Croat Serbs.This is the reason why the pending recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Belgrade is not creating a lot of excitement in the Croatian diplomatic circles.

    Zagreb diplomatic circles actually think that the Contact group plan will practically fall through soon, and that in a short period, a new conference on former Yugoslavia will be convened, something that Croatian president Tudjman has already accepted. They also think that it will be the German and French diplomacies will define the content of this new conference, which will be held by the end of this year at the latest.

    Butkovic's source was of the opinion that conference will have the significance of the Berlin Congress or Yalta for the region of former Yugoslavia. At it, the international factors will come out with the final proposal for the solution of the crisis, which will be hard to refuse for any of the parties. This proposal will not respect the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    The source said that the proposal probably will not respect the borders of Croatia either, but that Croatia is strong enough not to accept any change of its borders, something Bosnia and Herzegovina might be forced to. If this conference is not held, and if Yugoslavia does not recognize Croatia, something Croatia is not counting much on at the moment, the military option becomes open again. The source told Butkovic that Croatia will not tolerate status quo and that until the end of the year it will undertake wider military actions. Butkovic estimates that such a turn of events leaves in front of Croatian diplomacy only a series of bad solutions.

    Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", May 26, 1995.


    The possibility of new, wider military developments is also discussed by Marinko Culic in the May 29, issue of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune".

    Culic asks where is Croatia after the action in Western Slavonia and is one marching step forward paid by two steps back for Croatian diplomacy , stating that this is exactly what happened, even though some Croatian representatives are stating that the dust has settled quickly.

    The author says that it could be speculated that it was quietly accepted that Western Slavonia, as the " most Croatian" among the former zones, due to the composition of its population and to its mood, could be re-integrated by a short - cut that would not be accepted elsewhere. But, at the same time, it was repeated too often for it to be considered a coincidence, that a test of peaceful ingrowing and joint life of Croatian majority with Serb minority is being passed in the triangle Jasenovac- Gradiska - Pakrac.

    But the mass exodus of Serbs across Sava river (something that seems to have been eagerly waited for by Karadzic and Milosevic, who are competing who will eject mote Croats from Bosnian Krajina and Baranja and Eastern Slavonia), shows that current policy simply is not able to realize this. Stretched between new considerations towards the other nation and old considerations towards its own, it will always choose the latter, because it thinks that its destiny does not depend on the former, while it has solid proof that it is not wise to confront the latter.

    If even the most superficial "scholarly" analysis can show that from the start there is no will for co-existence even in the highest bodies in Zagreb, on the contrary, new verbal abuse against Serbian representatives in the Parliament are tolerated, then only a miracle can happen that Mazowiecki could return from Western Slavonia wit a positive report, and Goldstone leave for the Hague without a set of files with new suspects.

    It should be remembered, says Culic, that Zagreb has not felt any repercussions for such "deviations". Actually it was privileged in this respect, but drawn from something that impeded it heavily - Croatia is not guaranteed, but is being delayed over and over again its right for territorial integrity, which it is then "compensated" by not being pressed for the respect of the rights of minorities (Serbian first of all, but others too).

    Culic cites the opinion of a foreign diplomat in Zagreb who said that since the arrival of the UN troops , the situation in Croatia has not been more hopeless than today, after the action in Western Slavonia, suggesting that the Croatian state top tied its own hands for anything else than new wars, "limited" or not.

    The author suggests that such a choice has already been made and that the only the best moment is being awaited. Some estimates even think this might happen before the summer is well on the way, particularly if the "unification" between Martic and Karadzic goes through. the others, are awaiting the possible new conference on former Yugoslavia, and its possible failure, for another "lightning".

    But even if this does not happen, there is a lingering impression that on the fifth anniversary of its statehood, Croatia is standing in front of the second half of a first decade without any idea how to step into it. Because, if only war remains, now or later, maybe even the wider circle of people will finally start asking: is a ten year Serb-Croat war awaiting us? And, is there actually no way to evade this ?, concludes Culic.

    Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", May 29, 1995.


    Macedonia

    Independent Skopje weekly "Makedonsko Delo", published in its issue of June 9, a commentary on various advice given from abroad to Macedonia concerning its internal and external policies.

    The act of opening the former communist countries to the West means, in principle, to undertake wide responsibility for the governing a country and for securing a system that functions equally for all. Of course, this can by no means completely eliminate the practice of having one or more countries, which are likely to use their position for interests narrower than those of the entire community, dominate in these institutions.

    Moreover, the domination of great powers and their mutually conflicting interests often cause damage to other countries and this is the exact reason for today's efforts to reduce their influence and power. The example of the former Yugoslavia and even more of Bosnia- Herzegovina are very obvious examples of this. In this context the case of Macedonia has several specific features which are mainly due to the internal chaos in the country itself.

    Several international institutions, such as the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, are currently present in Macedonia, accompanied by numerous non- governmental international institutions which are specialized in various fields. The funny thing here is that Macedonia is not a member of these institutions - indeed, it is a UN member, but admitted without its name and national symbols. All this has created conditions for relative international control, that is, the two-way manipulation with Macedonia.

    The first is the fact that Macedonia, despite all promises so far, has still not been granted a full OSCE membership due to a veto by Greece, and the second is the fact that the principle of consensus, functioning the way it does, puts candidates for membership in a far from equal position.

    Moreover, the control conducted by the OSCE in Macedonia seems irrelevant, as Macedonia can freely neglect all objections and remarks by this organization of which it is not a member. The case with the Council of Europe is even more specific. Regardless of the real situation in the country, Macedonia was eager to accept the advice of the Council in regard to its new Constitution, especially those reflecting the rights of minorities. All this was accepted with blind-folded eyes and without a consideration for the possible consequences of such a constitutional definition of the minorities living here, which continue to present one of Macedonia's biggest problems today.

    In fact, the attention of international missionaries in Macedonia is mostly turned towards the minorities, particularly the Albanians in the country, who act as if they were the only population in the country. The Macedonian government policy of constant concessions toward them resulted, among other things, in an urgent population census conducted in as many as 6 languages. Although the census was verified by international monitoring teams who were able to see for themselves the concrete domination of the Macedonian population, the very same monitors continue to speculate and manipulate with the number of Albanians living in Macedonia.

    The so-called Albanian-language university in Tetovo brought to a paradox the involvement of the international missionaries, especially through Gert Arens and Max Van der Stoel who, depending on the position from which they speak, tend to relate the right of such an institution to the extreme.

    At times, they call on the government to allow such a university, while at other times they warn that the established educational system must be respected. The report of an OSCE official immediately after the incident in Mala Recica is especially interesting; he hastened to report of a large number of injured and killed Albanians (?!).

    The Macedonian government allows itself to be blackmailed by almost all sides, but the roots of this are the officially admitted promises to the Albanians for a university in their mother tongue; the promise was confirmed by the British Foreign Office and the PDP leader himself, who revealed that Gligorov had promised the Albanians a university. What is otherwise characteristic of the Council of Europe is that it kept saying, over the past two years, that Macedonia will be admitted to the Council "by the end of the year", since such issues are not resolved by a consensus there.

    Nevertheless, the impression is that the relations between the current Macedonian government and the international institutions changed after the second elections. The official delegations of OSCE, the Council of Europe and others servedas a perfect cover for the thwarted elections with their reports on "regularity" of the elections. The authorities in Macedonia maximally used the fact that the international community closed one eye to the elections. But the boycott of the opposition was obviously something no one counted on.

    As a result, the report of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali questioning the regularity of the elections aroused bitter attacks on the Secretary General's report (explained, by the way, by no regime media) and on international factors in general, which, as they said, "are not necessarily objective".

    So, as long as Mr. Gligorov and the other segments of the government were able to make use of the international factors in covering their misdoings, everything was quite all right. But all of a sudden, the Macedonian public saw a television interview of Mr. Frckovski in which he explained, in an expert way, that the international observers, having considered the Macedonian case only 20 minutes before they landed at the Skopje airport, are not competent to state objective opinions on the situation in Macedonia.

    Comments in certain regime media, attacking the British MP's for stating "standpoints prepared beforehand", resembled attitudes often met in comments made by the Serbian ruler Milosevic, who could not care less for what the world thinks of his acts. What seems to be forgotten here is that the same world is unanimous in attacking Milosevic for his role and his actions. Regime- inclined papers even attacked members of the Macedonian parliament for failing to coordinate their views prior to the session.

    It sounded like all of them were supposed to say that life in Macedonia is just wonderful. And like foreigners coming to Macedonia must not have "standpoints prepared beforehand" on the fact ,easily seen from far away, that the Macedonian Parliament has no opposition. In conclusion, Macedonian public opinion is not only manipulated by all kinds of world missionaries (some of them are indeed to be skeptic about), but also by the Macedonian government. The latter manipulates the nation through the international community, but it also manipulates within the community, which at times serves the purpose of deceiving the public, only to be brought down the next moment for "not being competent" to bring judgments about Macedonia.

    Source: Skopje weekly "Makedonsko Delo", June 9, 1995.


    The weekly international edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje", carried in its June 8-15, issue a transcript of an article from Novi Sad (Vojvodina) independent weekly "Nezavisni", by the leader of the Vojvodina "League of Social Democrats", Nenad Canak, concerning the possibility of a civil war in Serbia.

    The possibility of civil war in Serbia is being discussed for sometime, explained by the thesis that "everything must end where it started, in Serbia", begins his analysis Canak. The problem all the time was that it was not possible to define the potential sides in such a war and that the starting point was the assumption that this conflict would essentially have to be between "position and opposition". Nobody thought about "the bad guys in their own ranks".

    Serbia never defined its relations with "Serb Republic of Krajina" and "Serbian Republic"(in Bosnia). Those regions are not formally part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which by definition means that they are outside of FRY, that they are regions of other states. In spite of this, it is a usual practice that soldiers from those regions move freely in the FRY in uniforms of their armies, often armed. From that follows that the relation towards this "abroad" is not the same as some other, since I never saw in my country, says Canak, not one armed soldier of another state except them (UNPROFOR does not count anyway).

    Then the political conflict came. The "president of SR"(Karadzic) was not allowed to enter FRY (which does not apply to his soldiers). FRY will not militarily support "SR", the army of "SR", like the rest of the population will start to suffer. The only one that supported them in their "justified struggle" is the president of the "Serbian Radical Part" (Seselj), who has already, in that name, organized gigantic meetings of solidarity.

    What will "duke Mladic" do when he, due to lack of support from FRY,starts loosing in the battlefield ? Where can he retreat, except over the river Drina ? It is clear that "duke Seselj" will be there waiting for him. And what when at that moment, the two "dukes" start squaring the accounts with "serbs of lesser quality who have betrayed the Serbian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina!?

    Anyway, if you can threaten London and Washington (which you cannot reach, or even throw a stone onto), what can you do in Belgrade with all the practice through the years on Sarajevo. A part of the units of the Army of Yugoslavia (in recent times strongly indoctrinated with Serbian nationalistic mythomany) would definitely join "the quality Serbs". The police would also split on the same crazy principle into the "forces loyal to Serbia" (Milosevic's artistic name) and the "forces loyal to Serbdom" (the working pseudonym of the triumvirate Karadzic-Mladic-Seselj).

    Those "forces" would kill each other with unseen brutality as a morbid proof that in these wars, from the actual beginning, it was not the question of "Serbia" or "Serbdom", but that this was all only an unscrupulous fight for power.

    It is clear that the "forces loyal to Serbdom" would prevail. In spite of the unseen skill of the Serbian TV to turn obvious defeats into victories, it would be hard to explain to the viewers that their , until yesterday,"threatened brothers on the left side of the river Drina", now represent the danger for Serbia which has to be resisted with arms.The mobilization of reservists would be completely boycotted, and those that would be caught anyway, would run away from the conflict or would give up.

    An enormous wave of refugees would start towards the countries of Western Europe and America.. Would the encounter in belgrade end with Milosevic running away from the country or serious bargaining, at this moment is not even important.

    On the road to Belgrade fear and terror would spread, and those on the way that think differently would be physically liquidated. The sanctions of the international community, which are being applied in a stricter manner, and probably additional ones are on the way, are favouring this turn of events. Dissatisfaction is rising within Serbia due to the "stubbornness of Bosnian Serbs".

    In "SR" the dissatisfaction is on the rise due to "treason", and famine is knocking on all the doors. After the collapse of the ambitious dream of overtaking SFRY through the overtake of the former communist party and the defeat of the "shortened Yugoslavia", Milosevic now only rules exhausted Serbia. Does that mean that his next step in the lowering of ambitions is "return to base", meaning the Belgrade party committee (this time it would be called "Belgrade county")?

    If these were "those times", Seselj would "hang himself" in jail, or would be "eliminated during a breakout attempt". No Seselj, no welcoming committee for Mladic. It is not a question whether Milosevic would dare to do this in a case of need, but whether he is able to do that anymore.

    Source: International weekly edition of Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje", June 8-15, 1995.(transcript of Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni").


    Belgrade independent daily "Nasa Borba" brought a profile by Dragoljub Petrovic of the Milosevic's negotiator in the UN hostage crisis, Jovica Stanisic, head of the Serbian security service.

    The chief of the Department of State security of Serbia, Jovica Stanisic, who has recently been promoted to a special negotiator of Slobodan Milosevic is a man of indisputable influence in the regions between Negotin (Serbian-Bulgarian border) and Knin. This untypical Montenegrin was born in Backa Palanka (Vojvodina), originating in the same city as another "security man" Mihalj Kertes.

    He started out as an operative in the Belgrade security service (those knowledgeable say of dubious working characteristics), then became the Belgrade office chief, then becoming, without much notice, the head of the Second Serbian secret police. As the head of the whole "SDB" operative, during the period of the "anti-bureaucratic revolution"(1987-88), on the recommendation from the "Hungarian in the neighborhood"(Kertes), he became the chief of "Serbian CIA", replacing there Zoran Janackovic, who went to be the head of SID - the intelligence service of the Federal foreign ministry.

    As the verified fighter for the "Serbian cause", Stanisic soon turns into the "brain" for special actions of the Serbian secret police in Bosnia and Croatia. He organized secret services there, the arming of "empty handed people", coordination of intelligence and counter-intelligence work, and many other important jobs, carried out by the people he himself brought into service (it is enough to mention Frank Simatovic - Frenki, who was involved in the Knin uprising, under the "operative" name of dragan Simendic).

    It is interesting to mention that four years ago a special state commission was formed with the task to examine some irregularities in Stanisic's work.

    Those knowledgeable say that Stanisic had connections with a certain Belgrade journalist, so that many important facts "dripped" into the public. But, that was forgotten when the war in ex-Yugoslavia started gathering steam, so that many members of this commission were replaced from their functions on Stanisic's orders, while he slowly became the man of confidence of the Serbian political top.

    Even though he carried some tasks sloppily and thoughtlessly, for example the kidnapping of the "Vreme" journalist Dusan Reljic, the arrest of Western Slavonia Serb politician Veljko Dzakula, then the break-in into the Federal police offices, Stanisic restored those mishaps with perfect coordination of military activities.

    Soon after, the newspapers proclaim him as the "second man in Serbia", which those knowledgeable say, is not far away from the truth. Meetings and telephone contacts with president Milosevic are a part of his working day, so that nobody was surprised when he was nominated as the special envoy. This is definitive proof that Stanisic strengthened his position in the circle of people whom Serbian president trusts without a doubt.

    The new "ad hoc" function of Stanisic could be interpreted also as his first appearance in front of the world public in a humane mission, since in the recent years, particularly after the affair with the documents of Ceda Mihajlovic, his name was being connected with war crimes. The "Mihajlovic affair" even though it ended in famously, has compromised in great measure Stanisic's service, showing that SDB is full of "personal holes", and that it has many people unfit for this job.

    Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", June , 1995.


    Strategic considerations

    Foreign policy commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, examines in that magazine's issue of May 19 the reality of the theory that Moscow has intentions to make a military port in the Boka kotorska bay in Montenegro.

    After the conflict in Chechnya, high military officers of the Russian federation have found its new vantage point. General Grachov announced future interventions of his forces in the state of CIS, allegedly due to worsening situation of minority Russians in them, and General A.I. Lebed threatened Europe with a general war. Some western military analysts write in the specialized magazines that the policy of Russian militarism could soon become official.

    With or without Yeltsin. They seem to think that the time of "cold peace" is arriving, the time of more numerous Russian military actions on its Southern borders and the renewal of the fear in Europe of the insurgency of the "Russian cavalry".

    Even today, writes Jovanovic, the strategic component of the nuclear forces from the Atlantic to the Urals has not been seriously dismantled, and is still able to destroy the Northern hemisphere, even though the majority of the military analysts on both sides of the never truly believed in the possibility of a nuclear war.

    In the late Eighties - early Nineties the USSR army left its bases in Eastern Europe, and NATO entered the empty space, coming "under the walls" of Russia. This worries the Russian generals, who think that the honor of their arms has been muddied by the political mistakes during the nine year war in Afghanistan, and particularly by the withdrawal from Europe without a fired shot. The reform of the Russian army is evolving in the "times of dramatic changes and the search for a new identity"(Krasnaya Zvezda), but the things are not going smoothly and the Russian army is quivering under corruption and disobedience without a precedent.

    Talking about the "Yugoslav connection", Jovanovic says that the Russian volunteers are coming to Bosnia, their pilots are on instruction visits at the Batajnica military airport near Belgrade. The FRY army is also receiving parts for the air defence systems from Russia, and a military agreement was signed in March in Moscow. Russian generals are travelling through Serbia in the mission of giving hope to "endure". Visitors included generals Grachov, Denekin, Zurbenko, Sipilov, and their pensioned colleague Filatov. General Denekin was even attempting to persuade Serbs to take Bihac at any price and put the airport there under full control...

    This cooperation though is developing quite under the expectations of the Serbian generals, who would like to see Russian air bases on their territory, and particularly Russian ships in the Adriatic. They would like to sense a mighty ally in their vicinity, which would confront NATO. In relation to Montenegro, the Russian war fleet in their ports would mean definitive formation of a coastal military belt towards the rest of the Medditeranean. And what is the actual reality of the Boka kotorska bay becoming a Russian military base ?

    For a long time Russia has the problem of a "lunatic shirt", meaning a bad geographical position in relation to the access to world's warm seas, and its coastal regions are recessed inland (Baltic and Black seas). Moscow is now in a dispute with Baltic states about the parts of the Baltic fleet, as well as with Ukraine about the Black sea fleet.

    With the plans of building military ports in Rumania and Bulgaria, NATO is placing itself "in between", and this is where crises could arise., having in mind the tensions in Moldavia and the Caucasus. The Adriatic Sea, in such a situation is too far away and cut off for a more ambitious Russian maritime plans, concludes Jovanovic.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", May 19, 1995.


    Serbia -
    the questions of minorities, nationalism...

    Belgrade weekly "Vreme" in their issues of May 15 and 22 had as key themes detailed reports on two burning questions - the relations between the regime and the minorities in Serbia and nationalism, this second theme base on excerpts from a book by Dusan Kecmanovic, titled "The Mass psychology of Nationalism".

    In the report on the minorities question, published in the May 15 issue, Perica Vucinic mentions a recent meeting in Belgrade between the leading Albanian party from Kosovo LDK and the coalition partner of the ruling SPS in the Serbian government, "Nova Demokratija"(ND -New Democracy).

    The possibility that this meeting even occurred raised suspicions, but was confirmed to be true, although further contacts have been suspended on the request by the Albanian side.also, talks have also begun between the Serbian authorities and the SDA party of Sandjak. The authorities were represented by on of government's vice presidents, Svetozar Krstic, and the SDA by the leader of one of its fractions, general secretary Rasim Ljajic.

    The news about these meetings were placed shyly. The representatives of the regime and the minorities have more courage to lead a discussion than admit that they are leading it, at which the representatives of the minorities are more hesitant and vulnerable.

    The author cite the opinion of Zoran Lutovac, the researcher at the Institute of Social Studies in Belgrade, who says that in all of the newly formed states after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia the "old minorities", are in a better position that the "new" ones,, formed by the fact of the breakup.

    Since the processes of the disintegration of the SFRY, escalation of nationalism and political pluralization developed at the same time, as the reaction to such a situation the cores of the national minorities saw the formation of political parties which represented themselves as "the only legitimate representatives of the nation".

    Different political options unified around a joint strategic goal. As the crisis strengthened, the homogenization grew stronger, and the political stratification or homogenization within the national groups will depend on the untangling of the Yugoslav crisis.

    Lutovac presented the author with the example of the Kosovo Albanians, where the LDK party unified all of the ideological goals of Albanians in Kosovo. According to the press information of the LDK, at the internal Albanian elections organized recently, LDK won 96 parliamentary seats, Parliamentary part 13, Peasant party of Kosovo 7, Albanian Christian-democratic party 7, and independent candidates 2 (one was a Muslim candidate), based on the proportions in the population 14 places were "kept" for Serb and Montenegrin delegates, and four for Muslim representatives. But, in spite of the relative political stratification, all of the Albanian parties have reached the consensus about independent Kosovo as the legitimate goal of the Kosovo Albanians.

    When it ventures into the solution of the minority questions, which it does very cautiously, the Yugoslav state is forced to talk with the representatives of the national congregation. In the situation when there are no standards for the solution of minority problems, in the atmosphere burdened with distrust, national minorities become a problem, which grows relative to the size of the national group.

    This was confirmed by the federal minister for minorities, Margit Savovic, who stated for "Vreme" that the largest problems arise in relations with largest minority groups - Albanians and Hungarians, although that the problems which the state has in communication with the Hungarians cannot be put on the same plane as the ones it has with the Albanians.

    In her written responses to questions posed by "Vreme", Savovic goes on though to accuse the representatives of the Hungarian national parties that they state that they are loyal citizens of the state in which they live and that they are exercising all the rights they have, but that on the other side, in their statements in front of the international forums they insist that their rights are threatened.

    Laszlo Joza, a lawyer from Subotica and a former assistant minister for human rights (Panic government) denies the accusations about separatist tendencies of Hungarians. He says that the larger number of European countries has a restrained approach towards minority autonomies, but thinks that these concepts will come to the fore very soon.

    The largest Hungarian party in FRY DZVM came out with the concept of "three tier" autonomy, composed of personal, territorial autonomy and local self - governing. Minister Savovic insists that this concept came out as part of the action of the Hungarian state, and that the introduction of the three tier autonomy is unacceptable from the constitutional and internal political standpoint, since by its introduction "some citizens would be more equal in the territories that would represent autonomy within autonomy. Savovic also states that the territorial minority autonomy in the current balance of power and weakened international position of FRY, could be misused for secessionist goals.

    The 1974. Constitution gave more possibilities to Kosovo Albanians that the Hungarians expect to gain from "three tier autonomy". Unable to bridge the conflict with Serbian authorities, promising to its population the maximalistic project of independent Kosovo, the Albanians have formed a parallel state, which represents itself quite successfully, but which is in vital segments, first of all economic and financial, submerged in the official Serbian state.

    Every contact of Serbs and Albanians, and those were mostly informal, are still a sensation Dialogue is a word which has great weight in a closed society. When the society is a conflict one, the weight grows. The leader of Albanians Ibrahim Rugova and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic are prisoners of maximalistic promises about independent Kosovo and unified Serbia.

    According to some speculations, the Albanians are counting on the forthcoming US elections and a possible victory of their lobbyist Bob Dole. As a remainder, the Serbs in Bosnia counted on the victory of Bill Clinton on previous elections. They got it.

    The leading Muslim party in Sandjak SDa got the OK for the meeting with the Serbian authorities from the "head office" in Sarajevo, but both in Novi Pazar and Sarajevo they are aware that in the current situation in Bosnia there is little they can do one for the other. The first steps, though, were small, but successful. The next big strep could be participation of the SDA in the next parliamentarian elections.

    The possible firmer truce, will in an event stronger manner put in front of Serbia the problem of national minorities. They could be the bridge but also a reason for blackmail. In Serbia event JUL (the reformed Communists) have started a campaign in nationally mixed communities, particularly in Sandjak. Member of the executive committee Mustafa Dzigal says that the formula is quite simple: the people are longing for the good old times, when there were no ethnic tensions.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", May 15, 1995.


    In its May 22 issue "Vreme" discussed the problem of nationalism,based on the book its publishing house recently presented on the question, written by Dusan Kecmanovic and called "Mass psychology of Nationalism".

    When somebody reads nationalistic programmes and proclamations, when he listens to nationalistic speeches, everything seems infinitely simple. All the puzzling variety of the world has been reduced to a very simple equation, states Kecmanovic, showing how everything is aligned into two sides, in two large groups - who is not with "us", he is against "us"; in the nationalistic dichotomy of the world there are simply no neutrals,innocent, unaligned...

    The need for an ideological rigidity serves for the retainment of a monolithic position in the ranks of nationalists, prevents any softening of nationalistic, ethno-national prejudices and in that manner secures the critical mass of single mindedness, necessary for the execution of planned projects.

    Nationalistic messages are intended for the heart and not for the mind of the listener... That is why propaganda, which has to rise the readiness of people for the acceptance of nationalism, is geared first of all towards the emotions: in the press, radio and TV there is a specific selection of news and pictures, which show people of other nationalities in a terrible light, and "our" co -nationals as, above all, humane and truth loving souls.

    Nationalistic stands and beliefs prepare the terrain for war, and sooner or later lead to war; on the other hand, war is most conductive for spreading ethno-national prejudices, since any war between (ethno)national groups is followed by human casualties that cause particularly strong emotions.

    It is interesting that many militant nationalists, probably so that they could make a balance with the injustices they are committing, insist on the respect of the moral framework of marital, family, religious life, and represent themselves as particularly honest husbands, etc.

    Lastly, to be able to successfully impose moralistic principles to a larger number of their compatriots, the nationalists dress their morals in to a very pathetical cloak with the calls to the sacred duty, sacred obligation of every member of the nation, showing actually in practice that nationalism is actually mythology, mythologization of national feelings.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", May 22, 1995.


    Interviews

    Belgrade weekly "Vreme", published in its issue of May 22, an interview with Joze Pirjevec, professor of history at the University on Padova, Italy, who recently published his fourth thematic book tied with the region of former Yugoslavia, called "The Serbs, Croats, Slovenians - the history of three nations".

    Pirjevec told "Vreme" that his main thesis is that the first Yugoslavia(between two wars) fell apart because the nations found themselves within a state in which they did not have the possibility, or intelligence, or a chance for a political dialogue, partly because of a differing background, and mentality.

    Croatia had, for example a differing experience, having in mind Dalmatia and the influence of Venetian state. I state that Serbia bore the experience of centuries of subordinate position under the Turks, and that has influenced her approach in shaping of Yugoslavia. That is why that state, even at its inception bore the seeds of its destruction. This concerns not only centralism, but also the wide diversity of internal events which the centralism attempted to level up.

    As far as the second Yugoslavia is concerned, it is true that the national rights were somehow in the genes of the communist party. In actuality, though, the republics for a long time remained only a facade for centralization. That is why the ideas of shaping inter-national relations came up on the agenda on number of occasions in the Fifties and Sixties.

    The Communist party posed the problem, but it did not know or did not have the interest to deal with it. Everything remained on the proclamations of "brotherhood and unity". Only in the period after the fall of (former chief of security and police up to mid-sixties) Rankovic, which is the most liberal in the whole history of second Yugoslavia, national question came to full expression. That is when Slovenians demand the right for their language on radio and TV,introduction of the national language in the administration, particularly in the federal institutions. That is when the scandal broke with the Memorandum of the Croatian intellectuals and the response of the Serbian intellectuals in 196; in 1968. the first rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo occurred, than there is "Maspok" in Croatia (early Seventies), Serbian nationalism appeared, which Serbian "liberals" attempted to control. It was shown how Yugoslavia did not know how to timely solve the problems, but allowed that they pile up until they erupted.

    The top leaders were aware of this. Tito and Kardelj considered Serbian nationalism as most dangerous. Kardelj shaped the 1974. Constitution, above all, to block the possibility of Serbian hegemonism. To my criteria, said Pirjevec, the "liberalism" period of early Seventies in Serbia is the brightest in the whole Serbian history.

    I Am convinced that in Serbian history there are two streams which blend from the end of 18. century until today. One is European, which is attempting to straighten up Serbia, started by Dositej Obradovic, and the liberals being the descendants of that line. The other stream is "levantine", autharcic, in essence it carries fear from Europe, and since it feel it is not up to it, closes itself in its minute nationalism...Unfortunately, in Serbian history this second line has more numerous supporters, but I would not say that it is winning.

    The liberal Serbian group knew very well how Yugoslavia should be shaped. The precondition was bringing down of Tito and his autarchy. Even then they were aware that it is essential market into economy. Above all, they understood that for Serbs themselves nationalism is extremely dangerous, and that Serbia has to nurture , clearer, more direct and equal relations with other Yugoslav nations. Their fall in 1972. was the biggest tragedy for Yugoslavia, greater than the purge of Liberals in Slovenia and Croatia. That brought the fall of the line which could have shaped the situation in which the Yugoslav community could have survived.

    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", May 22, 1995.


    Split weekly "Feral Tribune" brought in its issue of June 5 an interview with Dragutin Hlad, a former Croatian emigre, and later official of the ruling HDZ party, who has recently, after dissatisfaction, left its ranks.

    Hlad, whose membership card in the HDZ carried number 6, said that at that time he hadn't any notions that Tudjman was an expansionistic Croatian nationalist. As early as 1989. I sent messages that HDZ does not have in its programme anything that deals with the question of Serbs in Croatia, even less a model for its solution. I thought that this does not bode well, because the Serb question is key for Croatia, so the anti-Serb hysteria I encountered upon return to Croatia surprised me.

    Serbian population should have been offered something, since it felt connected throughout Yugoslavia, so that with its disintegration, it should have been obvious to anybody normal that you cannot simply say, we are going away, and you Serbs, as you wish.

    It is quite sure that Milosevic would not have had such results if he did not have a "partner" on the Croatian side. Also, we always talk about the idea of Greater Serbia, as if there did not exist the idea of Greater Croatia. It existed, but here it is taken as something natural, but when somebody else comes with something similar, then that is terrible.

    The HDZ regime should have sent first a message to the Serbs that this is their homeland too, and I believe that a big part of Serbs in Croatia would accept that message, which could have made the influence of their extreme part much smaller.

    Discussing the influence of Croats from Herzegovina in Croatian politics and economy, Hlad said that in Eastern Europe in general, nation has an ethnic root. Here it is rising from the group as the conscious entity, and not from a group of citizens which have a joint set of values. To Croatia as a whole happened that the periphery is dictating the solutions and makes the decisions. But, this is a characteristic of all nationalisms when the peripheral parts of the nation are usually the most extreme ones, this is the case with Robespierre from French periphery, Hitler, from German periphery, Herzegovina Serbs and Herzegovina Croats.

    With Tudjman's blessing, people from Herzegovina immediately infiltrated the top of the regime, taking over key positions in the police, army, economy in looting. Today, we have a quadruple occupation of Croatia - from the Serbs, UNPROFOR, from the Americans in the Adriatic and the islands, and from the Herzegovina Croats. In that manner, one of the key elements of democracy has been undermined - territoriality, in the sense that the decisions about the life on the certain territory should be made by the people who live there.

    If the situation in Croatia today could be described with one word says Hlad, now a ranking member of the oppositionary HND party, that word would be fear. It is natural that people are afraid in a state where the owner of all businesses is the state. In that manner, the existential security of people is threatened and that is the element which contributes to fear. Discussing the oncoming political prospects, Hlad estimates that the ruling HDZ will lose the next elections in any case, but that president Tudjman, due to his playing the "leader", is not without a chance.

    Source:Split weekly "Feral Tribune", June 5, 1995.


    THE POLITICAL STANCE AND
    INVOLVEMENT OF
    THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

    Last month saw the publication of a series of articles in the press of Serbia and Montenegro which deal with the political stance and involvement of the Serbian Orthodox church, stimulated by the more and more evident rift between the Orthodox church and the authorities in Serbia, concerning the handling of the Bosnian Serbs and the relation towards the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here we present a digest of some of the more indicative of the articles published.

    Podgorica weekly "Monitor" brought in its issue of May 19, an analysis by the AIM news pool correspondent Gordana Igric concerning the existence of factions within the Serbian Orthodox church.

    Zahumlje -Herzegovina bishop Atanasije, called the regime in Belgrade traitors, appealing to the Serbs to think hard and to "protect its nation, disregarding the borders drawn by Broz" (Josip Broz - Tito). He did this at the press conference after the Croatian action in Western Slavonia. On the occasion, he did not deny the mindlessness of the bombing of Zagreb - "if it happened". His colleague of Montenegro-Primorje, Amfilohije, threw an anathema recently on Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic because of the sanctions he introduced towards the Serbs in Bosnia.

    The split between Belgrade and Pale served as the initial spark for the Orthodox church to take of its religious robe. Many today see the two mentioned eminences as the political hawks, patriarch Pavle, as a political personality, and that the Holy Sinod, with its frequent statements reminds of a politbureau.

    The ferocity of the two bishops, "Justinians", joined by the third from Raska-Prizren, Artemije (so called the "A" trio), for a long time does not represent a surprise for the ever - growing number of believers in Serbia. The decision of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) to drop diplomatic behaviour and reveal its disappointment with the newly made peacemaker Milosevic and delight with Radovan Karadzic is of a newer date. It seems that the SOC finally found a leader which recognizes the hymn "Boze Pravde" (God give us justice ), listens with respect to what it has to say and is no way disgusted with the Chetnik movement from the WW II.

    The moderate dignitary, theology professor Dimitrije Kalezic, told the author that SOC estimates that "Karadzic is not interested in the power "per se", but that he wants to make a renewal and spiritual strengthening of Serbdom, that the power is to him the means for the renewal of the soul of the nation".

    The relation of the Church towards the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was not such at the beginning of his stay in power, but was never full of sincere understanding and love, although it seemed that way to many.The Church saw him as the necessary evil, the communist who could bring to life the Serbian national dream, return the Church estates taken away in 1945, and heal the wounds fifty years old. The similar expectations were held by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which saw him as the person to realize its nationalistic "Memorandum". To Milosevic, the Church served as the tool to homogenize the nation. This made the marriage out of necessity. Even the scenario of homogenization conducted at the mass rallies was spiced wit pro-religious and religious iconography - carrying of pictures of the political leaders, historical figures, religious dignitaries, with their participation in those events.

    But, Milosevic could not become a believer out of a communist, nor did the priests stop interpreting communism as the biggest evil in the world, but in the beginning there was a surface calm in the church - state house. Even at that time, inside the Church existed a "hard" and "soft" wing, and those knowing say that patriarch Pavle actually was selected as a compromise solution. His speeches at the time did not stimulate aggression.

    It seems though, that the previous autumn (1994.) definitively steered the Church in the direction of Pale. At the Sinod session in banja Luka, it was voted to give a positive answer to the president of the "Bosnian Serb parliament" Momcilo Krajisnik , who requested that the Patriarch and his highest dignitaries come to the extraordinary session of the parliament.Now it is not possible to hear the voice of the moderate bishop Irinej Bulovic, who thinks that the church should not take part in daily politics.

    The Church proposed to Milosevic a contact with Karadzic and his officials and mending of relations, but Milosevic refused. Finally, a "one on one" meeting of Milosevic and the Patriarch occurred, which was not even mentioned in statements from the Sinod.

    Professor of sociology of religion Dragoljub Djordjevic told the author that, analysing the occurrence of nationalism, not only in Serbia, it could be stated that it was not the religions, confessions and religious societies the originating and exclusive culprits, but only co-participants,which also puts a part of the blame on their chests. Above mentioned church official Dimitrije Kalezic, on the other hand, thinks that it would have been dangerous for the church to disconnect itself form the processes in the society, because the former ideology is on the rebound, in a somewhat changed form. The presence of the church, though must be positive, and it should be such in Bosnia.

    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", May 19, 1995.


    The similar theme of the moderate and"hawkish" line in the Serbian Orthodox church is explored in the Sunday edition of the Belgrade independent daily "Nasa Borba" of June 3-4, by Ejub Stikovac.

    The author mentions the public appeal of the high official of the Serbian Orthodox church in Zagreb Milenko Popovic, who supported the hunger strike of the Banja Luka Catholic bishop Komarica, saying that it in some ways resembles the joint letters to the public written on a number of occasions by Komarica and Banja Luka Orthodox bishop Jefrem, in which they drew the attention of the believers not to be mislead by "any influences which would lead you to hate one another just because you are of different confession", as well as the joint prayers of thee three confessions (including Muslim) in Tuzla in 1992.

    The voice of the Orthodox dignitary from Zagreb and the desperate act of the Banja Luka bishop could have a greater effect in the public than the general condemnations of the war by the leaderships of the churches they belong to, since it is done by the people "for the terrain", who feel the best the effects of the war and conditions they create.

    Even though the war is still not over, an impression could be formed that the time has arrived when the accounts should be settled in the ranks of the church itself about where and when the mistakes were made in the estimates of the key political figures and social changes which were in the beginning experienced euphorically and in a particularly romantic manner.

    Stikovac also mentions bishop Amfilohije, and his swing of publicly expressed opinion about Serbian president Milosevic, whom he put among the stars in 1990, to criticize him fiercely in 1994. and 1995. did it pay off or the Church to deal purely in politics, or did it have to do that seeing that the political leaderships are manipulating too much with the people, so that it simply could not close its eyes in front of that ? It seems the answers are currently being sought, says the author, even though self - criticism in the churches and religious societies was a rarity so far.

    This self - criticism was most definitely expressed by Zagreb-Ljubljana and whole Italy bishop Jovan, in the interview to the Belgrade magazine "Duga". Directly mentioning Atanasije Jeftic, Amfilohije Radovic and Irinej Bulovic, saying that by their participation on the sessions in the Writers union of Serbia, "they left the theological programme and threw themselves in the cheap daily - political adventure ", Jovan sad that "to me as a high church official it is bothersome that we were, consciously or unconsciously drawn in the dangerous and bloody war game".

    Mentioning the statements of bishop Atanasije, and Irinej Bulovic, who wrote that separation between the church and state is practically impossible, as the counter approach to that of bishop Jovan, Stikovac says that this differing approaches show the difference of views in the Church, not only about the leading politician in Serbia (Milosevic), but towards the state as such.

    The Serbian Orthodox church will have a hard time answering the question why did the larger part of their priests from the crisis regions leave their parishes, even before the war broke out. The larger part of them, has no intention of returning, fearing for their families.

    Another question that poses itself is: "Can the differing approaches towards the political problems lead to divisions within the Serbian Orthodox church and dent its spiritual unity, which is so often stressed by its high dignitaries?" Radovan Bigovic of the theological university in Belgrade says that Serbian orthodox church is not monolithic and is comprised of people who have different opinions. But, he says, differing opinions do not immediately mean divisions and conflict.

    Even though the dignitaries insist on unity, the doubt remains, concludes the author. The events have shown that the justified solution of national rights mentioned in the Church Memorandum of 1992. are not in sight, not only where the shots are still fired. The appeal from Zagreb and the hunger strike of the Banja Luka bishop are ample examples of that.

    Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", June 3-4, 1995.


    "Nasa Borba" published a joining article in the same issue by Nikola Todorovic, concerning the situation in the churches "across the river Drina".

    The position and the role of the Orthodox church in the "Serbian Republic" and "Republic of Serb Krajina" can be seen on two levels: through the penetration of state institutions and relations with believers themselves, and the other, through the relations between the Church and political top, which is "undercover" and in full swing. On one hand teaching of religion was officially introduced, and a Spiritual Academy was opened in Srbinje(Foca- Bosnian Serb territory), while the minister of religion of the Bosnian Serbs says that at least two religious high schools are needed. The presence of the priests in hospitals, jails as well as in the army has been officially regulated, where the latter bears particular importance.

    On the other hand, priests themselves are telling about the fact that there is less people coming to the church than before this war, partly blaming this on the fact mentioned also by Stikovac (above article) that most priests left their parishes.This makes the situation even harder, prompting some dissenting voices like that of high dignitary Zarko Gavrilovic, who said that "Tudjman, using the vacuum made by the runaways re-christened tens of thousands of Serbs, and nobody can complain a word to the church hierarchy".

    As far as the "political activity" is concerned, "the people who know" have told the author that during their meeting in the first year of the conflict, the Church top has suggested to Serbian president Milosevic to proclaim "the unification of Serb lands", getting an answer that this could be done in a more peaceful manner, through referendums, which would, as they were told, be more acceptable to the international public.

    The Serbian church is directly involved in the attempts of Bosnian and Krajina (Croatian) to unite, sending delegations to both sides. Recently deposed Krajina prime minister Mikelic says that such a meeting "deep in the night" recently brought the decision that he should be eliminated from his position.

    Radovan Karadzic obviously has the most favoured position of all Serb politicians in the Orthodox church. The initiatives for the recent meeting between patriarch Pavle with Karadzic and Milosevic, seem to have come from his side. During one of those that concerned the possible recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the delegation was solely comprised by the dignitaries from the other side of river Drina. On the other hand, Dabro-Bosnian bishop Nikolaj, who has recently replaced Amfilohije in the sinod, is considered to be one of more "flexible" and calmer compared to other dignitaries from Bosnia, and particularly compared to Amfilohije himself.

    Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", June 3-4, 1995.


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